Last stand of HMS Strongbow

Day broke on the 17 October 1917 and HMS Strongbow, an M-class destroyer escorting a convoy consisting of two British, one Belgian and nine neutral Scandinavian vessels from Lerwick to Bergen with the armed trawlers Elise and P. Fannon. Strongbow was at the rear of the convoy whilst her sister HMS Mary Rose under Lt Commander Fox led the convoy from the front, when the crew spotted two cruisers at 06:05 approaching through the early morning haze at two points after beam. Visibility was only 4000 yards and the two vessels were closing at speed. The Duty officer Acting Lieutenant James believed them to be British light cruisers of the Cleopatra class and signalled them for identification using a Morse spot lamps.
There was no response.

The second signal met with no response.

The third was met with a poorly morsed letters that made no sense when translated. Something was not right and James immediately sent for the Captain Lt-Commander Brooke and Strongbow turned to meet the two unknown vessels and increased speed.

HMS Strongbow moves to engage SMS Bremse and Brummer

SMS Bremse and Brummer had been dispatched by Admiral Scheer to seek convoys on the Lerwick to Bergen route and if none were to be found to proceed to the West coast of Britain and range into the Atlantic at their discretion and depending on their fuel supplies.

The Germans reasoned that whilst the rest of their fleet was known to be engaged in the Baltic and capturing Helsingfors that the British would not expect an attack. A successful attack would also cause problems for the enemy and ultimately aid the U-boat campaign as the Royal Navy would need to bleed off vessels searching for U-boats to protect these neutral convoys from surface raiders. The mine-laying cruisers Bremse and Brummer were specifically chosen for their appearance which was similar to British cruisers and that they had a top speed of 34 knots and could use either oil or coal. With their decks cleared of all their mine laying equipment, save for the lowering mechanism, and the births for 450 mines the cruisers left Wilhelmshaven and proceeded into the North sea after a day's delay whilst minesweepers cleared a path for them.

Scheer legitimised attacking neutral ships in his memoirs;

It was known that neutral merchant vessels assembled in convoys to travel under the protection of English warships, and therefore they might be regarded as enemy vessels, since they openly claimed English protection as to benefit the enemy and consequently to injure us.

Room 40, the Admiralty's code breakers, had intercepted Bremse and Brummer reporting their position as north of the Sylt at Lister Tief. This information was passed on to Operations to evaluate as Room 40 had no knowledge of British vessel's dispositions.

The Admiralty Operations room did not believe that two mine laying cruisers would be a threat to anything and that they were probably adding to the formidable minefields already in existence. There had been a belief that the Germans would attempt a raid of some sort and a force of tree cruisers, twenty seven light cruisers and fifty-four destroyers spread itself from the mid North Sea to the coast of Norway looking for a mine layer and force of destroyers.

The Brummer and Bremse had slipped by at night using their high top speed and now were closing on Strongbow and at 3000 yards fired with their first salvo falling short. The second hit the main steam pipe causing the destroyer to stop and the Wireless room removing her ability to call for help. The time was 06:15.

With Mary Rose some way ahead the defenceless merchant ships slowed to a stop and began abandoning ship in the hope that they're crews could be afforded safety in the lifeboats. The two German cruisers closed and began sinking the merchant ships with expertly aimed shots at the waterline and would eventually claim all nine of the neutral Danes, Swedish and Norwegian vessels whilst the Belgian and British vessels fled the scene.

At 06:20 the Mary Rose reappeared reacting to the gunfire and sighting four merchant vessels already sinking and bravely charged the German warships whilst trying to send an SOS transmission. Although acknowledged by a shore station and asked for confirmation SMS Brummer managed to block any further communication. Mary Rose began firing straight away at a range of 6-7000 yards and closed with the enemy at top speed but at 2000 yards Fox ordered the helm hard over and the two German cruisers hit their mark sending all but eight of the crew to their deaths.

With the escorting destroyers dealt with the German cruisers returned to the task of shelling the defenceless merchant vessels. 

The fight was not over as the plucky Elise defied orders and returned to the scene at first trying to rescue survivors from Strongbow and then firing upon the two German vessels and trying to draw them away. When this failed the trawler could do no more than move to a safe distance and wait.

With their work completed Bremse and Brummer withdrew to the South-East without picking up a single survivor. Scheer would later legitimise this by stating that;

As two (actually three) of the steamers had been able to get away in time on noticing the attack, the care of the crews in the boats could be left to them, for our cruisers had to consider their own safety on the long return journey.

The Elise did return and pick up survivors from Strongbow whilst others were picked up by lifeboats

SMS Brummer 

from the lost merchants. Strongbow finally disappeared beneath the waves at 09:30 having been scuttled by her crew following the destruction of all code books. All in all 250 men died in those few hours or from exposure and a further 50 were wounded. The Germans suffered no casualties.

News of the disaster did not reach the British authorities until 15:50 when HMS Marmion, on the return Bergen - Lerwick track, found the ELISE at 13:30 and steamed to send the message to Admiral Brock, officer commanding Shetland and Orkneys. Beatty was told within an hour and hurriedly deployed his cruisers on the off chance of catching the two Germans that night but to no avail.

The Admiralty were criticised for their failings by the Conservative press and questions were asked in Parliament but the only defence offered was that the sea is a large place and occasionally the enemy, using night and fog may slip through the defences and hit a convoy. It was also pointed out that some 4500 vessels had got through safely in the last six months on the same route.

Beatty was livid that he had not been informed the German ships were Bremse and Brummer as he would have changed his whole deployment knowing their capability. Changes to the convoy system were brought in immediately with larger convoys on a less frequent basis with Destroyer commanders ordered to be at constant standby, suspect all unknown vessels as enemy until absolutely certain to the contrary, scatter the convoy when attacked, avoid engaging "Superior forces" and use W/T to call for help "IMMEDIATELY"

Criticism was brought against Fox and Brooke for their "ill advised" actions that day. Although their bravery in engaging the enemy was hailed it was the various enquiries and court-martials opinion that they're first duty was to summon assistance from the cruiser forces. It was later acknowledged that the Strongbow simply did not have the opportunity to contact anyone as her W/T set was knocked out within minutes. Post war it was revealed by the Germans that Mary Rose had also attempted to do the same .

Indeed the German official account post war acknowledge the bravery of the British crews:

The heroic fight put up by the two British destroyers had been in the highest British tradition, but it achieved nothing.

It was a defeat for the Allies but it was learnt from quickly. Beatty took steps to rectify the situation with his fresh orders and the number of vessels in convoy were increased whilst their frequency decreased so that they would be better protected.

For the Germans it was a victory and was celebrated by the Kaiser with the opening of champagne. Two cruisers had caused embarrassment to the Royal Navy for no loss at a time when good news in Germany was distinctly lacking but strategically it achieved nothing.

There were accusations of war crimes post war with the German crews accused of shelling survivors in the water. Newbolt wrote that;

Throughout the attack the Germans displayed a severity which is hard to distinguish from downright cruelty. They gave the neutral masters and crews no chance to lower their boats and get away, but poured their broadsides into them without warning as though they had been armed enemies... In the case of the destroyers the enemy's conduct was even worse; for to their everlasting discredit fire was opened and maintained upon the Strongbow's survivors.

This would later be refuted by the Germans in Krieg in der Nordsee;

Some of Strongbow's crew, who had taken to the lifeboat , and others who had leapt into the water, became additional victims of gunfire, possibly from shots falling short; it stands to reason that there was no intention whatsoever of firing on them. The statement of the British Official history, that defenceless survivors form the Strongbow were deliberately fired on, cannot be refuted strongly enough.

Battle of Texel

On the 17 October 1914 the 7th Half-Flotilla's four S-90 class torpedo ships shipped out of the Ems estuary to carryout mining operations on the Downs or even as far as the Thames Estuary which would cause major disruption to British shipping.

The torpedo boat SMS S-119

   The force was selected for their good speed of 27 knots and that beyond coastal patrol duties they were of little use with only torpedo launchers and three 2" L/40 guns. The design was almost twenty years old and  much lighter in armour and armament than the Royal Navy's destroyers and indeed there were some within the Admiralstab who had written them off as expendable and the crews were all volunteers for this dangerous journey.

   "Expendable" was a thought many miles from the mind of Korvettenkapitän Georg Thiele as the thirty three year old stood on the bridge of his flagship SMS S-119 as it proceeded south along the Dutch coast off Texel. Thiele had been forced to keep close to land by British mines that lay between Lat 51 15'N and 51 41' against Long 1 35' E and 3 0'E.

 

   The 7th Half-Flotilla had already lost on of her number in the relative safety of the Ems estuary. The S-116 had been torpedoed by Lieutenant-Commander Horton's HMS E9 as it reconnoitered German naval build up on the 6 October killing nine men and her commander Kapitanleutnant Kurt Freiherr von Ziegesar. It was an inauspicious start to the operation but for Thiele, submarines were no longer his concern as a signalman reported smoke on the horizon aft.

   Acting on a report from HMS E8 the British Admiralty had dispatched a small force to reconnoiter the Dutch coast. They were disconcerted by the activity in the German estuary fearing that the Kaiser's warships were going to sweep down the coast and threaten the port of Zeebrugge which the British were using to resupply the British and Belgian armies. At the same time the German army was sweeping westward with all of its might and should a force of German Cruisers attack and destroy or even damage the port facilities at Zeebrugge it would see the German army to continue straight through the Belgians.

   To combat this a several patrols were sent to meet any German vessels with the light Cruiser HMS Undaunted leading the destroyers HMS Loyal, HMS Lance, HMS Legion and HMS Lennox from the First Division of Third Destroyer flotilla arrived off the Dutch coast. Captain Cecil Fox on the Undaunted began to proceed north with the destroyers at 16 knots when at 1:50 p.m. they sighted their quarry. At first the German formation made no move to avoid their British counterparts until they were in visual range when they began to scatter.

   For Fox this small force of German ships had to be dealt with quickly as they may be screening a larger force heading for Zeebrugge. The Undaunted was ahead of her destroyers and orders were rapidly dispatched with each destroyer to attack their opposite number with the Undaunted assisting with the order "General Chase" signaling the start of the battle and a further signal to the Admiralty "Am pursuing four German Destroyers.

   As the Undaunted reached eight thousand yards she opened fire on the S-118 causing the German vessel to take avoiding action which saved her from damage but allowed the Undaunted to get closer. The British Cruiser resumed fire at 5000 yards with the destroyers going in to support.

   HMS Lance and the Lennox tunred to chase the easternmost German ships, the S-115 and S-119 whilst the Legion and the Loyal went for the S-118 and the S-117 with the Undaunted took direct action on the unfortunate S-118 at a range of 2500 yards with the Legion and the Loyal. One of HMS Loyal's lyditte shells struck the German's conning tower blowing in and Kapitänleutnant Erich Bickert away whilst another 6" shell from the Undaunted caused an explosion by her foremost funnel. The German Torpedo boat was reduced to a "sinking condition" with the Legion and the Loyal firing freely and the vessel disappeared at 3:17 p.m.

   Korvettenkapitän Thiele ordered the S-119 and the S-117 to turn back to attack the Undaunted by either launching a torpedo attack or to draw fire from the beleaguered SMS S-118 but as they reached the furthest limits of torpedo range the Undaunted turned sixteen points away with Fox ordering the Legion and the Loyal advance to attack the advancing Germans. Fox had watched the Germans approach with a growing temptation to let them approach and decimate them with his gunfire but he later commented that “common sense prevailed” which might have been tinged with the memory of the loss of the Amphion still fresh in his mind and not willing to risk another of His Majesty’s warships. Thiele appeared to be unwilling to risk his vessels and countered by seemingly abandoning the attack with the S-117 turning sixteen points north whilst Thiele’s flagship turned east with both vessels coming under direct fire from HMS Loyal, HMS Legion and the Undaunted.

   The Legion pursued the fleeing SMS S-117 and entered a duel which saw the German vessel turn to fire off three torpedoes at her pursuer. Lieutenant-Commander Claud Allsup ordered avoiding action with the first torpedo passing a few yards past her bow and the second a few yards astern but the third torpedo sailed below the destroyer amidships just below her funnel. Thankfully for Allsup and his crew it failed to go off. With her torpedoes spent the S-117 resumed her escape attempt and fired her guns continually at her pursuer as well as trying to rake the decks of the Legion with machine gun fire but to no avail. The British Lyditte shells were much more effective and knocked out the German’s steering gear forcing her to likewise turn in a circle and leaving her deck covered in twisted metal with steam escaping from her many holes. Kapitänleutnant Sohnke’s men fought on until the last gun fell silent and then abandoned ship taking their chances in the cold North Sea than on the sinking wreck which finally slipped below the waves at 3:30 p.m.

   HMS Loyal gave chase to Thiele’s flagship with the excitement clearly getting to Lieutenant-Commander Burgess Watson’s men who began firing wildly at 3,500 yards before steadying their fire with five well executed salvoes that were thought to have calmed the men and “disturbed the quarry”.

   Thiele and the S-119’s Captain, Oberleutnant zur See Windel executed another daring move to try and put off their pursuers by turning eight points towards the Loyal so as to pass astern of her and to put a few shells into her. Watson refused to change course and later reported that;
I decided to steer a steady course and give the after gun a chance of knocker her out; however the spotting was very and. Shot after shot was going over. I sent a Sub-lieutenant aft to with a more or less curt message that they must get a shot short. The Sub-lieutenant soon returned looking rather startled with the information that the First Lieutenant and two men were knocked out. (Naval review p.141) 

   One of the wounded men was Lieutenant Commander G. L. Davidson who remained at his post after his left foot was shot off encouraging his gun crew to continue their efforts and giving orders whilst spotting for the gunners and reporting where the shot fell, a feat that earned him the DSC.

 SMS S-119 soon became a target for both the Loyal, who had altered course to bring her other guns to bear but also the Lance who had left the Lennox to deal with the S-115 alone. The Lance put three shots into the German vessel in quick succession but was struck amidships by the S-119’s last torpedo but it failed to explode. Thiele, Windel and S-119 slipped beneath the waves at 3:35 p.m. but not before a metal case that had been chained shut was jettisoned overboard containing the naval code books.

  In the meantime HMS Lennox had begun firing her forward turret at SMS S-115 at 2:25 p.m. but was inaccurate for some thirty five minutes and it wasn't until 3:10 p.m. that any damage was registered when two Lyditte shells disabled the steering gear forcing the German vessel to turn sixteen points to port. It was at this point that the Lance departed to assist in combatting the S-119. Starting at 2500 yards the Lennox began to demolish the stricken German vessel destroying the bridge at 1,200 yards. It was not until the destroyer reached 700 yards that fire was ceased believing the Germans would strike their colours and surrender but the crew continued to fire prompting the Lennox to resume her devastation until all signs of resistance ceased and a boarding party was dispatched with the officer later reporting that;

   On conclusion of the action I was sent away in a boat to S-115 to take off the only man left alive on board. He was standing on the propeller guard waving his shirt as a signal of distress and on my coming alongside he jumped into the boat and shook me warmly by the hand, pouring down blessings on my head in guttural Hun language.

He continued his report on the damage caused by the Lennox's fire;
I had been ordered to waste no time in taking off the German, so really was not able to make a thorough inspection of her; perhaps I was also thinking a little of our own safety, in that at any moment she might have been expected to blow up, as she was burning fiercely between decks.
   Her hull was riddled with shot holes all along the water-line the starboard side; and aft, she had two large gaping holes either side of the stern post. Nothing could be seen inside these latter but twisted lumps of metal and burning woodwork.
   The funnels, although rather badly knocked about, were still standing, but were more in the shape of a bashed in top-hat than anything else.
   The foremost torpedo tube and the foremost starboard gun had completely disappeared, only gaping holes showing the havoc wrought by our Lyditte.
   Both masts had also gone over the side, this, unfortunately, frustrating any chance there might have been of securing her ensign as a much to be valued trophy.
   The ‘midship torpedo tube was practically untouched, only the lip being a little bent and the torpedo was still in the tube. The after gun also remained standing, but a shell had evidently struck the muzzle, as about half the barrel had been blown away. The after torpedo tube hadn’t been fired and was very little damaged.
   It seemed evident that the officers and crew had jumped overboard soon after the ship had really began to get knocked about; but I should think that they must have nearly exhausted their ammunition first. I am sure that had there been anything left in the magazines the ship would have blown up, considering the heavy fire that was raging fore and aft.
   Owing to the short time I was alongside, I was unable to see what damage had been done to the engines and boilers, or to the foremost port gun; but as regards the former, they were probably reduced to scrap iron, judging from what I could see through holes in the ship’s side.
   Having collected a few empty 4-pounder cartridge cases as “souvenirs,” I pulled back to the ship with our one prisoner. We picked up four other survivors later from the water, one of whom died on the way home from the effects of a bad leg wound. (Naval review p142-3)

   SMS-115 was finally sunk by the Undaunted signalling the end of the German squadron in an action which had claimed some two hundred sailors killed including all four vessel's captains and the flotilla leader with only thirty one men pulled from the water as prisoners and a further two sailors being pulled from the water by neutral shipping. During the engagement Alfred Fright, who was serving on the bridge of the Undaunted witnessed one of the German vessels hoist a white flag before firing upon lifeboats that were lowered by one of the destroyers. The First Officer, Lt-Commander Wood asked if he should lower the boats to which Fox retorted that "If you do I'll shoot you." It was rumoured that Fox had sworn that he would kill an equal amount of the enemy as had perished under him aboard the Amphion. Needless to say the Undaunted picked up no survivors.  

For the Admiralstab it was a stinging but expected defeat and the loss of the four older vessels only cemented their belief that the Royal Navy destroyers had superiority of numbers and ability over their German counterparts and further such missions were abandoned.

   The Royal Navy could not afford to be self-congratulatory though as despite the easy victory and only five wounded casualties the accuracy of the gunnery was exceptionally questionable with a total of 1031 shells being fired by the five vessels and HMS Lance firing 262 alone. Fox attributed the high amount of shells to the action taking place at high speed and long range and in an article written for the Naval review he made several observations which would have been dutifully brought forward to the Admiralty's attention including noting that independent fire at a range of over 2000 yards with officers spotting was wasteful and inaccurate preferring controlled fire using salvoes with bursts of rapid fire would be the best method until range finders could be employed.

   The Germans on the other hand had also failed to score any significant hits whether due to poor accuracy or just not being able to get rounds in the air due to the enemy fire. The damage was minimal with the Legion being struck in the starboard condenser, the Loyal took two shells including the one that struck the aft gun with the second causing a small fire in the steering compartment and had to undergo minor repair on return to Harwich and her wounded were taken off. The Lance  was raked with Maxim machine gun fire but the damage was superficial and the Lennox and the Undaunted suffered no damage at all.

   With concern that U-boats may be in the area Fox decided to leave the area as quickly as possible and with a brief signal to the Admiralty enforming them that the German force had been sunk his ships turned for home.

   The silence left by Thiele's force passing led to the Admiralstab accepting the worse and a hospital ship was dispatched to look for survivors. The SS Ophelia  was a 1153 ton liner formerly owned by the Hamburg-London line which had been pressed into service as a hospital ship. All was not as it seemed and the Ophelia's behaviour attracted the attention of the Royal Navy as she communicated with the German Naval Wireless station at Norddeich and then she broke the Hague convention by communicating in coded wireless messages. The Admiralty consulted their list of hospital ships which they had exchanged with the German government on the commencement of the war and found the Ophelia was not on the list. HMS D8 was sent to follow the liner but when the submarine was spotted the German ship fled at speed adding to the belief that she was being used as a thinly veiled scout and the decision was taken to board and inspect the vessel which was allowed by the convention.

   HMS Meteor intercepted the vessel and began an inspection. At first all seemed to be in order but there was a curious amount of Verey lights discovered onboard including 600 green, 480 red and 140 white compared to the British who carried no more than twelve of each. The actions of her Captain, Dr Pfeiffer condemned the vessel further as he was spotted throwing code books and documents overboard. The Ophelia was seized as the destruction of her Wireless set and code books officially cast doubt on her status and the decision was upheld in the Prize Courts the following year. The Germans accused the British of piracy with Scheer writing post war that;

SMS Ophelia

The English captured her and made her prize, charging us with having sent her out for scouting purposes, although she was obviously fitted up as a hospital ship and bore all the requisite markings.  (Scheer, R.  Germany's High Sea's Fleet in the World War, Kindle, loc 1101)

 

  The final chapter of the Texel episode came almost two months after the battle on 30 November when a British trawler snagged and retrieved a lead lined box on the sea bottom. On inspection it was found to be the chest jettisoned from SMS S-119 which contained the Naval Verkehrsbuch codes which were for cable communications between Naval attaches, foreign based ships and Admirals at sea adding to the books already taken from the Magdeburg and the Hobart handing Room 40 a massive advantage in deciphering German naval codes and anticipating their moves.

 

Action on the Skagerrak 31 May - 1 June 1916

Late on the 30th May 1916 SMS Seydlitz, Moltke, Lutzow and Derflinger mobilised and at 2:30 a.m. on the 31st they left the Jade estuary and made for the Skagerrak led by Admiral Hipper. They were accompanied by Admiral Bodicker's II Scouting group of 30 torpedo boats, the Wiesbaden, Pillau, Elbing and Frankfurt. Admiral Scheer led the sixteen dreadnoughts of the High Sea's fleet out ninety minutes later escorted by Commodore Reuter's IV scouting group consisting of Stettin, Munchen, Hamburg, Stuttgart and Frauenlob with 31 torpedo boats led by the light cruiser SMS Rostock. At 5:00 a.m. the force was joined by 16 pre-Dreadnoughts.

Claus Bergen's painting of the German fleet passing Helgoland

   The plan was simple, they would lure small sections of the British fleet out and onto the core of German heavy units but the Royal Navy's Room 40 had decrypted the Kaiserliche-Marine's orders and knew a fleet was at sea and where they were heading and Jellicoe and Beatty's forces put to sea but did know their objectives or that Scheer's heavier ships were out in force.

   With the Battle-cruisers leading the force with the scouting forces forming a screen for the larger ships flanks and front the German force almost unwittingly caught Beatty's forces between the two formations but the British admiral's orders were to stop and turn before this could happen. The two fleets converged when British units stopped to check the Danish N J Fjord only to find that German destroyers B-109 and B-110  were already doing it. HMS Galatea and Phaeton opened fire first which the German light cruisers returned at extreme range with Elbing  striking Galatea first.

   At 3:22 p.m. Hipper's forces spotted Beatty and at 3:45 p.m. turned to lead the British Battle-cruisers onto Scheer's bigger guns some forty-six miles to the South east and at 3:48 p.m. the exchange of shells began with the Germans enjoying the benefits of wind (blowing smoke clear of their vision) and poor visibility for the British as the sky was overcast obscuring he German ships. SMS Moltke scoured nine hits on HMS Tiger in twelve minutes and the German squadron striking three of the six British ships before the British could strike one. SMS Lutzow  wrecked Lion's Q turret and had Major Harvey (RMLI) the turret commander ordered the magazine flooded before a fire could spread to the magazine, a fate that befell HMS Indefatigable who suffered three 11" shell strikes from Von der Tann  causing a fire in the x magazine which detonated and a further strike on A turret which caused the forward magazine to explode tearing the ship apart taking 1019 souls to the depths save for two sailors.The 5th Battle Squadron consisting of the Queen Elizabeth class Battleships under Rear Admiral Evan- Thomas got into range and HMS Barham began striking VonDer Tann at 4:08 p.m whilst the other ships of the squadron began firing at 4:15 p.m. Tragedy again struck as HMS Queen Mary, under the combined salvos of Lutzow and Derflinger set fire to one of the forward magazines. A Blackmore on HMS New Zealand said; 
The Fore turret started to dip and the fore parts of the ship... She went up wth a terrific bang with debris flying all over the place.

Nine men of 1275 were saved.At 4:30 p.m Scheer's heavy units began to arrive  whilst the two navy's destroyers swirled in dogfights trying to get torpedo strikes on each other and the larger battle cruisers. Seydlitz was struck at 4:57 p.m. causing her to take on water but maintained course and speed though the destroyers V-29 and V-27 were sunk in exchange for the immobilizing of HMS Nomad and Nestor which Scheer's forces sank in passing. As Scheer approached Beatty turned his force around to lead the German forces on the superior guns of Jellicoe's fleet, though due to a communications error the battleships of the 5th Battle squadron did not turn and came under fire from Scheer at extreme range and Evan-Thomas took the initiative and turned his ships before they converged however the slower battleships did drew fire from the Germans as they sat between Scheer Beatty. With Hipper's Battle cruisers engaging HMS Barham and Valiant as well as the battle ship Malaya receiving seven hits from Scheer's ships causing an ammunition fire and some heavy casaulties. In return Lutzow, Derflinger and Seydlitz were struck as well as some hits on SMS Markgraf which was damaged by a 15" shell.Rear Admiral Hood was sent with his 3rd Battle cruiser squadron to assist Beatty and at 5:38 p.m. his forces were engaging Bodicker's which had been attacking HMS Chester and had caused significant damage. Bert Stevens said:They Smashed us up... They killed all the gunners. Those that wasn't killed were terribly wounded....

The wounded included Jack Cornwall with a horrific thigh injury, a ship's boy who stayed at his post on the guns whilst the rest of the crew lay dead awaiting further orders and was posthumously awarded the VC.Invincible's intervention saw the light cruiser Wiesbaden disabled and Bodicker's remaining vessels fleeing to the safety of Hipper and Scheer leaving Wiesbaden to fire off torpedoes at the British as they passed and absorbing return fire. The same happened to the destroyer HMS Shark which was part of Hood's destroyer screen and she lay disabled firing at the enemy when she could despite her crew being offered salvation on HMS Acasta. Commander Loftus Jones continued to return fire despite a leg injury and mounting damage. The Shark did immobilise the destroy V-48 which was likewise lost to superior fire from HMS Valiant and other ships causing the loss of 90 sailors and only Hans Tietje being picked up in the night after fourteen hours in the water. Shark was lost to increasing German destroyer fire and Loftus, along with the majority of his men was lost although was later granted the Victoria Cross. His Gazette entry read:


On the afternoon of the 31st May, 1916, during the action, Commander Jones in H.M.S. "Shark", Torpedo Boat Destroyer, led a division of Destroyers to attack the enemy Battle Cruiser Squadron. In the course of this attack a shell hit the "Shark's" bridge, putting the steering gear out of order, and very shortly afterwards another shell disabled the main engines, leaving the vessel helpless. The Commanding Officer of another Destroyer, seeing the "Shark's" plight, came between her and the enemy and offered assistance, but was warned by Commander Jones not to run the risk of being almost certainly sunk in trying to help him. Commander Jones, though wounded in the leg, went aft to help connect and man the after wheel. Meanwhile the forecastle gun with its crew had been blown away, and the same fate soon afterwards befell the after gun and crew. Commander Jones then went to the midship and the only remaining gun, and personally assisted in keeping it in action. All this time the "Shark" was subjected to very heavy fire from enemy light cruisers and destroyers at short range. The gun's crew of the midship gun was reduced to three, of whom an Able Seaman was soon badly wounded in the leg. A few minutes later Commander Jones was hit by a shell, which took off his leg above the knee, but he continued to give orders to his gun's crew, while a Chief Stoker improvised a tourniquet round his thigh. Noticing that the Ensign was not properly hoisted, he gave orders for another to be hoisted. Soon afterwards, seeing that the ship could not survive much longer, and as a German Destroyer was closing, he gave orders for the surviving members of the crew to put on lifebelts. Almost immediately after this order had been given, the "Shark" was struck by a torpedo and sank. Commander Jones was unfortunately not amongst the few survivors from the "Shark" who were picked up by a neutral vessel in the night.

Hipper was forced to hold back from Beatty due to mounting damage and turned to join Scheer at 6:00 p.m. as Jellicoe's force arrived and with no communication from Beatty as to where the German fleet was deployed and hoped to be able to cross the German advance bringing all of his guns to action. It was a massive gamble because if Scheer came out further down the line it could easily be severed and then the Germans could broadside as the passed. There was confusion as British ships crossed each other as the fleets converged with Lion narrowly missing Warrior all under fire of some of the German battleships. For Scheer it was just as confusing as he did not know Jellicoe was at sea and was having to contend with Hood attacking from the North east. Suddenly two British warships were sighted heading for Weisbaden - the Defence and Warrior had moved to sink the drifting hulk only to be saturated by enemy fire with Defence exploding with all hands whilst Warrior  was only saved because Warspite had a steering malfunction and sailed between her and the Germans drawing their fire. Whilst Warspite was quickly withdrawn Warrior was scuttled the next day due to her heavy damage.Hipper's flagship was hit repeatedly but Lutzow and Derflinger got a clear shot at Invincible and fired three salvos into her causing her to explode in 90 seconds.

She was just one flaming letter V - A Smith described the sinking - When we steamed through the main patch there was ,em pm rafts. bits of wood, bravely cheering, waving and there was a  smell of cordite... and a smell of burnt bodies.

HMS Invincible exploding (IWM SP 2468)

Lutzow was doomed though and unable to transmit W/T messages and severe flooding  she began to make her withdrawal whilst the Admiral transferred his flag to G-39.At 18:30 a very surprised Scheer burst out of smoke and fog to find twenty four British Dreadnoughts line abreast and very quickly came under fire with SMS Konig bearing the brunt of the fire from ten of the British ships which Scheer later described as:

The eentire arc stretching from north to east was a sea of fire. The flash from the muzzles of the guns was distinctly seen through the mist and smoke on the horizon, though the ships themselves were not distinguishable.

Within three minutes the German line began to turn 180 degrees with much fire coming down towards Friedrich der Grosse without striking her. Jellicoe gave pursuit but not a direct chase in case of torpedo attack from aft launchers whilst Scheer played for time and at 18:55 the German fleet turned east to avoid a stern chase but by 7:15 p.m. the British battle line had again crossed Scheer's fleet and fired their broadsides damaging Konig, Grosser Kurfurst, Markgraf and Kaiser from the 3rd Squadron and Helgoland from the 1st for two hits on HMS Colossus causing negligible damage by the limping Seydlitz. Yet again Scheer ordered the fleet to come about but the intense British fire made it confusing rather than the well practiced manouevre and Scheer had to send in a screen of torpedo boats to buy his big ships time along with Hipper's battlecruisers (although Hipper was still aboard a destroyer.) Kapitan Hartog led from Derflinger in what some have called the "death ride" and saw all but Moltke severely hit as they absorbed shells from eighteen British battleships! Derflinger lost two turrets in what Scheer would describe as:
The behaviour of the battlecruisers is specially deserving of the highest praise; crippled in the use of their guns by their numerous casualties, some of them badly damaged, obeying the given signal, "At the enemy" they dashed recklessly to the attack.

As night descended Jellicoe decided to trail the Germans using a cruiser screen to detect them and then catch the Germans the following morning whilst Scheer tried to cross the British wake and head for Horn's reef and home. The British failed to take the opportunity and when German units were sighted and fired upon the reports were not made to Iron Duke and gun fire seen at night was dismissed as "destroyer actions" rather than investigated and incredibly when the Captain of HMS Malaya sighted German battleships crossing behind them deferred authority to fire to Evan- Thomas who decided that by using the wireless or firing it would give away the British fleet's position. This was further compounded by the Admiralty not passing on several important decrypts indicating Scheer's position and destination.

Through the night the British destroyers did manage to sink SMS Rostock and the pre-dreadnought Pommern which was sunk by HMS Onslaught whose torpedo caught her by the 17 cm ammunition magazine causing the ship to explode killing all aboard and SMS Hannover to hove out of formation to avoid striking the sinking wreck. SMS Nassau rammed and severely damaged HMS Spitfire taking 20 feet off her upper works whilst SMS Posen rammed the light cruiser SMS Elbing which was abandoned by her crew to sink the following day. SMS Thuringen spotted a vessel attaching itself to the line of German warships and quickly realised that it was HMS Black Prince and she was hit at point blank range by Thuringen, Nassau, Ostfriesland and Frederick the Great and sank with all hands. Similarly Moltke and the damaged Seydlitz joined a British line but were able to escape when they realised and allowed to do so by British captains who didn't want to give their positions away.

SMS Frauenlob, the survivor of Helgoland in 1914 was forced to swerve to avoid both Seydlitz and Moltke as they crossed the lines and with the rest of her formation blundered into the path of Goodenough's cruisers. HMS Southampton and Dublin illuminated the IV Scouting group in their spotlights whilst the rest of the British ships stayed in the darkness and fired. Southampton was severely damaged and as she pulled away she put a torpedo into the Frauenlob which one survivor described;

The torpedo smashed through into the engine room and it seemed to lift the ship clear out of the water in less than seven minutes everything had gone to the bottom. Some of us climbed on to three small rafts. We had to sit back with our legs in the water. The sea was very rough and the waves continually washed over us. Of the eight men on our raft six dropped off during the night and disappeared. We drifted for more than ten hours.

Only 9 men survived the sinking.

SMS Lutzow could no longer continue her run having sustained an enormous amount of damage andV-4 whose bow erupted possibly from a mine strike whilst the British also claimed a torpedo strike on a pre-dreadnought by HMS Champion although this was actually a miss on the Von der Tann. 

By 5:20 a.m the German fleet were mostly in the clear and almost to port with only Ostfriesland striking a mine killing one and wounding ten. Seydlitz barely limped home and had to be assisted finally arriving on the 2nd June.

The Germans claimed a massive victory having sunk, by their reckoning a battleship, two battle cruisers, two armoured cruisers and a light cruiser for the loss of Pommern and Wiesbaden (so they reported). The British, though bloodied were defiant and revealed the true extent of German losses and as time went by and the German fleet did not challenge the British in the North Sea again perception began to change to a British strategic victory especially that the German heavy ships took months to repair and the losses to the fleet could not easily be replaced and Seydlitz had took three and a half months to repair!

The Crippled Seydlitz in port on 16 June '16 ( IWM  Q 2065)

close to capsizing her Captain ordered the surviving crew to be picked up by destroyers and scuttle the worn out battle cruiser at 2:45 a.m. The only other loss that night was the destroyer

The final casualty lists was 6094 British killed and 674 wounded compared to 2551 Germans with 507 wounded. Included in the dead was Johann Kinau the German poet whose pen name was Gorch Fock who went down with the rest of the crew of Weisbaden. My Great-great Grandfather Joseph Woodhouse, who had turned 40 on 28 May survived on HMS Indefatigable whilst my great grandfather's brother Henry "unsinkable Sid" Sams had been transferred of Vanguard the day before the battle and was on his way to Chatham. The battle itself was best described by A P Smith as:

It was really a confused battle... I've never seen so many ships it was a hundred thunder storms going off at one.