Friday, 21 December 2012

George Bone and the Boer War Pt I

One of the dark periods of British history is the Anglo Boer war period at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. I will go on to talk about this at length in another blogpost however.

The conflicts was fairly costly and cost my family two family members - my Great Great Grandfather Homersham and my Great Great Grandfather Bone and it is the latter I want to write briefly about.

George Bone was born in Sussex in 1871 and eventually joined the Army as a Royal Engineer rising to the rank of Corperal Master Wheelwright with the army number; 23654.

Whilst serving at the Royal Engineers Barracks he met Mary Williams whom he married in March 1898 at St Mary's church in Gillingham.

As an army wife she joined with him when he moved to other barracks and their first and only child, Albert Richard Bone was born on 25th January 1899 at the Curragh Camp in Ireland. Unfortunately George never met his son - he was already in South Africa serving with the Army in the Boer War.

He received the South Africa medal 1899-1901 with clasps for Wittebergen, Driefontein, Paardeberg, Modder River and Belmont.

Although I was told he died after Belmont it would appear that the chronology is out of order and that he actually died after Wittebergen or in a skirmish not long after that in 1900. The legend is that he was shot in the liver during the battle and took three days to die.

He was buried in Lowersfontein at the British War Grave Cemetry where he rests to this day. His name also appears on the Boer War Memorial in Brompton Barracks.

I want to find out more about him, I have been trying in the past but am going to make a concerted push for information so I would be grateful for any pointers. None of my direct family were killed in the First or Second World War and for me this is like the quest many undertake for an uncle, their grandfathers, cousins in the Somme or at Dunkirk. I will write more as things come to light.

Sunday, 2 December 2012

The Crucified cat of Albert

German Prisoners after the Battle of Albert 1918
By September 1918 the once proud German army was in severe disarray. The Allies were forcing them back behind the so called "Winter line," which was the proposed position for 1919 and all the work of the great summer offensive had been wiped out.

The Prussian guard volunteered to stop the Australian advance at Mont St. Quentin. One prisoner told his captors that within two hours of arrival they had all been captured and killed including the Staff officers! He said that the "War is about finished now" [1] p.529

As they retreated much equipment and a trail of their dead was left along the muddy roads and fields. There also lay a trail of destruction. Villages were burnt and booby traps were laid with delayed action fuses in large houses and churches to catch unaware Allied units out when they were looking for a sheltered billet. [2] p.531

One such incident is reported in Sir William Orpen's An onlooker in France 1917-1919 during the liberation of Albert in September 1918.

The day the Boche were driven out of Albert, General Rogers went there and brought back the story of the cat. When Tommies got into the town, even through the din, they heard the wailing of a cat in agony, and they found her crucified on a door, so they naturally went to take her down, but as they were pulling the first nail out, it exploded a bomb and many were killed. It was a dirty trick! [3]

Although I've not been able to verify the story so far it is indeed possible. All manner of hideous booby traps have been employed by soldiers over the years. North Vietnamese troops would wedge grenades in tins, the US used to hide faulty rounds on the dead and in enemy ammo dumps that when fired would blow up the gun and unfortunate holding it.

During the Second World War my Grandfather told me of a group of Tommies who entered a house formerly held by the Germans. They went in through a window, disarmed the bomb on the front door, combed the entire house and were satisfied it was clear. Then they started moving the dead out. One corpse had been laid over a pressure activated bomb which promptly blew up.

The Cat of Albert is not the only crucifixion story either. Rumours are abound of a Canadian sergeant being found pinned to a door with 6 bayonet blades in 1915.
Although a documentary in 2002 uncovered some evidence and even the name of Sgt Harry Bands, there is no concrete proof that it, like the Albert cat ever happened - yet, neither incident are beyond possibility.


[1] W. Philpot "Bloody victory; The sacrifice on the Somme", Abacus, 2009, p.529

[2] Ibid. p.531

[3] W. Orpen "An onlooker in France 1917-1919", Richard Clay and sons, 1921, Kindle edition loc. 911

Saturday, 10 November 2012

The day the war stopped: The Laconia incident

U-156 & U-506 picking up survivors

This remembrance day I'm not going to talk about the horrors of war, life in the trenches or sacrifice that should be remembered.

Instead I'm going to talk about one of those rare moments where the rifles are laid down, human kinship and compassion transcend the state of war.

It happened at Christmas 1914 with a football match, or during the static trench warfare when a Saxon regiment sent warnings in dud shells to their opposing British regiment of impending barrages and to "take cover."

It also happened at sea at 22.00 on the 12th September 1942 when the German U-boat U-156 torpedoed and sank the RMS Laconia off the coast of West Africa. The Laconia had been pressed into war service as a troop ship and carried 463 crew, 286 British Soldiers, 103 Polish soldiers who were guarding a staggering 1793 Italian POWs taken in the war against Rommel and 80 civilian passengers.

Korvetten Kapitän Werner Hartenstein ordered his U-boat to surface to capture any of the ships senior officers and found himself surrounded by some 2000 people in the sea. On hearing Italian voices out in the dark he immediately feared the worst; he'd torpedoed an Italian vessel, it had happened before when a Messerschmitt 110 had shot down an Italian civilian air transport.

He began to pull survivors out of the water to try and ascertain the truth and rapidly discovered what had happened, including myriad reports from the Italians who had escaped.

After the torpedo struck Laconia the Polish guards left the POWs locked in their makeshift cells in the cargo holds. Meanwhile on deck the crew had a major problem as the ship began to list further and further they were only able to use a percentage of their life boats.
The Italian prisoners managed to break out or climb up vents and rushed the decks where they're attempts to rush the boats were met with gunfire and bayonets. Faced with a wall of steal many elected to jump into the sea.

Hartenstein hurriedly sent out a message to U-boat command;

Versenkt von Hartenstein Brite Laconia. Marinequadrat FF 7721 310 Grad. Leider MIT 1500 Italienischen Kriegsgefangenen. Bisher 90 gefischt. 157 CNN. 19 Aale, passat 3, erbitte Befehle.

Sunk by Hartenstein British Laconia. Grid 7721 310 degrees. Unfortunately with 1500 Italian POWs. Till now 90 fished. 157 cubic meters (oil). 19 eels 8 torpedoes, trade wind force 3. request orders.

In the water things were getting desperate. The evacuation was far from perfect and many lifeboats lay empty or half full. As the Italians tried to swim for boats they were shot at by inhabitants fearing their boat would be swamped and sunk. There were even reports of hands being severed by axes. The blood in the water attracted sharks.

"sharks darted amongst us. Grabbing an arm, biting a leg. Other beasts swallowed entire bodies" reported Corporal Monte

Jim McLoughlin was hauled aboard the U-boat and confronted by Hartenstein who demanded to know if they were Royal Navy, the Kapitän angrily said that had he known that she was a transport vessel he would never have fired upon her without warning.

Laconia slipped beneath the waves at 23:23 as U-156 began collecting survivors. Hartenstein ordered his men to bring in life boats that were half filled and fill them up with people fished from the sea.

In France Admiral Dönitz, commander of the U-boatwaffe ordered submarines from the Eisbar flotilla that was making its way to Capetown to disengage and head to Hartenstein. He was quickly over ruled by Hitler who didn't want the Capetown or U-boats jeopardised and Admiral Raeder, the Naval C-in-C ordered the boats and Hartenstein to carry on to their original target. Raeder and Dönitz ordered U-506 under Klt Würdemann, U-507 under Korvettenkapitän Schacht and the Italian submarine Cappellini to rendezvous with Hartenstein, relieve him of his survivors then proceed to the Ivory coast freeing up Hartenstein to go back to his original target. OKM, the Naval high command also contacted Vichy France who promised to send warships to relieve the U-boats.

By the next day U-156 had picked up 393 survivors and redistributed then or had them standing on the deck of the U-boat. U-506 and 507 arrived on the 14th and 15th September and also began work collecting survivors, redistributing and providing medical care. The U-507's log for 17th September states:-

Women and children had spent night aboard me. All survivors given warm meal, drinks, clothing and medical attendance where necessary.

The U-boats began to take the life boats in tow, patrolled the area and await the French vessels supporting the survivors as much as possible with the menagerie space and facilities they had aboard.

Where were the Allies?

Laconia sent a message at 22:22 after the torpedo strike.

SSS SSS 0434 South/ 1125 West Laconia torpedoed.

This was followed up by Hartenstein at 6am on 25 metre and again at 6.20 on the 600 metre international bandwidth:

If any ship will assist the ship wrecked Laconia crew, I will not attack providing I am not attacked by ship or airforces. I picked up 193 men. 4,53 south 11,26 west - German submarine.

British authorities believed it was a trap and that Hartenstein was laying in wait for rescue ships. On 15th a poorly worded message to the American forces stated that the merchant ship Empire haven was on its way to the area but made no mention of the U-boats and what they were doing. In his memoirs Dönitz was certain that one of Hartenstein's messages would have been received by the British.

U-156 as she was at the time of the US attack

At 11.32 on 16th B-24 Liberator flew over the scene and was signalled by Hartenstein and an RAF officer who was aboard saying they were on a peaceful mission. They also had a Red cross flag draped over the conning tower.

RAF officer speaking from German submarine, Laconia survivors on board, soldiers, civilians, women, children.

At the Ascension Island secret airbase Senior duty officer Captain Robert C. Richardson III who feared the Germans would move to attack their base or the Allied craft heading to the area and disbelieved any combat ship would fly the Red cross ordered Lt James Harden to return to the site and sink the sub.

At 12:32 he duly began his attack run. Hartenstein saw what was happening and ordered the lines towing the lifeboats cut and everybody back into the water so that the Submarine could submerge. Following an order that had come from Dönitz that he was to save as many lives as possible without endangering his own vessel or crew, he ordered the dive.

Lt. Harden claimed the Sub was sunk and the crew received medals later for their success.

Hartenstein's vessel survived with minor damage. Unfortunately, as he reported in his log;

While the tow with four lifeboats was being cast off, the aircraft dropped a bomb in the middle of these latter. One boat capsized

Hartenstein ordered the lifeboats to hold position hoping that the other two U-boats would collect them and with his damaged craft withdrew. Indeed a communique from Dönitz reaffirmed the stance that the Kapitän's first duty was to his crew and boat and if it was necessary to preserve them he had to be ruthless and abandon the rescue.

As the U-156 withdrew two life boats decided not to heed the German's instructions and headed for the African coast. The first boat made it to the coast after 27 days with 16 out of an original 68 survivors, the second was picked up by a British trawler some 40 days later with only 4 out of 52 occupants alive.

Dönitz sent fresh orders to the remaining U-boats telling them not to bother with the Red cross flags as he doubted the British would respect them in the light of what had happened to Hartenstein. A few hours later he requested an update.

U-507 held 491 (15 women & 16 children)
U-506 held 151 (9 women and children)
Meanwhile the Cappellini was picking up survivors set adrift by U-156.

Fresh orders were sent through to bring the Italians aboard, put the British and Poles into the boats, mark position and set adrift before heading to the rendezvous to meet the French. Dönitz felt that if they were to risk the lives of his U-boat crews it should be for their allies. Schacht and Wurdemann felt differently and disobeyed the order keeping the boats in tow.

The USAAF hadn't finished with them and five Liberators took to the skies. One spotted a lifeboat adrift and reported it to the Empire haven. Lt. Hardin spotted the U-506 and began an attack run. The U-boat cut its lines and crash dived and thankfully no one was hurt this time.

On 17th September the British signalled Ascension Isles informing them that French vessels were now in the area. Captain Richardson, now fearing invasion recalled his bombers.

The French had indeed arrived and the Gloire picked up 52 survivors some 60 miles away and met the U-boats at 14:00 on 17th and transferred all but two British officers aboard. Gloire proceeded to the rescue area and recovered another 11 lifeboats. After a good sweep of the area and a meeting with another French vessel, the Annamite, a count was made.

373 Italians, 70 Poles, 597 Britons (including 48 women and children) had been saved.

The Cappellini was delayed making the rendezvous as the French vessel Dumont-d' Urville had found survivors of another sunken ship, the Trevilly and had paused to look for more. 6 Italians and two British officers were kept aboard whilst the others were transferred.

RMS Laconia

All in all 1113 of 2732 were saved from the water. Had Hartenstein not acted as he did the death toll would have certainly been much higher. Although those on Laconia found themselves in peril because of the U-165, Kapitän Hartenstein and the others risked the lives of their crews to try and save as many lives as possible. It was the last action of it's kind. Dönitz, fearful of losing men and ships in token gestures like this issued the Laconia order forbidding U-boat crews from aiding those in the water and to think of themselves first.

War is a tragedy and it is unfortunately the innocents who pay with their lives. I leave you with the story of one survivor's story.

One survivor, a missionary nurse called Doris Hawkins was one of the 16 who washed up in Liberia. She had been escorting a 14 month old girl, Sally, who was lost at sea.

"We found ourselves on top of the arms and legs of a panic-stricken mass of humanity. The lifeboat, filled to capacity with men, women and children, was leaking badly and rapidly filling with water; at the same time it was crashing against the ship's side. Just as Sally was passed over to me, the boat filled completely and capsized, flinging us all into the water. I lost her. I did not hear her cry, even then, and I'm sure that God took her immediately to Himself without suffering. I never saw her again."


Wikipedia article "The Laconia incident"

Gudmundur Helgason's article "The Laconia incident" on which also features articles on Hartenstein and the U-boats involved.

Dönitz, K. "Ten years and twenty days" the memoirs of the Admiral.

Mallmann - Showell, J "The U-boat century; German Submarine warfare 1906-2006"

Wednesday, 31 October 2012

Where are the German strategic bombers?

Dornier Do. 19 prototype
Whilst staring at the "Goodnight Mr Tom" theatre poster I geekily noticed that the "German" bombers all had four engines rather than the usual two. In fact they were mostly B-17 Flying fortresses.

So does it matter? Well yes. Arguably had the Luftwaffe had four-engined Dornier Do.19 or Junkers Ju.89 bombers available they could have decimated the airfields or London with a bomb load of 3520lbs and could have taken a lot more punishment. There is also an argument that they would have been decimated when they flew out of escort range as the Allies found in their early raids on Germany mounting in an unacceptable loss of men and materiel.

So why didn't they build or develop any four-engine bombers as the war went on?

Well, I'm glad you asked that question.

One of Germany's greatest problems and motivations for war was the severe lack of resources. As such manufacturing had to be prioritised. The ReichLuftMinistry (RLM) had worked out a ratio of materials needed for each aircraft which worked out thusly;

5 Single seat fighters = 3 Medium bombers = 1 heavy bomber

German military thinking was limited by this resource deficit and although OKW would have liked a large, all conquering war machine they had to accept the reality of "Blitzkrieg" and a minor adaption of Guderian's principles from "Achtung Panzer!"

This would run a limited thrust against the enemy in a single knockout blow. An overall strategic bomber fleet would be unnecessary in this sort of campaign and a fast mobile "flying artillery" of Ju. 87 Stukas backed up by a medium bomber fleet to decimate airfields and transport systems within a certain radius would be more than ample.

The RAF thought along the same lines at this point as they maintained light bombers such as the ill fated Fairey Battle or the Avro Anson or medium bombers like the Hampden or Vickers Wellington.

When it came to preparations for Operation Sealion the Luftwaffe fielded 3358 (2550 serviceable) aircraft with a breakdown of 934 (805) Bf.109s, 289 (224) Bf.110s, 1482 (998) medium bombers, 327 (261) Stukas, 195 (151) reconnaissance and 93 (80) coastal aircraft.

If you apply the RLM ratio and sub out the Medium bombers and the 75% serviceability rate the Luftwaffe planners used, they would have had only 371 bombers available with a total of 494.

Hermann Goering summed it up when he said that;

"The Führer will never ask how many engines my bombers have, only how many we have."

To make this case more pointedly lets look at a table of comparisons of specs for each aircraft;

ModelD0.19Ju.89He. 111Ju. 88WellingtonFW. 200
Range941 Mi1862 mi1429 mi1429 mi2550 mi2212 mi

(It should be noted that the bombload could be increased on both the He.111 and Ju.88 but at a cost to fuel efficiency and flight handling. The Ju.88 could carry up to 6,600lb on racks and the He.111 could carry up to 7,900lb but required rocket assisted launch!) 
General Wever, the Luftwaffe chief of staff between March 1935 and his tragic death in February 1936, was the main supporter of a strategic bomber force. He issued the Ural Bomber order for an aircraft that had a range long enough to drop an adequate bomb load on Russian industry in the Ural mountains. The aim was to create a fleet of bombers that could wage a war over a static front and bring an enemies industry to its knees. This was at odds with OKW's vision of a fast war that would mean less resources wasted and the Army were keen to have their aerial umbrella to protect their men and tanks. It was inevitable that after the air crash that claimed Wever's life that the project would be dropped.

General Ernst Udet, head of procurement and a former stunt pilot finally got his way on dive bombers supported by Jeschonnek and the new Chief of Staff Albrecht Kesselring who did not want to see men or materiel wasted and favoured fighters.

It is understandable when you look at the specifications of the aircraft as the two models put forward are very comparable to the two engine Heinkel and the modern Ju.88.

As for a long range reconnaissance craft, military planners didn't think they needed one until the war with the British Isles looked unavoidable in 1940 and Fw. 200 Condor airliners were converted with some success in the anti-shipping role. A formation was also used for bombing Manchester. However this was a temporary stopgap move and not to be considered for long term military strategy.

The problems really arose when the Luftwaffe hit the static front over the skies of England. Although temporary aerial superiority was gained over Kent and the South east the majority of British industry was merely shifted North and Squadrons were moved to Scotland for R&R away from the front.

This problem was exacerbated on the Russian front but still Luftwaffe planners preferred to go for quantity and the army had become to dependent on their aerial umbrella - everything was being  thrown at the Russian armoured columns - even Stukas fitted with Cannon from armoured cars wit recoil so strong it would stop the aircraft dead in the air. A four engine bomber would be fairly superfluous and once out of escort range a crew of eight maybe ten much needed airmen could be lost with no hope of retrieval.

However planners did look into a four engine scheme with the Messerschmitt Me. 264 coming out as a fore runner for the Amerika bomber plan and as a U-boat support craft. It was too little too late and with the prototypes destroyed in an air raid the RLM decided to drop any real interest as they could not spare the production capacity in 1943-4 as fighters to combat the Allied bomber offencive were needed.
Range9500 mi1814 mi2530 mi2000 mi
Bombload6614 lb13227 lb14 - 22,000lb8-17,000 lb

There was also the ill fated He.177 Grief which was nicknamed the "Flying firework" by her crews. The craft had two engines in each nacelle so gave the look of a two engined bomber. Unfortunatley due to a design botch an oil line ran across the hot engines and had a tendency to burst into flames in mid flight (hence the name). Its arrival to Luftflotte 6 on the eastern front was used to some effect by Feldmarschall Lohr against Russian transport systems and factories, even attacking Gorki. Unfortunately as the Wehrmacht withdrew further and further into Poland more and more targets dropped even out of the range of the 177 and the unit was used in normal tactical role of the Ju. 88 or He. 111.

There was the improved He 277 which put the engines into four nacelles instead of two that Dr Heinkel continued work on in private and was a marked improvement but Goering would not allow it's development!

I would also be amiss if I didn't mention the Dive order from General Udet. It was a devastating order from the head of procurement. Every bomber aircraft had to be able to act as a dive bomber as well as level bomber. This threw all kinds of spanners into the design process and vitally delayed the He 177 production and deployment. It wasn't until his death in 1941 that this order could be effectively rescinded but it had already set back the program by a detrimental amount of time.

Thursday, 11 October 2012

It isn't a Messerschmitt Mr Cameron

Today, during his trip to the Imperial War Museum David Cameron referred to the Museum’s Focke-Wulf Fw 190 as a Messerschmitt. Normally this would not be a problem but unfortunately he said it within earshot of an amateur Luftwaffe historian – me.

Now it may not seem like too much of an error but to put it into context it would be like comparing a Spitfire to a P. 51 Mustang.

So if you’ll bear with me I will provide a brief biography of both aircraft and within you will see the differences.

BF 109 G's note the Daimler Benz inline engine & small cockpit
The Messerschmitt Me 109 was designed by Robert Lauser and Willi Messerschmitt at the Bayern Flugzeugwerke with the first prototype flying in September 1935 with a Rolls Royce Kestrel engine. It was designed as the Messerschmitt entry to a RLM specification for a new single seat fighter to replace the aging He. 51 biplane. The 109 saw of challenges from Focke-wulf and Arado fairly easily. The big competitor was the Heinkel He. 112, the competition was so close that both machines were dispatched to the Condor Legion in Spain to take part in the civil war. Despite the superiority of the Heinkel machine the 109 was chosen.

The 109 was the first fighter to kick off the revolutionary designs that would come to the frontlines of air forces around the world including the Dewoitine D.520 and Supermarine Spitfire. The 109 was the first all metal fuselage fighter with an enclosed cockpit with a new high-powered engine. The Me 109 R (later listed BF 209) one many pre war air races. During its brief spell in Spain the 109 acquitted itself excellently ripping through the older Soviet models of the Republican forces and hand in hand with the modern Heinkel He 111 and Junkers Ju. 52 bombers (as well as the excellent Junkers Ju 87 Stuka) handed aerial superiority to the Nationalists.

By the outbreak of the Second World war the Messerschmitt 109D (dora) was the standard model of the Luftwaffe which was slowly being replaced by the superlative E (emil) model. Whilst on a par with the Spitfire, Hurricane and D.520 they’re massed numbers over the Panzer thrusts and with superior tactics with experienced officers who had served in Spain quickly gained superiority.

When it came to the Battle of Britain the 109 E with its four machine guns and two MG FF cannons maintained superiority in the early months of the battle. It was only when the OKL directives to push the 109s to fly deeper over England that losses began to mount and the limits of the range became apparent. When the Luftwaffe switched targets to London the 109 was working at the limits of its range and only had enough time for twenty minutes of air combat over the capital which would mean that the Jagdflieger would have to keep an eye on the fuel gauge or risk ending up in the drink on the way back to France.

The pinnacle of the 109 design, the F (Friedrich) model was coming into the frontline. The F was superior to anything else in the air at the time and quickly maintained superiority over the RAF in the Balkens, Africa (where Marseille shot down six Hurricanes in one day – TWICE!) and Russia. When Hauptmann Pingel crash landed his Friedrich outside Dover in ’41 he handed the RAF an intact model for evaluation and soon the Spitfire was modified to meet the design.

The G (Gunther) came out in ’42 but was only meant to be a stop gap for the proposed BF 209 fighter but when it didn’t come it continued to be the mainstay of the Jagdflieger. The G was covered with “boils” with extra armament and additions to the fuselage but it took its toll on performance and the model was quickly out performed by the P-47 Thunderbolt, P-51 Mustang and the newer models of Spitfire – even by Yak 9’s in Russia.

Despite this there was the 109K (Kurfaust) which saw limited production which was designed for high altitude fighting, the 109 T which was a 109 E with an arrester hook for Aircraft carriers and the post war models including the Hispano Ha. 1112 in Spain (which was powered by the Rolls Royce Merlin and a squadron were used in the making of the Battle of Britain movie) and the Avia S-99 (powered by a Junkers Jumo 211 engine, which had been used in Heinkel He. 111 bombers.) which served with the Israeli airforce.

The 109 was the highest scoring fighter in the war. Aces like Erich Hartmann who scored over three hundred kills aided this. It was also the most heavily produced aircraft of all time until recent years with 30,573 machines built in Germany during the war accounting for 47% of all aircraft built for the Luftwaffe!

FW 190 A- note the radial engine and bubble cockpit
The Focke-wulf 190 was designed by Kurt Tank with the maiden flight being in June 1939 and, unlike the 109 was powered by a radial engine rather than the sleek inline liquid cooled engine. The Radial engine, which many experten claimed was a hindrance, actually gave the craft a greater lift and able to carry heavier loads. This led to the 190 being used for torpedo aircraft roles, anti-tank ordinance and the MistellenThe original A1 model was fitted with four 7.92 mm Machine guns (two in the fuselage and two in the wing) and two outboard MG FF cannon on wing mounted pods which gave it quite a punch and it was swiftly nicknamed the Butcherbird.

After its eventual introduction in 1941 it quickly proved itself superior to anything the RAF had to offer until the Spitfire Mk. IX came to the front line which levelled the playing field again. On its arrival to Russia in 1942 it made an immediate impact despite the Soviet’s believing the 109 was the threat. With modifications the ground attack units became quite a menace to the Soviet armour.

The big problem with the 190 A was that its manoeuvrability at high altitude was quite poor in comparison to other craft but more than made up for it at medium and low altitudes. Focke-wulf quickly rectified this problem by using the inline Junkers Jumo 213 engine thus creating the amazing long nosed Fw 190 D (dora). However this model lacked the high rate of turn and roll that the A model had had. The Dora was supposed to be a stop gap according to Kurt Tank for the Ta. 152 which when tested by Herr Tank left six Mustangs that “bounced” the prototype in its dust!

However positive feedback of the Dora from the pilots changed the minds of OKL. Unfortunately for the Luftwaffe it was too little to late as it didn’t come into service until the end of 1944. The retreating Wehrmacht and destroyed German production meant that there was a shortage of numbers being produced and the ageing 109, far beyond its useful production life and the vicious 190 were unable to stop the tide of Allied aircraft.

Tuesday, 9 October 2012

Bombing the wrong targets: The Luftwaffe in Africa

Some readers may know that on Wednesday 9th May I've volunteered to do a talk to the Imperial War Museum History department about the Luftwaffe in North Africa and the campaign against Malta. To be fair I was at a leaving party last year, I'd had a couple of beers and got talking to one of the others about my Dissertation and said in usual Becks fuelled bravado.
You know what Bryn... I could talk about that. Next year? Yeah plenty of time.

Well now I need to present and the research is taking up a lot of my spare time and taking over my writing time. As I am trying to commit my presentation to text I thought I'd post it here on this blog for anyone that is interested....


There are several generalisations and disbelief about the German Military that have developed through time since the War and I'm hoping to dispel them through the course of this presentation.

Germany's War aims were driven, not through ideology, though that did help, but by resources and OKW (OberKommandderWehrmacht) was painfully aware of the short falls of fuel, precious metals and rubber that faced the fledgling Wehrmacht.

The notion of Blitzkrieg grew out of tactics first used by German Stormtroopers and during British counter attacks in 1918. Heinz Guderian, in his seminal work Achtung Panzer! described the conditions for the ideal tank attacks to punch through an enemy front line and into the rear areas quickly.

Its all about Schwerpunkt.

OKW and OKH (OberKommand der Heer) would select a point of attack along the enemies front line that was the weakest or most preferable for attack. Behind German lines tanks and motorised Infantry would be massed and on X-day they would advance under artillery fire through the line and then sweep towards stores and rear areas sewing confusion and panic into civilians and military staff alike with the aim of bringing the war to a swift end.

This type of war appealed to the German strategists who knew that Germany could not afford another protracted war of attrition like the First World War. If Germany was to go to war she had to take out her enemies quickly and efficiently and this is where a problem arose.

Artillery is slow and cumbersome, it cannot be dragged along at the same speed as a Panzer column and takes time to deploy and fire. Also with the advent of aircraft any large mass of artillery being deployed behind the lines and the lengthy barrage before the attack would attract a lot of attention and the enemy would be able to guess where the attack would come. So what is the solution?

Cue the Luftwaffe.

The German high command had not been ignorant of technical developments and had pursued an active, though supposedly secretive, creation and evaluation program for aircraft development including the infamous "Dive bomber order" from Udet's office.

I'm not going to delve into the age old, and dare I say it tired debate, about whether the Luftwaffe was a Tactical or Strategic air force. For the purpose of Blitzkrieg it was purely tactical as the OKW heads were not interested in long term aerial strategy they only needed temporary aerial supremacy above the Schwerpunkt and advances. The point of the invasion was to knock the enemy out quickly.
I shall never start a war without the certainty that a demoralised enemy will succumb to the first stroke of a single gigantic attack  - Adolf Hitler

The Luftwaffe was thus seen only as flying artillery. The beauty of it, as seen by the Army commanders and their master planners in Berlin, was that they could attack without prior warning. On X-day the medium bombers would strike the enemies air instillations around the target areas whilst 109's would perform a freijagd over the advancing columns and areas shooting at anything that moved and engaging enemy aircraft. As the Panzer columns moved forward Ju 87 Stukas would be called in to strike hard points in the defencive network and enemy counter attacks.

This was all controlled by the column commanders who had a Luftwaffe officer attached to update the local Fliegerkorps commander of situations and to report their units current position to cut down the chance of friendly fire. This way the Army group commanders and Luftflotten commanders knew where their men were- In theory.

One of the big problems came with the attacks on England and Malta. The Luftwaffe was suddenly thrown into a strategic role without Panzer support. Africa and Russia threw into sharp relief the amount that the Luftwaffe was being used as an artillery piece. Field commanders were more than happy to call in wave after wave of Stuka dive bombers on one target forgetting the wear and tear on aircraft and their crews but I'll come to that later.

One of the great myths about the Third Reich is the size of its armed forces including the Luftwaffe. What is often forgotten is that during the invasion of Poland there was only 1 bomber fleet on the Western front and only a handful of fighters. The same was true during Sealion, the Germans fielded some 2400 aircraft and that was the total strike force available. When the Germans built up a bomber fleet for Malta or assigned the meagre forces to North Africa they were reassigning aircraft from more vital areas and were generally the only aircraft available.

By the beginning of 1941 the Wehrmacht was undefeated on the Continent of Europe and had swept away all opposition. OKW were doing their utmost to force Britain and her Empire to surrender. In fact the Fuhrer HQ couldn't understand why the British continued to fight considering the defeats the Army had faced. With Britain's capitol under air attack, the island under Naval blockade it became necessary to start looking at British colonies.

This was further added to the Italian's absolute failure in Libya. General O'conner's advances in 1940 with its superior Matilda tank nucleus pushed the Italian army all the way back to Bengazhi obliterating 10 whole Divisions. There was concern that the loss of North Africa would leave the British open to a springboard back into Southern Europe through Greece or even Italy. Intervention would be needed and a small German force was sent to assist the beleaguered Italians.
The man chosen to lead the German forces was Generalleutnant Erwin Rommel, a former Infantry officer from the Great War who had written the military handbook "Infantrie Angriff" and had led a Panzer division during the successful campaigns in Poland and France. 

Rommel was a gambler and risk taker, loved by his men for his habit of leading from amidst his men and the enemy. He regularly toured the front and suffered the same privations as his men and ate at their field kitchens rather than well behind the lines in a Chateau and safe from enemy fire. 

Hitler was in awe of his young Panzer commander as he turned seeming defeat into victory turning the tide in Libya, capturing General O'Connor and pushing the British back and besieging Torbruk with only a small force. 

Despite watching German tactics in action in Europe and Russia the British commanders were unable to counter Rommel and Frohlich's small force of Ju 87s covered by BF 109 E's and even BF 110's were able to provide temporary air superiority over Rommel's spearheads striking a Schwerpunkt into the British wide front. The RAF, although numerically superior and more experienced with the peculiarities of desert aircraft maintenance were using inferior aircraft, mostly American surplus like Kittyhawks and Aircobras and only the Hurricane really provided anything similar to the 109s but even still they fell far short.

However, Rommel's strength was also his greatest weakness. He was somewhat arrogant over confident in his own abilities and refused to believe that his plan would not fail. He planned the taking of Torbruk refusing to believe Intelligence reports and Luftwaffe reconnaissance pictures that showed a build up of British armour and infantry preparing Operation Crusader. He was so confident that he was right that he went on leave to Rome to see his wife.

The British struck hard and the Germans under Cruwell fought back but soon found that the weight of British armour and the counter attack by the Torbruk garrison was enough to push them from their prepared positions. Rommel was furious on his hurried return and began to mobilise the counter attack. His consolidated tank groups quickly cut of one British advance and then under Rommel's direction charged 60 miles due East to the Egyptian border before sending von Ravenstein over the border into Egypt.

This was a striking move that threw the British forces into chaos and General Cunningham was forced to make a speedy withdrawal from his command HQ in a Blenheim bomber as the Panzers rolled forward. The question on everybody's lips was;

Where is Rommel?

Unfortunately some of those lips belonged to Cruwell and Westphal Rommel's adjutant back at the Torbruk front. The British army had reformed after the shock and had retaken the vital airfield Sidi Rezegh as well as making further in roads into the Axis lines. Frohlich's meagre forces were unable to do more than try and keep the Allies at bey and could do nothing to find Rommel who lay deep in British territory with no radio contact. After three days Westphal sent out a general withdrawal notice and a very angry Rommel returned with a handful of his original tanks that were left after British attacks. The aerial superiority of Hurricane IID fighters had mauled the lines or tanks and their supply trucks. On his return Rommel looked at the overall strategic map of the situation and ordered the full withdrawal towards Bengazi.

During the withdrawal the Luftwaffe harassed the Allied advance and Rommel, ever the hunter led surprise counter attacks on the slow approaching Allies and kept them on their toes - no one, not even his superiors or Air support, knew where Rommel would strike next. His move on the captured Benghazi caught everyone out and the British lost their forward stores to a jubilant Rommel and OKW. There was enough munitions and petrol for Rommel to launch a counter attack forcing the British back to Torbruk again.

Supplies were vitally important to all efforts in Africa, be it Italian or German. Britain had its own problems too but had a back door. As Axis aerial superiority grew in the Mediterranean and with the fall of Crete bringing routes from Malta to Alexandria Britain was forced to divert its vulnerable troop ships the long way around. This was very fortunate for Private Peter Sams of the 3rd East Kent Regiment who saw Cape town and the cloud tablecloth flowing from Table mountain and arrived late to the battle of El Alamein rather than sailing under the guns of the Luftwaffe and Italian Navy (it would be another year before he saw the devastating aerial bombardment of a Stuka dive bomber). It also meant that as the British withdrew they were getting closer to their supplies and depots and the Germans further away from theirs.

There was no back door for the Germans however, all supplies had to come via ship from Italy to Libya and later from Crete to Torbruk.

The supply route (marked in red)

On arriving in Italy as the new C-in-C South Generalfeldmarschall Albrecht Kesselring looked at the overall strategic situation and found the major sticking point that would be the key to the whole African Campaign.

Supplies and the convoy system.
On his arrival, Kesselring began working with the Chief of staff Count Cavallero was willing to take suggestions and they formed a daily conference to discuss Convoys and supply transfer to Libya and specialists were gathered by the Italian Naval high command, Supermarina, and a permanent Supply board.

Before the war the Italians had set up supply depots on both sides of the sea but they'd never been able to fill them to capacity and air raids had taken a heavy toll. Added to this was the nature of the Italian Colony. There was no Railway from the ports to the front and all supplies had to be driven up by trucks which drank a lot of the petrol delivered and provided a great target from the air!
There was also the problem of equipment. Where as the Allies used the same kit the German and Italian equipment varied wildly and they could not share or pass around surpluses. All German equipment must come from Germany first.

There was also the problem of the shipping. Italian production was still in peace time mode and spare parts were spread around wharves across the whole country as were the ships and merchant fleets. The Italian Navy failed to take control of the merchant marine which left Italian captains thinking of "Their" ships and "Their" crews rather than the Nation's and were thus hesitant to put themselves in any danger. Tankers particularly drew a lot of fire from enemy air and sea units especially when the enigma codes had announced that tankers were sailing. Indeed by November 1942 it was acknowledged that with the losses that had already been incurred, any further resupply by sea would ultimately fail.

The supply situation would get so bad in Africa that the Panzer units would steal Aviation fuel to power their tanks leaving their airmen stranded on the ground.

For victory to be attained in North Africa the Allied island of Malta would have to fall to take the pressure off the shipping supply line.

The crux of the whole campaign is Malta. All supplies from Italy to Tripoli or Benghazi have to pass within range of the island. Even the supplies from Crete that came by ship would encounter the Submarines and long range aircraft that would fly round trips between Alexandria and Malta.

Royal Opera House Valletta after an air raid 
Kesselring knew this on arrival, Admiral Raeder knew this post Sealion, the Italian high command were aware of it but were less than enthused by the prospect of a landing. However the Regio aeronautica did commence air raids on the small island catching the small British garrison and defence force off balance. Most of the defences had yet to be finished and the amount of aircraft available had been severely neglected, mainly because the RAF fighter production in 1940 had been purely for fighter command. Faith, Hope and Charity were considered to be the only three aircraft on the island, three Gloucester Sea Gladiators which were more than obsolete compared to the RAF and Luftwaffe standards but compared to the Fiat Falco bi-planes and the Italian twin bombers they were on a rough par. However in truth there were 56 aircraft (20 fighters) on the island at the beginning of 1941 which was when Geisler's units arrived in Sicilly with II/KG 26, 2./KG 4 with the escorting Me 110 fighter units 4 and III/ZG 26 and he also managed to borrow Von Richtohofen's Stabe StG 3 and Lehrgruppe 1 each with two Gruppen

Success was quick as Stuka dive bombers struck convoy MS.6 and between the Stukas and a He 111 pathfinder they sank HMS Southampton and severely damaged the aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious who was pursued by Geisler's men who flew 200 sorties (losing 8) to try and sink her but she managed to get to Alexandria.
The first raids against Malta were carried out by Junker 88 bombers flying in small formations over the island with 110 escorts and then came Heinkel He 111 night bombers. The 110s were still inadequate as escorts and their charges were often damaged or shot down as their 110s ungainly struggled in the skies and the Italian fighters just didn't cope well at all. The situation was further exasperated when one of the Zestorergruppe was transferred to North Africa.

General der Flieger Geisler
Then Oberstleutnant Joachim Muncheberg arrived with 12 Messerschmitt 109 Es. They immediately began cutting through the Hurricanes and Muncheberg shot down two of four hurricanes in one go, on 26th February he shot down Flying officer Taylor Malta's resident ace. Aerial supremacy was gained and the surviving Wellington bombers were forced to withdraw and the fighter force was cut down to 24 fighters.
Stukas were used night and day, the 109s supplemented by a gruppe from JG 27 were used for free sweeps and Jabo raids but Geisler lacked the firepower to completely subjugate the whole island and after a total of 2741 sorties between January-May they only lost 44 aircraft, 62 enemy planes shot down (42 by Munchenberg's squadron and 19 by the Oberstleutnant). The threat to Greece and the Balkan situation led to the Luftwaffe force being withdrawn and the Italian airforce being put back in charge of subduing Malta and escorting convoys.

OKW agreed to Il Duce that Italy should rule their own airspace and Geisler was moved to Crete to carry out operations against the British fleet and bomb Alexandria from there. However without the quality German aircraft the RAF were quick to rearm their forces with 50 Hurricanes arriving in Mid May and a fleet of Swordfish.
Geisler's forces did not damage the royal navy but they did contain them to port and in a daring raid 100 RAF aircraft were destroyed in Abu Sueir depot on 10/11 July. However Geisler's forces were not really meant or trained for anti shipping attacks and it wasn't until  Kommando Petersen the anti shipping experts from the Atlantic and North sea were called in as were a small group of Focke Wulf Condors.

However it soon became apparent that the Italians had lost the initiative over Malta as RAF sorties grew more and more bold and voices in OKW and ObDl were vying to have Geisler and his forces returned but to do so would have been a blot on Italian honour so in the end Geisler was moved with a reduced force of 20 aircraft to police the Naples to Tripoli sea lanes. This was not ideal though and soon he was forced to use Stukas against Submarines - something they were truly unsuited for.

With the arrival of Kesselring and a lot of his Luftflotte 2 formations from Russia to set up C-in-C south at the end of 1942 a second phase in the attacks on Malta restarted. This time there was a plan for invasion. Whilst a sustained aerial bombardment by the larger formations Italian paratroop and Von Ramcke's German paratrooper force were training for an assualt codenamed Herkules. Student, the officer behind the victory on Crete had planned it with Ramcke. According to Kesselring's memoirs the draft plan was three fold.

1. Airbourne troops would take the southern heights before assualting and capturing the airfields south of Valetta after the Luftwaffe carried out a strike on the airfields.

2. Using sycronised bombing raids and in conjunction with the paratroops, Naval landings would take place south of Valetta and take the strong points and costal batteries before moving on to strike the harbour.

3. Diversionary attacks on the bay of Marsa Scirocco would draw the Allied garrison away from Valetta.

Kesselring's forces were to strike the airfields, AA batteries and naval yards in preparation for the invasion. For the second time his forces would be used in a strategic context but the difference in the attacks on Malta was that the island was a lot smaller than England and the 109s could operate with much more fuel.
German crews would often fly three sorties a day over the island (one of which against airfields). Fighters would precede the bombers with a strafing or jabo run then the bombs would fall decimating the airfields. Aerial superiority was quickly gained with Hurricane figures dropping to 20 serviceable out of 80 and 97% of all raids were taking part in daylight.
USS Wasp landed 46 Spitfires but they were quickly bounced and their airfields bombed leaving ony 27 by the next day.
The German forces were not immune however and Junker 88s suffered from heavy losses at first as they were diving individually on targets giving gunners time to take them one at a time. Soon formations would move to striking as a Squadron.

Despite these heavy raids and the reduction of Takali airfield to that of a World War One battlefield the battle was called off. Between March and April the Luftwaffe flew 11819 sorties and dropped 6557 tonnes of bombs (3150 on Valletta).

The Luftwaffe was called off. Malta was beaten and supplies were reaching Rommel in Africa in larger numbers. The Italian high command knew their troops would not be ready until August to take the island and OKW still smarting from the massacres on Crete were unwilling to throw their troops into another blood bath. The choice between Herkules and Thesius had to be made.
Rommel with his usual flair and promises of victory against the disorganised British army, who were in full retreat to their defencive line at an unknown railway halt called El Alamein. Rommel had taken vast swathes of supplies from the British at Torbruk and against all the advice from Kesselring and von Waldau he pressed for the attack. Believing that the British would soon be defeated, concern to avoid a similar blood bath on Malta as he had seen in Crete and believing fully in his Paladin Hitler shelved Herkules. Thesius went forward with results far from the German plan but I shall come to this shortly. 

As for Malta... With Herkules postponed indefinitely and Rommel charging deeper into Egypt the plan was forgotten. Loerzer, the fleigerkorps commander in Sicily had his forces scattered to the winds and reassigned. Some of them were reassigned to a blockade of Malta operating from Crete but it proved fruitless as Allied air power grew.

The Luftwaffe did manage to inflict damage upon the British ships. LG 1 interceted three convoys and sank four ships coming to 28970 GRT and three out of the four Destroyer escorts. The British response was to launch operations Harpoon and Vigorous to relieve the island and Commando raids on the bombers based at Heraklion. Though with Stuka assistance they managed to sink another two ships (12915 grt) and two more destroyers.
When the British decided to try another tacck by bringing a convoy (operation pedestal 11th August) from Gibraltar rather than Alexandria the Germans moved LG 1 to Sicily to engage it. Once a radar equipped Ju 88 found it 75 German aircraft attacked over 4 days costing the Luftwaffe 16 aircraft. They did however sink five ships totalling 52416 grt but laden with food and fuel the convoy still arrived.

One final throw of the dice was made in October 1942 and lasted all of three days. Kesselring could only manage 150 aircraft with a 50% serviceability rate and the RAF had grown in number and had a new commander, his old nemesis Keith Park formerly of 11 Group! The Germans suffered a 7.5% loss rate over the three days and even the much overrated 109Gs failed to help the situation and the RAF began using Operation Window to confuse the Freya radars on Sicily stopping the proper fighter response.
The Luftwaffe lost a total of 357 planes in two years, the Italians 175 and the island remained untaken, its operations unhindered much to the detriment of Rommel's campaign.

One of Rommel's complaints was that the Luftwaffe weren't doing enough and historians are keen to point out the lack of German aircraft over the advance towards El Alamien and even over the fortified front.
So what were the Luftwaffe doing in North Africa?

In a prophetic message to the advancing British soldiers in 1941 a fighter pilot of Jagdgeschwader 53 wrote on the blackboard of their airbase:

"We Come back... Happy Christmas!"
Two months later they had riding forward with the Panzer armies. As the successes of Rommel's push became apparent aircraft were taken from Kesselring's Malta operations and his refusal to accept Herkules and his own thirst for glory meant that the Luftwaffe were dragged along with him on his ill advised thrust into Egypt.
Von Waldau FlFu Afrika

Rommel was notoriously difficult to work with and Frohlich, the Fifu Afrika took to avoiding meetings and was eventually relieved of command and Von Waldau was placed in charge. Waldau had much more of a backbone, he wasn't willing to take Rommel's outbursts and spoke plainly. Of course Rommel's style of leadership left a bewildered Waldau guessing what was going on. During Operation Crusader Waldau held his craft back unknowing what the over all situation was and where Rommel and his tanks were. The same happened as Rommel pushed forward in Operation Thesius and for the first two days the Luftwaffe was absent from the skies. On the third day, in desperation Waldau sent his Stukas up and when they found a group of tanks heading West towards the German lines they attacked. Unfortunately they were Rommel's tanks that had got turned around in the swirling desert combat - luckily no one was killed. Better communication from the field would have averted this and given Waldau's forces more potency.

There were sevre logistical demands on the small air force in North Africa as they were caught in the same supply problems that held Rommel's forces in a vice. At any one time he had no more than a months supply of petrol until November 42 when it dropped by 90%!!! On top of that the desert proved problematic to the running of aircraft with sand clogging aircraft and engines becoming warn out from over use in operations like the air bombardment on Bin Harcheim, but I will come to that in Part V.
Larger parts like wings and undercarriages could not be brought in by airlift or shipping so a lot of damaged aircraft had to be cannibalised just to keep the few in the air and without a recovery service the number of aircraft just dwindled. This was not helped further by Rommel's rapid retreat from the line at Alamien and Luftwaffe crews were forced to abandon the lame ducks and get out with what they could.
Permanent air superiority could never be obtained in the true style of Blitzkrieg. Waldau had too few aircraft. The North African Luftwaffe never really surpassed 300 machines as the Ostfront in Russia had priority for new machines especially with the massing of aircraft for the push towards the Caucuses in mid 1942. Von Waldau also had the problem that he had no medium bomber force. The Luftwaffe needed two engine-bombers for longer term aims such as knocking out enemy airfields behind the lines, harassing communications and roads to help cause confusion and chaos. The desert was not suitable for such aircraft and none could be spared from the operations over Malta or the Mediterranean so Von Waldau had to had to work with Stukas and Jabo (Fighter bombers) which suited Rommel's needs as he really only wanted a flying artillery to give his tanks more mobility and speed.
Geisler sent raids from Crete to strike the Allies behind the lines and hit the RAF depot at Alexandra but they began to suffer from enemy fighters pushing them to night attacks. They were further hampered by the Allies stripping down Spitfires to be able to reach high altitude and intercept the Junkers 86 recon aircraft thus leaving them blind of potential targets and assess damage. Frohlich had also sent a solitary bomber to strike the French held fort Lamy on Lake Chad on a round trip of 2500km but that was about it for the Medium bombers role. The consideration that a medium bomber raid on British targets in Egypt would have led to their destruction at the hands of the larger RAF force in Egypt and the greater discipline of the RAF pilots to target bombers over fighters, unlike the Jagdflieger. 

 The Fighter pilots were a breed unto themselves. Hans-Joachim Marseille, the star of Africa shot down 17 fighters on the same day and had a top score of 158 and rivalled a fellow pilot Horst Reuter's feat of shooting down 6 Hurricanes in a single day TWICE. The famous Bomber pilot Werner Baumbach claimed that fighter pilots lacked the discipline and stoic attitude of the Kampfflieger and in Africa he is proven correct as the fighter pilots became caught up in scoring as many kills as possible to try and get bigger and bigger scores but they saw more challenge in taking down fighters which although important was not what was needed as many Afrikakorps soldiers found to their discomfort as the defence lines and Rommel's devil's gardens were bombed to oblivion. These aces began to suffer losses as the RAF improved the quality of its fighters and the 109 Fs were suddenly facing Spitfire Mark Vs and P-40s instead of the rugged and dependable Hurricanes. Though despite their losses Unteroffizier Bernd Schneider shot down a Bristol Bombay transport carrying the 8th Armies new C-in-C Lt Gen W. H. E. Gott and he was killed on impact meaning that another C-in-C a little known General called Montgomery was called up.

The third limb was the Stukageschwadern who worked so hard to help Rommel advance. They were expertly handled by Waldau who, with Kesselring's intervention, managed to tame Rommel into letting him know what was going on in advance rather which paid massive dividends in the taking of Torbruk which earned Waldau the Knights Cross and Rommel his baton. However the bombs were near useless in the desert. Unless there was a direct hit on a tank or building they were next to useless. Half of all bomb damage and casualties are caused by flying shrapnel and glass but in the desert the explosions only throw up sand which doesn't do any damage when it hits other vehicles or even soldiers.

Waldau's 300 aircraft were beset by enemy bombing attacks, SAS strikes, bad weather that turned the dust strips into swamps, supply issues that plagued the whole African adventure, huge lines of communication and with the massive advances by Rommel a head on the lines that would outrace all the important logistical sections like Fuel, signals, repair miles in the rear with no time to catch up. The situation was so dire that a glider formation was brought in to fly these necessary logistical organisations up to the front without wasting fuel.

Kesselring promised Rommel an airlift of supplies and the Feldmarschall provided. It took a bit of time as the Luftwaffe didn't have the number of transports available in the Mediterranean theatre and they had to be disengaged from the Eastern front which obviously takes time. Oberst Robert Starke with some six Gruppen of aircraft and gliders from LLG 1 were the first to arrive and begin operations. The airlift flew a total of 4425 sorties across Mittlemeer from Greece and Crete to Bengazhi flying in pulks of 25. There were extreme shortages of crews due to sickness and aircraft even though Starke took ambulances and signal aircraft and even a modified refrigeration plane to plug the gaps. These shortages meant that crews would often have to fly the trip twice a day!

The trip was perilous for the formations of Junkers 52 transports and their Messerschmitt 110 escorts. Not only were their take off times similarly heralded with an Ultra message, which of course were duly read by the RAF, they also could only fly on good weather. On the 12th May 1942 15 Ju52s were intercepted by Kittyhawks and Beaufighters, by the end of the battle 8 transports were lost and a further one damaged - 175 soldiers went down with them but only 39 were rescued.
That day one of those true acts of heroism that War brings out occurred when father of six Hauptman Kroseberg of the Search and rescue flew over the survivors and dropped his own life jacket to the men in the sea - only to go MIA before he could return.

However the crews managed to deliver 28,200 men and 4400 tonnes of supplies as well as taking back the wounded, which numbered over 10,000 for June 42, mail, Von Waldau's burnt out aero engines so that they could be repaired and retuned later. In the early stages of Thesius they carried 1000 men, 25 tonnes of material and 300 tonnes of aviation fuel- Daily!
The air fleet transferred to Brindisi in Italy at the end of a railway hub operating to Torbruk but the number of aircraft dropped to 161 aircraft by August, 50% were operational. Allied fighters were increasing in number and pressurising the transports and their escorting ME 110s from 7 and 9/ ZG 26 and 70 52s were lost in a six week period! These craft would be vitally missed that winter with the airlift to Stalingrad! Further aircraft were drafted in including Wiking flying boats and Messerschmitt gigant 323 and 321 transports and even the transport schools were mobilised to assist coming up to half the Luftwaffe's transport fleet even Bomber groups were conscripted. The sad fact was as Rommel fell back the Crete based aircaft under Wild's Lufttransportfuhrer I could no longer reach the German front lines and after Torbruk fell only the line from Italy to Bengazi remained and that was under constant pressure from a resurgent Malta. Even sadder still, and infuriating for Kesselring, Rommel blew up all the ammunition and fuel he had demanded that Kesselring's men had fought so hard to get to him as he withdrew from El Alamein.

By November '42 they had flown the Herculean feat of flying 42,000 men, 15,000 tonnes of supplies pulled 9000 wounded and sick out of the front.

It can not be said that the airmen and machines of FlFu Afrika and of Luftflotte 2 operating in the Mediterranean had not tried their utmost or not fought valiantly. Ultimately they were undone by overall strategy and logistics though.