The fall of Tsingtao

SMS Scharnhorst and HMS Minotaur in Tsingtao early 1914 (IWM HU 64344)

   As the Geopolitical situation deteriorated the situation in Tsingtao grew tense. Orders came through for all gunboats to return to base, and the Yangtze river gunboats Otter, Tsingtao, and Vaterland simply disarmed themselves and the crews hurried back to the Naval base leaving the boats at their moorings where they were taken by the Chinese.

   Searching for a safe port and bearing news from Berlin warning of possible if not probable war, the arrival of Austro-Hungarian cruiser Kaiserin Elizabeth on 21 July prompted the Emden’s Fregattenkapitän, Karl von Müller, to call a council of war as the senior Naval officer in port. Although it was all speculation as to whom they would be fighting, the fleet still had to mobilise, defend the colonies, escort colliers to a rendezvous for squadron manoeuvres, and above all not get blockaded in port. The cruisers of the East Asiatic Squadron and the skill of her crews were more than a match for the Russian forces and could also match the French. The big question lay over England, and how swiftly HMS Minotaur and Triumph could swing into action or Australia and New Zealand to organise their vessels and soldiers for occupation forces. There was the chance that Japan would join her ally England and lend her vast and modern warships to the struggle—her recent aggressive foreign policy and voracious need for fresh territorial gains meant that this would be very likely. There was a prevalent view in Germany that Europeans were superior to Asians, which led to the Kaiser declaring that he would rather surrender Berlin to the Russians than Tsingtao to the Japanese.

   It was obvious that Japan’s involvement could mean a siege sooner rather than later, and with Germany their sole source of coal and ammunition, it would only be a matter of time before Tsingtao would be forced to surrender. Things in the islands would be more cut and dry; with no formal defences, and only a handful of Melanise policemen and army reservists on each island, an organised Allied landing would quickly overpower German resistance. The only plausible defence would be for von Spee to catch the invasion forces unescorted, or for an organised guerrilla war against the Allies. The nearest the Germans came to this was Leutnant Herman Detzner disappearing into the jungles of New Guinea. If the war was restricted to Russia and France, their limited reinforcements in the region and more pressing priorities on the European front would mean attacks on the colonies would be less likely. Only Britain’s involvement would include enough soldiers to occupy all of the scattered islands and their overwhelming sea power could escort invasion transports and hunt the East Asiatic Squadron.

   On 22 July the Cormoran’s captain, Zuckschwerdt, ordered his crew to work around the clock, using spotlights at night. Supplies and ammunition were organised to warehouses by her slip, so they could be loaded quickly when it was fully operational. Although Zuckschwerdt knew that the Cormoran would stand little chances against a modern warship, it was better to be at sea than trapped in port awaiting capture or internment, which was the likely outcome for the inhabitants of Tsingtao. Adalbert Zuckschwerdt had been in the Pacific a long time and was well known throughout the fleet with a reputation for fairness laced with discipline, and a stubborn streak that favoured action rather than wasting time on deep contemplative thought. Even though he avoided harsh personal exchanges and was quiet and conscious of others, with the advent of war he was putting an amount of zeal and strength into getting the Cormoran ready. Throughout the colony the efforts to mobilise the flotilla of gunboats for defence, the colliers for supplying the Kreuzerwaffe, and the creation of auxiliary cruisers moved at pace. Korvettenkapitän Sachse of the Iltis was ordered to mobilise the dockyard to war. Korvettenkapitän Friedrich Luring of the Jaguar was ordered to stay in British Shanghai to reorganise German operations there whilst his vessel fled under Leutnant Fritz Matthias before handing over command of Karl von Bodecker the former commander of the Tiger. The Jaguar along with the Luchs, Tiger, Iltis, and torpedo boat S.90 were charged with protecting the harbour at the direction of Governor Alfred Meyer-Waldeck.

   Emden was put on a war footing and through July her readiness was increased until 31st, when all her unnecessary equipment, flammable trim, and excess personal effects were stored in a warehouse on the dock. Her ammunition and coal stocks were fully supplied, so when the orders came through, she would be ready to leave immediately. A shore party was also arranged to assist with the receipt of telegraphs and increase the military capability. Von Müller was determined to leave port on the 31st, this was to avoid a blockade that would see his ship wasted and to comply with orders from Berlin—to get as much available coal out of the harbour and delivered to von Spee. After meeting with Zuckschwerdt to hand over command of the naval forces and give directions, he ordered the cruiser to leave port at 7.30 p.m., with the S.90 sailing ahead to clear the way and scout for enemy vessels while the collier Elsbeth sailed behind. When reports came through that Russia had declared war on Germany, von Müller was given permission to carry out his plan; after releasing the Elsbeth to head for Yap the Emden turned towards the Tushima straits hoping to find Russian shipping plying the trade between Nagasaki and Vladivostok, or the Russian cruiser Askold. On 4 August, the lookouts spotted a vessel flying the Russian flag and moved to intercept. When the ship responded to the warning shot by opening up her engines and commencing evasive manoeuvres, as well as sending out a plethora of wireless transmission signals, von Müller loaded his guns and fired a few shots closer to the vessel. On the third passing through the rigging, the Russian vessel came to a stop, still sending SOS signals that the German Captain hoped had been jammed by his vessel’s signals. On inspection the Russian vessel, SS Ryazan, turned out to be a modern German passenger vessel built in Danzig in 1909, with a top speed of 14 knots and decent capacity. Reservist Leutnant Lauterbach led the boarding party over to secure the vessel, almost falling in the sea when his small launch got caught in a swell alongside the ship. The Russian Captain protested that he did not know war had begun, he protested that the Germans were pirates and he protested that he did not speak German. Lauterbach reminded him that he had seen him in Tsingtao and knew he could speak German, he also reminded him that the Russian had tried running, which meant he knew war had begun. On inspection of the cargo manifest, he found that the vessel was carrying tea, iron railings, salted meat, and spirits, as well as some passengers who also protested that they were being kidnapped. Von Müller decided to take the vessel back to Tsingtao for conversion and turned both vessels around operating in blackout and wireless transmission silence; the passengers aboard the Russian vessel were not cooperative and kept turning lights on and, when the bulbs were removed, taking them from other fittings. Lauterbach was kept very much on his toes. The two vessels passed many Japanese fishing vessels and even intercepted a transmission that Britain was now at war with Germany, a very ominous piece of news but he had no wish to run into any of the heavier British vessels.

   On arrival at port, von Müller ordered the immediate resupply of the Emden and took Zuckschwerdt to see Meyer-Waldeck to report his success and future plans. It was decided that the liner Prinz Eitel Friedrich should be fitted with guns and crew from the Tiger and Luchs, and placed under command of Fregattenkapitän Max Thierichsens of the Luchs. All excess sailors were to be assigned to marines, formed into infantry detachments ready for the eventual siege. Though not what they were trained for, it was the best solution that could be hoped for as they needed everyone who could carry a rifle to assist. Zuckschwerdt reported that Cormoran’s engines had been repaired and tested that very morning. However, the haste at which it had been reassembled by tired men, working day and night, meant that the repairs had not been successful and the engine merely shook herself apart, causing the propeller shafts to break. Its completion would take a further few days at least. It was decided to convert the Ryazan into another auxiliary using the crew and Captain of the Cormoran due to her having a good rate of speed and crew capacity. With the older Bussard out of commission it made sense to at least use her guns and crew for something useful. Zuckschwerdt began work immediately, using the large spotlights and twelve-hour shifts that had been in place from his previous command. The new vessel was also to be called Cormoran in honour of the previous vessel—to carry on the legacy. In four days of continual work the vessel was ready for commission, with eight 4-inch guns deployed, two searchlights, ammunition, food provisions to last five months at sea, and 2,000 tons of coal. Due to the small coal bunkers on the new the Cormoran, the crew quarters had to be converted and the crew were assigned to sleep on the decks of the ship. The crew was topped up with reservists, volunteers from the Vaterland and Iltis and the new recruits that had arrived just two months beforehand. The total compliment was twenty-four officers, 218 men, and fifteen helpers, including four Chinese laundrymen.

   Events were beginning to overtake Tsingtao, with news that the Japanese fleet had sailed on 8 August and the German’s worst fears were confirmed by a telegram from Berlin that stated war with Japan was imminent. SMS Emden reacted to von Spee’s summons to Pagan Island by leaving port on 6 August taking the Prinz Eitel Friedrich and the collier Markommannia, with a small flotilla of other colliers leaving on separate routes to meet the Admiral. Zuckschwerdt was determined not to get caught and the Cormoran left Tsingtao on 10 August at 2 p.m. amidst a growing chatter of Japanese wireless transmission traffic, with concerns that the vessel may not make it to the open sea. S.90, predominantly used as a scout ship, reported the horizon all clear and with one last look at Tsingtao the Cormoran slipped out to sea. Over the next few days came warnings from command of the Japanese fleet detaching and operating heavily in the area. On the 15 August the Japanese ultimatum arrived; this gave the Germans a month to abandon Tsingtao to the Japanese, and to remove all warships from Chinese waters immediately—they gave the Germans eight days to respond. Obviously this was unacceptable to the Germans and Mayer-Waldeck responded with a letter:

It is a matter of course that we can never consent to surrender Tsingtao to Japan without drawing the sword. The frivolity of the Japanese demand admits but of one reply. But it implies that we must reckon on the opening of hostilities at the expiration of the date fixed. It will be a fight to the finish.
Another German wrote in his diary of the Japanese ultimatum, ‘they can tell this to a Russian but not to a German’.

   A heavy Japanese presence, with a week until hostilities were declared, meant that any operations in the Yellow Sea would be perilous, and so the Kaiser’s newest auxiliary had to head south away from her coaling base. Flying her Russian flag, the Cormoran, tried to slip past islands and Japanese fishing boats at night so as to avoid observation, all the while listening to continued Japanese wireless transmission messages that seemed closer and closer. After four days at sea, and lacking communication from the radio station at Yap, Zuckschwerdt decided to use a general radio call out. Gaining a response from the steamer Ahlers, who reported an English vessel visible on the horizon. The Cormoran rushed towards the scene only to receive a second message that it was in fact another German vessel—the Göttingen of the Deutshe Lloyd steam company. Although Zuckschwerdt ordered his vessels truned about, he received orders the next day from the Scharnhorst to rendezvous with these two ships, and to bring them immediately to him—he required as much news as possible. However, it was not as simply as it initially seemed to be; the Cormoran got caught in a storm knocking her 100 nmi off course, which also damaged the wireless transmitter, smashed a lifeboat, and saw supplies being washed out to sea. It was not until 21 August that they met with the two wayward German vessels and began their journey to von Spee (which took another four days), passing the released Gouverneur Jaschke, which pointed them towards the Majuro Island. Within the lagoon lay the Prinz Eitel Friedrich, Titania, Yorck, Prinz Waldemar, Holsatia, Mark, and Longman, with the Emden and the Nürnberg detached. Zuckschwerdt immediately reported to his Admiral and submitted for inspection.

   In Tsingtao the situation looked bleak. They had amassed a force of 1,500 men in four infantry

Some of the Prinz Heinrich Kompagnie at Tsingtao

companies with 140 cavalry men, six quick-firing 3-inch guns organised into a field artillery battery, two machine gun detachments, and 140 engineers. There was a further 750 men coming from Tientsin, under Oberstleutnant Kuhlo, and a Taube aircraft, flown by the redoubtable Gunther Plüschow. A second Taube had crashed on her maiden test flight, putting pilot Leutnant Müllerkowski in hospital and his aeroplane in pieces. Further reinforcements had come from the Prinz Heinrich Kompagnie, part of the Shanghai Volunteer corps, the elements of this detachment arrived carrying Lee Metford rifles and wearing British cut uniforms and ammunition pouches and were quickly assimilated into 7. Kompangie of III. Seebataillon. The German forces would be no match for a large Allied army and they knew it; however, the British had estimated that it would take five months to organise and deploy an Indian garrison, reliant on favourable conditions. Japan on the other hand would be more than ready as it had no other military commitments. Tsingtao had a tactical advantage of a strong mountainous defence to the north, as well as neutral China; if the Allies were to obey the rules of war and not violate China, they would have to come from the sea. The harbour was well defended with guns, mines, the torpedo boat S.90, and the gunboats all under the Kaiserin Elisabeth. There were also diplomatic channels for Mayer-Walbeck to explore. He tried to get Washington to intervene by making European settlements in China neutral, and also contacted China to say that they would like to terminate the lease and give it back. Washington was not interested and China just terminated the lease refusing to take it back. This only gave legitimacy to the Japanese claim that the Germans were unwanted interlopers in Asia, and they would expel them ‘…for the assurance of peace of the Far East and the preservation of China’s territorial integrity’.

   Martial law had already been declared on 1 August and the German troops had already filed into their trenches, fortifications, and strongpoints preparing for an invasion. The Japanese were likewise anxious to gain the colony, and had already begun massing its troops ready for embarkation and preparing a blockade. While the German government looked at the ultimatum, they would be joined by a subordinate Anglo-British force under Colonel Barnardiston. The force of 23,000 men and 142 guns landed on 2 September to the north of Tsingtao in Chinese territory, setting up a headquarters in the provincial town of Tsinanfu. This was much to the consternation of local British consul John Pratt, who argued this was a violation of Chinese neutrality akin to Germany’s march through Belgium, but he was hushed by his superior in Peking. After the Chinese protested, the Japanese stated they were going to secure the railway network and any Chinese resistance would be seen as friendly to Germany and an act of aggression to Japan. The march was impeded by bad weather and heavy rains that flooded large parts of the plains, but as they marched the Japanese censored all local communications and removed all Europeans from their line of advance to mask their numbers and strategy.

   Mayer-Walbeck was informed of the landing and began preparations to strengthen the northern approaches, sending Kuhlo’s men to the mountains to dig trenches, lay mines, and prepare artillery emplacements using Chinese labourers. There followed several days of inaction, with only two very ineffectual Japanese air raids and one Japanese spy, shot for trying to poison the water supply with Typhus. A third air raid on the Kaiserin Elizabeth and Jaguar was also attempted to no effect. The second Japanese landing came on the 18th, supported by the Anglo-Indian forces shipped in on rented Chinese vessels on the 22nd, in the south of the peninsula. Their advance was slow as the weather had turned the roads into quagmires bogging down the men and their equipment. Relations were strained between the two allies and General Kaimo, though polite and reserved, saw this as a solely Japanese venture of which the British were allowed to tag along. His officers did not think much of the British fighting skills and, on more than one occasion, mistook them for German troops and fired at them. The weather, and Kaimo’s cautious advance, meant that it was the end of September when the naval blockade opened fire for the first time, destroying the Russian cemetery, a pigsty and Bismarck barracks prison.

 As the bombardment, began the German defenders fell back from the front line to protect

SMS S.90

themselves and it was up to the remnants of the East Asiatic Squadron to strike back for Germany. On 28 September the Iltis was damaged by Japanese artillery and along with a toothless and damaged Tiger, Luchs, and Cormoran was towed to deep water and set aflame to stop them falling into enemy hands. The Jaguar remained busy engaging enemy shore batteries and positions as well as causing the destroyer Shirotaye to be grounded on the 3 September. The Jaguar had also engaged in an unsuccessful sortie with the Kaiserin Elisabeth before the cruiser donated her large 6-inch and 2-inch guns forming the 'Batterie Elisabeth'- her excess crew assigned to the garrison. These were not the only victories for the navy, the minesweeper Lauting and torpedo boat S.90, with the support of one of the shore batteries bombarded HMS Kennet on 22 August; S.90 hit Kennet twice forcing her to withdraw. This success was again repeated by Kapitanleunant Brunner's vessel as she ran the Allied blockade on the evening of the moonless 17 October torpedoing the Japanese Cruiser HIJMS Takachiho killing 271 of her crew of 325. This was an outstanding success, but celebration was short lived as at 1:30 a.m. a wireless message was recieved from S.90;

Have attacked enemy cruisers with three torpedoes, registered three hits. Cruiser blew up at once. Am hunted by torpedo-boat destroyers return to Tsingtao cut off, trying to escape south, and if necessary shall explode boat.    BRUNNER.

Brunner was forced to scuttle of the Chinese coast and the crew interned themselves, eventually being held in Nanking. The gunboats continued to shell the Allied vessels, with the minefield around the harbour would claim three Japanese steamers. Despite their limitations the last surface units of the East Asiatic were going down fighting against a much superior force.

   However, the ground forces were becoming more fatalistic knowing that they were outnumbered six to one. One German officer told his men ‘we cannot obtain victory here; only die. Still, before it reaches that point, take as many of the yellow Apes with you as you can’. As they withdrew (to twin lines along the ridges around the settlement) they destroyed bridges over mountain gorges and destroyed the Mecklenberg Inn. The Germans gave a token night attack, but were repulsed. Following this, the allied forces attacked in the middle of the month, pushing the Germans back along the line except at a strong point where the German Cavalry were able to aid in driving off the infantry and take a toll on the enemy. A negotiated ceasefire occurred after this assault, in order to bury the dead. The Japanese were playing a long game, bringing 100 heavy siege guns, with 1,200 rounds each, to the top of Prinz Heinrich Heights. They began shelling on 31 October. The land bombardment was joined by naval guns, up to 11 inches in calibre. Although the Germans did respond at the Japanese land positions, with accurate spotting from the unstoppable Plüschow, they soon ran out of ammunition. Their guns sat silent as the Japanese rained death upon their positions for a whole week, setting coal stocks and petrol tanks on fire and causing the 150-ton docking crane to collapse under the incessant fire.

   The weather still caused massive problems for the attackers, slowing their advance. The hostile weather killed several engineers and eight Welsh soldiers, who were constructing a pontoon bridge across a swollen river, all the while Japanese fire came down upon the Germans.

   On 6 November, Plüschow flew out of the encirclement clutching the last of Meyer-Waldeck’s dispatches. He came down in a rice paddy, though still managed to get the dispatches out and back to Germany. He also began his long journey home, which involved travel via China, Japan, across America by train, and a boat to Italy, which unfortunately for him stopped at Gibraltar, where he was taken prisoner. He eventually escaped from Donnington Hall POW camp in England, working at the London Docks before eventually slipping out to Holland and finally into Germany. On the same day, the Japanese infantry charged in a great wave through the remains of the German lines under the cover of darkness and swept through the tired German defenders, taking 200 prisoners and forcing others from their positions, which the defenders often detonated. Other fortifications were abandoned, left full of bodies and equipment. The Japanese urged the Germans to surrender, while at the same time switching to shrapnel shells to cut down the fleeing infantry. By morning the struggle was over, with the surrender of the remaining forces to the Allies. The Jaguar was scuttled that morning and joined the Kaiserin Elisabeth, which had been scuttled on the 2 November by her commander Richard Makovicz after she had exhausted her ammunition; his final message to his ship was ‘Addio Lisa’. Meyer-Waldeck refused to fight on—some of his officers felt that they should—and sent a message to Kaimo: ‘…my defensive means are exhausted. I am now ready to enter into surrender negotiations for the now open city’. The German marines and sailors of the East Asiatic had put up a spirited defence and held out against Allied forces for three months, a lot longer than anyone had thought possible and caused 727 killed and 1,335 wounded, for the loss of 199 and 504 wounded.

German prisoners from Tsingtao held in Japan © IWM (Q 52827)

   When the Allies marched into the town, the Germans lined the streets in silence to watch the Japanese. The moment the British column arrived they turned their backs in disgust, for their use of Asians to fight their battles instead of fighting them honourably. The surrender documents were signed by the chiefs of staff for the German and Japanese forces and, in yet another snub, the British were left out. The Kaiser was deeply disappointed, but could not be surprised—the best support he had been able to offer were words of encouragement: ‘With me, the entire Germanic nation looks with pride on the heroes of Tsingtao whom, true to the word of the Governor, are fulfilling their duties. You should know all of my appreciation.’

   The garrison laid down its arms and marched into Japanese captivity, to be freed and returned to Germany in 1920.  One British officer described the garrison:

…their dejection was far from pleasant to watch. They were brave men, they had done their best, their clothes were ragged. They seemed amazed to see Britons standing by and, as though with final effort, they raised their heads as they passed and met me eye-to-eye with burning looks.

With the loss of the port the only harbour with a German Imperial grade shipyard in the whole Pacific was lost to von Spee. It was of no consequence to the Admiral as he was an ocean away when it fell.

The battle of the Falklands - Von Spee's end

It was 5am ship's time when SMS Gneisenau and Nurnberg broke formation with the rest of the East Asiatic squadron and set a northerly course for the Falklands. Captain Maerker, along with Huhn and Lüdecke, had voiced his concerns at the meeting with Graf Spee on 6th December about the proposed landing but he had been overruled.

The two cruisers were to advance to the east of Cape Pembroke at 14 knots and survey the mouth of Port William and subdue any defences. Once the way is clear Nürnberg would head out towards Berkeley sound to scout out British shipping whilst Gneisnau lowered boats to survey the outer harbour of Port William for mines. Once clear Nurnberg would enter the harbour of Port Stanley and take on stores whilst Gneisnau advanced to the channel between the two anchorages and lowered cutters filled with marines to arrest the Governor under the cover of Nürnberg's guns. The two cruisers were due to return to the rest of the squadron by 19:30.

The only worry was that the British fleet might have taken shelter in Port William harbour after Coronel and been bolstered to form another line of defence. As they approached the islands the Gneisnau's chief gunnery officer Lieutenant -Commander Busch relayed that there was thick with dust and smoke. As at Tahiti the coal stores were being burnt to deny them to the Germans. He also reported four A frame style mast heads visible which meant that the battleship that they had heard was accompanying Craddock was here joined by another, there was also a cruiser advancing to the mouth of the harbour. If Gneisnau could sink her there then the rest of the British fleet would be bottled up and easy pickings. signalling Busch's observations to the Scharnhorst, Maerker was confident the vessels in the harbour would pose little threat. The German cruisers advanced, ensigns flying and guns presented. It was 9.20 am.

In London Winston Churchill received a telegram from the Governor of the Falklands saying;

Admiral Spee arrived at daylight this morning with all his ships and is now I'm action with Admiral Sturdee's whole fleet which was coaling.

The fear that gripped the Admiralty was that Sturdee had been caught napping and the German Admiral was tearing him apart at his leisure in port. This would be worse than Coronel and the Mediterranean debacle combined and would do immeasurable damage to British prestige, especially in the Southern American states but also embolden the German navy at home into action.

Canopus beached at the Falklands for support

Things were not as desperate as they seemed though. Sturdee's fleet were indeed coaling with their boilers no where near full steam but Sturdee's noted calmness under pressure could save a situation  that might make a hotter headed Commander flap and panic making the situation worse. Glasgow was the first to see the signal from the lookout point at Sapper's hill via Canopus and tried to signal Sturdee's flagship but the smoke and clouds of dust that hung over the harbour obscured the signal flags, finally the 3" salute cannon was fired to gain the admiral's attention. There quickly followed a report that German warships were approaching from the southeas . Sturdee took stock of his vessels dispositions. The two heavy battlencruisers had colliers filling their bunkers, Glasgow and Carnarvon were fully refuelled but like the rest of the squadron had no steam up. Bristol and Cornwall had low fuel stocks and had opened up engines for maintainence. Only HMS Kent had steam up but lacked fuel.

After a few moments quiet thought the Admiral ordered Kent to leave port, colliers to move away and the whole force to get steam up. It would take time but that was all he could do. He was depending on Canopus to give enough covering fire with Carnarvon and Kent to keep the two cruisers at bay. His orders given, Admiral Sturdee went below for breakfast.

Canopus fired her heavy guns at maximum range of 11,500 yards at 9.20 sending up great white spouts of water in front of Maerker's vessel. Then the improbable happened as the last shell struck the Armoured cruiser's funnel sending German crew scattering for cover. By a twist of fate it was a practice shell and did not explode. Shaken, Maerker ordered the ships turn east but when another salvo did not follow up he resumed their course towards the ports whilst sending a signal to the flagship that they had come under fire. His intention was still to bottle the British fleet up.

Admiral von Spee had different aims though. Coal was vital to his squadron's journey and fresh supplies would be very welcome but not at the expense of irreplacable ammunition which would be needed if they made it to the North sea and had to run the British blockade. They could also not afford to take any lame ducks with them, especially not one of his Armoured cruisers. The British squadron at the Falklands was of no consequence. They had already set the coal stocks aflame and all were at anchor. In the time it took them to get out of the harbour and get a full head of steam his forces would have disappeared into the blue and heading for the rendezvous point with fresh colliers. The British would never catch him, especially not the Queen class battleship the only ship that posed a serious threat. More importantly this lucky escape meant that they would never find him out in the blue in such numbers again as they would need to split up to sweep for him. Orders were issued to Maerker to turn his ships around and rejoin Scharnhorst and the rest of the squadron heading east at a steady pace whilst the three support vessels released to the south east. On the arrival of his detached ships von Spee turned his warships south to give the illusion they were heading around the Cape for the safety of Chilean waters or to lose the British amongst the islands and bad weather.

There has been debate over the German admiral's actions and why he didn't press the advantage. With hindsight it is easy to see that the Germans could have easily caught Sturdee napping and, as Churchill and Fisher feared, take the fleet apart at anchor or bottle them up and escape. On the bridge of Scharnhorst a century ago though von Spee was playing the long game and every decission was made with one eye on the final confrontation in the North sea preserving as much of his squadron for that bloody day had to be his primary duty. They had already come half way, why throw it away for nothing?

With the Germans well underway, Sturdee's fleet slowly brought their boilers up to steam by mixing oil and coal. Glasgow was the first to pull out of port at 9.45 followed by Carnarvon and the two battlecruisers Invincible and Inflexible and the vessels began to give chase at 24 knots. The first major problem for Sturdee was that despite the icy clear and calm weather he could not see the East Asiatic Squadron. The amount of smoke being belched out from the two battlecruisers was obscuring the observers view. It was a particularly nasty thick acrid smoke caused by the burning of the mixed fuels. Sturdee quickly ordered Inflexible to his starboard quarter and Glasgow to his port and at the same time ordered the fleet to a more leisurely 19 knots so the armoured cruisers could keep up.There also followed a signal that the midday meal would still be served as normal at 11:45.


The three German support vessels were fleeing the Royal Navy at speed and separately to von Spee's warships. They had been ordered to head for Pitcairn island to await the East Asiatic or the outcome of the battle. Captain Fanshawe of the Bristol received a report that the German transports or colliers were making their way towards the Falklands at 11:00. Fearing the Germans were leading off the fleet so that an armed landing could take place Bristol was detached from the pursuit at 11:45 to locate the Auxiliary HMS Macedonia and find the German supply ships. If any of the raiders escaped they would be robbed of extra coal and supplies. He took Bristol west south west meeting the converted liner at 12:30 and turned towards Point Pleasant and together began their search of the area finding nothing over the next hour and a half.

There seemed only one logical course of action and he turned southeast, the direction von Spee's warships had been heading. It made sense that the supply ships would follow them at a distance or be heading for a rendezvous in the same direction. There soon came a message from Fitzroy, a small settlement near Point Pleasant. Two steamers had been spotted moving at full speed past the point and minutes later their smoke was spotted off to port from Bristol's conning tower. Fanshawe turned to investigate.

The Baden and Santa Isabel did not intend to be stopped and tried to run from the two British ships ignoring signals to stop for half an hour until at 15:30 Bristol opened fire on them. It was futile to resist and thinking of their crews lives the captains ordered a full stop. Fanshawe had been led to believe that these ships would be full of German Marines for the proposed landing and was ready to sink them as per Sturdee's extensive pre battle instructions, the white flags rapidly changed that and further investigation revealed their cargo of coal and food supplies.

At 19:00 with the prisoners removed to the Macedonia Fanshawe decided to follow his original order and both British ships opened fire before Bristol turned to follow Sturdee's line and leaving the Auxiliary to make certain the German ships sank.


By 12:20 Admiral Sturdee signalled Inflexible to "Engage the enemy" and together the two battle cruisers worked up speed to 26 knots and by 12:50 Inflexible was firing on the Leipzig at the rear of the German formation. Due to engine vibration and the smoke obscuring the rang finders the two turrets on each of Sturdee's battle cruisers took half an hour to sight and range con Spee's squadron.

SMS Scharnhorst

At 13:20 Admiral von Spee made the decision that could make or break his command. The British wanted his two Armoured cruisers destroyed and it would onlybe a matter of time before he would be forced into action, time in which Leipzig would take a critical hit. He would have to buy them time to escape. He might even be lucky and damage the British enough that he could still lead his squadron home but he doubted it. A signal was sent to the ligh-cruisers to break formation and escape as beast they could. He then signalled Gneisnau of his intention and together both ships turned East-north-east and commenced firing on the two battle cruisers.

The German Admiral's aim was to buy his light cruisers as much time as possible and to close the range so his 8.3" guns and if possible even closer and use his 5.9"s. His men were already performing well at ranging the British and then firing in ordered measured shots. One British officer commented;

The German firing was magnificent to watch. Perfect ripple salvoes all along their sides. A brown-coloured puff with a centre of flame marking each gun as it fired... They straddled us time after time.

 Sturdee on the other hand was struggling with bad gunnery. Not only were his reservist crews lacking in practice they were also struggling with the lack of visibility from all of their own smoke. The British whilst fighting at long range also found that they were losing out on accuracy and then Invincible took a hit forcing Sturdee to increase the range again. Von Spee seized on this opportunity to turn south again and try to escape again whilst they were out of range and hoped to encounter bad weather that could help them lose their pursuers. They managed to keep away for  forty minutes but ultimately Sturdee's top speed was too much for them and again the British shells fell about Scharnhorst and Gneisnau. The Germans turned on their axis and crossed the British T so as to bring their broadsides to bear. The manoeuvre did not work.

The German shells were accurate but they bounced off the Invincible and Inflexible's armoured decks where as the British 12" lyddite shells went through the German ships as if they were made of china causing death and destruction on the lower decks and shattering gun turrets. On Scharnhorst the Admiral's flag slipped to half mast and Maerker believed the Admiral dead and signalled Schultz (Scharnhorst's captain) to confirm it.
I am alright so far. You were right after all came the Admiral's reply. There was also one final order from Scharnhorst to Maerker to try and save his vessel if he could and then the flagship passed her sister ship heading straight for the British vessels. The battle had taken its toll on von Spee's flagship as she listed to port and her once proud engines pushed her at an ever decreasing speed and she was clearly taking on water. Pochhammer, the Gneisnau first officer later recalled seeing the flagship with;

Funnels are fallen, smoke was pouring out, flames were visible inside the vessel through shot holes and scuttles.But her guns crashed out furiously and without intermission.

Scharnhorst sinking

The Admiral was trying to buy time for his friend and son aboard Gneisnau and kept up a steady stream of fire on Invincible turning his ship to starboard for one last broadside. Scharnhorst's outer decks were beginning to flood as fires raged across her decks as she began to heel over to port and as the sea got to six foot from the fore turret she fired her last round then she slipped under the waves leaving a cloud of of steam, powder smoke and coal dust that left the crew of Gneisnau feeling a "boundless loneliness" and a fear of their own inevitable fate. Pochhammer felt the pall was saying "the Scharnhorst waits for the Gneisnau."

Maerker's vessel was in a poor state as well, her hull was holed and on fire. A shell had penetrated the after dressing room and not only killed the wounded being treated it also killed the Staff surgeon and the Squadron's Chaplin who was administering last rites. Pochhammer made a patrol below deck and reported to his Captain that there were piles of wreckage, dead and dying below decks and fires were breaking out. The engines were damaged and her speed much reduced. Despite von Spee's intentions and the high morale of his crew who were bringing up reserves to replace the dead and carrying up the ammunition to guns by hand in areas where mechanical hoists laid shattered, he knew escape was impossible. Both the Inflexible and Invincible had their guns trained on him and they were now joined by Stoddart on Carnarvon and between them they went about the business of taking out gun battery after battery pausing briefly thinking their work done but commencing again when a port battery squeezed out a final shot.

The battle was over and the German officers knew it. The Captain ordered the men on deck with anything that could float whilst another team opened the seacocks and planted charges. Officers were moving amongst the survivors issuing hammocks, wood from life boats and fittings when the vessel lurched starboard and those on deck pushed forward and over the port side and onto the Gneisnau's hull.

Many a clenched fist was brandished [at the British] and the men's fury found vent n full blooded seaman's oaths. Then the Captain, who preserved his wonted calm to the last, ordered three cheers for H.M the Emperor, and "Our good and gallant Gneisnau" and proceeded to sink the ship. Our crew, who had really given their utmost in endurance and courage, complied with enthusiasm and the strains of "Deutschland über alles" echoed through the ship with all its wonted vigour, followed by the hymn of the "Black, White and Red flag" which was flying riddled with shot, at the mainmast-head.

Inflexible picking up Gneisnau's survivors

The order was given to abandon ship and as she capsized two hundred men, including Pochhammer, Inflexible stopped to pick up survivors and in all 166 of her 764 compliment were pulled alive from the water and survived to serve the war in POW camps including Gneisnau's first officer Fregatten-kapitäin Pochhammer but not her captain or von Spee's youngest son Lieutenant Heinrich von Spee.
were plunged into the freezing 4° water which quickly claimed the wounded and weakened crewmen. The Albatrosses also descended on the wounded using razor sharp bills to tear at soft flesh and open wounds. The men were forced to try and defend themselves with the very flotsum they clung too, the effort tiring them out further and leaving them vulnerable to the cold.

The Kent, Glasgow and Cornwall pursued the light German units as fast as they could. Dresden was already pulling ahead of the other two Captain Luce of the Glasgow already believed that he could not bring that vessel to action before nightfall and signalled Cornwall that he would slow the Leipzig down so that the Cornwall could come up and sink her with its heavier guns. At 14:50 Luce opened fire and Captain Huhn responded by turning to present his broadside and firing off barrages, he knew that he could not escape and was prepared to give a good account for his vessel in the face of the enemy. Leipzig's navigational officer reported after the battle that his vessel's rate of fire was hampered by the fact only three of the starboard guns and only one port gun was occasionally able to fire on the enemy. This didn't stop the Leipzig striking the Glasgow and causing boiler damage that would stop her from chasing Dresden and concerned Luce enough to not close with her where the German's 4.1" guns would do more damage.

Cornwall closed to support Glasgow and at 16:42 Captain Ellerton's vessel blew Leipzig's foremast away and twenty minutes later struck the German with his full broadside which had set her on fire within an hour. After a patrol around the deck the chief gunnery officer reported to Captain Huhn that the guns were all spent and could offer no more resistance. Huhn stood philosophically for a moment before turning to his Chief torpedo officer and told him it was his turn. Leipzig tried to engage and strike the Glasgow and Cornwall but to no avail, the British heavy guns took their toll and the German cruiser slowed to a stop.

As Leipzig came under fire the Nürnberg and Dresden were going hell for leather to escape the British cruisers with the Dresden well ahead and HMS Kent doggedly pursuing Nürnberg. The British vessel's coal stocks were getting dangerously low but Captain Allen urged the stokers on and ordered all woodwork to be thrown on the fires to increase speed and despite her reputation as poor at holding her steam the ships engineers managed to coax the vessel to 25 knots which was over her commisioning top speed and well above what she was comfortable with, the over stretched engines were vibrating so much that the gun target controllers were next to useless!

The distance was down to seven miles and gradually closing until by 17:00 the Nürnberg opened fire with her stern guns hoping to deter her pursuers but to no avail, her shots sailed over the Kent.

Allen pushed his vessel harder to bring his 6"guns to bear and to narrow the chance of missing through the drizzle and fading light as well as the engine vibrations. Soon they began to return fire.

Despite Nürnberg's excellent rate of fire and accuracy her 4.1" shells could not penetrate the Armoured cruiser's plating. Kent on the other hand got in two lucky shots, one of which hit the after steering plane beneath the water line killing all save one in the compartment.

At 17:35 two of Nürnberg's overworked boilers blew and her speed was reduced to 18 knots. There was only one option open to von Schönberg - turn and fight to either disable the pursuer or go down with honour, he ordered his cruiser to turn 8 points to port to present her full broadside and fired.

Allen knew that his coal and the daylight were fading. If he wanted to stop the German cruiser he had to move to close range and trust that the Kent's armour could absorb the smaller vessel's shells. He brought Kent on a converging course at 6000 yards and the one sided exchange began.

By 18:00 the range had fallen to 3000 yards and although Nürnberg had managed to get a shell burst within one of Kent's gun turrets and one on the wireless room knocking out the communications the British ship was fairly undamaged. The German cruiser faired very differently and by 18.25 she had come to a dead stop, all but two guns were silent, her top mast had been shot away and fires were breaking out. Kent began to circle the crippled ship but the moment Nürnberg began to alter course, presumably to fire her other broadside, Allen gave the order to fire all his starboard guns at 3800 yards knocking out the forward guns and ravaging the forecastle before moving out of torpedo range and ceasing fire.

Nürnberg was barely afloat, the forecastle was decimated with no signs of life with a fire burning brightly under the bridge conning tower and she was starting to list and down by the stern. Still her flag flew defiantly and as Kent approached she opened fire again until five minutes later it was ripped down. Schönberg knew there was nothing left for his vessel and ordered his men to assemble on deck and to load the wounded into a lifeboat. With a final three cheers for the Kaiser the boat was lowered into the sea.

The Last man by Hans Bohrdt

Captain Allen had surveyed his lifeboats and found them all holed or shattered by shellfire and ordered his carpenters to begin repairs to the least damaged as quickly as possible. Within 20 minutes the gig andf cutter were also being lowered but it was too late. Nürnberg's boat of wounded had sunk due to its own damage and at 19:26 the cruiser suddenly heeled over to starboard and sank within four minutes taking the majority of the crew with her. The lifeboats moved forward but only managed to pull twelve men from the water alive, five were to die before reaching Kent or soon afterwards. As the ship sank the British saw some Germans clinging to some wreckage waving the Naval ensign attached to a staff and through the cold still night air heard them singing Deutschland über alles.

The Kent remained on station until 21:00 trying to search for survivors but no more of the crew of 322 could be found, including Lieutenant Otto von Spee, the admiral's eldest son and Captain von Schönberg.

Captain Allen later reported that;

I very much regret if my closing the enemy to such short range was the cause of so many casualties. If I erred in taking my ship too close to the enemy it was due to my extreme eagerness to sink her before she could escape, there were only a few hours of daylight left.

Kent had been struck 37 times during the fighting and had suffered four men dead and twelve wounded. Although it seems pretty much one sided the Kent came close to being destroyed. A German shell had burst against the A3 casemate and ignited some of the charges. A sheet of flame shot down the shell hoist into the ammunition corridor where another charge sat ready. Had this ignited the fire would have quickly spread into the magazine and caused a chain reaction that would have blown the ship up. Luckily Sergeant James Mates of the RMLI was stood at the bottom of the hoist and had the presence of mind to throw the charge away and flood the compartment. In gratitude but perhaps not fully recognising the danger that had been posed, the Admiralty awarded him the Military cross.

With a severe lack of coal the Kent began to limp back to Stanley at a fuel conserving dawdle that did not see them return to a very surprised Sturdee the following afternoon. With no W/T transmitter Allen had been unable to signal his status and Kent was presumed sunk.


Glasgow approached the smouldering wreck of Leipzig and signalled Captain Luce's message;

Am anxious to save life. Do you surrender?

Luce was still wary that although the guns had fallen silent and the German vessel clearly was near her end her Imperial ensign still flew from the foremast denoting she was still an active combatent despite being aflame at each end and her main mast and two funnels blown away. If he brought his ship in close would the German ship surprise him?

An ambush was far away from Huhn's mind. His ship was dying and he knew there was nothing more he could ask of her or the crew. Orders were sent out for the remaining crew to assemble amidships with life saving equipment and the sea cocks were opened to aid the vessel's sinking. After a brief address to the surviving 150 men and three cheers for the Kaiser he pointed to the flag fluttering from the mast and the inferno that was raging at its base.

If anyone can reach the ensign, they can haul it down, for we shall sink now.

Obediently one crewman rushed forward to the mast but was overcome by the flames before he could reach it. It was I of little consequence as the vessel was clearly mortally damaged and as soon as Huhn gave the order his men would leave the vessel and the battle would be over.

Through ill luck a gun fired, whether by mistake, design or a shell lodged in the barrel overheated in one of the many fires no one knows but the result was the same. Glasgow fearing she was under fire openned up with her main guns with deadly effect on the massed ranks of sailors. Blasts and shrapnel ricocheting off the conning tower blasted men to pieces, tore away limbs turning the decks into a charnel house awash with blood and the stench of cordite and death. Men scattered in panic hiding behind the gunshields or diving into the sea and swimming towards their aggressors but whilst the British thought there was still fight left in Leipzig they there would be no rescue. As the death toll rose the surviving fifty men clung to their cover as best they could and waited in terror for the violence to stop and in a lull managed to launch two green flares.

SMS Leipzig

Luce saw them and took this as the Germans attempting to communicate their surrender and at 20:12 and approached again signalling;

I am sending boats to save lives.

 At 20:45 the lifeboats were made ready for launch to pull Huhn's men to safety. Leipzig had no lifeboats left to launch, they had long been turned to splinters or burnt up. The surviving crew sat with their captain In the dark on the forecastle sharing his cigarettes and calmly waiting for the British boats to hit the water. Looking out into the black they saw the white hulled boats approach, their nightmare was nearly over. When the British reached 40 yards Huhn turned to his companions and ordered them over the side before turning and walking forward into the dark night, going down with his vessel.

The water was cold and with little light the men in the sea stood little chance as fatigue and wounds combined to sap them of their strength. They're splashing and cries soon diminished. The surviving officers blew their whistles and the four boats approached plucking men from the icy embrace of the sea. Glasgow's two boats pulled seven officers who's whistles saved their lives, and ten men, Cornwall's pulled one out one man. Out of a crew of 288 only 18 were saw the end of the battle.

After seven hours of combat Leipzig disappeared beneath the waves at 21:23. Von Spee's oldest and most obsolete vessel had acquitted itself well in the face of the enemy.

SMS Dresden escaped into a rain and fog squall and disappeared from the combat zone. The other survivor was the hospital ship Seydlitz. The former liner that was carrying some British prisoners (From the collier Drummuir) and supplies had been tailing von Spee's warships acting as a hospital ship but with the approach of Sturdee's squadron she used her superior speed to escape south slipping past Bristol. She finally disappeared into the darkness and around the cape. She came very close to disaster though as she passed within four miles of gunfire and explosions that turned out to be the death throes of Leipzig.

The battle of the Falklands was considered to be the most decisive naval battles of the First World War and saw the almost complete destruction of von Spee's force. The battle saw 2000 Germans killed and the rest taken prisoner for 10 British sailors killed and 20 wounded. It also closed the chapter of the regular Kaiserliche-marine hunting merchant ships. Outside of the North sea only Dresden and the estuary bound Konigsberg remained elusive.

Royal Navy's first loss - Coronel

TThe first of November 1914 became a historic date in the History of the Royal Navy and Admiral Christopher Craddock, who feared repercussions similar to Trowbridge, would not survive the day.

HMS Good Hope, Glasgow, and Monmouth along with their axillary Otranto were a long way from their Atlantic station as they approached Coronel on the Chilean coast.

Craddock, a professional and well liked flag officer had swept down the east coast of South America chasing the white whale that was SMS Dresden and any auxiliary vessels and the spectre of SMS Karlsruhe.

Terror of the Caribbean; SMS Karlsruhe

When the war started the German cruiser Karlsruhe was at Havana having relieved Dresden from her post and duties of flying the flag and protecting German interests and citizens during the Mexican revolution. Dresden had not left the Caribbean and was at Port au Prince. The threat that these two cruisers presented was very real. Both ships were fast modern and well armed and it would take quite a few vessels to track them down in the island filled Caribbean and like the corsairs of old Dresden and Karlsruhe could strike any vessel or port and colony at anytime working together or striking at opposite ends of the sea forcing the Royal Navy to divide their forces and commit a far larger force to find them.


The Caribbean sea is also the starting point for many journeys to Britain and a vital trade hub for vessels bringing merchandise south from the USA and raw materials from the South Americas as well as those coming through the Panama canal. Merchant trade would freeze up as Captains refused to sail and run the risk which could be crippling all because there were two German ships. There was also the lightly defended colonies that could be shelled or at worse have German Marines land and cause havoc amongst the populous.

Understandably Craddock saw that finding and defeating these enemies as quickly as possible as his number one priority. There were five cruiser squadrons operating around the Atlantic and Caribbean so dealing with any auxiliary cruisers could be coordinated at leisure but he would personally deal with these surface units with the vessels available in the Caribbean. From Vera Cruz on HMS Suffolk he ordered Essex and Lancaster to Halifax to cover New York and to reinforce the HMCS Niobe in case the German's went north. HMS Berwick was directed to Jamaica to defend Kingston and Bristol was sent south to join Glasgow off Pernambuco to watch the way south. It was a wide net and he would react with his armoured cruisers as soon as the two German light units appeared.

In London, the same wisdom at the Admiralty which interfered with the hunt for Goeben and Breslau and redistributed Admiral Jerram's forces and sabotaged the hunt for von Spee's fleet intervened again. The Admiralty believed the primary threat was the clutch of liners that were currently in New York harbour being armed to harass British trade. HMS Good Hope was detached from the Grand fleet for Halifax. Admiral Stoddart who's squadron was stationed at Cape Verde was ordered to detach Monmouth and send to Pernambuco and the Bristol was sent north with Essex, Lancaster and Suffolk to Sandy Hook.

Kapitän Kohler  had anchored Karlsruhe in a remote area of the Bahamas to rendezvous with the SS Kronprinz Wilhelm of the North German Lloyd line and a former Blue Riband winner (in 1902). They lay 120 miles north of Watling Island and began trading crew and equipment to bring the liner up Auxiliary status. Captain Grahn of the liner was demoted to First officer and Karlsruhe's Navigation officer Kapitanleutnant Thierfelder took command and began overseeing the transfer of equipment and crewmen.

HMS Berwick passed Karlsruhe in the night

Through a fluke of war Admiral Craddock's flagship on her northern journey came over the horizon onto the two German vessels miles from anywhere. Craddock couldn't believe his luck and ordered the Armoured Cruiser to intercept. Karlsruhe and Kronprinz Wilhelm began heading in different directions at full speed. Craddock prioritised catching the cruiser and set to chasing Kohler's vessel and signalled Bristol to reverse course and summoned up Berwick to try and cut off the German's retreat. Despite the speed of the German cruiser and the fact that she had only been commissioned that year compared to the eleven year old heavier vessel, Craddock managed to keep pace from 11am until nightfall when he finally lost contact. In the moonlight Captain Fanshawe of Bristol caught sight of the German vessel and opened fire at 7000 yards. Over the next two hours the vessels exchanged fire but to no avail and Kohler managed to slip away. Berwick prowled the Caribbean night searching for the German raider but to no avail. Craddock's luck had run out though, as his last cruiser swept for its' prey it changed course little knowing that just out of sight a desperate Kohler was fleeing. On the 12th August, with only 12 tonnes of coal left in her bunkers, Karlsruhe pulled in to Puerto Rico.

Craddock revaluated the situation and following reports that Dresden had passed the Amazon and was heading south and Karlsruhe was trailing behind her and with the lack of liners heading out of New York he decided to head south too. He transferred his flag to Good Hope, which was fractionally faster and left Suffolk and his already northerly stationed vessels to deal with any Auxiliary vessels and Karlsruhe should she change course. Craddock took Berwick and Bristol south to St Lucia to meet the French vessels Conde and Descartes on 23rd August. Meanwhile the Admiralty had also directed HMS Cornwall and the Auxiliaries Otranto and Macedonia to support the Glasgow and Monmouth. Craddock also considered, in agreement with the Admiralty that von Spee would probably be heading towards the Straits of Magellan. He began communicating with London and deploying his force to patrol the River Plate area whilst Glasgow and Monmouth were sent around the Magellan straits and requested information about von Spee. No one had sighted Scharnhorst and Gneisnau since early August in the Caroline Islands but they agreed that it was a possibility that von Spee could head that way.

Dresden had continued to sail south and had captured two merchant ships Hyades and Holmwood (on 14th and 24th August respectively) before learning that the Royal Navy was forming up on the Eastern end of the straits of Magellan. Kapitän von Ludecke put in to Hoste island to overhaul his engines on the 5th September and isolated his vessel laying low in case the British were sweeping the straits. After eleven days the repairs had been completed and von Ludecke had to make a decision as to what to do now. It would be too dangerous to return north to try and meet up with Karlsruhe would be met with British warships looking for him and sewing up German trade. Ahead of him was friendly but neutral Chile with a lack of British warships. There was also the promise of SMS Leipzig operating off the west coast of the Americas and the possibility of von Spees squadron. His decision was clear, even with out the orders from Berlin advising him to join Leipzig. He put to sea and headed around the straits.
On the 14th September Craddock received fresh instructions from London outlining what was expected of his squadron.

Leave sufficient force to deal with Dresden and Karlsruhe. Concentrate a squadron strong enough to meet Scharnhorst and Gneisnau, making Falkland Islands your coaling base. Canopus is on route to Abrolhos; Defence joins, keep at least Canopus and one 'County' class cruiser with your flagship. As soon as you have superior force, search Magellan Straits, being ready to return and cover Plate, or search north as far as Valparaiso. Break up German trade and destroy German cruisers.

His force now consisted of the armoured cruisers Monmouth, Good Hope, light cruiser Glasgow, the AMC Otranto, with the battleship Canopus inbound and the modern Armoured cruiser Defence which would prove invaluable against the von Spee's vessels and could keep pace with them should the German decide to run.

Then von Spee threw the British a curve ball. Despite Captain Maerker, the Commander of Gneisnau's consul not to, the Admiral had led his two Armoured Cruisers to Apia in Samoa and feinted North North West. The Admiralty reassessed this move and thought that the Germans weren't heading for South America but were disappearing into the Pacific again. They believed that Craddock would only be sweeping away German trade and merchant ships with perhaps a chance encounter with Leipzig or Dresden which should be caught in a pincer of Craddock and Newcastle, Rainbow, Idzumo and the IJN battleship Hizen coming down from the north. The Admiralty signalled Craddock to that effect on the 14th September requesting the Admiral's intentions.

HMS Canopus

The Admiral agreed with his superiors in London, the four vessels he had available were sufficient enough to police the German trade he did however have severe misgivings with
Canopus. The aging battleship had been due to be scrapped and was held under care with a reserve crew that had been augmented with reservists. There were also serious problems with the engines that were significantly reducing their speed. There was also a problem with the acting engineering officer who maintained that the engines could not produce a speed greater than 12 knots. Craddock believed that this millstone would only slow him down and would be of little benefit especially if von Spee's squadron wasn't present and even if they were there the lumbering leviathan would be left in the German's wake. His appraisal was to take Good Hope, Monmouth, Otranto and Glasgow on a sweep around the straits and leave Canopus to escort the colliers trailing along behind the rest of the fleet at her best speed. He made a full sweep of the Straits looking for Dresden in rough weather. Although there was evidence that the German vessel had been there, the British liner Ortega reported being chased by Dresden in early September to Craddock, von Ludecke however was nowhere to be seen. He divided his forces and took his cruisers back to recoal at the Falklands and sent Otranto on to Punta Arenas to interdict German trade. Once ready he ordered Glasgow and Monmouth back around the straits to sweep Orange bay whilst he waited at the Falklands in case von Ludecke doubled back around.

The Admiralty signalled Craddock on the 7th October with fresh intelligence;

It appears that Scharnhorst and Gneisnau are working across to South America. You must be prepared to meet them in company, possibly with a 'Dresden' (Either SMS Emden or Dresden) scouting for them. Canopus should accompany Glasgow, Monmouth and Otranto, to search and protect trade in combination. If you propose Good Hope to go, leave Monmouth on east coast.

Craddock responded that he was going to concentrate his forces with Canopus at the Falklands and that he was not going to allow his vessels currently on the west coast to travel north above Valparaiso. He also expressed concern that von Spee now had five vessels with (his two Armoured and three light cruisers) and also that Karlsruhe was operating again in the north and suggested to their Lordships that Essex be sent up north to relieve Cornwall which could then be sent to him. He also asked for an update on Defence.

Events began to overtake Craddock. The main thing was Karlsruhe. The German cruiser, after a hiatus to carry out engine and boiler repairs, was operating with success similar to Emden's of the coast of Brazil capturing 15 British and 1 Norweigan merchant vessel. The Admiralty were getting nervous about it and rediverted HMS Defence away from Craddock to sit with Admiral Stoddart's squadron which was patrolling the River Plate. The Admiralty were concerned that should Craddock have concentrate all the British ships and proceed around the straits then von Spee could out manoeuvre him, get behind him and shell the Falklands and Abrolhos coaling bases leaving the Royal Navy nowhere to coal below the Caribbean. Spee could then disappear. Battenberg and Churchill were shore that Craddock was going to only send Glasgow up to Valparaiso but concentrate the rest of his ships at the Falklands whilst Defence and Carnarvon formed a squadron off Rio.

They also signalled Stoddart to order him across from the African coast to head for Montevideo with his force of five vessels and the Defence trailing from Gibraltar.

When Canopus arrived on the 18th October Captain Grant reported to Cradock that his engines needed a refit and her boilers cleaned which would take five days, there was no guarantee that this would indeed would increase the speed. Craddock decided he had to go to the aid of Monmouth and Glasgow and set sail leaving orders for the Canopus to follow when able with the colliers. Before leaving he wrote a letter for Admiral Meux in England with instructions to send it should he be lost, he also buried his medals and decorations in the Governor's garden. Although the letter has been lost to the mists of time, it has been speculated that he wrote a defence of his actions so that he wouldn't face the same disgrace Trowbridge had or be made a scapegoat. He felt the Admiralty had stitched him into a corner and that should he fail to stop Spee he would be disgraced.

Indeed the Admiralty still believed that the situation on the west coast "seemed safe." They were full of faith that the Newcastle with the Japanese cruiser and battleship were heading south with all due haste and that Glasgow and Otranto would lead von Spee onto Craddock's cruisers and Canopus. Of course the ocean is a big place and there was every possibility they would miss one another which is where Stoddart's force was to form a second line. That is why they still withheld Defence which Craddock again requested and denied him on 28th October. Further to this, the IJN Hizen was still at Honolulu trying to capture the SMS Geier and nowhere near HMS Newcastle let alone chasing down von Spee from the north.

On the 13th October von Spee departed Easter Island with his force; Scharnhorst, Gneisnau, Nurnberg, Leipzig and Dresden with their flotilla of colliers. Spee was more than aware through reports from the German consul and agents throughout South America, that the British force was in the area. This would be his first test.

With Canopus some three hundred miles behind him (now moving at a faster speed when the Captain found the truth out about his engines capability.) with the colliers, Craddock ordered Glasgow to Coronel to send a message to the Admiralty whilst he spread his other ships into a search pattern of twenty miles apart to search for the Germans.

Spee received word that Glasgow had left Coronel and decided that he should give his men a taste of action and set sail to catch the light cruiser whilst she was alone. At the same time Craddock's men picked up a radio signature coming through clear as day.

"Le, Le, Le"

It was the Leipzig. Craddock, like his opposite number, decided to catch the light cruiser on her own. Obviously she hadn't met up with Spee's squadron and was still operating on her own. He ordered his vessels to find and engage her.

At 16:30 in rough seas and clear weather with interspersed squalls of rain Good Hope sighted smoke on the horizon. It wasn't Leipzig. It was Scharnhorst and Gneisnau supported by Dresden and Leipzig whilst the Nurnberg carried out a stop and search of a merchant vessel. He quickly brought his squadron into formation and using his speed to out pace the British kept them from closing knowing that he had the disadvantage of being on the shoreline side of Craddock. He kept up the dance until the sunset around 19:00. Then with his British force was silhouetted against the sunset.

At 12,000 yards the German armoured cruisers fired their first salvo first firing over their target and then short to judge the range. The third salvo struck Good Hope taking out the front gun turret killing the reservist officers and men who were trying to prepare for fire. The Good Hope caught fire. Moments later Monmouth was on fire as Gneisnau's shells struck home. Otranto had already fled the scene and Glasgow which was the only vessel crewed by regular Crews and gunners was opening fire on the Germans but her shells were falling short. She was also under fire from Leipzig and Dresden who were scoring hits. The gunners on Monmouth and Good Hope were also unable to return fire from the majority of their guns as they were too close to the waterline and in the rough seas they could not see the Germans. Further to that the German vessels were hard to spot against the coastline.

Craddock ordered his ships to close the range so that he could try and use his smaller guns and Good Hope and Monmouth charged forward, both aflame, Good Hope ploughed forward trying to fire and fearing that Craddock meant to launch torpedoes Spee ordered his vessels to scatter away from her and concentrate fire. Good Hope was struck by thirty five shells, the final one striking her forward magazine which sent a massive explosion through the ship and broke her apart sending 919 men, including Admiral Craddock, his dog Nelson and four Canadian midshipman (who were the first Canadian sailors killed) to the depths. The time was 19:50.

Monmouth was also aflame and taking on water. A shell from Gneisnau had struck the fore turret starting a fire that caused an ammunition explosion so violent that it blew the gun into the air and off the ship. She fell away and out of line with Good Hope at 19:35. Glasgow managed to close with her at 20:05 but could do very little to assist her. Captain Luce tried to encourage the vessel to turn North west but he received a reply that the she was so badly holed that should she turn she would sink even more quickly. With the moonlight behind them Luce made the decision to leave her behind and save his own vessel and protect Otranto.

Nurnberg closed with the stricken vessel and ordered her to surrender. Monmouth wouldn't or couldn't lower her flags and the German light cruiser fired a warning shot, the only response was Monmouth turning towards her so she fired her guns into the British vessel which promptly capsized at 21:58. In the rough seas and lack of light Leipzig tried to locate survivors but couldn't find any and the German squadron moved on leaving another 800 men dead in the cold seas.

Admiral von Spee was only certain that he had sunk Monmouth and was certain that Good Hope had eluded him at first but after searching the area was satisfied he had succeeded in turning back the British squadron.

I am well and almost beside myself with happiness one German sailor, Hans Stutterheim wrote in a

Scharnhorst coaling in Valparaiso showing signs of damage

letter home.

It was great news that was celebrated through Germany when von Spee reported it to the German consul in Valparaiso.

HMS Glasgow collected up Otranto and met up with Canopus and warned her of the German squadron and their ability. Luce took the stragglers back around the cape to the Falklands and safety. The Germans did not follow, they went to Valparaiso to repair and recoal. Letting the Glasgow escape would have deadly consequences for the Leipzig six weeks later...