 |
| Blenheim Mk IVs formed the backbone of the bomber force |
7 December 1941 was a disastrous day for the American Navy
at Pearl Harbour. It heralded the beginning of Japanese military expansion, and
it had been something that some had been watching and waiting for—despite one
RAF intelligence officer, who believed that there was a rogue German fleet in
the Pacific. He argued that the Japanese could not fly aircraft as they were
carried as infants on their mother’s backs, and therefore lacked the necessary
development in balance. Others were more astute and had been watching the
Japanese with nervous eyes, believing the recent acquisition of south French
Indo-China could be used as a springboard into British Malaya. Sir
Brooke-Popham, the Air Officer Commanding, argued that the British should
occupy Siam to deny it to the Japanese, or at least bomb the Siamese airfields
that were being prepared for Japanese fighters. Intelligence officers estimated
that, should the Japanese manage to get a foot hold, they would be able to land
three or four divisions if they used the Siamese port of Signora, and be able
to establish land-based aircraft to threaten Malaya. The British staff within
the region had reached out to the local Dutch commanders to discuss mutual
defence as early as the autumn of 1940, and a conference was held in Singapore
to outline and finalise the basic plans the following February and a combined
military plan was decided by April on defensive lines, though with the
possibility of a limited offensive if needed or the opportunity rose
The RAF in the Far East,
much like in the Middle East, was spread thinly and armed with mostly obsolete
aircraft, including Vildebeest torpedo bombers and the untried Buffalo fighter,
and it had numerous inexperienced pilots and staff officers, with squadrons not
knowing what their operational roles were or what training they should be doing
until July 1941. New airfields had to be built to meet the strategical needs of
war on the Malayan peninsula, a process which also met the quagmire of local
government planning and shortages of both men and materials. The new airfields
that were built had inadequate anti-air defences, camouflage, dispersal
patterns and even the weapons for ground defence proved to be wholly inadequate
for military facilities.
Reinforcements from
Britain were even less likely to go out to the Far East, despite pleas for
modern aircraft and long-range bombers. A lack of spares added to the
desperation, though petrol and bomb stocks were at ‘adequate’ levels by
December 1941.
The British GOC,
Lt-Gen. Percival, had undertaken the responsibility of aiding the Dutch in
defending Borneo and its oil fields at Miri and Serio, even if the rest of the
island fell, which further watered down the number of aircraft available to
Malaya.
Further to that, Siam
was going to prove an Achilles heel to the British position in Malaya, with
their government leaning towards being pro-Japanese, and if they were
intimidated into allowing a Japanese occupation, it would give the Japanese a
springboard and airbases for their aircraft to attack. This was soon realised,
with Japan intervening into the conflict between Siam and Pro-Vichy French
Indo-China, which saw them occupy the southern region of the French colony and
immediately establish a military presence. With Japanese aircraft flying
reconnaissance over Singapore, Operation Matador was suggested, in which
British units would strike in Siam and occupy the port of Singora, the only
port in the area suitable for an invasion, but the military shortages and
warnings from London not to provoke Japan into war meant that they missed their
optimum window of opportunity. However, by the end of November, Percival was
pushing for Matador to be put into action, despite the local representative of
CIGS also warning that London would need consulted; that would take no less
than thirty-six hours, but the Japanese bombers in south Indo-China were
indicative of an attack against Siam rather than complete occupation of
Indo-China, and there was a belief that Japan would act quickly before more
Royal Navy units arrived at Singapore. The RAF in the region were moved to
standby to support Matador, with the Blenheim-I-equipped 62 and 34 Squadrons to
be ready to support the III Indian Corps, who were chalked for the advance with
seventy-two hours notice, while No. 223 Group brought its headquarters to Kuala
Lumpur.
The war seemed
imminent, with a report on 28 November from Saigon that showed that the
Japanese were going to attempt a seaborne landing near the vital port of
Signora between 30 November and 1 December: orders were released to attack any
such troop convoy if it was seen, and Matador was advanced from seventy-two to
twelve hours’ notice. Infuriatingly, London would not move on their position
and insisted on consultation, despite the fact that Japan could be landing in
thirty-three hours!
The situation was
deteriorating rapidly, to the point that the usual warning telegrams were to be
abandoned and the local governor given free reign to react. The whole of the
British forces were brought to second degree, which was defined as
‘International situation deteriorating utmost vigilance necessary; command to
be in position to operate at short notice’. (1)
On 7 December, the
Japanese 25 Army and elements of the 15 Army were spotted in convoy by Flt Lt
Ramshaw’s Hudson of the RAAF’s 1 Squadron, with further sightings through the
day, one of which was chased off by Japanese float planes. Quick response was
taken, with all forces ordered to full alert, and all bomber squadrons warned
to be armed and ready. Two Hudsons were assigned to follow the fleet, and 36
Squadron’s aging Vildebeests were moved to Kota Bahru in preparation for an
attack, while 62 Squadron brought under AHQ’s direct command—but the convoys
vanished. Bad weather and nightfall caused them to be lost and the search
widened into the Gulf of Siam, when a Catalina of 205 Squadron, flown by Fg
Off. Edwin Beddell, spotted the fleet and, without sending a message with
coordinates, instead dived to attack. Beddell soon found himself under attack
by five Ki-27s who had flown from the secret base at Phu Kok and they very
quickly destroyed the Catalina in a fire ball at 499 feet killing all of the
crew.
Despite continued
sightings of warships, freighters, and tankers in the Gulf of Siam, Matador was
abandoned in the fear that the Japanese were trying to provoke Britain into
breaking neutrality or draw British forces away from Singapore. With no
concrete photo reconnaissance, it was decided to wait for Japan to declare her
intentions. With the Blenheims and other craft on standby, awaiting an attack order
on Yamashita’s force before it landed between Singora and Patani and another
force heading for Kota Bahru while bad weather kept the station’s aircraft
grounded, the only help available to them was a message from the Chief of Staff
to the Air Staff:
Our thoughts are with you at this fateful time and I send to
all the air forces under your command best wishes of us all. We know the limits
in numbers and in equipment which necessity has set to your resources but we
are confident nevertheless, that your squadrons by their skill, gallantry and
determination will overcome all handicaps and win enduring fame for themselves
and their service. (2)
On 8 December, the
Japanese landed at Singora in the early hours of the morning and took the
neutral port with ease. The landing at Kota Bahru, however, quickly drew
attention as the first shells were fired, reconnaissance Hudsons were bombed up
and briefed to attack at low level, and all available aircraft were ordered to
attack at first light. 60 Squadron’s Blenheims were dispatched, 62 Squadron’s
were ordered to prepare for a high-level bombing raid, and 34 Squadron, based
at Alor Star, was bombed up with 500-lb SAP bombs and chalked up to attack
Kauntan—a plan that was changed at the last minute to transports off Kehasin,
before landing at Butterworth to refuel and prepare to go out again. The
Hudsons scored first, taking off in awful weather in the dark, but managing to
locate transports, who were supported by fierce flak. The largest of the
transports took two direct hits and exploded, while Japanese soldiers were
harassed as they disembarked onto the beachhead, and twenty-four barges were
sunk, killing an estimated 1,000 soldiers. One Japanese cruiser advanced,
giving the defenceless infantry covering fire and shooting down two of the
Hudsons. At 5 a.m., 1 Squadron RAAF withdrew to rearm. By the time 60 Squadron
arrived, they found that the Japanese ships had left the combat area with their
mission complete; the Blenheims attacked the already damaged barges and
abandoned landing craft, but then encountered Imperial Japanese Navy Zero
fighters over the bloody sands. One of the Squadron’s navigators, Kingwell,
described the scene:
 |
| Brewster Buffalo fighters were outclassed |
We attacked by flights, each flight choosing its own target.
The kill agreed in the squadron was one 8,000-ton ship and three fully laden
craft… Two or three Blenheims decided to drop their bombs on the transport. We
followed in behind and could see that she was red hot inside with bodies
sprawled all over the decks. We decided not to waste our bombs on it. We
dropped out bombs in a stick across them but by the time the twenty second
fuses had burned, the craft had moved some yards away. We could see that the
crews firing at us with automatic weapons. One of the boats overturned in the
explosion which followed and the others must have been badly shaken. It was a
neat bit of bombing but not particularly effective.(3)
One enemy fighter was claimed, but at the cost of one bomber
unaccounted for. L4913, flown by Flt Lt Bowden, was shot down into the Gulf of
Siam while attacking Japanese shipping. Bowden was
plucked from the sea to
become the first Allied airman taken as a Prisoner of War by the Japanese, and
the Blenheim flown by 60 Squadron’s Sqn Ldr George ‘Paddy’ Westrop-Bennett
crashed onto the beach, killing him and his crew.
3.Young, A. J. & Warne D. W Sixty Squadron, (London,
EP, 1967) p. 140
At 3.45 a.m., the
radar station at Mersing picked up incoming aircraft which quickly turned for
Singapore; the civil authorities were warned, the RAF’s fighters were advised
to attack at first light, and the AA guns ordered to fire. At 4.08 a.m., the
bombs began to fall on the city for the first time, killing sixty-one and
injuring twice as many. Seletar Airfield was also bombed, with three men killed
and facilities such as the sanitary annexe and cook house destroyed, while at
Tengah Airfield the runway was hit, leaving twenty-two craters and damaging
three of 34 Squadron’s aircraft. Two hours later, at 6.34 a.m., nine of 34 Squadron’s
surviving Mark IVs took off, leaving the three bomb-damaged aircraft behind.
The flight carried 500-lb GP bombs and similarly hit the barges and strafed the
beach, but they were attacked by Zeros, who quickly demonstrated their
superiority, causing one aircraft to crash-land and forcing another down at
Maching. The squadron reformed to head for Butterworth as planned, but were
intercepted by another fighter patrol, who claimed another bomber for the cost
of one of their own. The Blenheim fighters of 27 Squadron fared little better
and, having returned to their airfield, found it had been heavily bombed.
The only relatively
unscathed Blenheim attack of the day was 62 Squadron’s high-level attack. On
arriving over the beach, the formation of eleven bombers could see no Japanese
ships and so set off on a south-easterly course to find them; they eventually
found a force of fifteen ships, including barges carrying troops, and attacked
from 8,000 feet, but could not observe any results due to low cloud. Despite
flak and fighter cover from the Japanese 11th Regiment, all of the eleven
Blenheims returned to Alor Star undamaged. On returning, the squadron began
rearming and refuelling, but, at 10.45 a.m., they were attacked by high-level
bombers, who dropped 150-lb high explosive and incendiary bombs from 13,000
feet, well beyond the range of the 3-inch anti-aircraft gun’s range, killing
seven men and destroying four Blenheims, with a further five buildings damaged
and fuel dumps left aflame.
The Japanese had
also began flying to the newly acquired airfields in Siam, where they had
gained fuel and ammunition, and they prepared to attack and destroy the RAF in
large numbers while they were on the ground, following the successful bombing
of the Singapore fields that morning and the attacks on the FAA’s fields at
Machang and Gong Kedah. Zero fighters and Kawasaki Ki-10 Type 95s attacked Kota
Bahru over an eight-hour period, starting at 9:00 a.m., strafing AA posts,
aircraft, and personnel—diving down from 7,000 feet to treetop level and
hampering operations from the field. Sungei Patan fighter station, which
suffered from a lack of hangers and boggy ground that meant that the aircraft
could not be dispersed properly, also came under attack from high-level
bombers, who killed five, set fire to a petrol dump, and struck the Station HQ.
The surviving aircraft were withdrawn to Butterworth, which, as 34 Squadron
were to find out on their arrival, was far from ideal to operate from. On
arrival, the Blenheims found that there were no refuelling trucks or hoists
with which to arm the bombers with 500-lb bombs, leaving armourers to lift
250-lb bombs by hand. When oil tankers finally arrived, they only had 90
octane, which was inadequate, as the bombers required 100 octane. When the
higher-grade fuel was located, it was only available from oil drums, which had
to be hand-pumped into the aircraft. The station commander was a junior
accountant officer, and his day continued to get worse, as when the second flight
of 34’s Blenheims arrived, they were being pursued by Japanese fighters, who
proceeded to shoot up the airfield and shopt the undercarriage out from
underneath one of the landing bombers, causing it to crash-land. When the
Japanese finally withdrew, they left the squadron peppered, with only two
aircraft left serviceable. The field was soon crowded with the surviving
aircraft—seven Blenheim fighters of 27 Squadron and eight Buffalos of 21
Squadron—only to be attacked again, leaving only three of each fighter aircraft
serviceable. The Australian airmen left the field that night to sleep two miles
away from the target area, against the orders of their station commander.
Japanese troops had
managed to get into the hinterland, but there werer unsubstantiated rumours
that further landings were being made up the coast. After a failed attempt to
destroy the single branch railway bridge at Goluk River, it was decided by the
station commander, Noble, without consultation with the local army commander,
Brigadier Keys, to withdraw the aircraft to Kuantan. Noble went to investigate
rumours of Japanese troops on the perimeter, and so was not present when an
order from AHQ arrived to demolish the base to deny it to the enemy. He was
most surprised to find his operations room, containing the logs and diaries,
aflame on his return! By 7:00 p.m., all serviceable Hudsons and personnel had
evacuated by air and motor transport.
 |
| AVM Brooke-Popham |
A photo
reconnaissance Beaufort returned to base full of holes and so badly damaged it
burst into flames, but its valuable cargo survived, and by 3:30 p.m., the RAF
had confirmed that the Kota Bahru landing had been a diversion, and that
Yamashita had achieved his objective and taken Singora’s port facility
unopposed. It was imperative that the RAF attacked as soon as possible to
destroy the newly achieved airfields while they still had the strength to do
so, having lost nine of the eighty-seven aircraft of all types engaged on the
first day. In total the RAF lost of sixty aircraft out of 110 to bombing and
enemy fighters, with two airfields abandoned and two badly damaged. Lt General
Percival summed it up in his post-war book, stating:
The performance of Japanese aircraft of all types and the
accuracy of their bombing came as an unpleasant surprise. By the evening of the
eighth our own air force had already been seriously weakened.(4)
Air Vice-Marshal
Brooke-Popham signalled to the Chiefs of Staff that he needed the maximum
number of aircraft that could be sent, requesting that long-range bombers and
night fighters be dispatched as soon as possible, warning that ‘Should Japan
gain air superiority the situation would be very difficult.’ However, the
official history summed up the situation; ‘Japan was not to achieve air
superiority in the near future—rather she had grasped it that very day.’ (5)
The following day,
the remains of the RAF had to move quickly with the clearing and activation of
southern airfields to get what was left to relative safety. The airfield’s
approaches had to cleared of trees, drainage readying and most importantly fuel
and bomb stores had to be delivered to the fields—they could not afford a
repeat of Butterworth from the previous day.
With enemy air
superiority being the deciding factor, it was decided that the Blenheims would
have to launch attacks on the enemy’s airfields as soon as possible, especially
in the light that NORGROUP could only muster a small fighter defence. However
the implementation of the raid was not carried out with any haste, as orders
were not passed to Tengah until 9.39 a.m., for six Blenheims (three from 34,
armed with 500-lb bombs, and three from 60, armed with 250-lb bombs) to be
ready for a take off between 11–12 p.m., with a fighter escort collected at
Butterworth arriving over the target at around 4 p.m. Butterworth was to launch
a simultaneous attack using the maximum force of Blenheims available on Signora
port facilities and, if successful and possible, then mount a second attack.
There were fourteen
of the superior Blenheim IVs of 34 Squadron at Tengah Airfield, compared to the
four Mk Is of 60 Squadron. The former aircraft were preferred for the raid, but
half of the force were to be crewed by 60 Squadron’s men; the crews were
exhausted and had not slept properly in three days, and now 60 Squadron’s crews
were to fly unfamiliar aircraft. Nevertheless, six bombers took off an hour
late at 12.45 p.m. and flew to Butterworth to collect their escort, which
consisted of two Blenheim night fighters. The deficiency on the number of
fighter aircraft available at Butterworth, as well as the more pressing calls
to defend the airfield and provide III Indian Corps with tactical
reconnaissance, meant that was all that could be spared, and even then only for
a short while—they soon peeled away, leaving the six bombers to go it alone. On
arriving at the target, they were met by heavy flak and a swarm of fifty
fighters. which caused them to have to take ‘violent evasive action’, but bombs
were seen to land among a small group of fighters on the ground. The raid was a
costly one though, as half the formation was destroyed, with two of the crews
that were lost coming from 60 Squadron: Flt Lt Joseph Dobson’s aircraft came
down in a fatal jungle crash, and Johnstone’s was captured by the Japanese in
the jungle.
The second raid was
even more disastrous, with the formation of bombers being caught on the ground,
ready to take off, by a Japanese air raid with fighter strafing runs and
falling bombs taking a heavy toll. Sqn Ldr Arthur Scarf of 62 Squadron, whose
aircraft was already airborne, was undamaged, and he courageously went on the
mission alone, where he was attacked by fighters but still managed to bomb the
target. Despite a running gun battle all the way to the Malayan border, the
Blenheim stayed in the air, but force-landed near Alor Star, where the true
extent of Scarf’s wounds were revealed. The 28-year-old officer had suffered a
shattered left arm and a gaping hole in his back, but had brought his crew back
uninjured. Scarf was taken to the hospital and, despite the offer of a blood
transfusion from his wife, who was a nurse at the hospital, he died from his
injuries before the day was out. Post-war, Scarf was awarded a posthumous
Victoria Cross while his crew, made up of Sgt Calder and Sgt Rich, received a
DFM and a posthumous mention in dispatches in 1943 respectively. Butterworth
was attacked again that evening with ‘aircraft… being picked off one by one on
the ground.’
The disastrous first
daylight raids prompted AHQ to rule that no further daylight raids were to be
carried out until fighter escorts could be provided, but unfortunately these
orders were academic: the fighters of 34 and 27 Squadrons and RAAF 21 Squadron
had no serviceable aircraft, and neither did 62 Squadron, whose Blenheims were
likewise destroyed on the ground. The dire state of the theatre was also
playing on the mind of the station commander at Kuantan, who requested an evacuation
of the field on 8 December; this was eventually accepted and, on the following
day, the majority of aircraft (except for Hudsons and a flight of twelve
Vildebeests) were evacuated, with the Blenheims of 60 Squadron withdrawn to
Singapore itself. It was somewhat fortuitous, as the Japanese attacked the
airfield that lunchtime, destroying four Hudsons, a Vildebeest, a powerhouse,
and a bomb dump, with other damage to runways and other aircraft that caused
the remaining aircraft to be withdrawn as well. The ground crews of the
squadrons left by truck without official orders or their officers, before
meeting with 1 Squadron RAAF’s ground crew from Kota Bahru. Finding no one in
charge, they were taken over by their commanding officer, who took the
466-strong party to Jerautut, where they were put on a train that would send
airmen to Singapore and Station Headquarters staff to Kuala Lumpur.
Butterworth was
likewise abandoned on 10 December, followed by Alor Star, where the last two
remaining Blenheims of 62 Squadron were flown out to Singapore while ground
personnel were sent to Taiping in order to hopefully reform the squadron at a
later date. A further three Blenheim IVs of 34 Squadron and one solitary night
fighter flew back to Singapore from Butterworth to add to the small force
growing there. The airfields at Penanag was also demolished. Plans were made to
demolish Kuala Ketil and Labok Klap using unused bombs due to a lack of
demolitions equipment, but this was vetoed as the continual explosions and
smoke was worrying the already shaken army forces, who feared that the Japanese
had got past them—leaving RAF details to demolish the station’s buildings by
hand!
One flight of 34
Squadron advanced from Singapore for an early morning reconnaissance from
Kuantan as the base was evacuated of all other craft. Despite rumours of a
Japanese landing on the coast nearby (which was attended by Vildebeests and
Hudsons, who found next to nothing), Kuantan was still vaguely operational,
with one grass runway, stocks of fuel, and some ordinance, but no wireless. The
station’s commander was ordered to stand fast with three officers and twelve
men and await further orders, something that must have sounded quite ominous,
considering the proximity of the Japanese and the unsupported army getting
pushed back. The three Blenheims had been assigned to the important mission of
scouting ahead and around the Royal Navy Force Z, which was centred on HMS
Prince of Wales and the battlecruiser Repulse, who, under the flag of Admiral
Tom Phillips, were to launch a lightening raid on Signora. The previous day’s
abortive raids were supposed to have reduced the enemy’s air capability, as was
a proposed raid on Indo-China by the USAF from the Philippines, but this never
happened. Phillips was informed of movements sighted by the Blenheims and other
aircraft, as well as of the lack of fighters and bomber support available from
the RAF, who were now reduced to twelve Blenheims, twelve Vildebeests, and six
to eight Buffalo fighters in the Northern sector, with only a couple of bases
to operate from. Phillips dismissed the concerns, believing that the Japanese
air force would be able to do little against him if he struck fast. It was a
decision that cost him both capital ships and his life.
On 11 December, a
flight of six of 34 Squadron’s Blenheims were to take part in an intricate plan
to bomb Signora at night, with refuelling and rearming positions prepared at
Ipoh and Taipang. However, before the launch time, news reached AHQ that
neither field could be of much assistance, so the bombers were alerted and told
to spend the minimum amount of time over the target. The first aircraft to take
off collided with the hill top at Tanjong Gul at 2 a.m., the second failed to
take off, and the third circled Seletar Airfield for an hour and a half. The
next three reached and bombed the target through cloud, before returning safely
to Ipoh and Kluang by daybreak.
The RAF’s scattered
forces were no longer able to mount any further offensives and, with the
decimation of airfields, AHQ could do little more than relegate its force to
reconnaissance duties; this was carried out by the Hudsons, Buffalos, Catalinas,
three warship-mounted Supermarine Walruses, and Dutch aircraft, while the
Blenheim force tried to reorganise. On 14 December, 60 Squadron’s survivors
were sent to Burma to reform and rearm with new aircraft from the west, leaving
their Mark Is behind to shore up 34 Squadron while AHQ looked at converting
Vildebeests into bombers and Wirraways into dive bombers. A Japanese fleet
consisting of 140 ships was spotted on a south-south-westerly course from
Indo-China, including 100 transports, two aircraft carriers, and several
destroyers. Fearing the force was heading for Singapore to attack on her poorly
defended east side, the RAF assembled a strike force of sixty aircraft,
including nine Blenheim IVs armed with two 500-lb SAP, four Mark Is with four
250-lb SAPs, and five Mark Is with four 250-lb general purpose bombs based at
Tengah, supporting twenty-two Vildebeests, seven Hudsons, and fifteen Dutch
Glen Martins. However, at daybreak on 16 December the force could not be found
on the predicted course, having instead attacked Borneo.
The Anglo-Indian
army was faced with a very aggressive enemy, equipped with twenty light tanks,
and with air cover that left them struggling to hold ground. In ideal
circumstances, the RAF would have been able to offer some support to them or
the navy, but the earlier raids on airfields and losses during the counter
attacks had neutered their strike force, and yet again weary soldiers found
themselves looking to the skies and muttering ‘Where is the RAF?’ Furthermore,
the Air Staff favoured the Blenheim to strike Signora Port and troop
concentrations in the rear, rather than actively taking part in fighting over
the front, and they acknowledged there was little, if anything, they could do
to the Japanese-held airfields. This, however, was blocked by the GOC, with
Percival believing that hitting airfields would give the RAF breathing room to
attack shipping and aid the army. Those attacks would not come to pass though,
as Air Marshal Brooke-Popham reported to the Air Ministry that ‘he was unable
to deliver the scale of attack anticipated against enemy airfields and shipping
because the northern airfields were untenable.’(6)
Percival continued
to meddle directly in the RAF’s plans, ignoring the advice and statements of officers
who knew better, by ordering them to make supporting the 11th Indian Division
as their top priority, and instructing Brooke-Popham that his priorities were
in the Kedah region. The Air Marshal knew, however, that he did not have the
infrastructure or fighters to escort the bombers, without whom there would soon
be none left. Indeed, there were no fighters available to defend Penang’s port
on 10 December or to be used for tactical reconnaissance. It was a situation
that required the barrel to be thoroughly scraped and, despite pooling Buffalos
at Ipoh Airfield, the Japanese offensive continued and the airfield was
attacked, which reduced it to three operational aircraft, while Sungei Patani
airfield had to be evacuated as the Japanese were believed to be seventeen
hours away. On 19 December, Penang fell.
The airfields at
Alor Star and Sungei Patani were destroyed on 16 December by the RAF; Kuantan
followed two days later, with personnel being evacuated two days after that.
Other civilian fields fell to the Japanese, including the half-destroyed Sungei
Patani, where a large petrol dump was captured intact due to a ‘lack of time
and the hostility of the enemy.’ Ipoh followed on 18 December, with only three
operational Buffalos, and steps were immediately made to destroy excess fuel,
despite an attempt by an MVAF Rapide flying in spares to try and shore up the
defences. Japanese air raids soon claimed the Rapide. As many spares as could
be saved were placed on trains and sent to Sungei Besi at Kuala Lumpur, where
Norgroup re-established its headquarters. Within days, the shortages of
aircraft effectively meant that Norgroup ceased to exist, with its remaining
fighter aircraft put under the control of the Station Commander at Kuala
Lumpur, while everyone else was withdrawn to Singapore.
A last roll of the
dice was attempted with the only bombers available, and three of 34 Squadron’s
Mark IVs were sent to attack Sungei Patani. They took off from Tengah
individually without escort and set off into the night, but were forced to
return due to bad weather. The raid was attempted again on 23 December, and
they reached the target but could not see their results through the dark and
cloud. AHQ decided that further night operations would have to be carried out
from 27 December, when the full moon would aid their bomb aimers.
 |
| General Percival (far right) Surrenders Singapore |
Despite the bravery
of the Buffalo fighters at Kuala Lumpur, the Japanese tenacity proved too much,
and AHQ ordered the withdrawal and destruction of all the mainland airfields
and their stores, including Ipoh, on 22 December. Soldiers of III Corps managed
to save 300 drums of irreplaceable aviation fuel, and disposed of what could
not be saved before destroying the base.
The air war in
Malaya was very reminiscent of the RAF’s experiences in France and Europe, but
without the luxury of reinforcements. The crews of the Blenheim bombers—and,
indeed, the other aircraft—fought bravely against extremely tough odds, but the
deck had been stacked against them before it had even begun. Poor maintenance
of aircraft seriously affected availability of all types, while poor early
warning systems and airfield defences left the aircraft very vulnerable to the
inevitable air attacks by an exceptionally numerate enemy. The inadequacies of
the Buffalo fighters were a contributing factor, but the biggest was the
disregarding of information obtained by the Chinese and passed onto the RAF
about the capabilities of the Zero fighter. With their forces in withdrawal and
their aircraft destroyed, airmen were formed into scratch infantry detachments
to help the beleaguered army, and some of 62 Squadron traded their Blenheims
for armoured cars and, led by Squadron Leader Boxell, joined ‘C’Company of the
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders in battling the Japanese on the Grik road,
and fell back to avoid being encircled. The situation was dire and, where
possible, the army fell back to Singapore. The War Office looked at the very
real possibility that Singapore would fall soon too.
1. RAF Historical
branch War in the Far East Vol II p. 1
2.Ibid. p.8
4.Percival, A. E., The war in Malaya, (London, Eyre &
Spotswood, 1949) p.114
5.RAF Historical Branch, War in the Far East Vol II p.21
6.Ibid. p.52
