The loss of the Cressys

It had been a rough voyage for U-9, she had left port on the 20th September with sealed orders to

Silent killer SM U-9

patrol and molest shipping off Belgium and immediately fell fowl of a malfunctioning gyroscopic compass that took them fifty miles in the wrong direction. Then as a storm broke the German submarine was forced to take shelter on the bottom of the sea off Scheveningen but after several bumps along the sea bed the order was given to sail submerged to avoid collision. She sailed around aimlessly trying to ride the storm out but just before day break she was forced to surface to recharge the batteries.

The first officer, Johannes Spiess was in the conning tower on lookout and in the heavy swell and early morning light he spotted a warship's top mast. The boat's Captain Otto Weddigen, a competent and skilled commander, ordered the vessel to submerge and consult the periscope.

Three "small four-funnelled" cruisers were seen on the horizon moving at 10 knots in a line abreast possibly Birmingham class. Spiess was ordered to prepare the spare torpedoes, the vessel to dive to 15 metres and the crew stood by. At 7.20 (ship's time) the number 1 bow torpedo was launched but nothing seemed to happen. The young crew expected a mammoth explosion to mark their victory and a wave of disappointment washed over them. Weddigen checked the depth manometer to confirm his measurements and the periscope brow furrowed. Why had there been nothing?

In the distance they heard a dull thud as the torpedo detonated on the hull of the lead ship. Weddigen looked through the periscope and saw the lead vessel listing - it had been a direct hit!

Private Harry Sams RMLI was 46 years old and originally from Chipsted, Surrey. He was a naval reservist called up before the War started and kept on by Churchill and Battenberg's orders. Most of the crews of HMS Aboukir and her sisters Cressy and Hogue were reservists and midshipman joining the "Nucleus crews" of professionals and freeing up men to serve with the Grand fleet at Scappa flow. The assignment for the 7th Cruiser squadron, optimistically nicknamed the "Live bait squadron" was to patrol the long fourteens in the southern North sea, their mission was three fold but part of an agreement with France that the Royal Navy would secure the Channel and the northern French coast so that they could secure the Mediterranean from attack. They were also to keep the Belgium port of Scheldt open (a rumour of German merchant ships filling their holds with sand and cement destined to form block ships had reached the Admiralty), keep out mine layers and more importantly be the first warning in case the German High seas fleet was heading down the channel. Rear Admiral Campbell, who was in charge of the squadron was ordered to use his ships to patrol south of the 54th parallel to carry out this task as well as support Rear Admiral Christian's Harwich flotilla.

The Royal Navy Admiralty had theorised that the main threat to their supremacy was the German surface units which were in comparable number and quality to their fleet and the idea of submarines was somewhat of a novelty and not taken seriously. Commodore Keyes of the Harwich submarine flotilla wrote to his superior on the 21st August voicing concerns about the vulnerability of the squadron. Should the German fleet sail they would not waste half an hour on these ships, he also voiced his concerns about the vulnerability of the ships to submarine attack. His concerns were soon brought to the attention of Winston Churchill who stopped at Harwich on his way to Scapa flow to speak to Commodore Tyrwhitt (the destroyer commander) and Keyes with Admiral Sturdee, the Admiralty's chief of staff. He was so impressed that he consulted with the First sea lord, Louis of Battenberg and it was agreed that the 7th Squadron should be withdrawn in favour of newer cruisers could be deployed in their place. This was not a new concern as pre-War Admiral Mark Kerr raised similar concerns in a memo to the Admiralty. He theorised that should the Germans win a battle against surface units early on it would give them greater confidence, he argued the gap needed to be guarded by modern warships but the masters of the Grand fleet saw it differently

Now Sturdee tragically intervened this time and in conference with Battenberg it was decided to over rule Churchill and keep the cruisers on their important mission of keeping the Channel shut for the Germans until they could be replaced with Arethusa cruisers, which were still being fitted out. It was a temporary stopgap but one that would suffice.

The 7th Squadron was caught in the same bad weather as the U-9 as the ships were tossed about it was decided that the Destroyer flotilla should stay in port with the light cruiser HMS Hawke and Admiral Christian aboard the Eurayles was forced to abandon the rest of his vessels and return to port for re-coaling and repair his storm damaged W/T sets. He would later cite the bad weather as preventing him from transferring his flag to the Aboukir and suffered much criticism. Captain Drummond of Aboukir, as the senior officer took charge of the ships and the proceeded along their course at the slow rate of 10 knots, to save on coal, in a straight line. Another oversight was that Christian failed to tell Drummond he could call for destroyer escort should he think it necessary.

Aboukir began to list at 20 degrees as the water seeped into the boiler rooms. Captain Drummond signalled Hogue and Cressy requesting assistance as she had lost all but one of her life boats. As the damage was evaluated Drummond realised it wasn't a mine but a torpedo, he ordered a signal sent to the other vessels to warn them away. In the mean time anything that could float was jettisoned as men dived into the cold early morning sea. As the temperature hit them panic set in and their core temperatures began to drop. The boats tried to clear the stricken vessel which capsized and disappeared into the abyss at 6.55 am.

Then believing that her sister ship had struck a mine and the Admiralty's assurance that a U-Boat could not be at sea in such bad weather, the Hogue slowed to a stop and lowered her boats, to be safe Captain Nicholson placed himself on the opposite side of Aboukir thus putting the stricken cruiser between him and a possible U-Boat.

Aboard the German submarine the crew was elated at their success but were told to search the ship for any leaks caused by the concussion. Weddigen couldn't believe his eyes when he saw the second cruiser stop and was struck by conscience. As a chivalrous officer he was torn at whether or not to fire at a ship on a mercy mission - then again they were enemy warships.

Two torpedoes struck Hogue tearing her open. Within five minutes her quarterdeck was awash, five minutes later she was gone. However when the U-9 fired the sudden weight loss of two torpedoes meant she broke the surface at some 500 yards of Hogue who promptly opened fire at her, as did Cressy who also added speed to attempt to ram the U-boat. 

U-9 had been too close to Hogue and had to turn astern on one engine and dive despite her Chief Engineer's warnings about low batteries. Weddigen decided to press the attack loading the last reserve torpedo and trying to get a shot on the remaining cruiser. 

Cressy's deck crew scanned the surface of the water and sighted what they thought was a periscope and fired again. Weddigen fired two torpedoes, one of which was seen to go wide and the second striking her on the Starboard side boiler rooms, the cold water hit the red hot boilers and sent up clouds of steam that scalded several stokers to death. U-9 fired its last remaining torpedo that struck Cressy who sank a quarter of an hour later. The whole action had taken an hour.

As U-9 fled the scene the Dutch merchant vessels Flora and Titan as well as the British trawlers JCG and Corriander arrived to pick up survivors from the mass of splashing sailors and marines. Soon they were joined by Tyrwhitt's destroyers. In total 837 men were saved from the sea, 286 by the Dutch who repatriated them. 

In total 1459 men, mostly reservists and cadets lost their lives in that hour. Among them was Harry Sams who never returned to his wife Alice or 14 year old daughter (also Alice). He is remembered on the Plymouth Naval memorial.

Weddigen was hailed as a hero on his return. A jubilant Kaiser was said to be in "Seventh heaven" and awarded the ship the Iron cross. Weddigen would receive the highest decorations from Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria and Wurtemberg but was to die early in 1915 when his U-boat was rammed by HMS Dreadnought.

A court of enquiry found that Captain Drummond was at fault for travelling in a straight line without destroyers. The other Captains were blamed, though it was deemed understandable, for stopping to pick up survivors and presenting easy targets. Admiral Christian was criticised for not transferring his flag and Admiral Campbell was criticised even more for not being with his squadron at all and for staying with HMS Bacchantes as it underwent repairs, hardly the post of the squadron's CO!
Admiral Campbell defended his position by saying that he had never been given any real instruction as to what to do with his command

Churchill, undeservedly, took the most criticism for ordering them there in the first place and because of an ill timed speech on the 21st in which he said that if the German fleet didn't come out and fight then "they would be dug out like rats from a hole"

The King was quick to comment after the tragedy; "The rats came out of their own accord and to our cost!"

This was somewhat unfair criticism as Churchill had agreed that the situation was dangerous and it was Sturdee and Battenberg who thought better of it.

Admiral Christian later defended his order of travelling at 10 knots by saying;

The maintainance of a three quarter speed of thirteen or fourteen knots would have entailed an expenditure of coal which would have resulted in continual withdrawal of vessels from the patrol.

Battenberg decided that court martialling Drummond was not a good use of time. The board of enquiry ultimately decided that no one person was to blame and it was considered that lessons had been learnt. From now the Long Fourteens were to be patrolled by smaller vessels, no large vessel was to go below 13 knots, they had to travel in zigzags and if a vessel was torpedoed then large vessels were forbidden to stop.

Whilst the press played down the incident as regrettable in the UK, in Germany it was hailed as a great victory against the Naval super power.

At 49 New Road, Gravesend, it was met with tears and pain at a husband and father who was lost at sea and would never come home again.

The Royal Navy's hunt for von Spee in the Pacific

The Royal Navy were well aware of Vice Admiral von Spee's East Asian Squadron and even its numbers. Before the war officers of HMS Minotaur dined upon Scharnhorst in Tsingtao harbour on 12th June 1914 on an occaision that prompted one German officer to remark;

 "They desired a little glimpse at our readiness for war."

SMS Cormoran was well known in Brisbane  where she had regular refits and the squadron as a whole had been active in policing the colonies but now at this important juncture no one knew for certain where they were.

Conflicting information put the Scharnhorst in the Pacific, perhaps near Yap, Gneisnau was reported in Singapore to Admiral Jerram on the China station, which turned out to be the Geier, she was also sighted at Nagasaki (possibly with Scharnhorst) to Admiral Patey of the Australian station. They had very accurate information of the forces in Tsingtao but were unaware of the Emden's departure at the end of July.

The Royal Navy had been quite fortunate and had captured a lot of the auxiliary cruisers and commerce raiders in the Indian ocean. Although the Yorck and Prinz Eital Friedrich were being fitted out in Tsingtao and the Ryzlan was also under tow by Emden, the  Dirfflinger and Sudmark had been captured. There were others though, Seydlitz had disappeared off the coast of Australia, Princess Alice was last seen in the Phillipines and the Tabora, Zeiten and Kleist disappeared into the Indian ocean.

Admiral Jerram who had served on the China station since 1913 decided the best course of action was to try and isolate Tsingtao as soon as possible. British strategy had stated that it would take a couple of months to organise an invasion force to take the German stronghold and that would be reliant on gaining Naval Supremacy, should von Spee's fleet get amongst the transports it would be certain death for the soldiers aboard ship. In his report after the events the Admiral stated that;

I regarded it as likely that the German Admiral intended to concentrate his forces in the South seas but I did not feel justified in leaving China station to search for him through the southern pacific ocean and more over, the Australia, Sydney, Encounter and three destroyers were comparatively close to him.

In lieu of orders from the Admiralty Jerram decided the best course of action was to trap German shipping in the harbour and deny von Spee of a vital supply base, he was however over ruled by London who ordered his vessels back to Hong Kong.

HMS Triumph

Jerram's orders on the 28th July were to await the commissioning of the pre-dreadnought battleship HMS Triumph which had been put in the fleet reserve  on 25th August 1913 and which was hurriedly being equipped with crews and weapons from a flotilla of river gun boats as well as 100 volunteers from the Duke of Cornwall's light infantry and two of their officers. Once activated she would provide Jerram's cruiser squadron enough firepower to deal with the Germans. These repairs were completed and Captain Fitzmaurice steamed out of Hong Kong with HMS Yarmouth, four destroyers, the French cruiser Dupleix and began an interdiction sweep of Tsingtao under strict radio silence on 6th August.

Meanwhile Jerram planned to catch  Emden which he thought was heading to the strategic communications hub at Yap. He dispatched the Cruisers Minotaur, Hampshire and Newcastle at 15 knots, which he thought would be more than enough to overtake the German ship and its slow colliers. Unfortunately for the British the only vessel encountered was the SS Elsbeth who was on a routine journey with a cargo of Government coal for Yap from Tsingtao. Hoping to still catch Emden the German vessel was pulled over, her crew placed upon Hampshire and the vessel sunk with her cargo. Hampshire, which was low on coal and could have used some of the Elsbeth's cargo, was sent back to Hong Kong with the prisoners.

The German radio station at Yap Island

Yap was completely defenceless save for a party of soldiers from Rabaul who were preparing trenches and fire pits near the landing place but Jerram hadn't come to take the island, he did not have the men to spare or the time - his target was much more specific. The long range radio station was powerful enough to reach Tsingtao, Shanghai, Bismarck Archipelago and the Dutch colonies. Whilst the station stood it allowed von Spee to coordinate all of his vessels in the Pacific including colliers into a resupply network. With this still remaining in German hands he would be able to strike anywhere at anytime and it would make sense that Emden would be here to defend it.

At 9.30 on 12th August the two British cruisers opened fire from 4500 yards having given the civilian operator a signal to get clear. The new German garrison stood powerless as the 7.5" shells brought down the 200ft tower and caused fires in buildings and the oil depot. At 10am the British left to rejoin Triumph at Saddle Islands dividing in the hope of increasing their chance of catching any colliers or Auxiliary cruisers. Their voyage was uneventful and they discovered that Tsingtao had locked itself down and begun preparing for the inevitable siege.

The whole of the China station had been moving under radio silence and Jerram was unaware of the message sent by the Admiralty on the 11th August;

Practically certain Japan declares war against Germany on 12th August. Communicate by wireless with the Japanese Commander in Chief and concert measures. Send forth with one light cruiser to close Rainbow at Vancouver, coaling at Honolulu. You may now have whole protection of British trade north of Hong Kong to Japanese, concentrating your attention in concert with Australian squadron on destroying German cruisers.

At the same time the British forces were reinforced by two Russian cruisers (Askold and Zhemchug).  After their patrol the China squadron pulled in to Hong Kong on the 17th August and the C-in-C sent a message to the Admiralty:

Probably Scharnhorst, Gneisnau, Emden and Nurnberg are now together, but their position is still unknown, though Marshall Islands seems likely. I'm watching Tsingtao and arranging to protect trade routes between Japan, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Singapore with all available ships... Possible objective of German Squadron may be Dutch Indies, but ore likely Pacific coast of America.

He also asked the Admiralty if any vessels were available from home waters to help search the blue abyss and asked if they had any more news on the possibility of Japan joining the war. There was just too much sea and too many trade routes to cover for such a small force and von Spee's ships had disappeared like ghosts. Churchill would go on to describe that;

 von Spee and his squadron could turn up almost anywhere. On the other hand we could not possibly be strong enough every day to meet him. 

Ships were vital and already Admiral Patey's Australian squadron was being reassigned to escort troop ships as part of the Australian (and New Zealand) Naval & Military expeditionary force which was busy taking German colonies and facilities that could provide safety to von Spee but would be better used to search for the cruisers themselves. The only source of new vessels were the Home fleet on the other side of the world which were also being held in reserve in case the German High Sea's fleet were to set sail in numbers, or Japan which despite its anti-German stance and territorial ambitions in Asia was still uncommitted and denying the Allies 12 battleships, 11 armoured cruisers and 12 light cruisers that would have been invaluable to the search for von Spee.

Despite Jerram's theory that von Spee was heading toward South America he was concerned that he could double back having distracted the Allies. A transmission came from the Admiralty, its vagueness and penmanship point to it originating from Churchill;

How is China Station disposed? Destruction of Scharnhorst and Gneisnau is of first importance. Proceed on this service as soon as possible with Minotaur, Hampshire and Dupleix, keeping in communications R. A. Australia who together with Montcalm is engaged on same service. They are at present searching for them at Samoa.

However Admiral Patey wasn't at Samoa and had moved on and wasn't actively searching for the German squadron, merely hoping that they would run into them. Like Jerram his hands had been tied by the Admiralty and other events beyond his control.

HMAS Melbourne

Admiral Patey had originally deployed his squadron of Australian (and New Zealand) ships where he thought von Spee might attack and so the Sydney and a destroyer escort headed for Brisbane, Melbourne was at Fremantle and his light cruiser fleet went to Port Moresby ready to react. The Australian coast was large and unprotected and a bold bombardment of one of her coastal towns could make a large statement and be a major morale blow to the Allied cause. 

Patey also began to plan his own bold stroke of heading to Neu Pommern where the deep harbour would make an excellent base of operations for the German fleet. He hoped to catch von Spee there or failing that destroy the facilities there, any vessels or W/T transmitters. 

Things came to a head on the 6th August when the Australian Naval board reported that the German fleet were heading South East from the Solomon islands and were clearly on their way towards Australia. Patey swung into action and ordered the light cruiser Pioneer to relieve Melbourne so that the heavier ship could join his flotilla in the St George channel that led up to Neu Pommern. and meet the Germans head on. He was so convinced that the Germans would be hiding in the Bismarck Archipelago that he signalled Admiral Jerram to sweep down from the north whilst he probed from the south and catch the Germans unawares. His message didn't arrive until the 9th as Jerram's fleet were under radio silence heading for the Saddle islands and Yap. During this time Patey organised his fleet and briefed the Captains with a brave and audacious plan that involved HMAS Sydney and his destroyers to sail for Simpson harbour, Neu Pommern and after dark strike the German fleet at anchor catching Scharnhorst, Gneisnau and Nurnberg at anchor with the survey ships Komet and Planet which were on the Australian station. Landing parties would then search and destroy any W/T station they could find. No sooner were his plans laid out than the Admiralty in London sent an telegram to tell him to do what he was already doing and to do it quickly before the Australian government called his force to other things.

His forces swung into action and reached the port but found no German warships and the only evidence of a W/T station was one captured engineer who had recently arrived to make the hidden station operational. His vessels requiring coal and having failed to find anything of worth to destroy Patey's men destroyed all telephones and the post office and then withdrew.

On 12th August the New Zealand government alerted Patey that they were ready to send an occupation force to Samoa and enquired if it was safe to send transports. The bewildered Admiral had had no prior consultation and had to reassign his vessels as escort in case von Spee attacked it. He did agree that, having not found any German activity in Neu Pommern that the Germans must be concentrating at Nauru via Samoa and by occupying it they would cut the German line of retreat. Patey decided that the New Zealand's older P' class cruisers would not be sufficient to meet Scharnhorst and Gneisnau and so sent a message to meet Australia and Melbourne 400 miles south of Fiji before proceeding to Port Moresby to recoal for the final approach. He had unknowingly over ruled. The Admiralty in its' wisdom believed that there was enough local superiority and ordered the lightly escorted troop transports to sea, it was exceptionally fortunate that they did not meet von Spee's forces and invited a massacre. The Admiralty had also now directed that the French cruiser Montcalm should join Patey's force which was now divided in two and effectively neutered in its search and destroy capability. Instead of taking his heavy ships to Samoa straight away he had to send Sydney and Encounter to meet the Australian Expeditionary force that was intended to take Rabaul whilst he took Melbourne, Montcalm, and Australia to meet the New Zealanders at Noumea.

The New Zealand force arrived on the 22nd August and reached the final coaling point at Suva on the 25th August some two weeks later having effectively tied up the half of Patey's squadron that would have been most effective against the German squadron. Escort duties for Expeditionary forces had been the concern the Admiralty had warned Patey about on the 9th but yet a week later they were guaranteeing his forces to such duties without the Admiral's knowledge. Had they given Jerram and Patey more free reign to hunt for von Spee and catch him then the German colonies could have mopped up at their leisure without need for heavy escorts as without the Kreuzerwaffe only German commerce raiders and unprotected Bussard class cruiser Geier would have remained at sea.

Although significant in their actions in the Pacific the Allied commanders were left pouring over their maps asking... Where was Admiral von Spee and his cruisers?

The fate of the German "Australian Station"

At the start of the First World War the German Navy (Kaiserliche-marine) was divided into two main fleets with a Home port each and several smaller stations with responsibility over their areas which usually lay with the senior Captain taking charge of the vessels in time of emergency if no Flag officer was present.

Outside of the Grand Fleet there was the East Asia Squadron under Admiral von Spee with the cruisers Scharnhorst, and Gneisnau forming the core and the light cruisers Leipzig and Nürnberg. The light cruiser Emden was based in the home port, the Chinese concession of Tsingtao for defence. Smaller groups included the Schutztruppe in East Africa based at Dar Es Salaam (which consisted of the light cruiser Konigsberg) and the Australian station, based at Apia, tasked with patrols of the German islands of Samoa, Solomon Islands, Marianas, Marshal Is., Naura, Palau and Papau New Guinea. The vessels attached to the station were the survey vessel Planet and the Bussard class cruiser Cormoran.

Cormoran (Cormorant) was laid down in 1890 at Danzig with final completion on 25th July 1893.

SMS Cormoran

Armed with two deck mounted torpedo tubes, eight quick firing 10.5cm Sk l/35 guns on single pedestal mounts with 100 rounds each (range of up to 10,800 metres) scattered with two at the front, two on each side and two at the back. There was also five revolver cannon. The Bussard class were the last class of cruiser to be fitted with sailing rig as well as coal fired engines. As an "Unprotected" cruiser the Bussard class lacked side armour and all important deck armour protecting the vital equipment within the vessel. Eventually the Naval race between England and Germany meant designs leapt and bounded past them leaving them obsolete for fleet engagements but useful to carry out patrol ship duties, especially in the colonies and the islands of Australasia. She was never going to be the power in any particular water but against the isolated islands and for policing she was more than formidable. After a long career in Pacific waters carrying out various tasks including supressing two rebellions (once with the aid of the Kreuzerwaffe of the East Asian squadron), Cormoran was downgraded as a cruiser to a gunboat on 24th February 1913 by order of Admiral Tirpitz. Cormoran moved to Tsingtao for a refit on 30th May 1914. As war approached the senior Naval officer in Tsingtao, Kapitan Karl von Müller of the Emden ordered the repairs to Cormoran accelerated so that she could be sea worthy should war start. Emden left Tsingtao to go hunting just as war seemed imminent hoping to catch Russian warships at sea unaware. When she returned with the Russian freighter Ryazan in tow on the 4th August the situation had accelerated with Great Britain declaring war and Müller made the decision to abandon repair work on Cormoran and move her crew and guns over to Ryazan along with crewmen from the gunships Iltis, Luchs and Tiger as well as some war volunteers. The vessel was renamed SMH Cormoran II. The Cormoran was eventually scuttled by the Imperial Dockyard staff on the 28th-9th September to stop her from being captured.

Meanwhile her sister ship Geier (Vulture) was dispatched to replace her on the Australian station. The Geier had previously replaced another Bussard class cruiser, See-Adler, in East Africa and sailed from Taganyika for Tsingtao and stopped at Singapore to recoal and resupply. Hearing rumours of war about to break in Europe and aware of being in a British port the cruiser and her collier Bochum fled the Royal Navy and headed out to sea on the 29th July. Royal Navy intelligence passed to Admiral Jerream of the Chinese station stated that the Gneisnau instead of Geier had fled Singapore which shows how unreliable the observations and intelligence could be.

The Geier and Bochum managed to avoid the Royal Navy virtually disappearing and becoming a virtual threat that could have been a threat to merchant vessels and troop transports making the journey without escorts. She, like Emden and Spee's squadron were ghosts that were everywhere and nowhere. However Geier received orders from the admiralty to find the other vessel from the Australian squadron, the SMS Planet which was heading to Yap island to defend the important German Radio and supply base in the Caroline Islands. Once found she was to transfer her guns and torpedo tubes to the already lightly armed (3 revolver cannons) Planet and defend the island from any attack as best they could, failing that release the Planet for commerce raiding.

Geier was supposed to meet with the supply ship Tannenfels (which had also fled Singapore on the 2^nd August) loaded with 8500 tonnes of coal aboard that had been bought in Batavia but the collier never appeared at the rendezvous. Luckily for the Geier they did come across the Emshorn which transferred 1300 tonnes to the German cruiser and 1700 tonnes to Bochum before departing to try and make contact with von Spee’s ships but with the British capturing and destroying German radio stations and Spee operating under W/T silence the chances of finding them was very low, especially as Spee was heading due East at a faster speed than the old Geier could muster. The only other major German warship in Asian waters did make contact and after a missed meeting at Anguar on the 20^th August, Geier met with Emden and her collier Markommania at sea where the Geier’s Korvettenkapitän Grasshoff was ferried over to speak to Kapitan von Müller. No doubt they discussed the situation at length. It was decided that Geier would proceed to Anguar and not accompany Emden, possibly because she would slow down the bigger cruiser and be a liability if they were engaged by any Naval units. Geier taking on the mantle of a loan raider made things harder for the Royal Navy. With two separate units attacking targets in different areas it would cause confusion and chaos. If one were captured or sunk then the other would still be at sea. It was probably at this juncture that the decision to not get to the Planet was formalised and the junction at Yap Island written off, Geier would not make it before the Allies arrived and if they did they would surely be outnumbered, outclassed and out gunned by any Allied invasion force. Staying at sea was the only viable option.

As Emden made for the Molucca strait Geier turned for Anguar with Bochum. On arrival the empty supply ship was replaced with the supply ship Locksun (carrying 2000 tonnes of coal) and the Tsingtao (carrying 2300 tonnes of coal.) Locksun was ordered ahead to the Majuro atoll in the Marshall Islands whilst Tsingtao accompanied Grasshoff to New Hannover but Tsingtao was far from perfect as a supply ship, the coal it carried was Japanese and of a poor quality, it also had limited supplies and even lacked a water distillery for fresh water so had to use the Geier’s water distillery which meant regular stops to transfer water.

On the 4^th September at the island of Kusaie Geier surprised and captured the British freighter SS

SMS Geier

Southport and boarded her. Captain Clopet told the Germans he had been at sea and had no idea that Engalnd and Germany were at war. Taking them at their word the German boarding party decided not to scuttle the vessel and instead disabled the engines and disposed of tools that would aid in its repair before promptly disappearing again. The situation on Southport was bleak, it would take a miracle to get the engines working again but with pure determination from Clopet and his engineer Mr H Cox they managed to jury rig the engines to work in a very flimsy manner – it wouldn’t go backwards and they were was a strong concern that should they ever stop they may not get it to go again. This was coupled with the 2000 miles to the nearest British port and a severe lack of supplies. The Germans had told the local tribal king to supply the British ship with as much supplies as they could whilst it remained at the island and Clopet was able to barter for 350lb of coconuts and 400lb of a local root that the natives would eat for sustenance when all other food ran out, then he gave the order to set sail. On the 30^th September Southport pulled into Brisbane harbour and it became one of the great tales of British seamanship, doing the impossible and news of the Geier’s last known position was reported to the Admiralty but it was almost a month out of date. 

Now with the Locksun supporting her Geier continued its cruise around the Pacific but as coal supplies dried up the collier had to tow Geier when a recoaling at sea had to be abandoned due to rough weather and seas. Grasshoff had to change his plans again. He had hoped to get to San Francisco and surrender to the neutral Americans before he was caught by the Allies in open water, sadly his shortages of supplies meant that he would have to find a closer port to put into. On 15^th October the two vessels put into Honolulu harbour. According to international law neutral ports were only meant to allow warships of belligerent nations up to twenty-four hours to resupply and do minor repairs but as there was a lot of anti-British feeling amongst the Americans and the islanders the Geier was given an extension of three weeks! 

 On 23^rd October at 23:30 the USCRS Thetis spotted two steam powered launches acting strangely out in the harbour and signalled them to no avail, it lowered a boat and attempted to board one of them and fired a blank round from its’ 3lb deck gun causing the two ships to disappear into the night. The next morning the sun rose to reveal the battleship IJS Hizen and armoured cruiser Asama, with them was the German schooner Aeolus which the Japanese had caught just outside Honolulu harbour with its cargo of Copra. The Japanese were transferring the German captives to the Loksun in the harbour as well as taking the Copra aboard their vessels. Hizen’s launches continued to violate American territorial waters with their launches being chased by Thetis on several occasions including ordering the Japanese crews off the Hermes, another German trader overtaken and boarded within the three mile exclusion zone and ripping down the German flag. Captain Schmidt protested with the Japanese sailors claiming asylum and hoisted it back up as Thetis came closer threatening the Japanese with her guns. Hermes was greeted with cheers from the two German vessels already in port after the Japanese were forced to abandon their attempted capture. Hizen’s Captain claimed in an interview that he intended on waiting for Geier to come out and would stick to the rules of neutrality rigidly but every night his vessels would harry shipping within the boundary limits and the US navy sent out a further two launches from Pearl Harbour to aid Thetis, the actions of the Japanese did nothing to ingratiate them or the Allied cause to the Americans on the island.

With the amount of neutral shipping, including Japanese and German, operating in Hawaiian waters it would have been exceptionally disruptive should Geier take to sea and Grasshoff must have known that his vessel would have been doomed against the two heavier Japanese units and so it was decided to plead for asylum and internment at Honolulu, an action that satisfied all three parties and on 8^th November it became official and the two Japanese vessels left for San Clemente.

Three years later Geier was seized by American forces when the US joined the Allied cause against Germany. Her crew was taken into POW camps and the vessel renamed USS Schurz and refitted for escort duties. After various duties she was eventually sunk in a collision with a merchant vessel (SS Florida) which cut a sizable chunk out of her bow killing one crewman and injuring twelve. The order to abandon ship was given and on 21^st June 1918 she sank beneath the waves.

SMS Planet

The other vessel in the station, the aforementioned survey vessel SMS Planet was scuttled on 7^th October 1914 at Yap island to stop her capture by the approaching Japanese expeditionary force and her crew were transferred to the SMH Cormoran II, her wreck was later salvaged by Japan in 1916. With nothing more than three 3.7 cm revolver cannons she stood little chance of defending herself or the colony nor much chance of escape. Grasshoff's decision to not go to Yap was a wise one as his vessel would not have made any difference and both vessels would have been lost that day. He, like Spee took the gamble that should (when) Germany win the war, their colonies would be returned to them.

The German Australian squadron was not a war winning squadron, thousands of miles from the High seas fleet with obsolete vessels unsuited to war with the other Imperial powers and with only a limited ability against merchant shipping as their supply bases were quickly over run. The only hope for them would be to join up with Spee's East Asian squadron but they would be a hinderance to his larger vessels as traversed the ocean for Germany and would have been destroyed quickly in any major engagement. Their fate was sealed the day Britain and Japan entered the war and it was only a matter of time before they were forced to scuttle or be interned.

Escape of SMS Goeben and Breslau

SMS Goeben

It was 2.45am on 6th August 1914, and conditions on Rear Admiral Troubridge's flagship Defence were tense as in a little over three hours the first Cruiser squadron of the Mediterranean fleet consisting of the light cruisers Black Prince, Duke of Edinburgh, Warrior and Defence, with a screen of destroyers would be engaging the German battle-cruiser Goeben and her escort Breslau.

Throughout the night the squadron's men were preparing themselves mentally for the roar of the guns, explosions and the very real possibility that they could be killed and this was something that was preying on the mind of Captain Fawcett Wray when he stepped into the Admiral's chart room.

"Are you going to fight sir? Because if so the Squadron ought to know." He asked.

"Yes, I know it is wrong but I cannot have the name of the whole Mediterranean squadron stink" came the reply.

Obviously concerned by the answer Captain Wray, normally over confident and sure of his abilities voiced his concerns about the one sided nature of the upcoming battle. Goeben had almost twice the displacement of each of his cruisers, a slightly less weighty broadside but she was faster with bigger guns with longer range. Wray had been looking at these sums and that in daylight Goeben could rain down her 11" shells well out of range of the British squadron and use her superior speed to stay out of the British range. Wray finished his evaluation with the icy observation;

"It seems to me it is likely to be the suicide of your squadron."

       ***             ***          ***           ***         ***        ***        ***         ***       ***           ***        

Goeben and Breslau had been in the Mediterranean since 1912 patrolling the Balkans during the recent conflicts and flying the flag for Germany in the region. Goeben was a relatively new design having been completed in 1911 and dispatched before her sea trials had been completed and she had some on going boiler issues. Breslau, a light Magdeburg class cruiser was also constructed in 1911 and was similarly dispatched with the duty of escorting Goeben.

HMS Indefatigable one of three cruisers that could have sunk Goeben

As tensions grew in Europe grew Admiral Souchon the C-in-C of the Mediterranean squadron put into Pola, the Austro-Hungerian main Naval base and had his vessels overhauled and formed strategy with his counterpart Admiral Haus. It was decided on the outbreak of hostilities that the German and Austro Hungarian fleet would sail to the West of the Mediterranean and intercept the French XIX army corps that would be undoubtedly be transported by individual ships and covered by the French fleet spread out across the 3-400 miles route.

The German fleet had put into Messina on 2nd August to re-coal for a patrol and found facilities severely lacking. Souchon confiscated the German liner General and moved her crew over the Goeben  as well as a sizable chunk of coal whilst removing any unnecessary equipment from his vessels and stowed them. They pulled out of the harbour on the 3rd August at 1 am, slipped around the north coast at 16-17 knots heading for the ports of Phillipeville and Bône. At 6pm they received confirmation that Germany was at war with France. They accordingly divided then and headed for their targets.

The French fleet had also left port at Toulon on the 3rd August to escort the XIX army corps, however Admiral Lapeyrère had deployed his fleet into three sections to escort the transports in convoy rather than forming a broad front.

The Royal Navy under Admiral Archibald Berkeley Milne had also divided its forces with Rear Admiral Troubridge being dispatched with the first cruiser squadron to watch the Adriatic in case the Austro-Hungarian fleet should leave Pola. Milne was directed to remain with his other ships (Chatham, Weymouth) in case Admiral Souchon turned west or headed for the Atlantic. None of those were Milne's decisions, they came directly from London in a telegram on the 2nd August.

The lengthy message outline what Milne should do completely. His primary duty was to protect the French convoys, bring to action any individual fast ships but not to engage a superior force without French support.
Troubridge made clear to Milne that he believed that Goeben was a superior force to his cruisers, Milne was not worried.
"That question won't arise as you will have Indoubtable and Indefatigable with you."
Indeed the two I class cruisers with their 12" guns gave Troubridge an edge should battle with Goeben occur, they could engage her in a gun duel whilst the smaller cruisers and destroyers got closer for their guns and torpedoes. Their presence would also make the Austro-Hungarian fleet think twice. So with those two vessels, the cruisers Duke of Edingburgh, Black Prince, Defence, Warrior, the light cruiser Gloucester, and eight destroyers at 8pm on 2nd August.

The Germans made the first move. Despite receiving a telegram from his superiors in Berlin maked "Urgent" Souchon decided to press ahead with his original orders, which the new orders did not countermand. Goeben bombarded Phillipeville with fifteen shells before withdrawing. These were no transports laden with troops, no docked warships, no stocks of ammunition. Breslau found the same at Bône so Souchon ordered the withdrawal to save ammunition. He feinted westward before changing course north before looking at his new orders. Admiral Tirpitz was ordering his force to head east for the Bospherous with all due haste and then on to Constantinople. The idea behind it was to present the new ships to the Ottoman Empire replacing the two British build dreadnaughts that were confiscated by the admiralty before hostilities began.

At 10:30am, three and a half hour's before Great Britain's ultimatum was delieverd to Germany, Goeben and Breslau encountered Indomitable and Indefatigable, who had been ordered by the Admiralty (via Milne) to reverse course and head for Gibraltar in case the German squadron was heading west. As the two squadrons passed their main turrets turned to face each other and with each side eying each other suspiciously none of the customary courtesy signals were sent. As Goeben passed the two Royal Navy cruisers turned to pursue at a distance but keeping enough speed in reserve. Admiral Souchon must have intercepted the message from the Admiralty to Captain Kennedy about the British Ultimatum to Germany because he ordered more speed. In the Goeben's boiler room on a hot summer day the German stokers toiled so hard that they began to suffer from heat exhaustion, many passing out over their shovels and being carried out to lay on the relative cool air of the deck then at a critical moment there was a mechanical failure that released a cloud of red hot steam that scalded four men to death, but the orders held and the officers continued to press their men on. Slowly but surely she made headway over her pursuers who although of a comparable speed were in need of engine maintenance and their bellies scraping and they were unable to keep pace, even the light cruiser Dublin who managed another hour was forced to give up the chase sending the following signal to Milne at 7.37pm.

"Goeben out of sight now, can only see smoke, still daylight."

Later that night Admiral Milne was informed that both German ships had entered Messina harbour which threw up some new problems for the Royal Navy.

The good news was that they knew where Goeben was. The bad news was that he didn't know where they would go. The rumour of a German collier in Majorca weighed on his (and the Admiralty's) mind and the belief that the German ships would ignore the heavily defended French convoys and head out to terrorise the unprotected merchant ships in the Atlantic.

His hands were then tied by the Admiralty with a signal at 18:00 with the announcement of Italy's declaration of neutrality and banning any of His Majesty's ships from going within six miles of the Italian coastline, this would stop him from sailing down the straits of Messina or face violating international law. The best he could do was to deploy his ships at each end of the straits. Admiral Fisher (later First Sea lord) Commented afterwards that;

(Milne) "had no excuses whatever for not surrounding Messina with all his entire force right round the harbour mouth - close up! As if international law mattered a Damn! and the Italians would have loved him forever!"

Indeed when it came to international law the Royal Navy did not hesitate when it came to the Battle of Más a Tierra when HMS Kent and Glasgow violated Chilean neutrality to sink SMS Dresden which only led to the German consulate complaining. Although Italy was not Chile and the British government did not wish to provoke Italy despite their stance against Austria. However Milne lacked the flare to act independently, as was his right as the C-in-C on the spot.

 

Admiral Souchon in Turkish uniform

They pay me to be an Admiral, they don't pay me to think.

So Milne stuck rigidly to the orders he was given by the Admiralty in London. Troubridge was left at the mouth of the Adriatic watching for the Austrian fleet which he was capable of holding or slowing and waiting for Milne's squadron for reinforcements as long as the Austrian dreadnaughts did not sail.

Milne spread his I-class cruisers between Sicily and Tunisia in case the German Division did make aGloucester waited at the other end of the strait of Messina ready to tail the Germans.
move towards the French transports whilst he patrolled the North coast of Sicily with his other ships. The superior French fleet which could have decided the outcome could not be contacted and remained and unquantifiable. HMS

Souchon was having to make some hard choices as well. The Italians had given him a strict twenty four hour deadline and the coal stokes were severely lacking, there would not be enough to make it to Turkey. He confiscated as much coal as he could from any and all of the German vessels present ripping up their deck plates to speed up the process but it was still not enough. He also knew that the Royal Navy would be surrounding Sicily the situation was getting tough. He also received a signal saying that the Turkey order was not definite and that his reception was not guaranteed. Logically only the Austro-Hungarian fleet was safe, but how long before the Allies came for them and they were trapped in the Adriatic?

He decided to roll the dice and Goeben and Breslau slipped out of port at nightfall on the 6th August heading south through the straits and arranging to meet a collier in the Aegean islands. Milne heard that they had left and immediately redeployed his vessels heading west and then south to catch the Germans as they sailed around Sicily and slipped west which the Admiralty was certain they would do.

Souchon didn't know where the Royal Navy was and was concerned that with the amount of time needed to coal up he could find his small fleet being caught in the islands where they couldn't manoeuvre and taken apart. Goeben's engines were also playing up as they had been pressed hard in the last pursuit and he could not guarantee they could reach that speed again. There was another more pressing problem. He was being pursued by HMS Gloucester.

The light cruiser was dogged in her pursuit holding at 26 knots she refused to budge and even steered between Goeben and the shore to force the Germans to make a wider turn and slow down further. Breslau quickly dropped back fearing a torpedo attack on the lead German vessel and started making threatening passes and looking like she might fire at any time. Realising that the Germans could easily disable his vessel Captain Kelly ordered his ship to pull back and using the moonlight keep watch and signal Admiral Milne of their position. Admiral Troubridge was ordered to bring his fleet of cruisers, the light cruiser Dublin and his destroyers to intercept the Germans. At first confused by the heading and Goeben's feint Troubridge delayed his departure thinking he was going to turn north towards him but when it became clear from Captain Kelly's updates that the German's were still heading south east he ordered the fleet to make all due haste to meet them. According to estimates he should arrive in the vicinity of Goeben and Breslau at 6.30am. He signalled Dublin and Gloucester which arrived at 2.54am;

"First Cruiser squadron position 2.30 am 38 ̊ 25'N, 20 ̊ O'E Course south 20 knots. Am endeavouring to cross Goeben's bows at 6am."

Now Admiral Troubridge was waiting for his Navigator and said to Wray;

"I cannot turn away now, think of my pride!"

"Has your pride got anything to do with it sir? It is your country's welfare which is at stake" came the measured response.

After listening to the navigator with Captain Wray as they discussed the chances of his fleet getting through the up coming combat. It didn't look good. It was as they feared, the chances of them being able to get close enough to the German battle cruiser which had proved so amazingly fast against the two I-class battle cruisers just a few days before was very small. It seemed Wray's evaluation was correct. With tears in his eyes Troubridge ordered the end to the pursuit at 4am on the 7th August. Wray commented that;

"That was the bravest thing you have ever done in your life."

It is debated by historians and by the Admiralty in the enquiry and Troubridge's court martial as to whether he had done the right thing. Arguably with luck and a good amount of skill Troubridge could have damaged Goeben enough to slow her down or in best case scenario sunk her. The problem was how many of the Royal Navy ships would have gone down with her? Wray's theory might very well have come true and with Breslau running interference it could have become very dicey. There was also the confirmation that without the I-class cruisers that Goeben constituted a "superior force" as outlined by the Admiralty's prior orders, if anything Troubridge was following orders which is why he was eventually acquitted. At the battle of Jutland in 1916 HMS Defence did come into combat with German warships and was sunk after receiving seven strikes. Also at Jutland was Seydlitz, a similar vessel to Goeben took twenty-two 12" shells and thirteen to fifteen 15" shells which was a lot more powerful than the 9.2" guns Defence and the rest of Troubridge's squadron were sporting. In the enquiry Milne was asked what he considered were the most important factors to naval combat and he argued it was: "Gun power, weather and speed" so didn't consider armour worthy of note but it would have been the deciding factor for Troubridge's squadron.

At 4.49 am Troubridge signalled Milne to request orders and to report his decision.

"Why did you not continue to cut off Goeben? She only going 17 knots, and so important to bring her to action." was the reply.

For the first time Troubridge explained his actions in a very lengthy message at 8.30am:

"With visibility at the time I could have been sighted from twenty to twenty-five miles away and could never have got nearer unless Goeben wished to bring me to action which she could not have done under circumstances most advantageous to her. I could never have brought her to action. I had hoped to have engaged her at three thirty in the morning in dim light but had gone north first with the objective of engaging her at the entrance of the Adriatic.
I was too late to intercept her when she altered course to the south. In view of the intense importance of victory or defeat at such early stages of a war I would consider it a great imprudence to place Squadron in such a position as to be picked off at leisure and sunk while unable to effectively reply. The decision is not the easiest of the two to make. I am well aware."

Elsewhere that morning as Souchon's men had been unable to jam Kelly's transmissions the Breslau took positive steps to shake off their pursuer and with a need to shake them before coaling. She began weaving across the path of Gloucester as if laying mines. Captain Kelly ordered his 6" guns to fire on the German ship hitting with one shell beneath the waterline. Breslau began to rain down accurate fire upon the smaller British ship but unperturbed Captain Kelly urged his vessel to close the range so he could use his full broadside and torpedoes on the light German vessel. Pin pricks of light on the silhouette of Goeben meant only one thing and as two white columns of water confirmed Captain Kelly's fear, Souchon had ordered his vessel to slow and turn and bring his long range guns to bear on him. Kelly knew the odds and ordered his vessel to drop back signalling Milne at 2.45pm that:

"Have engaged at long range with Breslau and retreated when Goeben turned. I am now following again."

Souchon must have been very worried as with a light cruiser pushing at his fleet it could only mean that the Royal Navy were closing in on him. He must have been relieved to see Gloucester drop away at 4pm low on coal and following orders from Milne not to go further than Mataban and sent a final signal registering the German's course for the Aegean.

It wasn't until the early morning on the 8th August, some twenty four hours later that Admiral Milne would set off from Malta, 460 miles to the west with his three I-class cruisers and Weymouth to find Goeben. He would later site that HMS Indomitable which had been ready to sail on the 7th could not have gone alone as she was suffering from boiler issues and waited for his force to go en-masse. Still thinking Souchon was feinting took his time sailing at 10 knots awaiting the Admiralty to tell him good news.

Admiral Souchon met up with a collier in the Greek islands and began the lengthy process of fully coaling up for the last leg to the Bospherous, all the time listening to the Royal Navy's W/T transmissions getting closer and closer. Luckily for him the indecision of Admiral Milne and Troubridge's returning to the Adriatic meant he had enough time to carry out the operation without harassment on the 9th August. They made off at full speed and reached the Dardenelles on the 10th August at 5pm and received an escort through the minefield up to Constantinople, transferring his vessels to the Turkish navy on the 16th. It was a close run thing as Milne's vessels smoke could be seen coming over the horizon as they entered the Turkish mine fields. When Milne did arrive he was refused permission to give chase and was forced to stop.

The pursuit was viewed as a victory in the British press and celebrated as an example of the Royal Navy sweeping up the Mediterranean and the cowardly Germans running for safety rather than standing and fighting Milne's vessels. The Admiralty were not of the same opinion. The investigation into Troubridge's actions warranted a court martial for failing to engage but he was eventually acquitted due to the Admiralty's foggy order not to engage a superior force and what a superior force consisted of. Although considered blameless Troubridge and Milne's careers never recovered and they soon lost their posts being promoted sideways. Souchon however was promoted to Commander in Chief of the Turkish fleet on 23rd September 1914 and by November Turkey had joined the Central powers in their war against the Allies which led to the Gallipoli campaign as well as Britain's war in Mesopotamia and Palestine causing more deaths and casualties.


Condensed from the (hopefully) upcoming Kindle book "Evaders; Spee and Souchon against the Royal Navy" by C. Sams

Captain Benteen's orders

Benteen during the Civil War

Captain Frederick Benteen of the US 7th Cavalry took stock of the situation that was before him and was forced to make a decision, a decision that he has been criticised for since that fateful day on 25th June, 1875 on the banks of the Little Big Horn river.

He decided to disobey orders from his direct superior, Lt Col George Armstrong Custer, the CO of the regiment, and not advance to meet him and instead hold position with the embattled Major Reno.

The action definitely saved Benteen's three companies and the Ammunition train but also saved Major Reno's survivors from annihilation, but some argue doomed Custer's forces to death.

Custer's whole approach towards the Indian village was flawed from the beginning, it worked on the assumption that they would be rounding up women and children and that the braves would be out fought by the brave soldiers of the 7th Cavalry or flee before them. Custer was impatient and would not wait for the infantry column, nor would he take a battery of heavy Gatling guns because they would slow his advance. His aim was to move as quickly as possible living on the run like the  Native Americans did and the Gatlings, which required four horses each would slow down the advance and he wanted to catch the tribes before they dispersed. He also turned down assistance from the 2nd Cavalry believing that his men were the best and could defeat anyone.

There is some merit in his not taking the Gatling guns as they were prone to jam and as his unit would travel at thirty miles a day, average, they would have indeed impeded his advance. The arm chair tactician and many fellow officers at the time agree that having the ability to have a battery of guns that could fire 350 rounds a minute would have been devastating if deployed against a charging enemy.

On approaching the hostile country Custer's lack of intelligence and knowledge of the lay of the land or his enemies numbers or dispositions became evident and he began to divide his forces to scout them out and to give himself warning. Benteen's three companies were deployed on the far left to scout through rough terrain and make sure there would be no surprises for the rest of the column.

The rest of the command moved forward and sighted the Native encampment that his Crow scouts had reported as the biggest village they had ever seen. Custer believed that he was only going to face 800 warriors and the majority of the village were women and children. He divided his forces again to try and stop the Natives fleeing to the south, Custer's lion's share of the regiment would swoop in from the North as Reno struck from the South catching the them in a Hammer and Anvil manoeuvre that would force the natives to surrender (to avoid fighting amongst their Women and children) and submit to escort back to the reservation. He also believed that most of the braves were asleep in their tepees and would be caught out.

His hand was then forced when his scouts arrived to tell him that native riders had picked up his trail and were following him and that they had been sighted on the bluffs above Custer's position. If he didn't strike now, the initiative would be lost and the natives would disperse into smaller groups and flee which would be impossible to catch.

Reno's men advanced towards the village from the south with their flank covered by thick foliage and their view of the village likewise blocked and his men charged full speed abreast until they came around the river bend and were suddenly met with the enormity of the Native encampment. Had his forces been armed with Sabres they could have cut through cutting and slashing as they went causing chaos. As it was Custer had forbidden the 7th from carrying sabres. Reno's only hope was that if he formed a tight knit firing line and hoping that massed rifle fire would stop a counter charge and provide the anvil that Custer had wanted. Standard procedure was for the troopers to form into groups of three riflemen and a fourth to hold the horses in case they needed to break. He held a good position with the river to his front and the impassable brambles on the right and they began regular volley fire. Then it all started to go wrong as the Natives began to respond, they saw his vulnerable left side and began to attack it and even setting fire to the long grass forcing the men to withdraw. Their superior numbers began to tell and Reno would later testify he believed they were five to one. Finally when one of his Arikara interpreters, Bloody knife, was killed and his blood and brains covered the major's face. Reno's nerve broke and he called out to his men;

All those who wish to make their escape follow me!

There followed a rout as Reno led his men backwards towards the bluffs at their rear in complete disorder.

The exact nature of Custer's movements are unknown but as the 210 men approached the village, possibly trying to ford the river at Minneconjou ford at the centre of the village but were repulsed by a handful of sharpshooters. The native oral history makes claim that Custer was killed her as an officer in buckskin next to a standard bearer was shot dead into the water. Custer's body was found further north with the rest of his troopers so it is unlikely but someone certainly fell here.

Cooke's written order with Benteen's translation on the top.

 Custer took stock of the situation and the numbers of natives who were aligned against him and passed an order to his adjutant, the Canadian 1st Lieutenant William W. Cooke. The order was written hurriedly and thrust into the hands of sergeant Giovanni Martino, one of the buglers to deliver directly to the hands of Captain Benteen.

It read simply: Benteen come on. Big village, bring packs. W. W. Cooke. P.s. bring packs.

Knowing the pack mules were following behind slowly and not knowing what action was facing him ahead Benteen ordered his men to rest and water the horses for twenty minutes before advancing. Again he has been criticised for this decision but it is a reasonable action for a cavalry officer expecting action for you'd want fresh horses to face a charge. He claimed at the Reno enquiry that he asked Trumpeter Martin about what was ahead and he said that the "Indians were skedaddling"1 and saw no rush to follow up at speed.  He eventually moved off and arrived at Reno's position by complete coincidence and made that fateful decision.

As he approached he saw a fire fight up on the bluffs and thought it was the whole regiment and began to advance towards them, suddenly seeing a group of Tribesmen he charged with his orderly before finally recognising them as Crow scouts - they told him it was not going well, fearing that the force on the bluffs was the whole regiment having been whipped he moved to join forces and assess the situation.

The situation was bleak, the ammunition pack train was about an hour and a half away, natives were firing on Reno's position and they had taken losses in the disorderly flight. At the Reno hearing he described that Reno's men were in good order and that Reno had regained his composure, his men were still scattered around the bluffs for individual preference for firing but in relative good order, the nearest natives were about a mile away and there were some 900 Indians circling nearby but out of range.

Reno told Benteen that he had no idea where Custer and his 210 men were, they had followed the orders that had been issued with the understanding that Custer would support them as they advanced. That was the last order he had received. Benteen showed him the order he had received but then decided that he would be better placed to defend Reno's shattered forces. His men joined their tired and wounded comrades and began digging rifle fire pits to better protect the men and keep their firing rate up.

Captain Thomas Weir requested permission to ride towards the sound of volley fire stating they had a duty to try to reach the rest of the regiment and support their Commanding officer. Reno and Benteen refused to budge and Weir, without orders, charged forward with his troopers but they only managed to push forward for a mile before they were forced to retire again by large numbers of tribesmen. All that they could see of Custer's men was swirling dust and gunfire. It was already too late.

Benteen believed that they were under attack from up to eight thousand Natives and the fire became more lively, so much so that; You only had to show a hat or a head or anything, to get a volley toward it. 2 As Custer's men were firing their last shots the Sioux turned and headed in full force against Reno. Benteen's account describes a harrowing evening and night with the Natives shooting at anything that moved followed by heavy fire the next day. Rudimentary breast works were dug and Benteen led a charge to clear the enemy from the ravine before retiring back towards the summit of the bluffs and they dug in and waited around their horses and the ammunition train.

So did Benteen make the right decision? Should he have followed his orders without question towards Custer?

In short, I think he made the right decision to disregard the order. Had Benteen ignored Reno's position and forced their way towards Custer they would have been destroyed too. Reno's forces were shattered and short of ammunition and could not have moved out in any sense of order and without attracting the fire from below. Captain Weir's advance took place only thirty minutes after Benteen arrived and they were forced to withdraw quite quickly and that was before the ammunition mules had arrived. Benteen had no knowledge of what was ahead of him nor the exact position of Custer nor the number of enemies he was facing. The situation was totally untenable and without the information or the ammunition he could go nowhere. Had he advanced it would have been likely that his three companies would have been caught out on the trot and met the same fate as Custer leaving the Sioux able to cut what was left of Reno's forces to shreds.

Two men did leave the ammunition train, Boston Custer (the colonel's brother) and Henry Reed (his nephew). They went at full speed to Custer's side where they were killed.

Benteen's three companies could not save the lives of Custer's 210 men but they did save the lives of Reno's as well as their own.

Operation Banquet - British bombers over the beaches

Tiger moth Trainers were to carry out Banquet

Desperate times call for desperate measures and never has Great Britain been as desperate as it was in
the summer of 1940.

As 2400 German aircraft bombarded the RAF's fighter command and around 3000 barges were being pooled to transfer the 6th and 9th Armies across the English Channel. The British Military began looking at contingences in case the RAF were unable to overcome the odds.

As the majority of the light and medium bombers would be ear marked for attacking the heavily defended invasion fleet and ports, a new plan had to be organised for attacking the beaches and on the 13th July a survey of available aircraft for operations was ordered. The solution was Operation Banquet.

Banquet was divided into several different phases depending on where the aircraft were coming from be it Banquet Civil (using Civilian aircraft - which was dropped quickly), Banquet 6 (absorption of some of Group 6 units), Banquet 22 (absorbing 22 group army co-operation units), Banquet Alert (Fleet air arm training units under RAF Costal command) and Banquet Training. In all 350 aircraft of various types and quality were thrown together for this last ditch exercise.

Banquet Training and Alert are the most concerning as they consisted of trainee pilots considered to be of "a certain level of ability" and their instructors.

The aircraft they were to be assigned were modified Tiger moth trainer bi-planes which lacked basic defensive armament, self sealing fuel tanks or armour. They also lacked bombsights and only had racks that had been designed for small bombs weighing about 9kg.

The general plan was for the Tiger Moths to fly over the target once to identify it and then turn around and go into a shallow dive and release their bombs. these small bombs would have been very ineffective against enemy armour but could have proved deadly to infantry on the ground.

The problem was that the Tiger Moths would be attacking individually with only a handful of bombs under fire from anything the German's could fire at them and with the lack of armour and slow speed would have meant that even the small arms fire carried by infantrymen could have brought the planes down.

Further to that the inexperienced pilots would have been easy pickings in their trudging bi-planes to the Bf 109 E fighters.

The pilots spent the summer of 1940 practicing bombing but due to shortages the Tiger moths were flown from the front cockpits whilst a second man dropped bricks out of the rear cockpit to simulate the drop.

Paddy Denton, a young Bomber Command trainee had this to say of Banquet.

It was an indication of how ill prepared for war we, as a nation were. When there was some sort of threat of attack, presumably from the sea, some of the more serviceable Tiger moths were fitted with bomb racks and tiny little bombs, about 3lb, I would have thought.
These appalling threats to an invader were rehearsed without the benefit of Bombsight or anything so sophisticated by a neat HEAT Robinson device of little leavers in front of the intrepid aviator.
The experience did make me ponder about the possible outcome of the war.
(Bomber Crew, P. 43)

There was also another branch of Banquet that had Tiger Moths fitted with long metallic blades with the notion that they would fly through clouds of paratroopers and cut their parachute chords or the unfortunate soldiers in half immune from enemy fire as they would be in close proximity to their own troops!

So could Banquet have been pulled off?

In the desperate times of a German invasion of the British Isles there is no doubt that these 350 aircraft would have been thrown at the beaches swarming with German soldiers or concentrations of Paratroopers and a sizable chunk may have actually reached their targets.

The Luftwaffe fielded approximately 600 Bf 109s which had the task of providing escorts to any bomber attacks, sweeping the beaches to protect the infantry and forming an aerial umbrella over the landing craft to protect against the RAF's other bombers. All this over a front stretching from the Isle of Wight to Ramsgate! It would be fair to say they would have been very stretched allowing the aircraft of Banquet to get through.

There is also a good chance that the Tiger moths would have been difficult to intercept due to their slow speed. In the hands of a good pilot a biplane can avoid getting hit by rolling away. By the time the 109 realised they had missed and come around the Biplane would have got away. Sadly these would not be experienced pilots and their unarmoured crates would have broken up after a few rounds.

The biggest risk would have come from ground fire and although the soldiers would have had more pressing issues, like British machine gun posts and hard points, there is no doubt some form of defensive fire would have been thrown up .

Banquet would have been an unpleasant surprise for a German invader and I have no doubt that in Britain's most desperate hour these aircraft would have taken off. It would have been a gallant yet bloody defence of England's shores.