The end of the Goliath

The night of the 12/13 May was much like any other with the Goliath, the Cornwallis and five Bulldog and Beagle patrolled near Du Tott’s battery, HMS Pincher sat mid channel and HMS Wolverine and Scorpion guarded the opposite side of the channel at Eren Keui bay.

HMS Goliath

destroyers taking up position in the mouth of the straits covering the French position at Kereves Dere whilst the destroyers HMS

   The weather was far from ideal as the night was particularly dark and moonless limiting visibility which was exacerbated by fog. The use of searchlights to aid in observation were prohibited as they would give away the positions of the battleships.  Ashmead Bartlett later recalled that “Many who had prophesied that, owing to the exposed position, a disaster would occur sooner rather than later” (1) The suspicion of attack was so high that the gun crews and lookouts aboard the Cornwallis had been warned to be extra vigilant against a night attack. At approximately 1:15 a.m. an unfamiliar torpedo boat loomed out of the darkness close to the Goliath. The duty quartermaster hesitated giving the order to fire on the strange vessel in case it was a friendly vessel, as was most likely considering the large volume of Allied shipping and with no sign of the Ottoman fleet. A signal was flashed over demanding the vessel identify itself but the reply that returned, although in English, made no sense. The crew began to react but were only able to fire off three rounds from a 25 pounder gun before the first torpedoes struck the helpless battleship.

   The unknown vessel was, in fact, the Ottoman torpedo boat Muavanet-i-Millet under the command of Senior Lieutenant Ayasofyali Ahmed Saffed and Kapitänleutnant Rudolf Firle who had persuaded the Naval Command to allow them to try a raid on the Allied fleet. The German-Turkish crew had left Constantinople on the night of the 12 May and used the inky darkness to their benefit and drifted down the straits and clinging as close to the shore as they could passing the Bulldog and Beagle completely undetected until they came across the exposed battleship and took careful aim.

The Muavanet-i-Millet

   The first torpedo struck the Goliath abreast of the fore turret and the second abeam her fore funnel and moments later the third struck close to the aft turret. With all surprise gone the Muavanet-i-Millet quickly turned for home and disappeared into the darkness with the destroyers HMS Scorpion and Wolverine in pursuit in a desperate gamble to cut off the Ottoman’s retreat.

   Following the impact of the torpedoes the sleeping crew were shaken from their bunks and hammocks. Wolstan Forrester joined the other Midshipman who were gathering on deck in their pyjamas as some of the ship’s Boys were led by a RNR Sub-lieutenant (probably Albert Lund) up a ladder from the gun room flat with the Reservist assuring them to remain calm and that they would all be saved.

   The Goliath began to list quite quickly to starboard and as Forester climbed up to the quarter deck he estimated it was at a five degree list so quickly made for the port side where a crowd was gathering.

   There was a certain amount of confusion as Able Seamen tried to launch boats but found the growing list prevented launching. Calls of “Boat ahoy!” drew the crowd’s attention to the inky blackness but no boats could be seen and the Commander was was urging a team of men to throw flotsam overboard but the list stopped them getting it over the portside and the ship’s fittings, such as the Captain’s hatch made it too difficult to go over the starboard side and the men gave it up as a bad job.

   The night air was suddenly filled with loud noises from deep within the vessel as she listed further and further over twenty degrees.
Inside the ship everything was not secured was sliding about and banging up against the bulkheads with a series of crashes. Crockery was smashing – boats falling out of their cruches – broken funnel guys swinging anainst the funnel casings. (2)

   As the situation rapidly broke down it was obvious the ship was lost and the voices of the gathered men calling for help quietened momentarily and through this the voice of an officer rang out loud and clear:
“Keep calm men, be British!”

   Then the vessel rapidly began to heal over again and the men on the Portside began to climb over the sides and jump into the water with the Commander jumping two seconds ahead of Forrester who hit his face on the side of the vessel on his fall of thirty feet into the water. On hitting the water Forrester was struck by another falling seaman who almost pulled him down but the young midshipman pulled himself free and swam fifty yards to safety to avoid the suction of the battleship as it made its final journey to the bottom of the straits.
I watched her last moments. The noise of crashing furniture and smashing crockery was continuous. Slowly her stern lifted until it was dimly outlined against the deep midnight sky. Slowly her bows slid further and further under until, with a final lurch, she turned completely over and disappeared bottom upwards in a mass of bubbles. (3)
Forrester made for the nearby HMS Cornwallis two and a half miles away worrying about sharks and listening to the shrieks and calls of other men in the water grow more and more infrequent. Having jettisoned his water logged pyjamas he made it onto a spar for a rest before once again plunging into the cold water but found that the current was pushing him off course and he couldn’t even get into the Cornwallis’ searchlight beams. He looked around for another vessel and was able to signal a rowboat but promptly fainted as soon as he was pulled aboard after all of his exertions. The Cornwallis was too far away and the current was too strong with only one man getting no nearer than two hundred yards away before they were picked up. The Goliath had also laid only a hundred yards from the shore but none of the crew were able to swim against the current to reach it.

   Following the torpedoing it took the surrounding ships vital moments to realise the situation. From the Cornwallis those on duty on the bridge believed that they had heard a heavy gun firing. As the cries of the men gathered on the Goliath’s deck reached them the first thought was it was exultant French soldiers cheering a victory, others were dulled bu the constant rifle fire from the trenches before it became clear that they were actually hearing “Ship Ahoy!”

   On the nearby HMS Majestic Petty Officer Cowie was shaken from his hammock by the explosions and burst out onto the deck as the ship’s boats were ordered away to search for survivors in the water. “The Goliath was gone, but in the water were struggling men and floating wreckage of every description” (4) The men on the deck stared helplessly into the darkness as the current washed the “struggling mass of humanity down upon us”.

   Rope, life belts and flotsam were thrown overboard for the men to cling to and Cowie, in absence of orders forbidding their use, brought the searchlights on to scour the dark and illuminate those in the water to help the lifeboats recover who they could. However those in the water tried to avoid the Majestic believing she was steaming towards them when in fact they were caught in the current and the old battleship was stationary.

   For the boats in the water the current was proving quite a problem with Signalman Beale of the Cornwallis recording that:
I never want to have a more heart rending job! It was awful while picking up one man to hear another not twenty yards away shouting “Picket Boat, Help! Quick! I’m nearly done!” when we knew that the current was sweeping him down stream into the darkness. (5)
Though he also noted that the men retained their sense of humour and that ten minutes after getting into the boat and getting a jumper or coat from one of their rescuers would soon make a joke about having only doing their washing just the day before. Another issue the lifeboats had was with the searchlights playing across the darkness stopping their eyes from adjusting to the darkness.
We had to work at a slow speed as our searchlights and those of other ships only served to make the darkness more terrible, and we were afraid of running down the men struggling in the water. (6)

      Admiral, Sir Rosalin Wemys had stood on the deck of the cruiser Eurayles, a great coat pulled over his pyjamas, having been similarly been jolted out of bed by the action, watching the searchlights play across the water. He described the speed of the incident in his post war book:
They appeared to our horrified vision of men struggling in the water, all the clearer for the surrounding darkness. The night was perfectly still and it was difficult to believe that the fighting lay only hundred yards distance, a noise which gradually rose and fell and finally subsided as the men were picked up or drowned until at last stillness once more reigned and no sign were left of the tragedy that had so suddenly overtaken Goliath. (7)

   Forrester was brought aboard a trawler and given some clothes before transferring to the Lord Nelson with the other survivors. The men swapped stories of their escapes with a Lieutenant telling the young Midshipman that his watch had stopped at 1:29 a.m. when he hit the water and believed the battleship had sunk in three and a half minutes. News that the Commander had survived was greeted well but tinged with grief for the loss of Captain Thomas Shelford who was killed in the water by a falling boat which crushed him beneath its weight. Another of the fallen was the young Ship’s boy Alfred Gadd. One Midshipman was not picked up until two days later when he was found floating in his Gieve safety waistcoat but he was too exhausted from his exertions and sadly passed away soon afterwards.

   The current and the swiftness of the sinking meant relatively few were saved with 570 men being killed and 20 officers and 130 men saved with the former surviving in greater numbers as their quarters were above deck and the rest of the crew were “caught like rats in a trap, and were drowned below” (8)

   The loss had a bad effect on the crews of the other battleships with the speed of the attack and sinking as well as the high rate of loss. Cowie would later record that “the sight of those poor fellows struggling in the water and the realisation of the swiftness of the catastrophe, were significant to unnerve the strongest men.” For the crewmen on the decks of the nearby battleships they were left feeling helpless:

   One would imagine that after having seen hundreds of dead and wounded one would be inured to shocks of all kinds, but nothing we had experienced affected us so profoundly as the sight of these men, swept past in the darkness on a five-knot current, and the sound of their voices rising from the water (9)

End Notes:

1. Ashmead-Bartlett E. The uncensored Dardanelles Loc 1807
2. Forester W    From Dartmouth to the Dardanelles Loc 1159
3. Ibid. Loc 1474
4. Goodchild, G. The Last cruise of the Majestic p.103
5. Stewart A. & Peshall C, The Immortal Gamble p. 171
6. Ibid p.171
7. Wester-Wemyss R. The Navy in the Dardanelles campaign, p.83
8. Ashmead-Bartlett E. The uncensored Dardanelles Loc 1816
9. Stewart A & Peshall C, The Immortal Gamble p. 169

An Account of the Dardenelles raid 18th March 1915

A Letter written by Commodore Roger Keyes his wife dated 21st March 1915 detailing some of the events of the raid on the Dardenelles' forts on the 18th March 1915.

Roger Keyes in 1918

So much has happened since I last wrote it is hard to know where to begin... I don’t know how much

the Admiralty will tell, but we had cruel luck at a moment when we had the forts beat and should have been in a position to commence sweeping the mine field beneath the Narrows. The Turks are sure to claim that they sank 3 or 4 if not more ships, and the Admiralty must admit the loss of 3 so there can be no harm in writing about it. The light for the bombardment at the forts at the Narrows is bad until about 10:30 a.m. - it is an awful pity they can’t start much earlier, say daylight, as 4 hours are wasted, and we do want a long day so badly. The night of the 17th-18th we had mine sweepers, British and French, and Picket boats in the area our ships were to go into, and they reported in the early morning that all was clear so we went in the Agamemnon, Lord Nelson, Queen Elizabeth and inflexible, proceeded by s pair of destroyers sweeping. When we arrived about 16,000 yards from the forts at the Narrows we formed a line abreast in order of Q.E., Agamemnon, Lord N., and Inflexible.

The French squadron took up position about 2000 yards astern of us ready to close the forts when required - the idea being that we would bombard the forts at the Narrows at long range and when they were well hammered the older ships would close range under cover of our fire.

On each flank which we (ie. the 4 modern ships) were bombarding an old British battleship was stationed to fire on the concealed howitzer and other batteries on the hills overlooking the straits - Prince George our side (Gallipoli) and Triumph on the Asiatic shore.

These guns cannot be touched - or the majority of them, and the are very annoying. The only thing is, as their fire is indirect, if one moves about one can avoid a good deal - but of course this rather interferes with accurate shooting so we stay still until it gets too hot.

It is very obvious that all the defences are run by Germans. The system of fire is wonderfully good and they fire salvoes. Our friends dropped salvoes if 3 all around us, they came down from heaven very steep and do a good deal of damage. The field guns which are concealed about direct all their ttention to killing people with shrapnel in our control positions - and our experts had many close shaves - one shell hit the wireless and some digging and soars and sent a shower if dirt and stuff through the suit in the conning tower, a good deal got in my eyes which brother-in-law removed. It is a funny small world - who would have imagined Boysie and I would find ourselves in the Conning tower of the Queen Elizabeth during the attack on the Dardanelles. The Inflexible on the other shore had the same attentions but suffered more severely, her bridge caught on fire and blazed. Then a shell hit the fire control top killing or wounding everyone in it - but the did not know this in the Conning tower for a long time, and when they did know they couldn’t get up to help owing to the raging fire at the foot of the mast so they got almost cooked poor fellows. Vermeer was very badly wounded and another lieutenant would have lost a leg and an arm had he lived. The Inflexible had to go out for a bit go get the ship before the wind in order to take the smoke and flames away from the mast. The Dr. said he could have saved them both but while he was dressing them a shell hit the armour outside the dressing station and this made Verner wince and started hemorrhage again. Soon after that she struck a mine and the tremendous explosion shook the ship fore and aft, caused then such shock that in both cases the haemorrhages started again. They both died that evening. Many were killed by the mine explosion. She had 3 officers and 29 men killed ? Wounded. We were very lucky and had no casualties. The ship is so well armoured and the orders in all ships are very strict as to taking cover - our worst hole was s big one on the deck which wrecked the gun room. I have got in rather too fast.

At about 12(noon), the gifts bring silent, the French were ordered to close in to engage at close range. They were gallantly led by Guépratte. At about 2:39 they were ordered to withdraw to allow their reliefs to come in - the French squadron consisted of Suffrrn, Gaulois, Charlemagne and Bouvet. They had done very well but they, I mean the ships, not personnel, can’t stand a knocking about and they are rather a source of anxiety. The Prince George and Triumpg, had closed to support, then withdrew with the Frenchmen - when doing d, and practically passing through our kind, the Bouvet is seen to be on fire aft - then a tremendous explosion occurred and still going fast turned turtle and foundered. It would be impossible to imagine anything happen more quickly. It was a tragedy, all our ships near sent boats. Luckily every ship had a picket boat near her seeking for floating mines, and they and our destroyer, Wear, which is my charger, dashed off to try and save life, but everyone being at their action stations they had no time to come up and only a few officers and men were saved, 5 officers and 30 men out of about 730. (We have since heard that another 31 men were out of the ship) It was a tragedy.

In the meantime our division of ships and supporting ships moved up as if nothing had happened. The forts which had been temporarily silenced then opened again and a brisk action started once more - by 4 pm they were practically silenced. The mine sweepers has been ordered in but they did not do well and I disparities of ever getting them to face it properly. We couldn’t spare volunteers in any numbers as all ships were engaged. I am very sleepy as my writing shows - haven’t had much sleep lately it is 12:30. All my love. Are we down hearted? No but I think I was one of the very few who were not that evening - I do believe I am best at these times! And I am spoiling to have at it again. Only this time it must be an onslaught on the minefield - the forts we can always dominate - but the mine field is the devil and am organising if. I hate bit leading as I am asking people to do a lot and they will. I am sending 115 trawler men and skippers home - and manning the trawlers with naval officers and men volunteers- a military force in fact. I am having all the destroyers fitted with sweeps and organising a “picket boat” flotilla. Eva darling it’s a big thing. This is all anticipation. I will return to my story. I must go to bed...

U-boats off the Dardenelles and the loss of Triumph and Majestic

Admiral Haus

In early 1915 with the growing threat from the Entente navy off the coast of Turkey and a concern for the safety of the Dardanelle straits the Ottoman Empire asked for help from her Allies. The Turkish fleet did not have the numbers to defeat the Entente Allies in a fleet engagement nor the quality of vessels. Germany was unable to send any further surface vessels as it would affect the delicate balance of ships in the North Sea and to send a small force through the British blockade would more than likely see it destroyed. Beyond this the overseas German naval units had already been destroyed with only the light cruisers Dresden and Königsberg cornered by the Royal Navy in Tierra del feugo and Rufiji River respectively. 

  The burden passed to the Austro-Hungarian Empire and there was a certain amount of pressure for the Austrian fleet to sail for Constantinople and operate from there. This was of course unacceptable to the Austro-Hungarian Admiralty with several logistical concerns including that the Ottomans did not have the facilities to house or maintain such a fleet as well as the danger to the force as it sailed across the Mediterranean and, perhaps most important of all, leaving the Austro-Hungarian seaboard defenceless! Admiral Haus also believed that the time would come that war would come between Austro-Hungary and Italy and his fleet would be needed in the Adriatic.

   Submarines were the best solution to the problem and Germany again pushed Austria to send two of their submarines, U-3 and U-4, to Constantinople and even offered to send German Sailors to crew them and two of their UB class submarines as compensation. By the 4 March Grand Admiral Tirpitz noted that they had received no response from Vienna which was a “story characteristic of the Austrians” (1) and Germany took steps to take control of the situation itself.

Submarines in the pre-war Austro-Hungarian fleet were seen as a bit of a novelty and, much like the rest of the world, naval planners preferred the more obvious power of surface ships in particular the Tegetthoff dreadnought. The merits of submarines had attracted some interest and the Dual Monarchy had several short range vessels in their possession which were perfectly suited for their needs, namely fighting their Adriatic rival Italy. As war with Britain and France loomed they turned to Germany to build them five longer range craft so that they could begin to menace the Mediterranean shipping lanes. War came before those larger craft were completed and the Austro-Hungarians were forced to sell their new vessels to the German Navy believing that none of the craft would survive running the British blockade.

   Though Admiral Haus was hesitant in responding to the Germans there were moves to test their U-boats ability and on the 2 April Lineneschiffsleutnant Georg von Trapp departed Cattaro to attempt to raid the French fleet at Corfu. After an eighty five hour journey that saw an unsuccessful attack on a Victor Hugo class armoured cruiser all but two of the UB-5s crew had come down with sickness caused by cramped conditions and bad air. The Admiralty ruled the journey too dangerous for their smaller craft and only the U-12, with its range of 700 miles, was considered as the only vessel capable of going to Turkey.

   Haus finally replied to Germany that the journey was too dangerous, that he lacked sufficient spare vessels, their own priorities in fighting the French blockade of the Adriatic and that Austro-Hungary would have been happy to help if their five longer range U-boats had been delivered. He did offer the olive branch that as soon as he was able to send support he would which gave his allies assurance that Austria would act but when he was ready and not before.

   Germany had to take action. Three UB class U-boats were dispatched to Pola in April originally to replace the Austro-Hungarian U-boats sent to Turkey but now brought back under German control. Kapitänleutnant Hans Adam oversaw the arrival of each U-boat in fifteen pieces on eight railway flatbed trucks and their reassembly. From their dismantling to commissioning it took six long weeks and as soon as UB-3, UB-7 and UB-8 were made operational with their German crews they were dispatched for the Ottoman Empire.

The UB class U-boats were a small coastal vessel that had been designed to be broken down and transported so they could be moved forward and operate from captured Belgian bases in the shallow approaches of the Belgian coast. The “tin tadpoles” were considered underpowered and they struggled to chase down steamers whilst surfaced with only 6.47 knots and lacked a submerged durability but they were an expedient solution.

   The first vessel to leave was UB-8 which had been temporarily commissioned into the Austro-Hungarian Navy but reclaimed. On the 2 May the U-boat was towed by the light cruiser Novara through the Adriatic but the cruise was cut short when they were spotted by a French vessel and the Austrian cruiser cut the towline and headed for home at speed. Kapitänleutnant von Voight took his submarine beneath the waves and carried on towards Ottoman territory but the journey was not without incident. Two days after being left by the Novara the stern of the U-boat dropped into the sea violently throwing the watch officer, helmsman and a lookout into the sea and water began pouring through the Conning tower’s hatch. Von Voight acted quickly to save his sinking vessel by ordering the control room sealed and the tanks flooded with compromised air. Once on the surface they circled around to pick up their lost crewmen, but sadly the lookout had drowned.

   Although it had been in the Adriatic longest the UB-7 had developed a leak and so was delayed in leaving until the night of the 15/16 May under tow from the destroyer Triglav as far as the Ionian Islands before being released. The UB-3 was launched on the 23 May and sailed toward the island of Kékira by the Novara and was due to arrive on the 28 May but she never arrived disappearing into the blue abyss of the Mediterranean.

   Another more dangerous predator arrived in Cattaro on 13 May. The U-19 class U-21 under Kapitänleutnant Otto Hersing had left Kiel on 25 April and successfully ran the British blockade. On the 3 May whilst off Cape Finisterre she was resupplied by the steamer SS Marzala but the crude oil she brought was next to useless. Although she passed the strait of Gibraltar unseen on 9 May they were spotted by a steamer and had to avoid French destroyers south of Sicily on the 11 May. Whilst the U-21 underwent a week long overhaul the news of her arrival spread through the Mediterranean.

   On Saturday 15^th May the Nottingham Daily express ran an article proclaiming the existence of German Submarines in the Mediterranean declaring it had caused a certain commotion in the Greek shipping community and that there was a call for all Greek and Latin sailors to forget all past rivalries “when the peaceful exploitation of the Mediterranean is threatened since there is no place for Huns here.” The Royal Navy also offered a bounty to anyone who destroyed one of the German vessels. Petty Officer Cowie aboard HMS Majestic remarked that the news was:

discomforting… that a submarine was on its way from Germany to add variety to the conflict and to carry war into the three elements. It wasn’t nice to contemplate the arrival of this new visitor with a large fleet like ours for a target. (2)

Commodore Roger Keyes wrote to his wife on the 10^th May from HMS Queen Elizabeth and said:

There is one, probably two big German submarines on the way through the Mediteranean. One has been sighted twice, they, or it, ought to arrive here in a few days which will add enormously to our difficulties which Heaven knows are great enough! It is a great thing to possess a confident optimistic spirit! Of course it worries the Admiral horribly. We are doing our best to deal with it – and I only hope will succeed. This ship is our chief concern – and the transports full of wounded not under Red Cross. (3)

   Admiral de Robeck’s fleet had also suffered some rearrangement with HMS Queen Elizabeth leaving the area as had a squadron under Rear Admiral Thursby consisting of the battleships HMS Queen, Prince of Wales, Implacable and London which arrived at Taranto on the 27 May whilst the light cruisers Dartmouth, Amethyst, Dublin and Sapphire had already arrived in Brindisi to assist the Italians in any operations against Austro-Hungary. In return HMS Exmouth and Venerable had arrived from the Belgian coast and a request was made for HMS Chatham and Cornwall to come up from German East Africa. The French navy also brought its battleship complement up to six as well as the older cruisers Dupleix, Bruix and Kléber. The tension in the North Sea meant that no further reinforcement of cruisers or destroyers was available from home and de Robeck would have to make do with what he had. A scheme to try and block the Narrows was attempted but they found the current so strong that it had to be abandoned.

   The U-21 was a serious threat to the Royal Naval hegemony in the region. A U-19 class submarine

Otto Hersing

was bigger and faster than the UB class with a top speed of 15.4 knots on the surface and 9.5 knots submerged as well four torpedo tubes armed with six torpedoes and an 88mm deck gun. As part of the III Flotilla and under the command of Hersing the U-21 had been the first submarine ever to sink a ship with a self-propelled torpedo. On the 5 September 1914 when he sank HMS Pathfinder with a single torpedo with the resulting explosion engulfing the vessel in a giant blast off the Isle of May. Hersing then led a his U-boat on a successful campaign against the Allied Merchant shipping in the North sea catching and sinking the Malachite and Primo on the 14 and 15 November following the Cruiser rules and was the first vessel to destroy a merchant ship in the restricted U-boat war. By the time they had arrived in the Adriatic the 29 year old Alsatian was responsible for sinking six vessels totaling 8941 tons.

      The Ottoman Army had received reinforcements in the form of the Fifth Army Corps consisting of four divisions as well as various obsolete artillery pieces to augment the equipment they already had. On the 2 May the 2^nd Division arrived from Constantinople with Colonel von Landers deploying them in the rear of the Ari Burnu front to try and throwback the enemy. Corbett’s official Naval history suggests that an attack was planned to act in concert with the U-boats arrival in the straits. The Anzacs would be thrown back under the weight of numbers whilst their seaborne artillery would be in disarray as the U-boats attacked. On the 18^th May the Ottoman forces attacked but the Allies not only out gunned them, they knew they were coming due to aerial reconnaissance. The battleships Canopus, Triumph, Vengeance and the cruiser Baccahnte provided steady fire support but due to the closeness of the fighting could only aim at the enemy’s artillery emplacements and lines of reinforcement for fear of hitting their own men. The Triumph also had to fire shots at an Ottoman vessel attempting to attack from the Narrows. Despite heavy and determined assault the attack petered out with a lack of serious heavy artillery and ammunition at the cost of 3000 men killed and 7000 wounded. No U-boats had arrived in support of the attack.  

On 20 May U-21 began her uneventful journey to the Dardenelles. The British and French Navies had not ignored the rumours and reports of the arrival of U-boats in the region and had been expecting them for quite some time. On 22 May there was a submarine warning causing a slight panic. All transport ships and vessels without torpedo net defences were ordered to raise steam and leave the area for Mudros. A thorough search of the area found no U-boat and the sighting was chalked up to the body of a dead mule in the water.

   De Robeck was torn by his wish to protect his vessels and crews from harm and his duty to provide fire support to the army who were short on artillery and ammunition. The best solution he could come to was to reduce the number of vessels in the area by cutting the Gaba Tepe patrol to two from four, with one reserve at Imbros and the southern patrol from seven to four. Every day the ship’s reported to their station to duel the freshly arrived artillery with no further sightings of U-boats.

   Despite these moves to reduce the number of vessels in the region Hersing found quite a few easy targets including the Russian Cruiser Askold on the 24 May off Dedegatch but Hersing hungered for the larger targets and knew his first victory would cost him the element of surprise. As he cruised deeper into the straits he found three Majestic class battleships at anchor but the proximity of a hospital ship made him think twice. At 6:30 a.m. on 25 May Hersing sighted the Swiftsure in her firing position and manoeuvred to a firing position but fate intervened. The trawler Minoru spotted the German’s periscope and signalled a warning with two sharp blasts of her siren drawing two destroyers to search for the raider. Seeing the German heading for the French battleship St Louis they gave chase but Hersing did not give up the chase and was sighted a short while later between the Agamemnon and Swiftsure and only a few shells from the Swiftsure dissuaded him from further attention.

   With the very positive sighting the warships began to adopt defensive tactics and the Vengeance took a zig-zag course from Mudros to Cape Kephalo which saved her from disaster as at 10 a.m. Hersing fired his first torpedo. The Vengeance’s crew sighted the tracks in the water and the ship turned to starboard as the torpedo passed harmlessly by and Hersing withdrew, again under a hail of shell fire whilst the Talbot and a flotilla of available destroyers and trawlers began a concentrated search. The destroyers reported firing on the infiltrator four times but to no success.

   The presence of U-boats brought an understandable paranoia with wary lookouts seeing shadows and periscopes everywhere and the Canopus, which had been relieved by the Vengeance was zig-zagging hard back toward Imbros, sighted another submarine to the north heading south prompting Admiral Nicholson to request to withdraw his vessels to Kephalo as now it appeared that two submarines were operating in the area despite the Canopus sighting being slightly dubious and her escorting destroyer, Ribble, did not sight any U-boats.

   Hersing struck before any order could be given and at 12:25 HMS Chelmer, who was patrolling

Sketch of HMS Triumph sinking

around the Triumph spotted suspicious wake and moved to investigate. The Triumph was at the firing position off Gaba Tepe with all defensive measures taken including torpedo nets, water tight doors sealed and secondary armament manned and ready. A lookout sighted the periscope and guns began to fire but their rapport was masked by a greater explosion as the U-21’s torpedo passed through the nets and struck the battleship sending up a shower of water and coal and lifted the hull out of the water. The Triumph began to list to starboard making it impossible to lower starboard life boats and as the list grew more pronounced the Chelmer returned from a fruitless search for their aggressor and pulled alongside to retrieve as many men as they could from the stricken ship. On the portside men were finding it difficult to escape the torpedo netting. One of the Chinese Ward-room stewards who had served aboard since Hong Kong, climbed up one of the net boons as he could not swim. He was catapulted off as the ship heeled over but was quickly rescued.

   The Triumph’s list only grew worse and within ten minutes she had rolled onto her back and bobbed there, keel up with one officer remarking:

It was an extraordinary sight to see a ship like that turn over. Wild rumblings, as heavy weights took charge, could be distinctively heard from outside, and the ship finally sank, still growling like a wounded dog, as the things inside went adrift. (4)

Other than the Chelmer, the trawler Lord Wimbourne sailed among the men in the water and pulled a further 104 men to safety whilst other ships assisted though one officer was in the water for an hour before rescue. In total 78 men were lost which considering how quickly the vessel sank was quite a miracle.

Commander Barnes, the First Officer of the Majestic was below deck at lunch when the Chief Yeoman burst in with news that the Triumph had taken a direct hit:

We all got up on deck in time to see her turn over clean bottom up, and then down she went. We expected to follow her example any moment and, weighing anchor, steamed slowly back with our nets out to our anchorage off Cape Helles. (5)

Keyes led the search for U-21 with destroyers but was unable to find it. In a letter to his wife dated 1 June he lamented that:

I must have gone right over it 3 times – but there is no way (to destroy it) except by chance. It is so hard to make people understand. I am sure my anti-submarine tactics prevented her firing again at a ship that day. (6)  

A swift decision was made to withdraw the Swiftsure from her station to safety due to a lack of torpedo nets and leaving the older and more expendable Majestic on site with Rear Admiral Stuart Nicholson transferring his flag and kit so quickly that it was “thrown pell mell, without even being packed, mingled with an assortment of tinned meats, preserves and wines” into the waiting trawler. The Admiral also brought General Fuller, Hamilton’s artillery officer and the war Correspondent Ashmead-Bartlett and was later heard remarking aboard the Majestic that now they were safely behind nets they could sleep soundly. For the crew of the Majestic, having Nicholson aboard gave them a sense of reassurance as well with Commander Barnes remarking:

No submarine would have the impertinence to molest a vessel bearing the person and flying the flag of such a potentate, attended on all sides by his retinue, whose comings and goings were accompanied by such pomp and circumstance. It was unthinkable. (7)

This was not a feeling shared by all with Ashmead-Bartlett stating that he was “convinced the end was near” and that night the remaining bottles of champagne and a great deal of port was drunk in the Wardroom so that they would not be wasted should the ship be sunk. His fears were magnified when he reached his bunk to find it not only on the exposed sea side of the vessel but also below the waterline. Not wanting to be caught below decks should the worse happen he got a Marine to move a mattress up to the deck where he spent the night with thirty pounds and his cigarette case in the pocket of his pyjamas.

Hersing, who had waited some two hours to get his shot at the Triumph and had been forced to flee an onslaught of fire and destroyers had ordered U-21 to dive and cruise under the sinking Triumph before settling to the sea bed to wait for the trouble to pass. Some twenty eight hours later he returned to the surface for fresh air and to recharge the vessel’s batteries. He then ordered the U-boat to recommence its patrol to try and replicate the 25^th May’s success but early searches proved fruitless and so they turned south along Cape Helles.

Hersing spotted troops being landed in transport ships up ahead and that five hundred yards from shore lay HMS Majestic which was providing the landing troops with artillery support, with shells falling on the Turkish positions.

Hersing recalled post war that the British had reacted to the loss of the Triumph and were taking steps to protect the Majestic from the same fate:

The Submarine scare of the past few days, had indeed, had (an) effect. The Majestic was surrounded by an almost impenetrable patrol of boats of all kinds. Not only was there the difficulty of getting near her, but also the possibility of one of the small boats cutting across the path of a torpedo and getting it herself. The manoeuvring I had to do for a shot was intricate as a fine combination. (8)

HMS Majestic sinking

As Hersing studied his target his Watch officer reported they were at six hundred yards and that they probably could not get any closer a fact that was of no issue for Hersing as he had a perfect sight of Majestic but he had to contend with the swarm of smaller vessels cutting through his sights. A window of opportunity opened and he ordered “Torpedo – fire! Periscope in!”

Onboard the Majestic Petty Officer Cowie had just finished cleaning the fore bridge with six of the ship’s boys and was moving towards the after bridge when he saw Commander Barnes who was organising the launching of “the Admiral’s barge” in readiness of the arrival of the Exmouth to which he was due to transfer. Cowie glanced out across the water and his eyes fell on a strange object just astern of the minesweeper Reindeer. With sudden realisation he pointed at the periscope and called out to Barnes. The Commander looked to where Cowie was pointed and gasped.

“Yes, and here comes the torpedo!”

Both men shouted a warning to the men on deck and Cowie quickly ran and yelled down one of the ventilators before running to the end of the bridge to watch the explosion.

There was a deep muffled roar and a large spout of water and steam shot two hundred feet up into the air. The ship’s stacks shuddered whilst the masts and their yards swayed filling those below with dread in case they snapped and brought the masts crashing down but thankfully they stayed up.

U-21 dived away heading for safety, her escape further aided by the choppy sea conditions which masked the origin of the torpedo and its tracks. Hersing had to fight the urge to watch the results of his work and waited for any sound of a hit and then they hear it – “A distant ringing crash”

Deep in the Aft Stokehold, Stoker Sulivan was thrown twenty feet up into the air and he grabbed an overhead grating by reflex and pulled himself hand over hand to the nearest ladder before pulling himself up and onto the deck.

   An ordered urgency filled the men on deck as they hurried around throwing any flotsam into the water fearing that at any moment the ship would be ripped apart by an internal explosion and they all reacted to the order “Every man for himself” with quiet relieved professionalism.

The supporting vessels that surrounded the Majestic moved as close as they could to the wounded warship but could not come alongside as the vessel had healed to port to such a degree that it would do damage to the rescuers or take them down as well. Instead they had to sit and wait for the men to get off the ship and come to them. With only one lifeboat in the water most of them were swimming towards their salvation whilst others struggled to survive in the warm water or clung to anything that floated that had been thrown overboard.

   Cowie searched the aft-bridge for any wounded before walking down to the Quarter deck where he cut a ladder free and threw it in the water as an aid.

It seemed useless to remain on the ship longer, so I put the chin‐strap of my cap under my chin, made sure that my trousers were securely fastened, took a last farewell of the dear old ship and dived into a clear place away from the crowd. (9)

He remembered clearly that the last sight he saw on board was the reporter, Ashmead-Bartlett, standing on the bridge checking his watch and calmly noting down the time of the sinking. This may have been a case of mistaken identity though as Ashmead-Bartlett would later describe how he was awoken from his slumber on deck by the clamber of crewmen at 6:40 a.m. with one responding to his queries that; “A torpedo was coming.” After the impact he was swept down to the main deck by escaping crewmen before heading aft to the quarter-deck before climbing over the side.

Cowie was pleased to find that the water was warm, pleasant and full of men, but before he thought to save himself he calmly swam up to one of the open starboard scuttles and called into it but found nothing but an officer’s hat floating on the surface of the rising water. As he swam away from the vessel he saw crowds of men still on the deck unwilling to jump and he called out to them that the vessel was definitely sinking and not, as many of them believed, resting on the sea bed.

   With the British reacting immediately and the supporting vessels began scouring the sea looking for the German intruder firing their forward armament at suspected periscopes which prompted Hersing to make his escape deftly taking U-21 down to sixty feet and pulled away to a safe distance and briefly popping the periscope to see what damage they had done. Hersing could see that the Majestic was listing heavily but his jubilation was short lived as the British supporting vessels opened fire.

Cowie had swum thirty yards to a French trawler where he found Commander Barnes and one of Majestic's gunnery officers arming the trawler's guns to join fire on a distant periscope but by the time they were ready the German vessel had retreated and thoughts turned to the rescue of men in the water as the Majestic finally rolled over, still flying the Admiral's flag and began sinking slowly. The battleship’s masts became embedded in the sea bed arresting her sinking after four and a half minutes and there she stayed. The trawler Cowie was on moved forward gently and lines were thrown overboard with one pulling six men to safety in quick succession. Cowie himself dived into the water to save a drowning man and got him back to the trawler where, with artificial respiration, they were able to save his life and Cowie later remarking:

"Poor Chap! He had escaped death by a hair's breadth, and looked ghastly. His name was MacNeil, a RNR man."

Others were not so fortunate, Stoker Walter Partridge was plucked from the water and despite being worked on for some time was pronounced dead by a doctor much to the anger and frustration of the men who worked to save him.

Thomas Pegg, a wireless boy aged 19 from Cheltenham swam over to save a drowning man and despite being a noted good swimmer was pulled down by the man's struggles and both were lost. Stoker Sullivan had somehow found himself in the water following his escape up the ladder and was safely pulled from the water. When he was pulled to safety it was noted that his skin was flaming red all over as if he had been cooked but the lucky stoker, the sole survivor from the aft stokehold, swore that he was fine.

A large number of the crew were entangled in the starboard torpedo nets as the battleship heeled towards them but many were wearing lifebelts and so floated away to safety though others were caught in the suction.

One man sat alone on the keel of the slowly sinking Majestic. He had been on deck with the non-swimmers who were too scared to jump in the water and those who firmly believed the vessel would not sink, as she began to roll and had clambered up the side and onto the belly of the ship and just sat amid the chaos watching and waiting to be plucked to safety.

With the survivors scattered across several vessels and washed up on the beaches it was hard to get an accurate casualty figure though the smaller vessels soon moved their cargo to larger vessels such as the sweeper Reindeer which proceeded to Mudros. It was a sorrowful journey with the dead being buried at sea along the way, a task which fell heavily upon Majestic's chaplain, Reverend Dawson. The crew arrived at Mudros at 3 p.m. and were given fresh tea and jam sandwiches whilst fresh clothing was found for them and they soon joined the survivors of the Triumph. In all 49 men had been lost in the sinking.

Admiral Wemyss remarked in his diary that:

The material loss of these two ships was not itself of supreme importance and the loss of life but slight but the moral effect was considerable and infused the Turkish army, which we know had been somewhat demoralized by its heavy losses since the opening of the campaign, with fresh courage. (10)

Indeed on the beach the Ottoman troops peered out of their positions to see the aged Majestic erupt with a large column of water shooting up debris, smoke and water in a great column before slowly listing to her side and capsizing belly up and all fighting momentarily stopped as everyone turned to regard what had happened at sea.

Commodore Keyes wrote to his wife that:

Roger Keyes

At any rate the Army will never be able to say we haven't supported them. I think, in fact I am sure - they were enormously impressed by seeing two battleships sunk, one off each area. At ANZAC every soul could see it all happen - and off Helles thousands saw - besides there it was within 500 yards of the beach. (11)

General Hamilton wrote in his diary that:

Fuller, my artillery Commander, and Ashmead-Bartlett, the correspondent, were both on board, and both were saved – minus kit! About 40 men have gone under. Bad luck. A Naval Officer who has seen her says she is lying in shallow water – 6 fathoms – bottom upwards looking like a stranded whale. He says the German submarine made a most lovely shot at her through a crowd of cargo ships and transports. Like picking a royal stag out of his harem of does.  (12)


Almost an hour after making their escape the German U-boat returned to the scene of the crime so Hersing could try and ascertain what the effect of his attack had been. What he witnessed was the Allied ships sweeping the area systematically looking for survivors. The Majestic's keel still holding above the water which it would do for several months until a storm finally shattered the masts and she finally sank below the waves.

The result of these successful attacks was that the Navy considered having both British and French battleships in the area was too dangerous and so were withdrawn to the safety of Mudros harbour whilst HMS Queen Elizabeth was withdrawn to the Grand fleet after news of the sinking of HMS Goliath on 12 May filtered back to the Admiralty no doubt exasperated by the loss of both the Triumph and the Majestic. The Admiralty believed that destroyers were able to provide a decent amount of fire support with their 4” guns for most of the Army’s needs but should heavier fire be required then the battleships would return with heavy protection for short periods. This had a great effect on the battles as it meant the Ottomans would not come under regular heavy fire from the sea and freed up the Asiatic based artillery from suppression which allowed them to lay down heavy fire on the rear areas especially in the French zone. A final precaution was for the Arcadian, Hamilton's vessel, to be braced by two merchant ships strapped to the side to protect her from torpedo attack.

On arrival in Constantinople, Hersing was greeted as a hero and saviour and a grateful Kaiser awarded him a Pour le Merite for sinking two battleships in two days.

Footnotes:

1. Tirpitz, A. My Memoirs, Vol II, Hurst & Blackett, London, 1919  p.505
2. Goodchild, G. The Last cruise of the Majestic, p.101
3. Halpern, P. G. The Keyes papers, p.135
4. Chatterton, E. K, Dardanelles Dilemma, p.256
5. Ibid p.254
6. Halpern, P. G. The Keyes papers P. 143
7. Chatterton E. K, Dardanelles Dilemma p. 258
8. Goodchild, G. The last cruise of the Majestic, p. 117-118
9. Ibid. p. 120
10. Wemyss, The Navy in the Darndelles Campaign, p.135
11. Halpern, P. G, (ED) The Keyes Papers, p.147
12. Hamilton, I., Gallipoli Diary p.253

Escape of SMS Goeben and Breslau

SMS Goeben

It was 2.45am on 6th August 1914, and conditions on Rear Admiral Troubridge's flagship Defence were tense as in a little over three hours the first Cruiser squadron of the Mediterranean fleet consisting of the light cruisers Black Prince, Duke of Edinburgh, Warrior and Defence, with a screen of destroyers would be engaging the German battle-cruiser Goeben and her escort Breslau.

Throughout the night the squadron's men were preparing themselves mentally for the roar of the guns, explosions and the very real possibility that they could be killed and this was something that was preying on the mind of Captain Fawcett Wray when he stepped into the Admiral's chart room.

"Are you going to fight sir? Because if so the Squadron ought to know." He asked.

"Yes, I know it is wrong but I cannot have the name of the whole Mediterranean squadron stink" came the reply.

Obviously concerned by the answer Captain Wray, normally over confident and sure of his abilities voiced his concerns about the one sided nature of the upcoming battle. Goeben had almost twice the displacement of each of his cruisers, a slightly less weighty broadside but she was faster with bigger guns with longer range. Wray had been looking at these sums and that in daylight Goeben could rain down her 11" shells well out of range of the British squadron and use her superior speed to stay out of the British range. Wray finished his evaluation with the icy observation;

"It seems to me it is likely to be the suicide of your squadron."

       ***             ***          ***           ***         ***        ***        ***         ***       ***           ***        

Goeben and Breslau had been in the Mediterranean since 1912 patrolling the Balkans during the recent conflicts and flying the flag for Germany in the region. Goeben was a relatively new design having been completed in 1911 and dispatched before her sea trials had been completed and she had some on going boiler issues. Breslau, a light Magdeburg class cruiser was also constructed in 1911 and was similarly dispatched with the duty of escorting Goeben.

HMS Indefatigable one of three cruisers that could have sunk Goeben

As tensions grew in Europe grew Admiral Souchon the C-in-C of the Mediterranean squadron put into Pola, the Austro-Hungerian main Naval base and had his vessels overhauled and formed strategy with his counterpart Admiral Haus. It was decided on the outbreak of hostilities that the German and Austro Hungarian fleet would sail to the West of the Mediterranean and intercept the French XIX army corps that would be undoubtedly be transported by individual ships and covered by the French fleet spread out across the 3-400 miles route.

The German fleet had put into Messina on 2nd August to re-coal for a patrol and found facilities severely lacking. Souchon confiscated the German liner General and moved her crew over the Goeben  as well as a sizable chunk of coal whilst removing any unnecessary equipment from his vessels and stowed them. They pulled out of the harbour on the 3rd August at 1 am, slipped around the north coast at 16-17 knots heading for the ports of Phillipeville and Bône. At 6pm they received confirmation that Germany was at war with France. They accordingly divided then and headed for their targets.

The French fleet had also left port at Toulon on the 3rd August to escort the XIX army corps, however Admiral Lapeyrère had deployed his fleet into three sections to escort the transports in convoy rather than forming a broad front.

The Royal Navy under Admiral Archibald Berkeley Milne had also divided its forces with Rear Admiral Troubridge being dispatched with the first cruiser squadron to watch the Adriatic in case the Austro-Hungarian fleet should leave Pola. Milne was directed to remain with his other ships (Chatham, Weymouth) in case Admiral Souchon turned west or headed for the Atlantic. None of those were Milne's decisions, they came directly from London in a telegram on the 2nd August.

The lengthy message outline what Milne should do completely. His primary duty was to protect the French convoys, bring to action any individual fast ships but not to engage a superior force without French support.
Troubridge made clear to Milne that he believed that Goeben was a superior force to his cruisers, Milne was not worried.
"That question won't arise as you will have Indoubtable and Indefatigable with you."
Indeed the two I class cruisers with their 12" guns gave Troubridge an edge should battle with Goeben occur, they could engage her in a gun duel whilst the smaller cruisers and destroyers got closer for their guns and torpedoes. Their presence would also make the Austro-Hungarian fleet think twice. So with those two vessels, the cruisers Duke of Edingburgh, Black Prince, Defence, Warrior, the light cruiser Gloucester, and eight destroyers at 8pm on 2nd August.

The Germans made the first move. Despite receiving a telegram from his superiors in Berlin maked "Urgent" Souchon decided to press ahead with his original orders, which the new orders did not countermand. Goeben bombarded Phillipeville with fifteen shells before withdrawing. These were no transports laden with troops, no docked warships, no stocks of ammunition. Breslau found the same at Bône so Souchon ordered the withdrawal to save ammunition. He feinted westward before changing course north before looking at his new orders. Admiral Tirpitz was ordering his force to head east for the Bospherous with all due haste and then on to Constantinople. The idea behind it was to present the new ships to the Ottoman Empire replacing the two British build dreadnaughts that were confiscated by the admiralty before hostilities began.

At 10:30am, three and a half hour's before Great Britain's ultimatum was delieverd to Germany, Goeben and Breslau encountered Indomitable and Indefatigable, who had been ordered by the Admiralty (via Milne) to reverse course and head for Gibraltar in case the German squadron was heading west. As the two squadrons passed their main turrets turned to face each other and with each side eying each other suspiciously none of the customary courtesy signals were sent. As Goeben passed the two Royal Navy cruisers turned to pursue at a distance but keeping enough speed in reserve. Admiral Souchon must have intercepted the message from the Admiralty to Captain Kennedy about the British Ultimatum to Germany because he ordered more speed. In the Goeben's boiler room on a hot summer day the German stokers toiled so hard that they began to suffer from heat exhaustion, many passing out over their shovels and being carried out to lay on the relative cool air of the deck then at a critical moment there was a mechanical failure that released a cloud of red hot steam that scalded four men to death, but the orders held and the officers continued to press their men on. Slowly but surely she made headway over her pursuers who although of a comparable speed were in need of engine maintenance and their bellies scraping and they were unable to keep pace, even the light cruiser Dublin who managed another hour was forced to give up the chase sending the following signal to Milne at 7.37pm.

"Goeben out of sight now, can only see smoke, still daylight."

Later that night Admiral Milne was informed that both German ships had entered Messina harbour which threw up some new problems for the Royal Navy.

The good news was that they knew where Goeben was. The bad news was that he didn't know where they would go. The rumour of a German collier in Majorca weighed on his (and the Admiralty's) mind and the belief that the German ships would ignore the heavily defended French convoys and head out to terrorise the unprotected merchant ships in the Atlantic.

His hands were then tied by the Admiralty with a signal at 18:00 with the announcement of Italy's declaration of neutrality and banning any of His Majesty's ships from going within six miles of the Italian coastline, this would stop him from sailing down the straits of Messina or face violating international law. The best he could do was to deploy his ships at each end of the straits. Admiral Fisher (later First Sea lord) Commented afterwards that;

(Milne) "had no excuses whatever for not surrounding Messina with all his entire force right round the harbour mouth - close up! As if international law mattered a Damn! and the Italians would have loved him forever!"

Indeed when it came to international law the Royal Navy did not hesitate when it came to the Battle of Más a Tierra when HMS Kent and Glasgow violated Chilean neutrality to sink SMS Dresden which only led to the German consulate complaining. Although Italy was not Chile and the British government did not wish to provoke Italy despite their stance against Austria. However Milne lacked the flare to act independently, as was his right as the C-in-C on the spot.

 

Admiral Souchon in Turkish uniform

They pay me to be an Admiral, they don't pay me to think.

So Milne stuck rigidly to the orders he was given by the Admiralty in London. Troubridge was left at the mouth of the Adriatic watching for the Austrian fleet which he was capable of holding or slowing and waiting for Milne's squadron for reinforcements as long as the Austrian dreadnaughts did not sail.

Milne spread his I-class cruisers between Sicily and Tunisia in case the German Division did make aGloucester waited at the other end of the strait of Messina ready to tail the Germans.
move towards the French transports whilst he patrolled the North coast of Sicily with his other ships. The superior French fleet which could have decided the outcome could not be contacted and remained and unquantifiable. HMS

Souchon was having to make some hard choices as well. The Italians had given him a strict twenty four hour deadline and the coal stokes were severely lacking, there would not be enough to make it to Turkey. He confiscated as much coal as he could from any and all of the German vessels present ripping up their deck plates to speed up the process but it was still not enough. He also knew that the Royal Navy would be surrounding Sicily the situation was getting tough. He also received a signal saying that the Turkey order was not definite and that his reception was not guaranteed. Logically only the Austro-Hungarian fleet was safe, but how long before the Allies came for them and they were trapped in the Adriatic?

He decided to roll the dice and Goeben and Breslau slipped out of port at nightfall on the 6th August heading south through the straits and arranging to meet a collier in the Aegean islands. Milne heard that they had left and immediately redeployed his vessels heading west and then south to catch the Germans as they sailed around Sicily and slipped west which the Admiralty was certain they would do.

Souchon didn't know where the Royal Navy was and was concerned that with the amount of time needed to coal up he could find his small fleet being caught in the islands where they couldn't manoeuvre and taken apart. Goeben's engines were also playing up as they had been pressed hard in the last pursuit and he could not guarantee they could reach that speed again. There was another more pressing problem. He was being pursued by HMS Gloucester.

The light cruiser was dogged in her pursuit holding at 26 knots she refused to budge and even steered between Goeben and the shore to force the Germans to make a wider turn and slow down further. Breslau quickly dropped back fearing a torpedo attack on the lead German vessel and started making threatening passes and looking like she might fire at any time. Realising that the Germans could easily disable his vessel Captain Kelly ordered his ship to pull back and using the moonlight keep watch and signal Admiral Milne of their position. Admiral Troubridge was ordered to bring his fleet of cruisers, the light cruiser Dublin and his destroyers to intercept the Germans. At first confused by the heading and Goeben's feint Troubridge delayed his departure thinking he was going to turn north towards him but when it became clear from Captain Kelly's updates that the German's were still heading south east he ordered the fleet to make all due haste to meet them. According to estimates he should arrive in the vicinity of Goeben and Breslau at 6.30am. He signalled Dublin and Gloucester which arrived at 2.54am;

"First Cruiser squadron position 2.30 am 38 ̊ 25'N, 20 ̊ O'E Course south 20 knots. Am endeavouring to cross Goeben's bows at 6am."

Now Admiral Troubridge was waiting for his Navigator and said to Wray;

"I cannot turn away now, think of my pride!"

"Has your pride got anything to do with it sir? It is your country's welfare which is at stake" came the measured response.

After listening to the navigator with Captain Wray as they discussed the chances of his fleet getting through the up coming combat. It didn't look good. It was as they feared, the chances of them being able to get close enough to the German battle cruiser which had proved so amazingly fast against the two I-class battle cruisers just a few days before was very small. It seemed Wray's evaluation was correct. With tears in his eyes Troubridge ordered the end to the pursuit at 4am on the 7th August. Wray commented that;

"That was the bravest thing you have ever done in your life."

It is debated by historians and by the Admiralty in the enquiry and Troubridge's court martial as to whether he had done the right thing. Arguably with luck and a good amount of skill Troubridge could have damaged Goeben enough to slow her down or in best case scenario sunk her. The problem was how many of the Royal Navy ships would have gone down with her? Wray's theory might very well have come true and with Breslau running interference it could have become very dicey. There was also the confirmation that without the I-class cruisers that Goeben constituted a "superior force" as outlined by the Admiralty's prior orders, if anything Troubridge was following orders which is why he was eventually acquitted. At the battle of Jutland in 1916 HMS Defence did come into combat with German warships and was sunk after receiving seven strikes. Also at Jutland was Seydlitz, a similar vessel to Goeben took twenty-two 12" shells and thirteen to fifteen 15" shells which was a lot more powerful than the 9.2" guns Defence and the rest of Troubridge's squadron were sporting. In the enquiry Milne was asked what he considered were the most important factors to naval combat and he argued it was: "Gun power, weather and speed" so didn't consider armour worthy of note but it would have been the deciding factor for Troubridge's squadron.

At 4.49 am Troubridge signalled Milne to request orders and to report his decision.

"Why did you not continue to cut off Goeben? She only going 17 knots, and so important to bring her to action." was the reply.

For the first time Troubridge explained his actions in a very lengthy message at 8.30am:

"With visibility at the time I could have been sighted from twenty to twenty-five miles away and could never have got nearer unless Goeben wished to bring me to action which she could not have done under circumstances most advantageous to her. I could never have brought her to action. I had hoped to have engaged her at three thirty in the morning in dim light but had gone north first with the objective of engaging her at the entrance of the Adriatic.
I was too late to intercept her when she altered course to the south. In view of the intense importance of victory or defeat at such early stages of a war I would consider it a great imprudence to place Squadron in such a position as to be picked off at leisure and sunk while unable to effectively reply. The decision is not the easiest of the two to make. I am well aware."

Elsewhere that morning as Souchon's men had been unable to jam Kelly's transmissions the Breslau took positive steps to shake off their pursuer and with a need to shake them before coaling. She began weaving across the path of Gloucester as if laying mines. Captain Kelly ordered his 6" guns to fire on the German ship hitting with one shell beneath the waterline. Breslau began to rain down accurate fire upon the smaller British ship but unperturbed Captain Kelly urged his vessel to close the range so he could use his full broadside and torpedoes on the light German vessel. Pin pricks of light on the silhouette of Goeben meant only one thing and as two white columns of water confirmed Captain Kelly's fear, Souchon had ordered his vessel to slow and turn and bring his long range guns to bear on him. Kelly knew the odds and ordered his vessel to drop back signalling Milne at 2.45pm that:

"Have engaged at long range with Breslau and retreated when Goeben turned. I am now following again."

Souchon must have been very worried as with a light cruiser pushing at his fleet it could only mean that the Royal Navy were closing in on him. He must have been relieved to see Gloucester drop away at 4pm low on coal and following orders from Milne not to go further than Mataban and sent a final signal registering the German's course for the Aegean.

It wasn't until the early morning on the 8th August, some twenty four hours later that Admiral Milne would set off from Malta, 460 miles to the west with his three I-class cruisers and Weymouth to find Goeben. He would later site that HMS Indomitable which had been ready to sail on the 7th could not have gone alone as she was suffering from boiler issues and waited for his force to go en-masse. Still thinking Souchon was feinting took his time sailing at 10 knots awaiting the Admiralty to tell him good news.

Admiral Souchon met up with a collier in the Greek islands and began the lengthy process of fully coaling up for the last leg to the Bospherous, all the time listening to the Royal Navy's W/T transmissions getting closer and closer. Luckily for him the indecision of Admiral Milne and Troubridge's returning to the Adriatic meant he had enough time to carry out the operation without harassment on the 9th August. They made off at full speed and reached the Dardenelles on the 10th August at 5pm and received an escort through the minefield up to Constantinople, transferring his vessels to the Turkish navy on the 16th. It was a close run thing as Milne's vessels smoke could be seen coming over the horizon as they entered the Turkish mine fields. When Milne did arrive he was refused permission to give chase and was forced to stop.

The pursuit was viewed as a victory in the British press and celebrated as an example of the Royal Navy sweeping up the Mediterranean and the cowardly Germans running for safety rather than standing and fighting Milne's vessels. The Admiralty were not of the same opinion. The investigation into Troubridge's actions warranted a court martial for failing to engage but he was eventually acquitted due to the Admiralty's foggy order not to engage a superior force and what a superior force consisted of. Although considered blameless Troubridge and Milne's careers never recovered and they soon lost their posts being promoted sideways. Souchon however was promoted to Commander in Chief of the Turkish fleet on 23rd September 1914 and by November Turkey had joined the Central powers in their war against the Allies which led to the Gallipoli campaign as well as Britain's war in Mesopotamia and Palestine causing more deaths and casualties.


Condensed from the (hopefully) upcoming Kindle book "Evaders; Spee and Souchon against the Royal Navy" by C. Sams