U-boats off the Dardenelles and the loss of Triumph and Majestic

Admiral Haus

In early 1915 with the growing threat from the Entente navy off the coast of Turkey and a concern for the safety of the Dardanelle straits the Ottoman Empire asked for help from her Allies. The Turkish fleet did not have the numbers to defeat the Entente Allies in a fleet engagement nor the quality of vessels. Germany was unable to send any further surface vessels as it would affect the delicate balance of ships in the North Sea and to send a small force through the British blockade would more than likely see it destroyed. Beyond this the overseas German naval units had already been destroyed with only the light cruisers Dresden and Königsberg cornered by the Royal Navy in Tierra del feugo and Rufiji River respectively. 

  The burden passed to the Austro-Hungarian Empire and there was a certain amount of pressure for the Austrian fleet to sail for Constantinople and operate from there. This was of course unacceptable to the Austro-Hungarian Admiralty with several logistical concerns including that the Ottomans did not have the facilities to house or maintain such a fleet as well as the danger to the force as it sailed across the Mediterranean and, perhaps most important of all, leaving the Austro-Hungarian seaboard defenceless! Admiral Haus also believed that the time would come that war would come between Austro-Hungary and Italy and his fleet would be needed in the Adriatic.

   Submarines were the best solution to the problem and Germany again pushed Austria to send two of their submarines, U-3 and U-4, to Constantinople and even offered to send German Sailors to crew them and two of their UB class submarines as compensation. By the 4 March Grand Admiral Tirpitz noted that they had received no response from Vienna which was a “story characteristic of the Austrians” (1) and Germany took steps to take control of the situation itself.

Submarines in the pre-war Austro-Hungarian fleet were seen as a bit of a novelty and, much like the rest of the world, naval planners preferred the more obvious power of surface ships in particular the Tegetthoff dreadnought. The merits of submarines had attracted some interest and the Dual Monarchy had several short range vessels in their possession which were perfectly suited for their needs, namely fighting their Adriatic rival Italy. As war with Britain and France loomed they turned to Germany to build them five longer range craft so that they could begin to menace the Mediterranean shipping lanes. War came before those larger craft were completed and the Austro-Hungarians were forced to sell their new vessels to the German Navy believing that none of the craft would survive running the British blockade.

   Though Admiral Haus was hesitant in responding to the Germans there were moves to test their U-boats ability and on the 2 April Lineneschiffsleutnant Georg von Trapp departed Cattaro to attempt to raid the French fleet at Corfu. After an eighty five hour journey that saw an unsuccessful attack on a Victor Hugo class armoured cruiser all but two of the UB-5s crew had come down with sickness caused by cramped conditions and bad air. The Admiralty ruled the journey too dangerous for their smaller craft and only the U-12, with its range of 700 miles, was considered as the only vessel capable of going to Turkey.

   Haus finally replied to Germany that the journey was too dangerous, that he lacked sufficient spare vessels, their own priorities in fighting the French blockade of the Adriatic and that Austro-Hungary would have been happy to help if their five longer range U-boats had been delivered. He did offer the olive branch that as soon as he was able to send support he would which gave his allies assurance that Austria would act but when he was ready and not before.

   Germany had to take action. Three UB class U-boats were dispatched to Pola in April originally to replace the Austro-Hungarian U-boats sent to Turkey but now brought back under German control. Kapitänleutnant Hans Adam oversaw the arrival of each U-boat in fifteen pieces on eight railway flatbed trucks and their reassembly. From their dismantling to commissioning it took six long weeks and as soon as UB-3, UB-7 and UB-8 were made operational with their German crews they were dispatched for the Ottoman Empire.

The UB class U-boats were a small coastal vessel that had been designed to be broken down and transported so they could be moved forward and operate from captured Belgian bases in the shallow approaches of the Belgian coast. The “tin tadpoles” were considered underpowered and they struggled to chase down steamers whilst surfaced with only 6.47 knots and lacked a submerged durability but they were an expedient solution.

   The first vessel to leave was UB-8 which had been temporarily commissioned into the Austro-Hungarian Navy but reclaimed. On the 2 May the U-boat was towed by the light cruiser Novara through the Adriatic but the cruise was cut short when they were spotted by a French vessel and the Austrian cruiser cut the towline and headed for home at speed. Kapitänleutnant von Voight took his submarine beneath the waves and carried on towards Ottoman territory but the journey was not without incident. Two days after being left by the Novara the stern of the U-boat dropped into the sea violently throwing the watch officer, helmsman and a lookout into the sea and water began pouring through the Conning tower’s hatch. Von Voight acted quickly to save his sinking vessel by ordering the control room sealed and the tanks flooded with compromised air. Once on the surface they circled around to pick up their lost crewmen, but sadly the lookout had drowned.

   Although it had been in the Adriatic longest the UB-7 had developed a leak and so was delayed in leaving until the night of the 15/16 May under tow from the destroyer Triglav as far as the Ionian Islands before being released. The UB-3 was launched on the 23 May and sailed toward the island of Kékira by the Novara and was due to arrive on the 28 May but she never arrived disappearing into the blue abyss of the Mediterranean.

   Another more dangerous predator arrived in Cattaro on 13 May. The U-19 class U-21 under Kapitänleutnant Otto Hersing had left Kiel on 25 April and successfully ran the British blockade. On the 3 May whilst off Cape Finisterre she was resupplied by the steamer SS Marzala but the crude oil she brought was next to useless. Although she passed the strait of Gibraltar unseen on 9 May they were spotted by a steamer and had to avoid French destroyers south of Sicily on the 11 May. Whilst the U-21 underwent a week long overhaul the news of her arrival spread through the Mediterranean.

   On Saturday 15^th May the Nottingham Daily express ran an article proclaiming the existence of German Submarines in the Mediterranean declaring it had caused a certain commotion in the Greek shipping community and that there was a call for all Greek and Latin sailors to forget all past rivalries “when the peaceful exploitation of the Mediterranean is threatened since there is no place for Huns here.” The Royal Navy also offered a bounty to anyone who destroyed one of the German vessels. Petty Officer Cowie aboard HMS Majestic remarked that the news was:

discomforting… that a submarine was on its way from Germany to add variety to the conflict and to carry war into the three elements. It wasn’t nice to contemplate the arrival of this new visitor with a large fleet like ours for a target. (2)

Commodore Roger Keyes wrote to his wife on the 10^th May from HMS Queen Elizabeth and said:

There is one, probably two big German submarines on the way through the Mediteranean. One has been sighted twice, they, or it, ought to arrive here in a few days which will add enormously to our difficulties which Heaven knows are great enough! It is a great thing to possess a confident optimistic spirit! Of course it worries the Admiral horribly. We are doing our best to deal with it – and I only hope will succeed. This ship is our chief concern – and the transports full of wounded not under Red Cross. (3)

   Admiral de Robeck’s fleet had also suffered some rearrangement with HMS Queen Elizabeth leaving the area as had a squadron under Rear Admiral Thursby consisting of the battleships HMS Queen, Prince of Wales, Implacable and London which arrived at Taranto on the 27 May whilst the light cruisers Dartmouth, Amethyst, Dublin and Sapphire had already arrived in Brindisi to assist the Italians in any operations against Austro-Hungary. In return HMS Exmouth and Venerable had arrived from the Belgian coast and a request was made for HMS Chatham and Cornwall to come up from German East Africa. The French navy also brought its battleship complement up to six as well as the older cruisers Dupleix, Bruix and Kléber. The tension in the North Sea meant that no further reinforcement of cruisers or destroyers was available from home and de Robeck would have to make do with what he had. A scheme to try and block the Narrows was attempted but they found the current so strong that it had to be abandoned.

   The U-21 was a serious threat to the Royal Naval hegemony in the region. A U-19 class submarine

Otto Hersing

was bigger and faster than the UB class with a top speed of 15.4 knots on the surface and 9.5 knots submerged as well four torpedo tubes armed with six torpedoes and an 88mm deck gun. As part of the III Flotilla and under the command of Hersing the U-21 had been the first submarine ever to sink a ship with a self-propelled torpedo. On the 5 September 1914 when he sank HMS Pathfinder with a single torpedo with the resulting explosion engulfing the vessel in a giant blast off the Isle of May. Hersing then led a his U-boat on a successful campaign against the Allied Merchant shipping in the North sea catching and sinking the Malachite and Primo on the 14 and 15 November following the Cruiser rules and was the first vessel to destroy a merchant ship in the restricted U-boat war. By the time they had arrived in the Adriatic the 29 year old Alsatian was responsible for sinking six vessels totaling 8941 tons.

      The Ottoman Army had received reinforcements in the form of the Fifth Army Corps consisting of four divisions as well as various obsolete artillery pieces to augment the equipment they already had. On the 2 May the 2^nd Division arrived from Constantinople with Colonel von Landers deploying them in the rear of the Ari Burnu front to try and throwback the enemy. Corbett’s official Naval history suggests that an attack was planned to act in concert with the U-boats arrival in the straits. The Anzacs would be thrown back under the weight of numbers whilst their seaborne artillery would be in disarray as the U-boats attacked. On the 18^th May the Ottoman forces attacked but the Allies not only out gunned them, they knew they were coming due to aerial reconnaissance. The battleships Canopus, Triumph, Vengeance and the cruiser Baccahnte provided steady fire support but due to the closeness of the fighting could only aim at the enemy’s artillery emplacements and lines of reinforcement for fear of hitting their own men. The Triumph also had to fire shots at an Ottoman vessel attempting to attack from the Narrows. Despite heavy and determined assault the attack petered out with a lack of serious heavy artillery and ammunition at the cost of 3000 men killed and 7000 wounded. No U-boats had arrived in support of the attack.  

On 20 May U-21 began her uneventful journey to the Dardenelles. The British and French Navies had not ignored the rumours and reports of the arrival of U-boats in the region and had been expecting them for quite some time. On 22 May there was a submarine warning causing a slight panic. All transport ships and vessels without torpedo net defences were ordered to raise steam and leave the area for Mudros. A thorough search of the area found no U-boat and the sighting was chalked up to the body of a dead mule in the water.

   De Robeck was torn by his wish to protect his vessels and crews from harm and his duty to provide fire support to the army who were short on artillery and ammunition. The best solution he could come to was to reduce the number of vessels in the area by cutting the Gaba Tepe patrol to two from four, with one reserve at Imbros and the southern patrol from seven to four. Every day the ship’s reported to their station to duel the freshly arrived artillery with no further sightings of U-boats.

   Despite these moves to reduce the number of vessels in the region Hersing found quite a few easy targets including the Russian Cruiser Askold on the 24 May off Dedegatch but Hersing hungered for the larger targets and knew his first victory would cost him the element of surprise. As he cruised deeper into the straits he found three Majestic class battleships at anchor but the proximity of a hospital ship made him think twice. At 6:30 a.m. on 25 May Hersing sighted the Swiftsure in her firing position and manoeuvred to a firing position but fate intervened. The trawler Minoru spotted the German’s periscope and signalled a warning with two sharp blasts of her siren drawing two destroyers to search for the raider. Seeing the German heading for the French battleship St Louis they gave chase but Hersing did not give up the chase and was sighted a short while later between the Agamemnon and Swiftsure and only a few shells from the Swiftsure dissuaded him from further attention.

   With the very positive sighting the warships began to adopt defensive tactics and the Vengeance took a zig-zag course from Mudros to Cape Kephalo which saved her from disaster as at 10 a.m. Hersing fired his first torpedo. The Vengeance’s crew sighted the tracks in the water and the ship turned to starboard as the torpedo passed harmlessly by and Hersing withdrew, again under a hail of shell fire whilst the Talbot and a flotilla of available destroyers and trawlers began a concentrated search. The destroyers reported firing on the infiltrator four times but to no success.

   The presence of U-boats brought an understandable paranoia with wary lookouts seeing shadows and periscopes everywhere and the Canopus, which had been relieved by the Vengeance was zig-zagging hard back toward Imbros, sighted another submarine to the north heading south prompting Admiral Nicholson to request to withdraw his vessels to Kephalo as now it appeared that two submarines were operating in the area despite the Canopus sighting being slightly dubious and her escorting destroyer, Ribble, did not sight any U-boats.

   Hersing struck before any order could be given and at 12:25 HMS Chelmer, who was patrolling

Sketch of HMS Triumph sinking

around the Triumph spotted suspicious wake and moved to investigate. The Triumph was at the firing position off Gaba Tepe with all defensive measures taken including torpedo nets, water tight doors sealed and secondary armament manned and ready. A lookout sighted the periscope and guns began to fire but their rapport was masked by a greater explosion as the U-21’s torpedo passed through the nets and struck the battleship sending up a shower of water and coal and lifted the hull out of the water. The Triumph began to list to starboard making it impossible to lower starboard life boats and as the list grew more pronounced the Chelmer returned from a fruitless search for their aggressor and pulled alongside to retrieve as many men as they could from the stricken ship. On the portside men were finding it difficult to escape the torpedo netting. One of the Chinese Ward-room stewards who had served aboard since Hong Kong, climbed up one of the net boons as he could not swim. He was catapulted off as the ship heeled over but was quickly rescued.

   The Triumph’s list only grew worse and within ten minutes she had rolled onto her back and bobbed there, keel up with one officer remarking:

It was an extraordinary sight to see a ship like that turn over. Wild rumblings, as heavy weights took charge, could be distinctively heard from outside, and the ship finally sank, still growling like a wounded dog, as the things inside went adrift. (4)

Other than the Chelmer, the trawler Lord Wimbourne sailed among the men in the water and pulled a further 104 men to safety whilst other ships assisted though one officer was in the water for an hour before rescue. In total 78 men were lost which considering how quickly the vessel sank was quite a miracle.

Commander Barnes, the First Officer of the Majestic was below deck at lunch when the Chief Yeoman burst in with news that the Triumph had taken a direct hit:

We all got up on deck in time to see her turn over clean bottom up, and then down she went. We expected to follow her example any moment and, weighing anchor, steamed slowly back with our nets out to our anchorage off Cape Helles. (5)

Keyes led the search for U-21 with destroyers but was unable to find it. In a letter to his wife dated 1 June he lamented that:

I must have gone right over it 3 times – but there is no way (to destroy it) except by chance. It is so hard to make people understand. I am sure my anti-submarine tactics prevented her firing again at a ship that day. (6)  

A swift decision was made to withdraw the Swiftsure from her station to safety due to a lack of torpedo nets and leaving the older and more expendable Majestic on site with Rear Admiral Stuart Nicholson transferring his flag and kit so quickly that it was “thrown pell mell, without even being packed, mingled with an assortment of tinned meats, preserves and wines” into the waiting trawler. The Admiral also brought General Fuller, Hamilton’s artillery officer and the war Correspondent Ashmead-Bartlett and was later heard remarking aboard the Majestic that now they were safely behind nets they could sleep soundly. For the crew of the Majestic, having Nicholson aboard gave them a sense of reassurance as well with Commander Barnes remarking:

No submarine would have the impertinence to molest a vessel bearing the person and flying the flag of such a potentate, attended on all sides by his retinue, whose comings and goings were accompanied by such pomp and circumstance. It was unthinkable. (7)

This was not a feeling shared by all with Ashmead-Bartlett stating that he was “convinced the end was near” and that night the remaining bottles of champagne and a great deal of port was drunk in the Wardroom so that they would not be wasted should the ship be sunk. His fears were magnified when he reached his bunk to find it not only on the exposed sea side of the vessel but also below the waterline. Not wanting to be caught below decks should the worse happen he got a Marine to move a mattress up to the deck where he spent the night with thirty pounds and his cigarette case in the pocket of his pyjamas.

Hersing, who had waited some two hours to get his shot at the Triumph and had been forced to flee an onslaught of fire and destroyers had ordered U-21 to dive and cruise under the sinking Triumph before settling to the sea bed to wait for the trouble to pass. Some twenty eight hours later he returned to the surface for fresh air and to recharge the vessel’s batteries. He then ordered the U-boat to recommence its patrol to try and replicate the 25^th May’s success but early searches proved fruitless and so they turned south along Cape Helles.

Hersing spotted troops being landed in transport ships up ahead and that five hundred yards from shore lay HMS Majestic which was providing the landing troops with artillery support, with shells falling on the Turkish positions.

Hersing recalled post war that the British had reacted to the loss of the Triumph and were taking steps to protect the Majestic from the same fate:

The Submarine scare of the past few days, had indeed, had (an) effect. The Majestic was surrounded by an almost impenetrable patrol of boats of all kinds. Not only was there the difficulty of getting near her, but also the possibility of one of the small boats cutting across the path of a torpedo and getting it herself. The manoeuvring I had to do for a shot was intricate as a fine combination. (8)

HMS Majestic sinking

As Hersing studied his target his Watch officer reported they were at six hundred yards and that they probably could not get any closer a fact that was of no issue for Hersing as he had a perfect sight of Majestic but he had to contend with the swarm of smaller vessels cutting through his sights. A window of opportunity opened and he ordered “Torpedo – fire! Periscope in!”

Onboard the Majestic Petty Officer Cowie had just finished cleaning the fore bridge with six of the ship’s boys and was moving towards the after bridge when he saw Commander Barnes who was organising the launching of “the Admiral’s barge” in readiness of the arrival of the Exmouth to which he was due to transfer. Cowie glanced out across the water and his eyes fell on a strange object just astern of the minesweeper Reindeer. With sudden realisation he pointed at the periscope and called out to Barnes. The Commander looked to where Cowie was pointed and gasped.

“Yes, and here comes the torpedo!”

Both men shouted a warning to the men on deck and Cowie quickly ran and yelled down one of the ventilators before running to the end of the bridge to watch the explosion.

There was a deep muffled roar and a large spout of water and steam shot two hundred feet up into the air. The ship’s stacks shuddered whilst the masts and their yards swayed filling those below with dread in case they snapped and brought the masts crashing down but thankfully they stayed up.

U-21 dived away heading for safety, her escape further aided by the choppy sea conditions which masked the origin of the torpedo and its tracks. Hersing had to fight the urge to watch the results of his work and waited for any sound of a hit and then they hear it – “A distant ringing crash”

Deep in the Aft Stokehold, Stoker Sulivan was thrown twenty feet up into the air and he grabbed an overhead grating by reflex and pulled himself hand over hand to the nearest ladder before pulling himself up and onto the deck.

   An ordered urgency filled the men on deck as they hurried around throwing any flotsam into the water fearing that at any moment the ship would be ripped apart by an internal explosion and they all reacted to the order “Every man for himself” with quiet relieved professionalism.

The supporting vessels that surrounded the Majestic moved as close as they could to the wounded warship but could not come alongside as the vessel had healed to port to such a degree that it would do damage to the rescuers or take them down as well. Instead they had to sit and wait for the men to get off the ship and come to them. With only one lifeboat in the water most of them were swimming towards their salvation whilst others struggled to survive in the warm water or clung to anything that floated that had been thrown overboard.

   Cowie searched the aft-bridge for any wounded before walking down to the Quarter deck where he cut a ladder free and threw it in the water as an aid.

It seemed useless to remain on the ship longer, so I put the chin‐strap of my cap under my chin, made sure that my trousers were securely fastened, took a last farewell of the dear old ship and dived into a clear place away from the crowd. (9)

He remembered clearly that the last sight he saw on board was the reporter, Ashmead-Bartlett, standing on the bridge checking his watch and calmly noting down the time of the sinking. This may have been a case of mistaken identity though as Ashmead-Bartlett would later describe how he was awoken from his slumber on deck by the clamber of crewmen at 6:40 a.m. with one responding to his queries that; “A torpedo was coming.” After the impact he was swept down to the main deck by escaping crewmen before heading aft to the quarter-deck before climbing over the side.

Cowie was pleased to find that the water was warm, pleasant and full of men, but before he thought to save himself he calmly swam up to one of the open starboard scuttles and called into it but found nothing but an officer’s hat floating on the surface of the rising water. As he swam away from the vessel he saw crowds of men still on the deck unwilling to jump and he called out to them that the vessel was definitely sinking and not, as many of them believed, resting on the sea bed.

   With the British reacting immediately and the supporting vessels began scouring the sea looking for the German intruder firing their forward armament at suspected periscopes which prompted Hersing to make his escape deftly taking U-21 down to sixty feet and pulled away to a safe distance and briefly popping the periscope to see what damage they had done. Hersing could see that the Majestic was listing heavily but his jubilation was short lived as the British supporting vessels opened fire.

Cowie had swum thirty yards to a French trawler where he found Commander Barnes and one of Majestic's gunnery officers arming the trawler's guns to join fire on a distant periscope but by the time they were ready the German vessel had retreated and thoughts turned to the rescue of men in the water as the Majestic finally rolled over, still flying the Admiral's flag and began sinking slowly. The battleship’s masts became embedded in the sea bed arresting her sinking after four and a half minutes and there she stayed. The trawler Cowie was on moved forward gently and lines were thrown overboard with one pulling six men to safety in quick succession. Cowie himself dived into the water to save a drowning man and got him back to the trawler where, with artificial respiration, they were able to save his life and Cowie later remarking:

"Poor Chap! He had escaped death by a hair's breadth, and looked ghastly. His name was MacNeil, a RNR man."

Others were not so fortunate, Stoker Walter Partridge was plucked from the water and despite being worked on for some time was pronounced dead by a doctor much to the anger and frustration of the men who worked to save him.

Thomas Pegg, a wireless boy aged 19 from Cheltenham swam over to save a drowning man and despite being a noted good swimmer was pulled down by the man's struggles and both were lost. Stoker Sullivan had somehow found himself in the water following his escape up the ladder and was safely pulled from the water. When he was pulled to safety it was noted that his skin was flaming red all over as if he had been cooked but the lucky stoker, the sole survivor from the aft stokehold, swore that he was fine.

A large number of the crew were entangled in the starboard torpedo nets as the battleship heeled towards them but many were wearing lifebelts and so floated away to safety though others were caught in the suction.

One man sat alone on the keel of the slowly sinking Majestic. He had been on deck with the non-swimmers who were too scared to jump in the water and those who firmly believed the vessel would not sink, as she began to roll and had clambered up the side and onto the belly of the ship and just sat amid the chaos watching and waiting to be plucked to safety.

With the survivors scattered across several vessels and washed up on the beaches it was hard to get an accurate casualty figure though the smaller vessels soon moved their cargo to larger vessels such as the sweeper Reindeer which proceeded to Mudros. It was a sorrowful journey with the dead being buried at sea along the way, a task which fell heavily upon Majestic's chaplain, Reverend Dawson. The crew arrived at Mudros at 3 p.m. and were given fresh tea and jam sandwiches whilst fresh clothing was found for them and they soon joined the survivors of the Triumph. In all 49 men had been lost in the sinking.

Admiral Wemyss remarked in his diary that:

The material loss of these two ships was not itself of supreme importance and the loss of life but slight but the moral effect was considerable and infused the Turkish army, which we know had been somewhat demoralized by its heavy losses since the opening of the campaign, with fresh courage. (10)

Indeed on the beach the Ottoman troops peered out of their positions to see the aged Majestic erupt with a large column of water shooting up debris, smoke and water in a great column before slowly listing to her side and capsizing belly up and all fighting momentarily stopped as everyone turned to regard what had happened at sea.

Commodore Keyes wrote to his wife that:

Roger Keyes

At any rate the Army will never be able to say we haven't supported them. I think, in fact I am sure - they were enormously impressed by seeing two battleships sunk, one off each area. At ANZAC every soul could see it all happen - and off Helles thousands saw - besides there it was within 500 yards of the beach. (11)

General Hamilton wrote in his diary that:

Fuller, my artillery Commander, and Ashmead-Bartlett, the correspondent, were both on board, and both were saved – minus kit! About 40 men have gone under. Bad luck. A Naval Officer who has seen her says she is lying in shallow water – 6 fathoms – bottom upwards looking like a stranded whale. He says the German submarine made a most lovely shot at her through a crowd of cargo ships and transports. Like picking a royal stag out of his harem of does.  (12)


Almost an hour after making their escape the German U-boat returned to the scene of the crime so Hersing could try and ascertain what the effect of his attack had been. What he witnessed was the Allied ships sweeping the area systematically looking for survivors. The Majestic's keel still holding above the water which it would do for several months until a storm finally shattered the masts and she finally sank below the waves.

The result of these successful attacks was that the Navy considered having both British and French battleships in the area was too dangerous and so were withdrawn to the safety of Mudros harbour whilst HMS Queen Elizabeth was withdrawn to the Grand fleet after news of the sinking of HMS Goliath on 12 May filtered back to the Admiralty no doubt exasperated by the loss of both the Triumph and the Majestic. The Admiralty believed that destroyers were able to provide a decent amount of fire support with their 4” guns for most of the Army’s needs but should heavier fire be required then the battleships would return with heavy protection for short periods. This had a great effect on the battles as it meant the Ottomans would not come under regular heavy fire from the sea and freed up the Asiatic based artillery from suppression which allowed them to lay down heavy fire on the rear areas especially in the French zone. A final precaution was for the Arcadian, Hamilton's vessel, to be braced by two merchant ships strapped to the side to protect her from torpedo attack.

On arrival in Constantinople, Hersing was greeted as a hero and saviour and a grateful Kaiser awarded him a Pour le Merite for sinking two battleships in two days.

Footnotes:

1. Tirpitz, A. My Memoirs, Vol II, Hurst & Blackett, London, 1919  p.505
2. Goodchild, G. The Last cruise of the Majestic, p.101
3. Halpern, P. G. The Keyes papers, p.135
4. Chatterton, E. K, Dardanelles Dilemma, p.256
5. Ibid p.254
6. Halpern, P. G. The Keyes papers P. 143
7. Chatterton E. K, Dardanelles Dilemma p. 258
8. Goodchild, G. The last cruise of the Majestic, p. 117-118
9. Ibid. p. 120
10. Wemyss, The Navy in the Darndelles Campaign, p.135
11. Halpern, P. G, (ED) The Keyes Papers, p.147
12. Hamilton, I., Gallipoli Diary p.253

Haddocks and the bombing of Northern Italy

   As German forces cut their swathe through northern France a large question mark began to hang over what Italy might do. Italy was neutral at the outset of the War but the Fascist government of Benito Mussolini held similar expansionist ambitions having taken Abyssinia and throughout the 1930s had been drifting into Germany's sphere. It was a consideration that the Allies had planned even before the German attack on the West with it being discussed in conference at Aden, Jerusalem and London. the French proposed a grand scheme that involved the RAF protecting Northern France and releasing the Armee de l'air to bases in the South and Tunisia which would cover Malta and attack Italian targets in Libya and Italy itself. Britain was lukewarm to the plan not wanting to commit the RAF to France on such a scale but promised to reassess should "the most need in war" require Tunisia to be reinforced. On the 3 May 1940 the Director of Plans laid out a strategy involving night attacks or with plenty of cloud cover if a day raid was attempted. Targets in Venice, Genoa, Milan and Turin were selected as the cities would be easily identifiable by the night crews and easier to find. The targets were mostly aviation industry factories such as Fiat in Turin, propeller, engine and frame work component factories around Genoa, Milanese airframe facilities and the main port at Venice which would hamper operations to shore up their positions in Albania. After these targets a list of secondary aeroplane factories was available as well as oil refineries and tank factories. Delayed action bombs were also to be used as the delayed explosions would cause a "powerful moral effect against the Italians, whose psychology was "ill-adapted to war."

   The first seeds of a forward British position in the South of France were laid out by the end of May with the aim of stationing four Wellington squadrons there. RAF strategists were keen to cut the range of their bombers and the range from the French frontier to Genoa, Turin and Milan is only around 150 miles which could equate to about an hour's flight rather than the ten or twelve the bombers based in England would face. Not everyone greeted it with enthusiasm with many in French circles fearing repercussions on French cities like Marseille for British actions. Barratt was also not enthused by the scheme as by 29 May his force had been practically wiped out and what was left was being stretched between defending a new line near Paris and trying to answer the desperate calls for support from the army. He wrote that;

   I recognise the value and possibilities of the plan, but am doubtful as to the weight of the attack that could be maintained against Italy on the slender administrative basis proposed, while I am certain that the introduction of a new force in France at this juncture must add materially to the risks of the present situation ¹

Vickers Wellingtons would make up the Salon based Haddocks 

Wheels were in motion though and the Supreme war council agreed the plan on the 31 May and with the aim of attacking as soon as possible a further meeting of the French and British Air and Naval staffs was convened on the 3 June in Paris. Despite the previous discussions the French were now wavering towards a naval bombardment of Genoa and there was  concern that the simple fact of four squadrons of bombers at the end of a line of communication, a line which could be broken at any time by the Germans in the North leaving them stranded 600 miles from home were hardly going to shatter Italy alone despite the RAF Air staff' s optimistic view that an attack, however small and brief might cause "effects of outstanding importance.” Barratt was given only administrative control over the new force and responsibility for establishing their bases and logistics but not given operational responsibilities.

   Group Captain Field of 71 wing was placed in command of the newly dubbed "Haddock force" and he moved from Nantes, where he had been based following his units withdrawal on 17 May, to the French airfields of Salon and Le Vallon which sat 30 miles away from Marseille and about 250 miles from Turin. Field organised the incoming fuel and ammunition trains and a week later on the 10 June he reported all was ready. Barratt had even been able to donate some of the AASF'S Bofors guns and a battery of thirteen 3 inch guns which had been at Nantes and whose defences were due to be reinforced by more units from Britain though they had not arrived by the 10 June.

     There had of course been a chance of plan as the situation in Northern France deteriorated and the AASF and Air component withdrawing to Nantes, Rennes, and ... whilst the BEF were withdrawing from Dunkirk. The Air staff, presumably not wishing to risk personnel and invaluable aircraft had instead decided to a squadron down for two nights then replace it with another one with operations being escalated if the situation improved. There was also a shortage of fighter aircraft to act as an escort or for protection of the airfields as the three French squadrons who had been in the area on the 3 June were no longer there, three more could be sent if the British sent twenty squadrons to assist in the Northern sector - something Dowding was resisting as he felt that every available fighter would be needed for a German attack on Britain, and Barratt had none available from his command. It wouldn't mean much as RAF tacticians had appraised the weather over Italy as cloudy enough to provide cover for the day bombers and that in any event the Italian fighter force would not be adequate to intercept them.

   At 4:30 p.m. (Rome time) on the 10 June a declaration of war was handed to the French ambassador and to the British at 4:45 and Mussolini announced to a crowd from a balcony at the Palazzo Venezia in Rome that he had taken the country to war. The following day twelve Wellingtons were sent to Salon to refuel and arm for a night raid on Turin and would be reinforced by thirty six Whitleys who would fly to the Channel Islands to refuel before setting off. The Wellingtons duly arrived in Salon at 3:30 p.m. and the crews began to recover and rest after the seven hour flight and prepare for the evening's assault. Not more than thirty minutes later a staff officer for General Gama of the 11^th French Bombardment group telephoned a message from the General to say the mission was not to be carried out. Field called his superiors for more information and was told that the operation was indeed on and the Whitleys were already on their way. Further French authorities contacted Field to tell him that the operation must be cancelled and even Barratt was contacted by General Vuillemin requesting it were stopped. Barratt telephoned the Air Ministry and was redirected to speak to Churchill who was at that time in France at Weygand's headquarters and was given the go ahead. When Barratt passed the message to Field he was told that the Deputé de la Marine and General in charge of the region telling him the French Government had forbidden any raid to launch from French soil. Barratt called Ismay and Churchill again and was told that the Whitleys could not be stopped and that the French Government had agreed to the strategy beforehand and now it was too late and at 10:15 p.m. Barratt relayed all of this to Field. The situation was not resolved by this though and for the next two hours the telephone in Field's office continued to ring with protestations from the French including the Naval authority in Toulon and even the Commanding officer of the 3^rd Army, General Houdermon, telephoned personally three times but by twenty-seven minutes past midnight the first Wellington began to rumble along the runway but came to an abrupt stop as French military lorries spilled out of the darkness and dispersed to block the runways. The local air commander had been given orders to stop the raid at all costs. Field could do nothing but use force to deal with the invaders but decided with deteriorating weather and advanced hour that it was best to cancel the operation and let his superiors sort out a solution and his crews retired to bed.

Yorkshire based Whitleys flew through the Alps to the target area

   Meanwhile the Whitleys had reached the Alps and encountered major difficulties with the weather conditions. The bombers of 10, 51, 58, 77 and 102 Squadrons had left their bases in Norfolk in the early afternoon and arrived at Guernsey at 5:00 p.m. After three hours they took off for the Alps but severe icing conditions with many engines failing or extractor controls freezing up leaving the pilot unable to vary the pitch of the engines and gain altitude. There was also a chronic problem with fluid freezing up in the extractors piping and leak out of pin prick holes which veteran crews would refill the tubes with any fluid they had to hand which was normally coffee or urine. S/L Hanafin’s Whitley, having soldiered through the cold and cloud and dodged a barrage of from French flak, plunged headlong into a thunderstorm and was promptly struck by lightning which burnt the navigator, Sgt Green’s hand and causing Sgt Oldridge, who was leaning on his guns in the tail, to be blown into the fuselage and knocked unconscious. Hanafin also saw both engines stop and the aircraft begin to dive under the sheer weight of all of the ice on the airframe. At the last minute Hanafin managed to recover the craft and judging that he didn’t have enough fuel to cross the Alps was forced to retire with twenty three others for Guernsey.

   Those that were able to press on were struck by a combination of the beauty of the Alps below and above them as well as the relentless numbing cold for which there was little protection. The Whilety’s Oxygen system was also inadequate for long distance at high altitude which provided another source of discomfort combined with fatigue for the pilots and navigators who had been furiously concentrating since launching with only a few hours rest and they were only halfway.

   Once through the Alps they faced the new challenge of finding either the primary target of Turin or the clutch of secondary targets including Milan, Genoa, Savona or Maggiore. The target area at Turin was masked by thick cloud banks from 5-2000 feet despite the lack of a blackout. The Italian authorities had not expected any Allied bombing force attacking Italian soil and were caught out by the Whitley’s approach and quickly enforced a blackout in Turin but failed to do so in Genoa. Flak was “indiscriminate” but heavy without support from search lights.

   W/Cmdr Staton of 10 Squadron identified the target at Turin and spent sixty-five minutes over it marking it with flares to confirm his suspicions and to light it up for following bombers before commencing his attack at 1:30 a.m. with all of his bombs striking the southern end of the target building and starting green fires.

   Just ten minutes before F/Sgt Deacon of 51 Squadron attacked at 15,000 feet dripping his “2 500lb bombs and 5 250lb bombs… in one stick” causing explosions “right across the target.” He was followed at 1.44 a.m. by P/O Oettle who hit the north west of the works. F/L Budden spotted a “Self-Illuminated target, thought to be a blast furnace” and dropped a 500lb and three 250lb from 8000 feet before dropping the remainder on the Railway marshalling yards which is where Sgt Denny’s Whitley dropped all of its’ bombload. The only 58 Squadron Whitley to arrive flown by F/O McInnes claimed hitting the Aero engine shed, the railway tracks (“Causing green sparks”) and a building 300 yards away. Two Whitleys of 102 Squadron hit targets causing “Violent explosions” and fires.

   The remaining aircraft to make it as far as the target area dropped their bombs on Genoa where the city lights stayed on and like the raid over Turin put up persistent but accurate light flak which was unaided by search lights. Indeed Italy was ill prepared for an air offensive on its’ cities despite passing laws on preparation for aerial assault some

   In the coming weeks the French, who had been anxious not to provoke Italy into retaliatory strikes or an aggressive war on the ground found to their discomfort that the Italians were intent on crossing the border even if they were not aggressively bombing cities. Grudgingly they accepted Haddock force and no more attempts were made to stop them. On the 15 June, twelve more Wellingtons arrived at Salon and attacked Genoa's Piaggio and Ansaldo factories but their night navigation, which was hit and miss at the best of times, was interfered with by thunderstorms and only one claimed to have hit the target Ansaldo works whilst the rest brought their ordinance home.

   On the 16 June, the day the AASF's Fairey Battles were withdrawn from France and bad conditions kept the British based bombers on the ground, nine intrepid Haddock Wellingtons took to the sky to target Milan. Once over the border four made it through the pitch black and low cloud to hit targets in Milan including the Caproni factory and the Scato San Giovanni, one crew was certain that their bombs on the Caproni works but saw no results. In reality the explosions and fire reported did little damage and one person was killed. One of the other raiders bombed Genoa and the remainder found nothing at all and returned home to the news that Haddock was over and the whole force was to be evacuated and raids on Italy would be carried out exclusively by Britain based bombers.

   Haddock could be seen as a failure as it failed to cause any major damage or alter Italian public perception but the military situation in France dictated the amount of aircraft that could be deployed and even if they took off at all! Sadly the small number of aircraft operating in far from ideal conditions Field's command could not have done more.

   The operations of Haddock force were not the last to target Italy in 1940 with several long distance raids being carried out by Whitleys through the Alps in the Summer with it their bases in England being perversely closer to the industrial targets of northern Italy than if they were based at Malta. The journey was long and arduous with crews suffering even more from the cold and bad weather through the mountains than they had operating over Germany on Nickel missions and it was not uncommon for missions to Turin to be scrubbed at short notice due to the bad weather. It was not until late in 1940 that a squadron of Wellingtons operating from Malta, began to harass Italian ports around the Naples basin and occasionally fly further up to attack the northern industrial powerhouses but their attacks were no more than a nuisance and were soon kept in check by the combined aerial attack on the island and also by the arrival of German anti-aircraft batteries who made it harder for the RAF. A prolonged campaign against Italy would have to wait for better conditions and the availability of more aircraft.

1.         RAF official history France and the Low countries P. 410

The death of the Advanced Air Striking Force

The 9 May 1940 started for Air Vice Marshal Barratt in a very inauspicious way at 2:15 a.m. with a call from London to warn him that Germany had issued an ultimatum to the Dutch, however there was no confirmation from the attaché in The Hague though it seemed like another “flap” like November and April. The squadrons were again brought to standby in readiness and although nothing came to pass that day they were held in a state of preparedness.
  

A formation of Fairey Battles

 Early the following morning the Luftwaffe made the first move with small groups of bombers attacking airfields at Bethenville, Mournelen, Berrey-Au-Bac and Reims-Champagne dropping high explosives and incendiaries but despite destroying hangers and tool sheds only three of the AASFs Battles were lost with a further two damaged. 142 Squadron received their visitors at 4:35 a.m. with six He 111 Bombers attacking between 600 and 1000 feet but causing minor shrapnel damage to one Battle and a clutch of German ordinance which failed to explode at all! They received another attack at 6:00 a.m. with incendiaries dropped causing no damage. In total forty-three French, ten Dutch and eight Belgian airfields were hit on the first day destroying 210 aircraft though the German crews claimed up to 829 aircraft destroyed on the ground. Had the Luftwaffe intelligence been sharper then the casualties in the North of France could have been a lot worse with only twenty one of ninety one airfields being attacked with half of them not holding first line squadrons and Luftflotte 3s crews failed to find any targets.

   By 6:00 a.m. news of German soldiers crossing the borders and paratroopers landing from Ju 52s reached the RAF and the Battle squadrons were brought up from Standby to Alert No.2 and very quickly Alert No.3 but by 10:30 a.m. when Barratt took control of the situation at Chauny the Battles were still on the ground. The Blenheims of the Component and AASF were sent on reconnaissance flights and spotted smoke over the Ruhr which obstructed most of their field of vision but vehicle columns a mile long were sighted heading north west from Kaldenkirchen. Three reconnaissance sorties in the norther sector were lost including P/O Thomas’ Blenheim of 57 squadron which came down at Echtveld at 11:30 a.m. with the crew all killed. F/Lt Wyatt of the same squadron was also injured in the arm by enemy fire

      As the day unfolded and the news of a widespread German assault on the low countries was reported the AASF were called to attack targets ten times but it was not until midday that eight Battles of 142 squadron, who had been on standby for two and a half hours, took off to attack a German column on the Luxembourg to Dippoch road. The formation had six Hurricanes flying as top cover as the low flying Battles approached the target but the danger was not coming from Messerschmitts above them this time and as soon as the Battles were close enough the German Flak opened up filling the sky with shards of hot metal that eviscerated the lightly armoured Battles at point blank range. The two sections came in at 250 feet and dropped their four 250lb bombs, set with eleven second delayed fuses. Of the seven Battles who reached the target (P/O Chalmers had returned following a problem with his landing gear) three failed to return. Sgt Spears and his crew managed to escape the Germans following their crash landing at Colmey whereas F/O Roth and his gunner were not so lucky and were taken away to the rear of the German advance and P/O Laws’ Battle crashed killing his crew. Other aircraft were severely holed with crewmen like LAC Cave, who was hospitalised on the return to base. P/O Corbett received a DFC for bringing his Battle back with an injured ankle and his observer, Sgt Irvine, dead. Despite these loses the Squadron’s record of events records proudly; “No. 142 Squadron was the first Squadron in the AASF to carryout operations on enemy columns.”

   Barratt was to dispatch other squadrons throughout the day to harass the columns with 150 squadron taking off in two sections of two and one of three taking off between 2:45 and 3:57p.m. Like 142 squadron they had had five aircraft on standby since 5:30 a.m. which was increased to eight at 9:45 a.m. and didn’t receive their preliminary orders until 1:10 p.m. The first wave led by F/Lt Weeks bombed the column found between Neufchateau and Bertrix attracting a similar hail of fire but Weekes and Sgt Andrews’ two Battles returned with P/O Campbell-Irons disappearing. The second wave also were never seen again after their take off whereas the third wing led by F/O Blom whose aircraft had been hit over Differdange by Flak which ruptured a petrol tank filling the cockpit with petrol fumes which impaired the crew’s vision and caused “Intense discomfort.” They failed to find a target between Luxembourg and Echternach but managed to find one near Gevenmacher and attacked at 100 feet and strafed with forward and rear guns but Sgt White’s Battle disappeared not long after the attack. Blom would later receive the DFC for attacking the column with his damaged aircraft despite the four missing aircraft only F/Lt Parker was killed with five men taken prisoner and Sgt White’s crew making a delayed evasion arriving on the 13 May.

   The crews of 103 squadron suffered quite extensively with three of the four bombers shot-down

F/Lt E Parker's wrecked Battle under guard

with P/O Drabble, Sgt Smith and LAC Lamble were all killed as were Sgt Poole and LAC Hutchinson of Sgt Lowne’s crew whereas P/O Wells and his crew as well as Lowne were all captured.



   The 10 May’s sorties showed that not only were the mobile columns easy targets as Allied planners had hoped but also that the Fairey Battle and indeed low flying Blenheims from Bomber Command, were exceptionally vulnerable to concentrated Flak. It was not just mobile flak batteries firing at the RAF but even German infantry firing rifles and motorbike and sidecar riders firing their mounted MG 34s! The AASF report stated:
Even at this early stage of operations the difficulties of operating against fleeting targets became evident. The Columns against which raids had been dispatched proved to have dispersed or to have moved elsewhere by the time the raid reached the area of operations.
This was the same problem encountered by Bomber Command over Heligoland coupled with murderous anti-aircraft fire and the threat of aerial superiority from German fighters.

   A further raid was authorised in the early evening when it was hoped that the failing light would mean there was less chance of being caught by marauding Messerschmitts especially as there were no Hurricanes or French fighters available for escort duties. Two half sections totalling four aircraft from 12 Squadron took off between 4.50 and 5.05 p.m. Although they did not encounter the Luftwaffe they did encounter “heavy crossfire” which severed F/lt Hunts bomb control cable and he retired to Piennes whilst Sgt Young, P/o Hulse’s observer was wounded in the shoulder.

   Through the fire F/lt Simpson dropped his four bombs and pulled away but was quickly informed by his observer, Sgt Odell that petrol was streaming from the tanks and he soon noted that the engine was starting to stutter as they crossed the frontier. Knowing that they would not make it back to their base Simpson decided to put the Battle down in a field in a controlled crash at 6:15 p.m. Odell and LAC Thomlinson pulled themselves free of the now burning wreck only to realise that Simpson was still in the cockpit and hurried to save their pilot. Although Tomlinson received burns to his hands pulling a similarly burnt Simpson between the two of them they managed to get 150 yards away before the Battle blew up. For their bravery Tomlinson and Odell received the DFM and Simpson the DFC. The only other aircraft not to come back was P/O Matthews who was reported last seen landing in a field at 6:00 p.m. but the whole crew were captured.

   Other squadrons had also engaged during the day with 105 squadron losing P/O O’Brien’s Battle and 218 Squadron whose aircraft reaped a similar level of flak killing LAC Baguley in the turret of L5402. Battles from 226 squadron joined the evening raids on a convoy taking off from Reims at 5:00 p.m.. Sgt McLoughlin reported anti-aircraft batteries on the surrounding hills north and west of Luxembourg and machine guns firing yellow tracer from railway cuttings. Despite being unable to pinpoint the troop concentrations Mcloughlin dive bombed but was unable to report specific damage whilst AC Russel emptied half a pan of his Vickers ammunition into targets. Sgt Barron bombed a convoy of thirty to forty vehicles not far from a large wireless station leaving a crater in the road and a near miss some fifteen yards away. But Barron was struck y anti-aircraft fire with a German bullet passing straight through his left leg but still managed to get his craft and crew home reporting seeing F/O Kerridge’s Battle in flames south west of Luxembourg. Kerridge was killed and Corporal Dixon badly burnt as the aircraft crashed into the northern suburbs of Faubourg de Luxembourg. F/O Cameron suffered a similar fate with ground fire shooting him down leaving his crew to join Kerridge’s in a POW camp and him ding in Diekirch hospital as the surgeons operated to save his arm.

   Of thirty-two Battles to go into action on 10 May thirteen were lost and the majority of the aircraft that returned were holed and damaged. The following day saw the AASF faced similar action against German columns with French reconnaissance pinpointing one consisting of important German units on the road from Prum to Echternach on its way towards Luxembourg. Six Hurricanes were sent to cover the target area above Prum at 9:45 a.m. but they returned having seen no Battles over the target area.

   Two half sections had taken off from both 218 squadron and 88 Squadron but none made it through with all four of 218s Battles being shot down. F/O Crews was brought down by ground fire which killed his observer Sgt Jennings and left Crews and Sgt Evans POW joining F/O Hudson and his crew. P/O Murray was badly burnt but similarly captured with his gunner and his observer hospitalised by the Germans at Limberg having lost his little finger. Only P/O Ridder of 88 Squadron returned as the sole survivor albeit heavily damaged and reported that:
his leader force-landed near Bastogne, and that he lost the remaining two aircraft near St Vith from ground fire. He was himself unable to drop his bombs because his bomb gear had been damaged and he returned followed by an Me 109. Of the remaining four aircraft there was no news at all.
None of the other crews returned or had landed in Allied controlled territory with F/Lt Madge’s Battle crashing on the Bastogne to Neufchâteau road with Sgt Whittle killed. Of the missing Battles P/O Mungovan and Sgt Robson were captured but all of P/O Skidmore’s crew and AC1 Maltby were killed. The combination of accurate ground fire and Messerschmitt patrols was starting to prove a deadly combination

   The Blenheims of the Air Component were faring no batter in their reconnaissance duties with two

Bristol Blenheim Mk IVs

of the four sorties sent to the Albert Canal being lost with Sgt Voi lost at 3:30 a.m. and F/O Ballis failed to return from the 8:30 p.m. patrol. The other squadron to see action was 53 Squadron which returned three of four Blenheims with no footage due to low cloud but lost P/O Alistair Panton who was bounced by six Messerschmitts whose concentrated fire shattered the control panel and caused the starboard engine to explode in flames whilst Sgt Bence in the rear turret cried out that he was hit and Sgt Christie collapsed from a head wound over the navigators table. Having brought the burning Blenheim down into a meadow. Panton pulled Christie free of the burning wreck before returning to pull Bence free whilst ammunition and fuel exploded around them and the Luftwaffe fighters making strafing runs at them. Panton managed to load his crew into a commandeered car and dodge a German column and Stuka attack to get his crew into a Belgian hospital. Bence lost his left leg due to his injuries but Christie and Panton managed to escape back to British lines.

   The RAF headquarters made the decision made the decision at midday that no reconnaissance flights should be made in the Maastrict area as the Luftwaffe had gained superiority and it was too dangerous and by 1:45 p.m. the Germans had taken the Canal and occupied Tongres whilst the Belgians retired to the Gotte river and the Wehrmacht continued to grow in strength in the Belgian Ardennes and Maastricht.

   The Reconaisance information gained by the French and the Lysanders of the Air Component showed that the Belgian airforce had been decimated with thirty burnt out aircraft seen at Wunche and Tirlement airfield. Other reports had left the planners stumped as to where the German strike was going to come from with the continuing build-up of forces in the Belgian Ardennes and the powerful thrusts that had already taken Paliscul, Bouillon and Givonne with their apparent target being Sedan. The quandary came as to whether this was to draw off attention from the Low Countries or the main thrust that would bypass Maginot into the French Hinterland but the “unpleasantly strong” forces in Belgium left them unsure. Barratt signalled GQG that he was;

Not yet able to decide which of the two following enemy threats is the main attack, general axis Maastricht – Gembloux with secondary thrusts on axis Bois-le-due – Tilbery or attack in the Ardennes in general direction Mézières with purpose turning the Maginot line.

   The decision was made for them by the Belgians who on the night of 11 May had sent an urgent

Crews boarding their Fairey Battle

request stressing the need to destroy two remaining bridges over the Albert Canal situated three miles to the south west of Maastricht. The Belgians had sent a team of engineers to destroy them but they had failed to do so because they had encountered stiff German opposition which led to the decapitation of the commanding officer by shell fire which also cut all means of telephone communication.

   The two bridge, one near Veldwezelt and the other near Vroenhoven on the M-Tongros line, were being fortified by German troops with flak emplacements and with all probability an umbrella of Messerschmitts. With such staggering odds an all-out attack by the whole AASF was ruled out and a smaller formation of volunteer crews was to be sent instead.

   When the assembled crews of 12 Squadron were asked for six volunteer crews they all volunteered and lots had to be drawn. Barratt did what he could to give these men a fighting chance and coordinated with Bomber Command to attack other crossings in the Maastricht area and German columns to draw off the Luftwaffe whilst also providing ten Hurricanes as escort.

   The Battles took off at 8:18 a.m. with three under F/O Garland heading for Veldwezelt and two under F/O Norman Thomas for Vroenhoven. The sixth aircraft flown by P/O Brereton suffered from a faulty wireless set so a second aircraft was quickly appropriated but that one had a mechanical fault with the hydraulic gear on the bomb rack failing. It was too late for them to get a third aircraft ready and with disappointment the crew returned to await the results of the raid unknowing that the faults had spared their lives that day.

   F/O Thomas and P/O Davey continued with their three Hurricane escort towards Vroenhoven but encountered a sweep of around thirty Messerschmitts when they were still twenty miles from the target. The Hurricanes, though outnumbered ten to one charged into the Germans and distracted them long enough for Thomas and Davy to make their attack runs on the bridge through a fierce barrage of anti-aircraft fire and small arms. The two Battles dived from six to two thousand feet and dropped a total of eight 250 lb bombs and striking the target. Sgt Mansell, Davey’s observer reported that “On looking down we saw that one bridge now matched the other” and the escorting Hurricanes saw bombs bursting on or near the target.

   The fire was too thick though and F/O Thomas’ Battle came down in flames and crash landed next to the target with the crew quickly captured. Davy was hit quite badly and he was also quickly attacked by a 109 which made two passes before diving away through a gap in the clouds trailing smoke following a blast from AC1 Patterson’s Vickers. Mansell contacted Davy down the intercom to tell him that the port fuel tank was leaking, trailing white smoke. Davy took the decision and try and bring L5241 back but not risk the lives of his crew and whilst over Maastricht he ordered Mansell and Patterson to bail out whilst he attempted to nurse the Battle home.



Fairey Battles attacking a German column (IWM C1737)

   Garland’s formation encountered the same level of flak but Garland did not hesitate and brought

his formation down on the bridge whilst German trucks snaked across it. One of Sgt Grey’s bombs send a column of water into the air showing a near miss but others struck home with one German truck bursting into flames whilst another struck the first span but Garland was seen to immediately burst into flames and crash. As the other two aircraft pulled out of their attack runs they were set upon by the Luftwaffe with one aircraft crashing into the river and the other into a field. P/O McIntosh, despite severe burns had dropped his bombs and managed to bring the burning wreck into a landing in a field within German territory. When his crew were interrogated the German officer was incredulous that the British had allowed them two days to fortify the bridge before attacking. Sgt Marland’s was last seen climbing out of control and claimed the lives of the whole crew.  Only Davy returned to base that day out of fifteen men who left that morning. Sgt Mansell returned having evaded German patrols but AC1 Patterson broke a bone in his foot on landing and was unable to escape the German held territory.

   Although the losses were high the crossings had been destroyed which had been the main objective of the mission and the German advance slowed. Garland and Grey were both awarded the Victoria Cross posthumously whilst Davy was rested but on his return to duty he was far from enthusiastic about being back on Battles.

   Holding the Germans at the Albert Canal was to prove fruitless as Holland surrendered on the following day and reconnaissance flights, although hampered by low cloud, which caused four sorties to be aborted and enemy fire which damaged two with another failing to return, reported the Germans had crossed the Meuse. When reports of German soldiers on the left bank were reported the AASF requested permission to attack but it took the BAFF HQ three quarters of an hour later it was decided that no attack would be carried out on this occasion with the official history recording that;

 The reason for returning a negative was not recorded; probably the targets were considered unsuitable, or else action was left to the French who operated with a few bombers in this area before midnight.

   The Germans were throwing their weight against the Meuse at where their main Schwehrpunkt would be and Guderian’s combat engineers brought up the last of their bridging equipment whilst the Panzers of Army Group A began to access and the flak detachments under the command of Oberst von Hippel began to dig in around the area having been brought to the front with all due haste. The Luftwaffe were also operating over the bridgehead attacking French positions and providing an umbrella of fighter cover for the vulnerable German soldiers in rubber dinghies and combat engineers struggling to construct pontoon bridges. By the morning of 14 May the Germans had occupied a front from Vringne-sur-Meuze to Mouzon with a depth of ten miles to Vendressa-la Nelville. Despite the order the day before not to engage the AASF had been put on standby with operations planned for the morning with three half sections to attack pontoon bridges at Sedan and two half sections at the Dinant sector. The situation was fairly fluidic though and during the night French Bomber forces claimed the Dinant bridges destroyed and the AASF raid scrubbed. By first light six Battles from 113 squadron were detailed to attack four bridges over the Meuse and at Chiers and four from 150 squadron took off at 7:35 a.m. to attack pontoon bridges at the island north of Villers and between Romilly and Allincourt. Both raids reported intense anti-aircraft fire from German positions but no fighters. Both formations were given fighter escorts with Hurricanes escorting the former and the French the latter and despite one of 103s pilots being injured all of the crews returned and reported success except for the island bridge which could not be located and so instead the two Battles attacked German troops in the village of Moliry.

   The results of these early raids were encouraging especially considering the levels of loss experienced on the previous days. As the crews debriefed and supplied the Intelligence officers with fresh reports on the German disposition plans were being drawn up for attack on German columns near Breda. By 12:15 p.m. the French contacted Barratt and pleaded for all of the help he had available to stop the German advance. There was a major thrust developing in the Dinant sector but more importantly the Sedan bubble was expanding and in need of checking with the French position being attacked before they themselves could launch a counterattack. General Gamelin and General Georges requested as much help as could be mustered with Barratt contacting the Chief of the Air Staff and ordering every possible bomber to be ready from 2:05 p.m. at the shortest possible notice.

   A plan was devised in coordination with the French to see them alternate attacks with three hour intervals with the AASF up first as the French had launched an attack of forty bombers escorted by a similar number of fighters at 12:30 p.m.. Barratt’s plan was for a wide spread of five brides to be attacked by eleven Battles each attack lasting over forty-five minutes with twenty minutes between attacks. Columns were also to be attacked in the same raids from Bouillon through Givena to Sedan with all seventy seven aircraft in the air at the same time.

   As with all plans there were two minor hitches with the orders reaching 76 wing, who were due to lead the attack, not getting their orders until 3 p.m. and not getting airborne until 3:25 p.m. and, although of little impact, only seventy-one aircraft took off.

   The delay in orders meant the Battles did not arrive in order and it is difficult to say who arrived first but 12 squadron were part of the first wave sending five aircraft to attack columns and lost four including Acting F/o Clancy who was also the acting commander of B-flight who came down at Pourn-St Rémy where Clancy was taken prisoner and his crew buried. A-Flight’s Commander, F/O Vaughan faired little better despite dropping his bombs on the road between Sedan and Givonne he was brought down and killed along with his observer Sgt Shelton-Jones. Vaughn’s gunner, J. D. Wright along with Sgt Winkler’s crew were taken prisoner. The soul survivor, P/O McElligott returned to base at 4:24 p.m. having witnessed Vaughan’s attack and the German flak emplacements following his successful bombing run.

   The eight Battles of 142 squadron led by Squadron Leader Hobler were met by not only a hail of anti-aircraft fire but also standing patrols of Messerschmitts from Jg 26, Jg 27 and Jg 53 which proceeded to engage the helpless British aircraft quickly claiming F/Sgt Spears’ P2333 which came down at Choloy killing two of the crew but were repulsed by AC Greenall manning F/O Reed’s gun who claimed to have shot down one of the German fighters. Hobler also fell to the Bf 109s and was badly burnt but was assisted by his crew, Sgt Kitto and Cpl Barbrooke who helped him to evade capture. On his return the gallant Squadron leader was hospitalised and eventually evacuated. F/Lt Wight and P/O Chalmers attacked the bridges with success and returned to Berry-au-bac reporting that they had seen fresh bridge works being built on both sides of the river. They were eventually joined by Sgt Spears and P/O Oakley and his crew who had managed to escape from a forced landing at Eely leaving the only unaccounted for aircraft being F/Lt Rogers who was posted as missing but was in fact killed with his whole crew. With the high numbers of crews returning it could be argued that 147 squadrons losses were less severe than others as aircraft were easily replaced but with the pressure building on the AASF both were rapidly becoming short supply.

   The last wave from 76 wing was 226 squadron who were similarly mauled with all of the aircraft sustaining damage with Sgt Annau having to abandon his attack having had his bomb release gear shot away by flak along with his left aileron and tail plane! Squadron Leader Lockett was seen crashing in flames with only one parachute spotted and was swiftly followed by P/O Dawn and Sgt Moseley. Two Battles hit the target and returned having absorbed a lot of fire from ground forces and in the pilot’s opinion, possibly from the French!

The worst losses were felt by 105 squadron’s Battles who took off from Villeneuve-les-Vertas at 3:40 p.m. to attack three bridges over the Meuse and encountered intense flak with five Battles falling in ten minutes with four of the crews killed and fifth returning by car to the airfield later that day whilst P/O Murray’s forced landing in a heavily damaged bomber on the airfield but perhaps the luckiest escape was that of F/O Gibson who came down behind enemy lines and finding himself and his crew captured by the Germans. Seizing on an opportunity he slipped away from his guards and made it back to French lines where due to his injuries he was admitted to hospital which is where his luck ran out as he was still being treated when the Germans overtook him and he re-joined his men in captivity. The Battles of 150 Squadron who had had such relative success in the morning engaged again and dispatched four aircraft to attack the pontoon bridges but all were lost in quick succession After the first bloodless sorties carried out by the squadron the four afternoon sorties were wiped out with one survivor, LAC Summerson. The other eleven men were all killed and buried in Choloy, Douzy and Donchery cemeteries.

   The German fighter patrols were growing in number with fighters of JG 26 and 53 operating in

Hans-Carl Mayer as a Hauptman

large numbers escorting their own bombers, of which Stg 3 flew some 300 sorties a day at geschwader strength, and engaging the British as they approached piecemeal. The Blenheims of 114 and 139 squadron (flown by 114 crews) lost five of their eight strong formation with Oberleutnant Hans-Carl Mayer (1/Jg.53) claiming two of them on top of two Battles whilst his wingman Oberleutnant Ohly claimed two more Blenheims and a Battle. They approached a pair of Blenheims with Meyer taking the right-hand side one and Ohly the left and making their passes leaving one burning and then finding another pair and doing the same thing. This time Mayer pressed home his attack and claimed his fifth victory of the war. Feldwebel Stark also attacked one of the Blenheims but following a burst of fire the bomber seemed to stay airborne. Much to his wingman’s surprise Stark got closer to his victim as the Blenheim exploded engulfing the pursuing White 3 leaving no trace of either aeroplane or crews. Unteroffizier Heinrich Hönisch, Stark’s wingman also put in a claim for two Battles and a Hurricane that day.

   One of the Blenheim pilots, Sgt Marcus Potter, was attacked by four 109s with one attacking from in front and three from behind. The German fire forced Potter to jettison his anti-personnel bombs and despite attempting to strike the bridge at Sedan was forced to withdraw with severe damage to the aircraft panels, propeller, cockpit and control panel. Although during their briefing he’d been assured that there would be fighter cover over the target area he did not see a single British fighter while he overflew the target area. He was left with no illusion of the strength of the Luftwaffe over the river.

We expected them to be defending the crossing coming into France they had to come through Sedan. Obviously they were going to defend it.

   The other Battle squadrons suffered just as heavily with 218 squadron losing seven of ten aircraft with only the injured P/O Harris returning, 88 squadron lost only Sgt Ross’ Battle with all killed and L5233 was heavily damaged. The men of 103 squadron lost three of their eight attacking aircraft with P/O Cunningham receiving a direct hit from and anti-aircraft shell causing the Battle to explode mid-air killing all aboard whilst despite injury F/O Fitzgerald pressed home his attack before crashing due to damage. The injury did not slow him down as he and Cpl Madkins evaded back to Allied lines as did the other aircraft’s crew flown by Sgt Beardsley who had been pounced upon by a Bf 109.

   It was the hardest battle the AASF would ever fight and despite the heroism of the pilots flying into what they would call “Hell on the Meuse” they were slaughtered by the overwhelming German opposition. Guderian would later praise his gunners describing the battle in his memoirs:

   There was now a most violent air attack by the enemy. The extremely brave French and English pilots did not succeed in knocking out the bridges, despite the heavy casualties that they had suffered. Our anti-aircraft gunners probed themselves on this day, one and shot superbly. By evening they calculated that they had accounted for 150 enemy aircraft. The regimental commander, Oberst von Hippel later received the Knight’s Cross for this.

   Whilst crews were buried, marched to captivity or made desperate attempts to evade captivity including one wounded pilot swimming the Meuse, an observer and gunner evading sitting with their mortally wounded pilot until the he died the following day and then evading, Barratt took the news of forty aircraft lost of seventy-one and went into shock. It is reported that he went back to his office and hung a “Do not disturb sign” on the door and crying at his desk for the loss of his men.

   Within four days the AASF had been not only been blunted but decimated as a fighting force.