Haddocks and the bombing of Northern Italy

   As German forces cut their swathe through northern France a large question mark began to hang over what Italy might do. Italy was neutral at the outset of the War but the Fascist government of Benito Mussolini held similar expansionist ambitions having taken Abyssinia and throughout the 1930s had been drifting into Germany's sphere. It was a consideration that the Allies had planned even before the German attack on the West with it being discussed in conference at Aden, Jerusalem and London. the French proposed a grand scheme that involved the RAF protecting Northern France and releasing the Armee de l'air to bases in the South and Tunisia which would cover Malta and attack Italian targets in Libya and Italy itself. Britain was lukewarm to the plan not wanting to commit the RAF to France on such a scale but promised to reassess should "the most need in war" require Tunisia to be reinforced. On the 3 May 1940 the Director of Plans laid out a strategy involving night attacks or with plenty of cloud cover if a day raid was attempted. Targets in Venice, Genoa, Milan and Turin were selected as the cities would be easily identifiable by the night crews and easier to find. The targets were mostly aviation industry factories such as Fiat in Turin, propeller, engine and frame work component factories around Genoa, Milanese airframe facilities and the main port at Venice which would hamper operations to shore up their positions in Albania. After these targets a list of secondary aeroplane factories was available as well as oil refineries and tank factories. Delayed action bombs were also to be used as the delayed explosions would cause a "powerful moral effect against the Italians, whose psychology was "ill-adapted to war."

   The first seeds of a forward British position in the South of France were laid out by the end of May with the aim of stationing four Wellington squadrons there. RAF strategists were keen to cut the range of their bombers and the range from the French frontier to Genoa, Turin and Milan is only around 150 miles which could equate to about an hour's flight rather than the ten or twelve the bombers based in England would face. Not everyone greeted it with enthusiasm with many in French circles fearing repercussions on French cities like Marseille for British actions. Barratt was also not enthused by the scheme as by 29 May his force had been practically wiped out and what was left was being stretched between defending a new line near Paris and trying to answer the desperate calls for support from the army. He wrote that;

   I recognise the value and possibilities of the plan, but am doubtful as to the weight of the attack that could be maintained against Italy on the slender administrative basis proposed, while I am certain that the introduction of a new force in France at this juncture must add materially to the risks of the present situation ¹

Vickers Wellingtons would make up the Salon based Haddocks 

Wheels were in motion though and the Supreme war council agreed the plan on the 31 May and with the aim of attacking as soon as possible a further meeting of the French and British Air and Naval staffs was convened on the 3 June in Paris. Despite the previous discussions the French were now wavering towards a naval bombardment of Genoa and there was  concern that the simple fact of four squadrons of bombers at the end of a line of communication, a line which could be broken at any time by the Germans in the North leaving them stranded 600 miles from home were hardly going to shatter Italy alone despite the RAF Air staff' s optimistic view that an attack, however small and brief might cause "effects of outstanding importance.” Barratt was given only administrative control over the new force and responsibility for establishing their bases and logistics but not given operational responsibilities.

   Group Captain Field of 71 wing was placed in command of the newly dubbed "Haddock force" and he moved from Nantes, where he had been based following his units withdrawal on 17 May, to the French airfields of Salon and Le Vallon which sat 30 miles away from Marseille and about 250 miles from Turin. Field organised the incoming fuel and ammunition trains and a week later on the 10 June he reported all was ready. Barratt had even been able to donate some of the AASF'S Bofors guns and a battery of thirteen 3 inch guns which had been at Nantes and whose defences were due to be reinforced by more units from Britain though they had not arrived by the 10 June.

     There had of course been a chance of plan as the situation in Northern France deteriorated and the AASF and Air component withdrawing to Nantes, Rennes, and ... whilst the BEF were withdrawing from Dunkirk. The Air staff, presumably not wishing to risk personnel and invaluable aircraft had instead decided to a squadron down for two nights then replace it with another one with operations being escalated if the situation improved. There was also a shortage of fighter aircraft to act as an escort or for protection of the airfields as the three French squadrons who had been in the area on the 3 June were no longer there, three more could be sent if the British sent twenty squadrons to assist in the Northern sector - something Dowding was resisting as he felt that every available fighter would be needed for a German attack on Britain, and Barratt had none available from his command. It wouldn't mean much as RAF tacticians had appraised the weather over Italy as cloudy enough to provide cover for the day bombers and that in any event the Italian fighter force would not be adequate to intercept them.

   At 4:30 p.m. (Rome time) on the 10 June a declaration of war was handed to the French ambassador and to the British at 4:45 and Mussolini announced to a crowd from a balcony at the Palazzo Venezia in Rome that he had taken the country to war. The following day twelve Wellingtons were sent to Salon to refuel and arm for a night raid on Turin and would be reinforced by thirty six Whitleys who would fly to the Channel Islands to refuel before setting off. The Wellingtons duly arrived in Salon at 3:30 p.m. and the crews began to recover and rest after the seven hour flight and prepare for the evening's assault. Not more than thirty minutes later a staff officer for General Gama of the 11^th French Bombardment group telephoned a message from the General to say the mission was not to be carried out. Field called his superiors for more information and was told that the operation was indeed on and the Whitleys were already on their way. Further French authorities contacted Field to tell him that the operation must be cancelled and even Barratt was contacted by General Vuillemin requesting it were stopped. Barratt telephoned the Air Ministry and was redirected to speak to Churchill who was at that time in France at Weygand's headquarters and was given the go ahead. When Barratt passed the message to Field he was told that the Deputé de la Marine and General in charge of the region telling him the French Government had forbidden any raid to launch from French soil. Barratt called Ismay and Churchill again and was told that the Whitleys could not be stopped and that the French Government had agreed to the strategy beforehand and now it was too late and at 10:15 p.m. Barratt relayed all of this to Field. The situation was not resolved by this though and for the next two hours the telephone in Field's office continued to ring with protestations from the French including the Naval authority in Toulon and even the Commanding officer of the 3^rd Army, General Houdermon, telephoned personally three times but by twenty-seven minutes past midnight the first Wellington began to rumble along the runway but came to an abrupt stop as French military lorries spilled out of the darkness and dispersed to block the runways. The local air commander had been given orders to stop the raid at all costs. Field could do nothing but use force to deal with the invaders but decided with deteriorating weather and advanced hour that it was best to cancel the operation and let his superiors sort out a solution and his crews retired to bed.

Yorkshire based Whitleys flew through the Alps to the target area

   Meanwhile the Whitleys had reached the Alps and encountered major difficulties with the weather conditions. The bombers of 10, 51, 58, 77 and 102 Squadrons had left their bases in Norfolk in the early afternoon and arrived at Guernsey at 5:00 p.m. After three hours they took off for the Alps but severe icing conditions with many engines failing or extractor controls freezing up leaving the pilot unable to vary the pitch of the engines and gain altitude. There was also a chronic problem with fluid freezing up in the extractors piping and leak out of pin prick holes which veteran crews would refill the tubes with any fluid they had to hand which was normally coffee or urine. S/L Hanafin’s Whitley, having soldiered through the cold and cloud and dodged a barrage of from French flak, plunged headlong into a thunderstorm and was promptly struck by lightning which burnt the navigator, Sgt Green’s hand and causing Sgt Oldridge, who was leaning on his guns in the tail, to be blown into the fuselage and knocked unconscious. Hanafin also saw both engines stop and the aircraft begin to dive under the sheer weight of all of the ice on the airframe. At the last minute Hanafin managed to recover the craft and judging that he didn’t have enough fuel to cross the Alps was forced to retire with twenty three others for Guernsey.

   Those that were able to press on were struck by a combination of the beauty of the Alps below and above them as well as the relentless numbing cold for which there was little protection. The Whilety’s Oxygen system was also inadequate for long distance at high altitude which provided another source of discomfort combined with fatigue for the pilots and navigators who had been furiously concentrating since launching with only a few hours rest and they were only halfway.

   Once through the Alps they faced the new challenge of finding either the primary target of Turin or the clutch of secondary targets including Milan, Genoa, Savona or Maggiore. The target area at Turin was masked by thick cloud banks from 5-2000 feet despite the lack of a blackout. The Italian authorities had not expected any Allied bombing force attacking Italian soil and were caught out by the Whitley’s approach and quickly enforced a blackout in Turin but failed to do so in Genoa. Flak was “indiscriminate” but heavy without support from search lights.

   W/Cmdr Staton of 10 Squadron identified the target at Turin and spent sixty-five minutes over it marking it with flares to confirm his suspicions and to light it up for following bombers before commencing his attack at 1:30 a.m. with all of his bombs striking the southern end of the target building and starting green fires.

   Just ten minutes before F/Sgt Deacon of 51 Squadron attacked at 15,000 feet dripping his “2 500lb bombs and 5 250lb bombs… in one stick” causing explosions “right across the target.” He was followed at 1.44 a.m. by P/O Oettle who hit the north west of the works. F/L Budden spotted a “Self-Illuminated target, thought to be a blast furnace” and dropped a 500lb and three 250lb from 8000 feet before dropping the remainder on the Railway marshalling yards which is where Sgt Denny’s Whitley dropped all of its’ bombload. The only 58 Squadron Whitley to arrive flown by F/O McInnes claimed hitting the Aero engine shed, the railway tracks (“Causing green sparks”) and a building 300 yards away. Two Whitleys of 102 Squadron hit targets causing “Violent explosions” and fires.

   The remaining aircraft to make it as far as the target area dropped their bombs on Genoa where the city lights stayed on and like the raid over Turin put up persistent but accurate light flak which was unaided by search lights. Indeed Italy was ill prepared for an air offensive on its’ cities despite passing laws on preparation for aerial assault some

   In the coming weeks the French, who had been anxious not to provoke Italy into retaliatory strikes or an aggressive war on the ground found to their discomfort that the Italians were intent on crossing the border even if they were not aggressively bombing cities. Grudgingly they accepted Haddock force and no more attempts were made to stop them. On the 15 June, twelve more Wellingtons arrived at Salon and attacked Genoa's Piaggio and Ansaldo factories but their night navigation, which was hit and miss at the best of times, was interfered with by thunderstorms and only one claimed to have hit the target Ansaldo works whilst the rest brought their ordinance home.

   On the 16 June, the day the AASF's Fairey Battles were withdrawn from France and bad conditions kept the British based bombers on the ground, nine intrepid Haddock Wellingtons took to the sky to target Milan. Once over the border four made it through the pitch black and low cloud to hit targets in Milan including the Caproni factory and the Scato San Giovanni, one crew was certain that their bombs on the Caproni works but saw no results. In reality the explosions and fire reported did little damage and one person was killed. One of the other raiders bombed Genoa and the remainder found nothing at all and returned home to the news that Haddock was over and the whole force was to be evacuated and raids on Italy would be carried out exclusively by Britain based bombers.

   Haddock could be seen as a failure as it failed to cause any major damage or alter Italian public perception but the military situation in France dictated the amount of aircraft that could be deployed and even if they took off at all! Sadly the small number of aircraft operating in far from ideal conditions Field's command could not have done more.

   The operations of Haddock force were not the last to target Italy in 1940 with several long distance raids being carried out by Whitleys through the Alps in the Summer with it their bases in England being perversely closer to the industrial targets of northern Italy than if they were based at Malta. The journey was long and arduous with crews suffering even more from the cold and bad weather through the mountains than they had operating over Germany on Nickel missions and it was not uncommon for missions to Turin to be scrubbed at short notice due to the bad weather. It was not until late in 1940 that a squadron of Wellingtons operating from Malta, began to harass Italian ports around the Naples basin and occasionally fly further up to attack the northern industrial powerhouses but their attacks were no more than a nuisance and were soon kept in check by the combined aerial attack on the island and also by the arrival of German anti-aircraft batteries who made it harder for the RAF. A prolonged campaign against Italy would have to wait for better conditions and the availability of more aircraft.

1.         RAF official history France and the Low countries P. 410

The death of the Advanced Air Striking Force

The 9 May 1940 started for Air Vice Marshal Barratt in a very inauspicious way at 2:15 a.m. with a call from London to warn him that Germany had issued an ultimatum to the Dutch, however there was no confirmation from the attaché in The Hague though it seemed like another “flap” like November and April. The squadrons were again brought to standby in readiness and although nothing came to pass that day they were held in a state of preparedness.
  

A formation of Fairey Battles

 Early the following morning the Luftwaffe made the first move with small groups of bombers attacking airfields at Bethenville, Mournelen, Berrey-Au-Bac and Reims-Champagne dropping high explosives and incendiaries but despite destroying hangers and tool sheds only three of the AASFs Battles were lost with a further two damaged. 142 Squadron received their visitors at 4:35 a.m. with six He 111 Bombers attacking between 600 and 1000 feet but causing minor shrapnel damage to one Battle and a clutch of German ordinance which failed to explode at all! They received another attack at 6:00 a.m. with incendiaries dropped causing no damage. In total forty-three French, ten Dutch and eight Belgian airfields were hit on the first day destroying 210 aircraft though the German crews claimed up to 829 aircraft destroyed on the ground. Had the Luftwaffe intelligence been sharper then the casualties in the North of France could have been a lot worse with only twenty one of ninety one airfields being attacked with half of them not holding first line squadrons and Luftflotte 3s crews failed to find any targets.

   By 6:00 a.m. news of German soldiers crossing the borders and paratroopers landing from Ju 52s reached the RAF and the Battle squadrons were brought up from Standby to Alert No.2 and very quickly Alert No.3 but by 10:30 a.m. when Barratt took control of the situation at Chauny the Battles were still on the ground. The Blenheims of the Component and AASF were sent on reconnaissance flights and spotted smoke over the Ruhr which obstructed most of their field of vision but vehicle columns a mile long were sighted heading north west from Kaldenkirchen. Three reconnaissance sorties in the norther sector were lost including P/O Thomas’ Blenheim of 57 squadron which came down at Echtveld at 11:30 a.m. with the crew all killed. F/Lt Wyatt of the same squadron was also injured in the arm by enemy fire

      As the day unfolded and the news of a widespread German assault on the low countries was reported the AASF were called to attack targets ten times but it was not until midday that eight Battles of 142 squadron, who had been on standby for two and a half hours, took off to attack a German column on the Luxembourg to Dippoch road. The formation had six Hurricanes flying as top cover as the low flying Battles approached the target but the danger was not coming from Messerschmitts above them this time and as soon as the Battles were close enough the German Flak opened up filling the sky with shards of hot metal that eviscerated the lightly armoured Battles at point blank range. The two sections came in at 250 feet and dropped their four 250lb bombs, set with eleven second delayed fuses. Of the seven Battles who reached the target (P/O Chalmers had returned following a problem with his landing gear) three failed to return. Sgt Spears and his crew managed to escape the Germans following their crash landing at Colmey whereas F/O Roth and his gunner were not so lucky and were taken away to the rear of the German advance and P/O Laws’ Battle crashed killing his crew. Other aircraft were severely holed with crewmen like LAC Cave, who was hospitalised on the return to base. P/O Corbett received a DFC for bringing his Battle back with an injured ankle and his observer, Sgt Irvine, dead. Despite these loses the Squadron’s record of events records proudly; “No. 142 Squadron was the first Squadron in the AASF to carryout operations on enemy columns.”

   Barratt was to dispatch other squadrons throughout the day to harass the columns with 150 squadron taking off in two sections of two and one of three taking off between 2:45 and 3:57p.m. Like 142 squadron they had had five aircraft on standby since 5:30 a.m. which was increased to eight at 9:45 a.m. and didn’t receive their preliminary orders until 1:10 p.m. The first wave led by F/Lt Weeks bombed the column found between Neufchateau and Bertrix attracting a similar hail of fire but Weekes and Sgt Andrews’ two Battles returned with P/O Campbell-Irons disappearing. The second wave also were never seen again after their take off whereas the third wing led by F/O Blom whose aircraft had been hit over Differdange by Flak which ruptured a petrol tank filling the cockpit with petrol fumes which impaired the crew’s vision and caused “Intense discomfort.” They failed to find a target between Luxembourg and Echternach but managed to find one near Gevenmacher and attacked at 100 feet and strafed with forward and rear guns but Sgt White’s Battle disappeared not long after the attack. Blom would later receive the DFC for attacking the column with his damaged aircraft despite the four missing aircraft only F/Lt Parker was killed with five men taken prisoner and Sgt White’s crew making a delayed evasion arriving on the 13 May.

   The crews of 103 squadron suffered quite extensively with three of the four bombers shot-down

F/Lt E Parker's wrecked Battle under guard

with P/O Drabble, Sgt Smith and LAC Lamble were all killed as were Sgt Poole and LAC Hutchinson of Sgt Lowne’s crew whereas P/O Wells and his crew as well as Lowne were all captured.



   The 10 May’s sorties showed that not only were the mobile columns easy targets as Allied planners had hoped but also that the Fairey Battle and indeed low flying Blenheims from Bomber Command, were exceptionally vulnerable to concentrated Flak. It was not just mobile flak batteries firing at the RAF but even German infantry firing rifles and motorbike and sidecar riders firing their mounted MG 34s! The AASF report stated:
Even at this early stage of operations the difficulties of operating against fleeting targets became evident. The Columns against which raids had been dispatched proved to have dispersed or to have moved elsewhere by the time the raid reached the area of operations.
This was the same problem encountered by Bomber Command over Heligoland coupled with murderous anti-aircraft fire and the threat of aerial superiority from German fighters.

   A further raid was authorised in the early evening when it was hoped that the failing light would mean there was less chance of being caught by marauding Messerschmitts especially as there were no Hurricanes or French fighters available for escort duties. Two half sections totalling four aircraft from 12 Squadron took off between 4.50 and 5.05 p.m. Although they did not encounter the Luftwaffe they did encounter “heavy crossfire” which severed F/lt Hunts bomb control cable and he retired to Piennes whilst Sgt Young, P/o Hulse’s observer was wounded in the shoulder.

   Through the fire F/lt Simpson dropped his four bombs and pulled away but was quickly informed by his observer, Sgt Odell that petrol was streaming from the tanks and he soon noted that the engine was starting to stutter as they crossed the frontier. Knowing that they would not make it back to their base Simpson decided to put the Battle down in a field in a controlled crash at 6:15 p.m. Odell and LAC Thomlinson pulled themselves free of the now burning wreck only to realise that Simpson was still in the cockpit and hurried to save their pilot. Although Tomlinson received burns to his hands pulling a similarly burnt Simpson between the two of them they managed to get 150 yards away before the Battle blew up. For their bravery Tomlinson and Odell received the DFM and Simpson the DFC. The only other aircraft not to come back was P/O Matthews who was reported last seen landing in a field at 6:00 p.m. but the whole crew were captured.

   Other squadrons had also engaged during the day with 105 squadron losing P/O O’Brien’s Battle and 218 Squadron whose aircraft reaped a similar level of flak killing LAC Baguley in the turret of L5402. Battles from 226 squadron joined the evening raids on a convoy taking off from Reims at 5:00 p.m.. Sgt McLoughlin reported anti-aircraft batteries on the surrounding hills north and west of Luxembourg and machine guns firing yellow tracer from railway cuttings. Despite being unable to pinpoint the troop concentrations Mcloughlin dive bombed but was unable to report specific damage whilst AC Russel emptied half a pan of his Vickers ammunition into targets. Sgt Barron bombed a convoy of thirty to forty vehicles not far from a large wireless station leaving a crater in the road and a near miss some fifteen yards away. But Barron was struck y anti-aircraft fire with a German bullet passing straight through his left leg but still managed to get his craft and crew home reporting seeing F/O Kerridge’s Battle in flames south west of Luxembourg. Kerridge was killed and Corporal Dixon badly burnt as the aircraft crashed into the northern suburbs of Faubourg de Luxembourg. F/O Cameron suffered a similar fate with ground fire shooting him down leaving his crew to join Kerridge’s in a POW camp and him ding in Diekirch hospital as the surgeons operated to save his arm.

   Of thirty-two Battles to go into action on 10 May thirteen were lost and the majority of the aircraft that returned were holed and damaged. The following day saw the AASF faced similar action against German columns with French reconnaissance pinpointing one consisting of important German units on the road from Prum to Echternach on its way towards Luxembourg. Six Hurricanes were sent to cover the target area above Prum at 9:45 a.m. but they returned having seen no Battles over the target area.

   Two half sections had taken off from both 218 squadron and 88 Squadron but none made it through with all four of 218s Battles being shot down. F/O Crews was brought down by ground fire which killed his observer Sgt Jennings and left Crews and Sgt Evans POW joining F/O Hudson and his crew. P/O Murray was badly burnt but similarly captured with his gunner and his observer hospitalised by the Germans at Limberg having lost his little finger. Only P/O Ridder of 88 Squadron returned as the sole survivor albeit heavily damaged and reported that:
his leader force-landed near Bastogne, and that he lost the remaining two aircraft near St Vith from ground fire. He was himself unable to drop his bombs because his bomb gear had been damaged and he returned followed by an Me 109. Of the remaining four aircraft there was no news at all.
None of the other crews returned or had landed in Allied controlled territory with F/Lt Madge’s Battle crashing on the Bastogne to Neufchâteau road with Sgt Whittle killed. Of the missing Battles P/O Mungovan and Sgt Robson were captured but all of P/O Skidmore’s crew and AC1 Maltby were killed. The combination of accurate ground fire and Messerschmitt patrols was starting to prove a deadly combination

   The Blenheims of the Air Component were faring no batter in their reconnaissance duties with two

Bristol Blenheim Mk IVs

of the four sorties sent to the Albert Canal being lost with Sgt Voi lost at 3:30 a.m. and F/O Ballis failed to return from the 8:30 p.m. patrol. The other squadron to see action was 53 Squadron which returned three of four Blenheims with no footage due to low cloud but lost P/O Alistair Panton who was bounced by six Messerschmitts whose concentrated fire shattered the control panel and caused the starboard engine to explode in flames whilst Sgt Bence in the rear turret cried out that he was hit and Sgt Christie collapsed from a head wound over the navigators table. Having brought the burning Blenheim down into a meadow. Panton pulled Christie free of the burning wreck before returning to pull Bence free whilst ammunition and fuel exploded around them and the Luftwaffe fighters making strafing runs at them. Panton managed to load his crew into a commandeered car and dodge a German column and Stuka attack to get his crew into a Belgian hospital. Bence lost his left leg due to his injuries but Christie and Panton managed to escape back to British lines.

   The RAF headquarters made the decision made the decision at midday that no reconnaissance flights should be made in the Maastrict area as the Luftwaffe had gained superiority and it was too dangerous and by 1:45 p.m. the Germans had taken the Canal and occupied Tongres whilst the Belgians retired to the Gotte river and the Wehrmacht continued to grow in strength in the Belgian Ardennes and Maastricht.

   The Reconaisance information gained by the French and the Lysanders of the Air Component showed that the Belgian airforce had been decimated with thirty burnt out aircraft seen at Wunche and Tirlement airfield. Other reports had left the planners stumped as to where the German strike was going to come from with the continuing build-up of forces in the Belgian Ardennes and the powerful thrusts that had already taken Paliscul, Bouillon and Givonne with their apparent target being Sedan. The quandary came as to whether this was to draw off attention from the Low Countries or the main thrust that would bypass Maginot into the French Hinterland but the “unpleasantly strong” forces in Belgium left them unsure. Barratt signalled GQG that he was;

Not yet able to decide which of the two following enemy threats is the main attack, general axis Maastricht – Gembloux with secondary thrusts on axis Bois-le-due – Tilbery or attack in the Ardennes in general direction Mézières with purpose turning the Maginot line.

   The decision was made for them by the Belgians who on the night of 11 May had sent an urgent

Crews boarding their Fairey Battle

request stressing the need to destroy two remaining bridges over the Albert Canal situated three miles to the south west of Maastricht. The Belgians had sent a team of engineers to destroy them but they had failed to do so because they had encountered stiff German opposition which led to the decapitation of the commanding officer by shell fire which also cut all means of telephone communication.

   The two bridge, one near Veldwezelt and the other near Vroenhoven on the M-Tongros line, were being fortified by German troops with flak emplacements and with all probability an umbrella of Messerschmitts. With such staggering odds an all-out attack by the whole AASF was ruled out and a smaller formation of volunteer crews was to be sent instead.

   When the assembled crews of 12 Squadron were asked for six volunteer crews they all volunteered and lots had to be drawn. Barratt did what he could to give these men a fighting chance and coordinated with Bomber Command to attack other crossings in the Maastricht area and German columns to draw off the Luftwaffe whilst also providing ten Hurricanes as escort.

   The Battles took off at 8:18 a.m. with three under F/O Garland heading for Veldwezelt and two under F/O Norman Thomas for Vroenhoven. The sixth aircraft flown by P/O Brereton suffered from a faulty wireless set so a second aircraft was quickly appropriated but that one had a mechanical fault with the hydraulic gear on the bomb rack failing. It was too late for them to get a third aircraft ready and with disappointment the crew returned to await the results of the raid unknowing that the faults had spared their lives that day.

   F/O Thomas and P/O Davey continued with their three Hurricane escort towards Vroenhoven but encountered a sweep of around thirty Messerschmitts when they were still twenty miles from the target. The Hurricanes, though outnumbered ten to one charged into the Germans and distracted them long enough for Thomas and Davy to make their attack runs on the bridge through a fierce barrage of anti-aircraft fire and small arms. The two Battles dived from six to two thousand feet and dropped a total of eight 250 lb bombs and striking the target. Sgt Mansell, Davey’s observer reported that “On looking down we saw that one bridge now matched the other” and the escorting Hurricanes saw bombs bursting on or near the target.

   The fire was too thick though and F/O Thomas’ Battle came down in flames and crash landed next to the target with the crew quickly captured. Davy was hit quite badly and he was also quickly attacked by a 109 which made two passes before diving away through a gap in the clouds trailing smoke following a blast from AC1 Patterson’s Vickers. Mansell contacted Davy down the intercom to tell him that the port fuel tank was leaking, trailing white smoke. Davy took the decision and try and bring L5241 back but not risk the lives of his crew and whilst over Maastricht he ordered Mansell and Patterson to bail out whilst he attempted to nurse the Battle home.



Fairey Battles attacking a German column (IWM C1737)

   Garland’s formation encountered the same level of flak but Garland did not hesitate and brought

his formation down on the bridge whilst German trucks snaked across it. One of Sgt Grey’s bombs send a column of water into the air showing a near miss but others struck home with one German truck bursting into flames whilst another struck the first span but Garland was seen to immediately burst into flames and crash. As the other two aircraft pulled out of their attack runs they were set upon by the Luftwaffe with one aircraft crashing into the river and the other into a field. P/O McIntosh, despite severe burns had dropped his bombs and managed to bring the burning wreck into a landing in a field within German territory. When his crew were interrogated the German officer was incredulous that the British had allowed them two days to fortify the bridge before attacking. Sgt Marland’s was last seen climbing out of control and claimed the lives of the whole crew.  Only Davy returned to base that day out of fifteen men who left that morning. Sgt Mansell returned having evaded German patrols but AC1 Patterson broke a bone in his foot on landing and was unable to escape the German held territory.

   Although the losses were high the crossings had been destroyed which had been the main objective of the mission and the German advance slowed. Garland and Grey were both awarded the Victoria Cross posthumously whilst Davy was rested but on his return to duty he was far from enthusiastic about being back on Battles.

   Holding the Germans at the Albert Canal was to prove fruitless as Holland surrendered on the following day and reconnaissance flights, although hampered by low cloud, which caused four sorties to be aborted and enemy fire which damaged two with another failing to return, reported the Germans had crossed the Meuse. When reports of German soldiers on the left bank were reported the AASF requested permission to attack but it took the BAFF HQ three quarters of an hour later it was decided that no attack would be carried out on this occasion with the official history recording that;

 The reason for returning a negative was not recorded; probably the targets were considered unsuitable, or else action was left to the French who operated with a few bombers in this area before midnight.

   The Germans were throwing their weight against the Meuse at where their main Schwehrpunkt would be and Guderian’s combat engineers brought up the last of their bridging equipment whilst the Panzers of Army Group A began to access and the flak detachments under the command of Oberst von Hippel began to dig in around the area having been brought to the front with all due haste. The Luftwaffe were also operating over the bridgehead attacking French positions and providing an umbrella of fighter cover for the vulnerable German soldiers in rubber dinghies and combat engineers struggling to construct pontoon bridges. By the morning of 14 May the Germans had occupied a front from Vringne-sur-Meuze to Mouzon with a depth of ten miles to Vendressa-la Nelville. Despite the order the day before not to engage the AASF had been put on standby with operations planned for the morning with three half sections to attack pontoon bridges at Sedan and two half sections at the Dinant sector. The situation was fairly fluidic though and during the night French Bomber forces claimed the Dinant bridges destroyed and the AASF raid scrubbed. By first light six Battles from 113 squadron were detailed to attack four bridges over the Meuse and at Chiers and four from 150 squadron took off at 7:35 a.m. to attack pontoon bridges at the island north of Villers and between Romilly and Allincourt. Both raids reported intense anti-aircraft fire from German positions but no fighters. Both formations were given fighter escorts with Hurricanes escorting the former and the French the latter and despite one of 103s pilots being injured all of the crews returned and reported success except for the island bridge which could not be located and so instead the two Battles attacked German troops in the village of Moliry.

   The results of these early raids were encouraging especially considering the levels of loss experienced on the previous days. As the crews debriefed and supplied the Intelligence officers with fresh reports on the German disposition plans were being drawn up for attack on German columns near Breda. By 12:15 p.m. the French contacted Barratt and pleaded for all of the help he had available to stop the German advance. There was a major thrust developing in the Dinant sector but more importantly the Sedan bubble was expanding and in need of checking with the French position being attacked before they themselves could launch a counterattack. General Gamelin and General Georges requested as much help as could be mustered with Barratt contacting the Chief of the Air Staff and ordering every possible bomber to be ready from 2:05 p.m. at the shortest possible notice.

   A plan was devised in coordination with the French to see them alternate attacks with three hour intervals with the AASF up first as the French had launched an attack of forty bombers escorted by a similar number of fighters at 12:30 p.m.. Barratt’s plan was for a wide spread of five brides to be attacked by eleven Battles each attack lasting over forty-five minutes with twenty minutes between attacks. Columns were also to be attacked in the same raids from Bouillon through Givena to Sedan with all seventy seven aircraft in the air at the same time.

   As with all plans there were two minor hitches with the orders reaching 76 wing, who were due to lead the attack, not getting their orders until 3 p.m. and not getting airborne until 3:25 p.m. and, although of little impact, only seventy-one aircraft took off.

   The delay in orders meant the Battles did not arrive in order and it is difficult to say who arrived first but 12 squadron were part of the first wave sending five aircraft to attack columns and lost four including Acting F/o Clancy who was also the acting commander of B-flight who came down at Pourn-St Rémy where Clancy was taken prisoner and his crew buried. A-Flight’s Commander, F/O Vaughan faired little better despite dropping his bombs on the road between Sedan and Givonne he was brought down and killed along with his observer Sgt Shelton-Jones. Vaughn’s gunner, J. D. Wright along with Sgt Winkler’s crew were taken prisoner. The soul survivor, P/O McElligott returned to base at 4:24 p.m. having witnessed Vaughan’s attack and the German flak emplacements following his successful bombing run.

   The eight Battles of 142 squadron led by Squadron Leader Hobler were met by not only a hail of anti-aircraft fire but also standing patrols of Messerschmitts from Jg 26, Jg 27 and Jg 53 which proceeded to engage the helpless British aircraft quickly claiming F/Sgt Spears’ P2333 which came down at Choloy killing two of the crew but were repulsed by AC Greenall manning F/O Reed’s gun who claimed to have shot down one of the German fighters. Hobler also fell to the Bf 109s and was badly burnt but was assisted by his crew, Sgt Kitto and Cpl Barbrooke who helped him to evade capture. On his return the gallant Squadron leader was hospitalised and eventually evacuated. F/Lt Wight and P/O Chalmers attacked the bridges with success and returned to Berry-au-bac reporting that they had seen fresh bridge works being built on both sides of the river. They were eventually joined by Sgt Spears and P/O Oakley and his crew who had managed to escape from a forced landing at Eely leaving the only unaccounted for aircraft being F/Lt Rogers who was posted as missing but was in fact killed with his whole crew. With the high numbers of crews returning it could be argued that 147 squadrons losses were less severe than others as aircraft were easily replaced but with the pressure building on the AASF both were rapidly becoming short supply.

   The last wave from 76 wing was 226 squadron who were similarly mauled with all of the aircraft sustaining damage with Sgt Annau having to abandon his attack having had his bomb release gear shot away by flak along with his left aileron and tail plane! Squadron Leader Lockett was seen crashing in flames with only one parachute spotted and was swiftly followed by P/O Dawn and Sgt Moseley. Two Battles hit the target and returned having absorbed a lot of fire from ground forces and in the pilot’s opinion, possibly from the French!

The worst losses were felt by 105 squadron’s Battles who took off from Villeneuve-les-Vertas at 3:40 p.m. to attack three bridges over the Meuse and encountered intense flak with five Battles falling in ten minutes with four of the crews killed and fifth returning by car to the airfield later that day whilst P/O Murray’s forced landing in a heavily damaged bomber on the airfield but perhaps the luckiest escape was that of F/O Gibson who came down behind enemy lines and finding himself and his crew captured by the Germans. Seizing on an opportunity he slipped away from his guards and made it back to French lines where due to his injuries he was admitted to hospital which is where his luck ran out as he was still being treated when the Germans overtook him and he re-joined his men in captivity. The Battles of 150 Squadron who had had such relative success in the morning engaged again and dispatched four aircraft to attack the pontoon bridges but all were lost in quick succession After the first bloodless sorties carried out by the squadron the four afternoon sorties were wiped out with one survivor, LAC Summerson. The other eleven men were all killed and buried in Choloy, Douzy and Donchery cemeteries.

   The German fighter patrols were growing in number with fighters of JG 26 and 53 operating in

Hans-Carl Mayer as a Hauptman

large numbers escorting their own bombers, of which Stg 3 flew some 300 sorties a day at geschwader strength, and engaging the British as they approached piecemeal. The Blenheims of 114 and 139 squadron (flown by 114 crews) lost five of their eight strong formation with Oberleutnant Hans-Carl Mayer (1/Jg.53) claiming two of them on top of two Battles whilst his wingman Oberleutnant Ohly claimed two more Blenheims and a Battle. They approached a pair of Blenheims with Meyer taking the right-hand side one and Ohly the left and making their passes leaving one burning and then finding another pair and doing the same thing. This time Mayer pressed home his attack and claimed his fifth victory of the war. Feldwebel Stark also attacked one of the Blenheims but following a burst of fire the bomber seemed to stay airborne. Much to his wingman’s surprise Stark got closer to his victim as the Blenheim exploded engulfing the pursuing White 3 leaving no trace of either aeroplane or crews. Unteroffizier Heinrich Hönisch, Stark’s wingman also put in a claim for two Battles and a Hurricane that day.

   One of the Blenheim pilots, Sgt Marcus Potter, was attacked by four 109s with one attacking from in front and three from behind. The German fire forced Potter to jettison his anti-personnel bombs and despite attempting to strike the bridge at Sedan was forced to withdraw with severe damage to the aircraft panels, propeller, cockpit and control panel. Although during their briefing he’d been assured that there would be fighter cover over the target area he did not see a single British fighter while he overflew the target area. He was left with no illusion of the strength of the Luftwaffe over the river.

We expected them to be defending the crossing coming into France they had to come through Sedan. Obviously they were going to defend it.

   The other Battle squadrons suffered just as heavily with 218 squadron losing seven of ten aircraft with only the injured P/O Harris returning, 88 squadron lost only Sgt Ross’ Battle with all killed and L5233 was heavily damaged. The men of 103 squadron lost three of their eight attacking aircraft with P/O Cunningham receiving a direct hit from and anti-aircraft shell causing the Battle to explode mid-air killing all aboard whilst despite injury F/O Fitzgerald pressed home his attack before crashing due to damage. The injury did not slow him down as he and Cpl Madkins evaded back to Allied lines as did the other aircraft’s crew flown by Sgt Beardsley who had been pounced upon by a Bf 109.

   It was the hardest battle the AASF would ever fight and despite the heroism of the pilots flying into what they would call “Hell on the Meuse” they were slaughtered by the overwhelming German opposition. Guderian would later praise his gunners describing the battle in his memoirs:

   There was now a most violent air attack by the enemy. The extremely brave French and English pilots did not succeed in knocking out the bridges, despite the heavy casualties that they had suffered. Our anti-aircraft gunners probed themselves on this day, one and shot superbly. By evening they calculated that they had accounted for 150 enemy aircraft. The regimental commander, Oberst von Hippel later received the Knight’s Cross for this.

   Whilst crews were buried, marched to captivity or made desperate attempts to evade captivity including one wounded pilot swimming the Meuse, an observer and gunner evading sitting with their mortally wounded pilot until the he died the following day and then evading, Barratt took the news of forty aircraft lost of seventy-one and went into shock. It is reported that he went back to his office and hung a “Do not disturb sign” on the door and crying at his desk for the loss of his men.

   Within four days the AASF had been not only been blunted but decimated as a fighting force.

First victory - Fairey Battles over Aachen

Fairey Battles in formation

The War started rather ingloriously for the Fairey Battles of the AASF as they settled in to their new aerodromes and began reconnaissance and training exercises. The RAF had formed two aerial forces to go to France with the offensive wing, the AASF (Advance　Air Striking Force),　comprising of the ten Fairey　Battle and two Blenheim　squadrons with support from two Hurricane fighter squadrons.

RAF bombing policy was tied down by the French who restricted raids on German industry and cities because they did not want to provoke a response from the Luftwaffe which they feared would decimate their infrastructure. RAF planners were keen to strike the Ruhr and cripple German industry but again the French felt that Allied bombers should support the army and make an immediate dent in any military advance. In the strategic impasse the squadrons of the AASF made themselves available to support the BEF and whatever the Army required of them which meant plenty of reconnaissance flights.

On the 20 September three Battles of 88 squadron's B Flight　took off at 10:00 from their advance field of Mourmelon-le-Grand for a reconnaissance flight over Aachen. F/O Baker led his formation towards the border encountering only light anti-aircraft fire from a French emplacement as they passed South East of Bitche but this was the least of their worries as at 11:47 they approached the target only to be intercepted by three 109s in a tight vic formation.

Jagdgruppe 152 was an embryo formation of what would become Zerstörergeschwader 52. Due to a lack of Bf 110 fighters being available to arm the formation they had been given surplus Bf 109 D's which were slowly being phased out in favour of the Emil by the Jagdgeschwadern during the assault on Poland. The Stab formation of Jagdgruppe 152 was patrolling the Franco-German border led by Hauptmann Lessmann who had claimed a French Potez 63 the day before. Seeing their foe and supposedly presuming they were Hurricane fighters Lessmann gave theorder for the Messerschmitts to dive on their foes.

In one pass the Messerschmitts sent F/Sgt Douglas Page's craft spiralling towards the ground leaving no survivors. F/O Baker decreased height to avoid the diving German's fire whilst his observer Sgt Fredrick Letcher fired back shooting down one of the attackers. In the dive Baker had lost sight of F/O Graveley but decided to head for home before the Germans came back arriving at 13:10.

Flying officer Graveley

Reginald Graveley had managed to crash land his shattered craft and despite severe burns dragged his wounded observer Sgt Everett to a safe distance from the burning wreck. He returned for AC1 David John but found him dead at his gun with a bullet through the head and Graveley was unable to retrieve his body. Graveley and Everett were rescued but despite having his leg amputated the Sergeant died of his wounds that day. Graveley was awarded the Empire Gallantry Medal in December by the King who was touring France. This award was later converted to the George Cross on its inception with the following description in the London Gazette.

This officer displayed great gallantry and a total disregard of his own safety when the aircraft of which he was the pilot was shot down by an enemy fighter in September 1939, and crashed in flames. Though badly burned, he pulled his wounded air observer from the wreckage to a place of safety and then returned to rescue the gunner. He found the airman dead however, and was unable to lift him from the cockpit.

Although the French authorities confirmed the wreckage of a German fighter the Luftwaffe Quartermaster shows no losses on that day. Nevertheless the Letcher's claim is considered to be the first German aircraft shot down by an Anglo/French aircraft. Letcher stayed with 88 squadron and was later killed in action when the Blenheim bomber he was acting as Observer in was shot down over Holland on 28th August 1941.

88 Squadron's losses on the 20th September 1939 were:

Battle K 9242:　 Observer Sgt William Stanley Everett (26) and Gunner AC1 David Joshua John (22)

Battle K 9245　　 Flight Sergeant Douglas Aubrey Page (27), Observer Sgt Alfred William Eggington (25) and Gunner AC1 Edward Arthur William Radford (24).
All of the dead are buried at Choloy War cemetery.

Reginald Graveley’s medals are held at the Royal Airforce Museum at Hendon.

Where are the German strategic bombers?

Dornier Do. 19 prototype

Whilst staring at the "Goodnight Mr Tom" theatre poster I geekily noticed that the "German" bombers all had four engines rather than the usual two. In fact they were mostly B-17 Flying fortresses.

So does it matter? Well yes. Arguably had the Luftwaffe had four-engined Dornier Do.19 or Junkers Ju.89 bombers available they could have decimated the airfields or London with a bomb load of 3520lbs and could have taken a lot more punishment. There is also an argument that they would have been decimated when they flew out of escort range as the Allies found in their early raids on Germany mounting in an unacceptable loss of men and materiel.

So why didn't they build or develop any four-engine bombers as the war went on?

Well, I'm glad you asked that question.

One of Germany's greatest problems and motivations for war was the severe lack of resources. As such manufacturing had to be prioritised. The ReichLuftMinistry (RLM) had worked out a ratio of materials needed for each aircraft which worked out thusly;

5 Single seat fighters = 3 Medium bombers = 1 heavy bomber

German military thinking was limited by this resource deficit and although OKW would have liked a large, all conquering war machine they had to accept the reality of "Blitzkrieg" and a minor adaption of Guderian's principles from "Achtung Panzer!"

This would run a limited thrust against the enemy in a single knockout blow. An overall strategic bomber fleet would be unnecessary in this sort of campaign and a fast mobile "flying artillery" of Ju. 87 Stukas backed up by a medium bomber fleet to decimate airfields and transport systems within a certain radius would be more than ample.

The RAF thought along the same lines at this point as they maintained light bombers such as the ill fated Fairey Battle or the Avro Anson or medium bombers like the Hampden or Vickers Wellington.

When it came to preparations for Operation Sealion the Luftwaffe fielded 3358 (2550 serviceable) aircraft with a breakdown of 934 (805) Bf.109s, 289 (224) Bf.110s, 1482 (998) medium bombers, 327 (261) Stukas, 195 (151) reconnaissance and 93 (80) coastal aircraft.

If you apply the RLM ratio and sub out the Medium bombers and the 75% serviceability rate the Luftwaffe planners used, they would have had only 371 bombers available with a total of 494.

Hermann Goering summed it up when he said that;

"The Führer will never ask how many engines my bombers have, only how many we have."

To make this case more pointedly lets look at a table of comparisons of specs for each aircraft;

Model	D0.19	Ju.89	He. 111	Ju. 88	Wellington	FW. 200
Engines	4	4	2	2	2	4
Range	941 Mi	1862 mi	1429 mi	1429 mi	2550 mi	2212 mi
Bombload	3520lb	3520lb	4400lb	2000lb	4500lb	4360lb

(It should be noted that the bombload could be increased on both the He.111 and Ju.88 but at a cost to fuel efficiency and flight handling. The Ju.88 could carry up to 6,600lb on racks and the He.111 could carry up to 7,900lb but required rocket assisted launch!) 

General Wever, the Luftwaffe chief of staff between March 1935 and his tragic death in February 1936, was the main supporter of a strategic bomber force. He issued the Ural Bomber order for an aircraft that had a range long enough to drop an adequate bomb load on Russian industry in the Ural mountains. The aim was to create a fleet of bombers that could wage a war over a static front and bring an enemies industry to its knees. This was at odds with OKW's vision of a fast war that would mean less resources wasted and the Army were keen to have their aerial umbrella to protect their men and tanks. It was inevitable that after the air crash that claimed Wever's life that the project would be dropped.

General Ernst Udet, head of procurement and a former stunt pilot finally got his way on dive bombers supported by Jeschonnek and the new Chief of Staff Albrecht Kesselring who did not want to see men or materiel wasted and favoured fighters.

It is understandable when you look at the specifications of the aircraft as the two models put forward are very comparable to the two engine Heinkel and the modern Ju.88.

As for a long range reconnaissance craft, military planners didn't think they needed one until the war with the British Isles looked unavoidable in 1940 and Fw. 200 Condor airliners were converted with some success in the anti-shipping role. A formation was also used for bombing Manchester. However this was a temporary stopgap move and not to be considered for long term military strategy.

The problems really arose when the Luftwaffe hit the static front over the skies of England. Although temporary aerial superiority was gained over Kent and the South east the majority of British industry was merely shifted North and Squadrons were moved to Scotland for R&R away from the front.

This problem was exacerbated on the Russian front but still Luftwaffe planners preferred to go for quantity and the army had become to dependent on their aerial umbrella - everything was being  thrown at the Russian armoured columns - even Stukas fitted with Cannon from armoured cars wit recoil so strong it would stop the aircraft dead in the air. A four engine bomber would be fairly superfluous and once out of escort range a crew of eight maybe ten much needed airmen could be lost with no hope of retrieval.

However planners did look into a four engine scheme with the Messerschmitt Me. 264 coming out as a fore runner for the Amerika bomber plan and as a U-boat support craft. It was too little too late and with the prototypes destroyed in an air raid the RLM decided to drop any real interest as they could not spare the production capacity in 1943-4 as fighters to combat the Allied bomber offencive were needed.

Model	Me.264	He.177	Lancaster	B.17
Engines	4	4*	4	4
Range	9500 mi	1814 mi	2530 mi	2000 mi
Bombload	6614 lb	13227 lb	14 - 22,000lb	8-17,000 lb

There was also the ill fated He.177 Grief which was nicknamed the "Flying firework" by her crews. The craft had two engines in each nacelle so gave the look of a two engined bomber. Unfortunatley due to a design botch an oil line ran across the hot engines and had a tendency to burst into flames in mid flight (hence the name). Its arrival to Luftflotte 6 on the eastern front was used to some effect by Feldmarschall Lohr against Russian transport systems and factories, even attacking Gorki. Unfortunately as the Wehrmacht withdrew further and further into Poland more and more targets dropped even out of the range of the 177 and the unit was used in normal tactical role of the Ju. 88 or He. 111.

There was the improved He 277 which put the engines into four nacelles instead of two that Dr Heinkel continued work on in private and was a marked improvement but Goering would not allow it's development!

I would also be amiss if I didn't mention the Dive order from General Udet. It was a devastating order from the head of procurement. Every bomber aircraft had to be able to act as a dive bomber as well as level bomber. This threw all kinds of spanners into the design process and vitally delayed the He 177 production and deployment. It wasn't until his death in 1941 that this order could be effectively rescinded but it had already set back the program by a detrimental amount of time.

Massacre over the Meuse

It would be understandable if you have never heard of the Fairey Battle. The Battle was a modern light bomber when it was designed with a Rolls Royce Merlin mark I with 1030 hp. As the Battle's career continued so too did the engine's evolution with mark II,III and even IV. Compared to contemporary fighters like the Heinkel He 51 or Gloucester Gladiator it's top speed was comparable at 241 mph.

It's design looked very modern to, no longer a biplane but instead a low cantilevered tapered wings and it elongated cockpit. Unfortunately with the war looking more and more likely fighter design really improved with Spitfires, Hurricanes (using the same Merlin mark II) and more importantly; the Messerschmitt Bf 109. Suddenly the Battle was out classed and with its solitary Browning .303 gun in the wing and Vickers K operated by a gunner in the rear of the cockpit it was outgunned. The 109 E, the most modern 109 in 1940 had 4 machine guns and the newer variants were fitted with an Oreliken MG FF cannon!

Never the less, with little else at hand in 1939, the RAF sent the bomber to France. Despite it's inadequacies a tail gunner shot down the first German aircraft over the front some three weeks into the war. It has been suggested that the overly eager jagdflieger presumed they were fighters and did not realise there was a tail gunner! The lesson was learnt from then on.

On May 10th 1940 the Wehrmacht rolled into France and the low Countries knocking the Allies back with such ferocity that many bridges were still intact. By the 12th the German army was massing by the Maastricht bridge fortifying it with 88 and other assorted flak detachments and organising a fighter umbrella. Should the bridge remain in tact a German thrust could cut the Allied front in half. It had to be destroyed.

Through a cloud of flak a flight of a squadron of Blenhiem bombers struck first from 3000ft. They broke formation after delivering their payload but quickly reassembled on spotting fighters. This saved their lives as they covered each other and massed their fire. Despite the enemy hitting all of the craft and what their leader described as the heaviest flak he had seen or could imagine possible only four craft were lost.

Sgt Gray VC and F/O Garland VC

Elsewhere 12 Squadron's CO asked for volunteers to strike the bridge. All the pilots volunteered but with only five Battles available lots were drawn.A Hurricane force was sent ahead to sweep away enemy fighters but they would be unable to do anything about the heavy ground fire. As the formation of Battles arrived, already under fire from the long range guns and with the Infantry adding their MG42s to the chorus Flying officer Garland asked his observer Sgt Gray what he thought, together they showed the reckless bravery in the face of adversity that has been the hallmark of the British serviceman for centuries. They flew on.

With the air clear of fighters the Battles flew through the soup they saw German trucks crossing and they dived immediatly. Garland dived the aircraft as low as possible and Gray released the 1000lb bombload upon the bridge. A column of water showed a near miss but there was also a blast as one vehicle was caught in the fire and another from a bomb striking the first span of the bridge. The Hurricane pilots regisetered that the bridge had been blown and temporarily out of use. As the Battles pulled for altitude and turned for home they were pounced upon by German fighters that had slipped past the Hurricanes. The resulting carnage left one Battle to return to the field with a solitary survivor, another crashed into the river, another into the fields. Garland's aircraft attracted the most fire as the group leader and he, Sgt Gray and Sgt Reynolds (the airgunner) were killed and their bodies interned in secret by locals. (1)

Both Garland and Gray were given the VC for their cool actions that saw the bridge blown, Sgt Reynolds recieved no citation as he was not part of the decission making process.

The remains of a Battle

On the 14th May the German army crossed the Meuse in two places near Sedan. Six more battles made an attack at 5am and in the half light were came back with only one pilot injured. At 7.30 am another four attacked the bridges but were again unsucessful despite all of them returning. By mid afternoon a range of targets including the pontoon bridges, and a further four between Mouzon and Sudan were selected. Sixty-seven Battles took to the air and only thirty-two returned having been ravaged by the Luftwaffe's aircraft and the flak batteries.  Over the following days Six crews returned to base from the raids including a crew who had attended their wounded pilot until he passed away and a pilot who was wounded in two places but still swam across the river!

The Battle did not see active service after the French campaign except in training and Costal command patrols.

Despite the bravery of the crews of the light bomber they were simply outgunned and outclassed by the oppoistion and were overtaken by events in the theatre that saw the Germans smash across the rivers and Blitzkrieg to the coast.