The loss of HMS Cornwall and Dorsetshire

With the raid against Colombo going better than expected Vice Admiral Nagumo ordered his second wave elsewhere. A radio message had arrived from one of the heavy cruiser Tone’s reconnaissance aircraft had reported two destroyers heading South-south-west, three hundred miles away from Colombo and travelling at 26 knots. Lieutenant Commander Takashige Egusa, the air group Commander of the Soryu lead eighty Val dive bombers off the decks and set course for he Destroyer’s last known position. Whilst airborne a second report came through that the destroyers were both cruisers.

   HMS Dorsetshire and HMS Cornwall were travelling as fast as they could to join with Admiral Somerville’s fleet to not only add to its firepower for a possible engagement with Nagumo’s fleet, but also to escape aerial attack in port. In the evening of the 4th April orders were sent ashore for the crews to return to ship and news leaked out that they would be joining Somerville and departing as soon as possible. At 10:00 p.m. the two heavy cruisers left port in line astern and set course for the rendezvous point.

   Although both vessels were running at high alert since leaving port the sighting of two separate reconnaissance aircraft confirmed that they were in for trouble and action stations were maintained. Harold Farmer, one of the engineering crew aboard the Cornwall came off watch to find the Mess empty and a note telling him to help himself to the leftovers. Following lunch hr reported for action stations on deck where a sympathetic Chief Petty Officer gave him leave to get some sleep. “Get your head down and if there’s any sign of action I’ll wake you up.” (1) It was an offer that was quickly taken. It was the opinion of the engineering crew that being at Action Stations on the deck was preferable to being trapped below which was were Lieutenant Drew was heading for his duty shift in the After-Engine Room. The atmosphere was tense, and he could see on the men’s faces that they were concerned, and he did his best to relax them despite the claustrophobic heated conditions.

   Unknown to the British sailors below Commander Egosa was signalling Nagumo’s flagship “Sighted enemy vessels.”
“Air Group, 1^st CarDiv take the first ship; Air Group 2^nd CarDiv take the Second Ship” (2)

Aichi "Val" divebomber

   In the Dorsetshire’s After Detector Patrick Cannon looked out the door to see the first bombs fall. “I saw it come off and go down. It didn’t hit the Cornwall but went off near her bows. As this was happening we went to full alert.” (3) Harold Farmer was woken by that first bomb exploding alongside the Cornwall. “Nobody had a chance to warn us, they (the Japanese) just came out of the sun that the sun and that was it… Near misses were doing more damage than the actual hits” (4)

   In the After-Engine Room Edwin Drew was suddenly made aware of the action when they heard a loud explosion and the Cornwall shuddered. Within moments dust billowed out of the supply ventilation ducts covering the artificers and main throttles followed by more explosions and shuddering before they lost steam and the room was plunged into impenetrable darkness.

There was pitch darkness. That was immediately followed by a bomb exploding at the after end of the Engine room with dense smoke and flames visible above me against the deck head. I shouted to the lads to get out. We could not see each other but everyone knew where the sole exit ladder from the Engine Room was situated. (5)

Standing alone in the darkness he heard a scream emanate from the far end of the room and Drew turned and began walking towards the sound only stopping when it petered out. Suddenly sapped of his drive he was overcome with fatalism and wanted to sit and await his fate but the thought of his wife and child at home changed his mind and he climbed the ladder. The journey to the surface was not easy and the raging fire burnt his hands and legs as he pushed through the smoky companionway. The ship was also beginning to list heavily to port and he was helped ono the upper deck.

I was in sock and in a poor state; in fact I was all in. The action was still on. We were still being bombed, but there was now no return fire. We really were sitting ducks. (6)

   Aboard the Dorsetshire Patrick Cannon had been ordered to leave his position as the main armament was useless and assist with the pompom guns. There was a raging fire below from a direct hit to the small arms magazine, the ship’s Supermarine Walrus and her aviation fuel. Despite having a thick nest of aerial wire fall on him, Cannon made it to the fore pompoms, but he was too late to be of any assistance. “I was speechless… the gun and the men were just like in a ball as if a giant had got hold of them and screwed them up.” (7) They were just distorted.”  Petty Officer Crossky, who had gone to the other side found pieces of his men scattered through he ship’s rigging. Cannon reported to one of the surviving gunners saying he was there to assist, the seaman turned to face him with a look of futility whilst gesturing to the remains of the gun. “With what?”

   Through the chaos someone shouted “Oerlikon” and Cannon began to make his way to the fore Oerlikon cannon. The pedestal mounted gun was one of a pair which had been recently fitted aboard to augment the older guns. Patrick Cannon opined that; “The Ack-Ack armament on the cruisers was totally inadequate. It had never kept pace with the development of naval aircraft from way back in the 20s and 30s.” (8)
   As he ran forward someone shouted his name and Cannon saw a wounded sailor on the deck, he paused and through the maelstrom called “Is that you Murtagh?”
   Able Seaman Thomas Murtagh had served with him as a boy on HMS Ganges and had been a prize winning boxer but was now just a limbless mass of blood on the deck calling out to his friend; “Don’t leave me! Don’t leave me!”
   Unable to move him due to his extensive injuries all Cannon could do is reassure and get to his post. Other wounded littered the decks intermingled with dead bodies including one of the ship’s doctors who had nearly been cut in two by machine gun fire. As the ship’s tilt became more pronounced the bodies began to roll with a river of blood flowing with them. The Japanese bombers kept coming down and Cannon found himself skidding under X turret waiting for the aircraft to pass. Once they were gone he clambered up to the quarterdeck and ran to the gunner who was blazing at the sky.
“Where’s your loader?” he shouted above the sounds of battle and the banging of trapped men below deck. The gunner indicated a body on the deck that was rolling with the tilt. Cannon grabbed the Oerlikon magazine and started attaching them to the gun and asked the gunner if he had had any luck and hit anything.
“Not a thing.” was the response as he continued to blaze away at the bombers which were so low that Cannon could see the bombs unclipping from their bellies.

    The Dorsetshire’s plotting officer, Lieutenant Commander Rupert East was aware the guns were firing but not of the damage the ship when the meteorological rating rushed in “Excuse me sir, the ship is sinking.” (9) East grabbed a second life jacket that happened to be lying around the plotting office and climbed to the starboard side against the tilt. As he prepared to jump in a rating without a life jacked appeared on the deck above him and asked if he could take East’s spare life jacket. Realising for the first time that he had two he threw it up before diving head first into the Indian Ocean. Years later he received a letter from Signalman Boardman thanking him for saving his life that day. 
   As orders were passed to “Abandon Ship” Patrick Cannon quickly unclipped the Oerlikon gunner who had the honour of being the last man firing at the Japanese and both jumped over the side. In the water they watched as the ship eased ahead slowly and started slipping beneath the waves. All around the Dorsetshire sailors were trying to find anything that floated that they could cling to and Cannon was no exception having left his life jacket hanging up in the Aft detector room. The mast snapped and fell into the water providing many with a life line and Cannon and his gunner found a chunk of wood to cling to as well. Together they made a pact that if they were to get through the sinking and meet again, wherever they were, they would have a night on the town. Slowly they began to make their way towards the main group of survivors. As they did they came across the wounded Petty Officer Crossky. Believing that the man wouldn’t make it through the night Cannon insisted on pulling him up onto their piece of flotsam.
I stayed with him for thirty-three hours. I never got my head out in thirty-three hours. I was covered in oil and eventually I got separated from (the Gunner) ut I stayed with Crossky and we made our way towards the main crowd. (10)

   Things were little better over on the Cornwall as the wounded Edwin Drew lay on the deck one of his colleagues, Lieutenant Archibald was suddenly struck by the realisation that he had a £50 note in his cabin. Battling his comrades attempts to restrain him and ignoring pleas to stop the Lieutenant pushed below decks to retrieve his money. As Captain Manwaring approached ordering “Abandon Ship.” Archie reappeared with the note in his pocket.
   Drew remembered;
They helped me up the sloping decks to the starboard side where I was able, with others, to slide down the ship’s side into the water. As I started the slide I remember thinking to myself “if I can only get into the water I’ll be ok.” Little did I know of the future at that moment. (11)
   Once in the water though he found himself covered in viscous oil which covered his eyes only allowing him to see if he tilted his head back and look along his cheeks and to add to this he realised that he ha no life belt despite having had one in the Engine room earlier. Despite these setbacks he still was conscious of the dangers of lingering near a sinking cruiser. Despite how hard he swam he wa still caught in the vessel’s pull and a cursory glance revealed the ship’s outer 14-foot starboard propeller was resting with the shaft at the sea level churning and sucking nearby flotsam and survivors towards it with no way to escape. As he drew close to it the Cornwall suddenly lurched to port and lifted the propeller clear of the water allowing Drew to pass under it safely.
   Harold Swann had made his way to the Cornwall’s rail and encountered a nineteen-year-old South African Stoker, Lawrence Swann, who refused to leave the ship on account of his inability to swim. His commrades pleaded with him to come them and they would take care of him in the water between them but he refused. “Ofcourse the ship went down in ten minutes so he had absolutely no chance. He was one of the many who went with the ship.” (12)
   The Cornwall had entered its’ death throes and Drew had a vivid memory of the death of his ship for years to come:
   I remember watching the ship moving away from me. I saw the Walrus float off the catapult but it was then sunk by the ship’s wireless aerials coming down across the wings as she went on her side. The seaman in the lookout barrel at the top of the foremast had to remain there until he was able to jump into the sea from a height of eight feet as the ship listed over to port… I was about half a mile astern of the ship when shortly afterwards she went down by the head and her stern came right out of the water and she sank in a vertical position and about half her length stood out of the water as she went straight down into the Indian Ocean… It is hard to believe but I heard a faint cheer. (13)

HMS Cornwall sinking taken from one of the attacking aircraft.

   Having received a dead man’s lifejacket, with the assistance of Sub lieutenant Dougall (RCNVR), Edwin Drew was suddenly aware of the Japanese aircraft passing over them firing their machine guns into the stricken sailors as they struggled to survive in the water. Patrick Cannon recalled clearly the strafing run:
I looked up and the Japanese planes had mustered in line and they dived over us and they machine gunned is in the water and I heard all of the plop-plop-plop and then I put my head as deep as I could – one or two who had life belts tried to do it and found they couldn’t and they reported later their backsides were up in the air like ducks! They were only too happy to find their backsides hadn’t been blown off! I remember seeing the bullets hitting the water not far from me. (14)
   Another sailor recalled hearing a Japanese gunner firing his gun to sound like a “V” for Victory in Morse code as an insult to the British.

   With the enemy now passed and the two heavy cruisers slipped beneath the waves the survivors had to take stock of the situation. Both crews were separated by several miles, despite being able to hear each other, they were effectively separated by several miles, despite being able to hear each other, they were effectively their own microcosms. As both crews had abandoned ship whilst the cruisers were still underway the men were scattered in a line and the speed of the sinking meant that only two boats from each cruiser were launched and most of the crew were clinging to Carley floats and flotsam and for many of the crew the first jo was to gather together around anything that floated.
   Edwin Drew had managed to find a mess deck table top which was three by ten foot and clung to it whilst surrounded by dead bodies floating on the ocean. As he tried to take stock of his situation the Cornwall’s  PT Petty Officer swam past and implored him to swim with him toward the Senior boat, the ship’s motorboat, which was just visible over the rolling waves. Drew agreed but on alighting from his flotsam he trod upon a large fish which was passing below the surface and the experience distressed him so much that he returned to the safety of his table top. After he had calmed down and thought about his surroundings the thought of being alone in the dark surrounded by corpses made him revaluate his choice.
So I summoned up courage and eventually reached the motorboat just as darkness fell. I reported to Commander Fair who was in the motorboat and he put me in charge of one of the Carley floats which was all roped together around the motorboat. There were already over twenty ratings standing in my float which meant that the buoyant “sausage” from which the wooden centre is suspended was two feet below water level so it looked as if we were standing with the water at waist level! (15)
   In the case of both ships In the case of both ships the boats were reserved for the wounded and as a makeshift surgery with the surviving ship’s medics doing all that they could for the worse cases with meagre supplies they had. If a wounded man succumbed to his wounds his body was lowered over the side and his place taken by somebody else. The Dorsetshire’s First Officer, Commander Cyril Byas, although wounded,  refused to take a space in the boats insisting that others be treated before him. Finally a group of ratings around him physically pushed him into a boat and a cheer went around that “Commander Byas is alive”. Stoker Francis Anstis recorded that Commander Byas “was our commander who virtually ran the ship and dished out punishment. He wasn’t too well liked and considered a bit too strict and a little unfair sometimes, but he was a good Commander and had control.” (16) By contrast, her Captain, Augustus “Gus” Agar VC was a very well thought of gentleman, a hero of the First World War but now seen by some in a paler light as he was sat in the ship’s whaler at the tiller.
Captain Agar who was sat in the stern of the whaler. Somebody said that he was coordinating and rallying the men. That wasn’t so. Everyone in that water was a survivor and were doing their own thing. Men were surviving on their own merits and not accepting orders from anybody. When you are clinging to a piece of flotsam in the middle of the Indian Ocean and you’ve been there twenty odd hours you are not looking for guidance from somebody sat in a boat. You’re hanging on like grim death. (17)
   This observation by Patrick Cannon may habe been understandable due to the nature of the situation but somewhat unfair as Captain Agar was suffering from the effects of the Bends which he had contracted during the sinking. The fifty two year old had been caught in the Dorsetshire’s suction and been pulled deep below the water and despite a shrapnel wound to his leg he managed to swim for the surface where he gulped down quite a bit of water and oil. He was in no state to be in the water.

   As can be expected by a lot of blood and dead bodies in the water sharks and other marine predators began to circle the shipwrecked men. The men did all they could to defend themselves which was to keep a sharp lookout and on spotting a fin the men would thrash vigorously and shout seemingly scaring the shark off. But this was only ever a temporary fix and the men were worried that they would suffer a similar fate to that of the shipwrecked crew of HMS Dunedin. The crystal clear water of the Indian Ocean gave a fantastic view of the schools of sharks massing beneath them.
A school of sharks went right underneath us, you could see them, they were well down in the water, but you could see the whole family. The thing that struck me was they were in V formation, but the blunt end was first…They were always there but you never thought of them too much unless they got too close. There were a lot of fish in the water. (18)
Another way to avoid shark attack was the pushing of dead bodies out of the group in the middle and out to the periphery believing that the sharks would more than likely take them first before the living.

   As the day dragged on the men had to fight off exposure, fatigue and their own wounds. Rupert East was somewhat philosophical about his thirty hours in the water commenting that “There is nothing you can do about it. If you’re in the water, nice warm water, and you are floating and not hurt there’s not very much you can do about it. You just continue floating.” (19). For the wounded the wait was unbearable and many succumbed to the shock or fatigue though Edwin Drew found the water very soothing on his burns. As clothes grew water logged and jettisoned other pieces of clothing were fashioned into head gear to keep off the sun’s heat. Much to Drew’s amusement and Lieutenant Archibald’s life long dismay the latter shed his trousers and condemned them to the deep before realising too late that the £50 note was still in the pocket.

   Fear of being picked up by the Japanese fleet, taken by sharks or that they would die out here was a constant despite the singing, talking and swimming competitions. It was believed that Somerville would not risk the rest of the fleet looking for them and that the ships had gone down so fast that no accurate position had been reported. As night fell and the temperature dropped several men began cheering believing a star on the horizon was an approaching ship and the delusion spread through the men bobbing in the ocean and there was a rolling cheer until the Officers quietened them down and pointed out the truth. This was not the worst delusion though and men suffering from stress, exhaustion, hunger and exposure began imagining things with fatal consequences.
I heard a boy called Jones (Able Seaman William Jones), I never could understand why he was screaming but he kept shouting “The Russians are coming, the Russians are coming.” Now we didn’t have any conflict with the Russians and for a boy seaman to shout about Russians was most unusual and he kept shouting. Then he died. (20)
Harold Farmer witnessed another incident;
This chap went a bit silly. He was in one of the rafts and so quite safe but he decided he was going to get a taxi and dived into the water. As he dived in we saw this shark come along and he never surfaced again so we imagine he was picked up by the shark. (21)
As men died due to their injuries, such as Engineer Lieutenant Mike Edgar of the Cornwall, the survivors often found themselves talking to the bodies of their former comrades with Patrick Cannon later recalling that he was talking for a while to a corpse and that a precaution they began taking was to ask a question at the start to see if they got a response. During the night Crossky, who was still laying on the flotsam, turned to Cannon and whispered that a man was trying to push him off and handed his pocket knife to Cannon and asked him to stop the man. Cannon said that should it happen again that Crossky should give him a nudge and he would deal with it. A short time later Crossky nudged him and Cannon shouted “Get off or I’ll cut your throat.” The drowning man pleaded that he too was from Torquay like Cannon and that he should help him but Cannon was firm in the defence of his wounded comrade. “I never saw him again. I’m presuming he drowned but that’s just hard luck.” (22)

   As the second day in the open ocean unfolded the meagre rations available were issued to the men. For the Dorsetshire’s crew they had to swim up to the whaler where they were issued a piece of hard tack biscuit the size of a postage stamp and allowed to dip their tongues into a tin mug so that they could moisten their lips. The Chief Petty Officer was holding the tiller threatening to wallop anyone who took a sip or if there was a danger of the boat being swamped by over enthusiastic crewmen. By contrast the Cornwall crew were eating tinned fruit. One of the ship’s doctors had petitioned the Admiralty to change the supplies in the lifeboats from the standard. The tins were punctured and passed amongst the men to take a mouthful of juice each. The tins were later opened and the fruit shared out.

   Tue first sign of salvation came as a Fairey Swordfish flew over them and rumour was spread that a jam jar was dropped with a message saying the fleet was searching for them. Word spread quickly and the men grew jubilant though the eventual sight of approaching ships concerned them at first as they feared the Japanese had found them until they saw the white ensign fluttering above HMS Enterprise and her attending destroyers HMS Paladin and HMS Panther. Somerville had received a garbled wireless transmission the previous day that talked about having a “shadower” and it wasn’t until 2 p.m. that they were able to identify the sender as the Dorsetshire but by then it was too late. The admiral had attempted to move towards the last known position of the two cruisers with one of his destroyers ahead  of him to begin the relief effort but they had to abandon the hunt because of the proximity of the Japanese fleet. As it was he had ordered the Enterprise that they had a limited time to find the survivors and not to be separated from the main fleet for too long lest they join the Cornwall and the Dorsetshire and the Enterprise’s Captain had already gone past the deadline when they spotted the men in the water. As the rescuers arrived they were ordered to stay where they were in the water and the Cruiser and destroyers would come to them and lower lifeboats but for the men in the water salvation was too tempting and several began to swim towards the ships though they found that their legs ached from fatigue and despite the mind’s willingness to get to safety quickly their bodies refused to budge.  As the Paladin approached the Dorsetshire’s survivors the crew began throwing over chunks of wood for them to hang onto as well as lowering scrambling nets for the men. As the ship went by, a South African seaman, Jeffrey Berlyn, reached out and grabbed Patrick Cannon by the hair and dragged him through the water and eventually onto the scrambling net.

   Once the operation was complete and the crewmen were pulled aboard their rescuers they were stripped of their oily clothes and washed off before being given what spare clothes were aboard and room to sleep and food to eat whilst wounded men were taken care of. Of the two ships a total of 1122 of 1546 men were rescued from the sea and sharks despite the Paladin having to bury twelve men who died that first night  but their deaths were kept a secret from the rest of the survivors to save them from upset.

   Somerville, though elated that so many of his men had survived being in the ocean for so long, was also sceptical of his chances of military success in the theatre believing that whomever was in charge would be unable to do any better. He wrote to his wife saying that “I’ve come to the conclusion that until I get a proper fleet out here I will simply have to hide, more or less.” (23)

(1)    Harold Farmer, IWM Sound archive Catalogue number 20500

(2)    M. Okumiya, J Horikoshi, M Caiden Zero! The Air war in the Pacific during World War Two from the Japanese view point, Zenger Publishing, Washington, P. 150-1

(3)    Patrick Cannon, IWM Sound archive Catalogue number 12811

(4)    Harold Farmer, IWM Sound archive

(5)    http://www.world-war.co.uk/cornwall_loss.php3

(6)    Ibid.

(7)    Patrick Cannon, IWM Sound archive

(8)    Ibid.

(9)    Roland East, IWM Sound Archive Catalogue number 10806

(10) Patrick Cannon, IWM Sound archive

(11) http://www.world-war.co.uk/cornwall_loss.php3

(12) Harold Farmer, IWM Sound archive

(13) http://www.world-war.co.uk/cornwall_loss.php3

(14) Patrick Cannon, IWM Sound archive.

(15) http://www.world-war.co.uk/cornwall_loss.php3

(16) http://www.world-war.co.uk/Dorsetshire_story.php3

(17) Patrick Cannon, IWM Sound archive

(18) Harold Farmer, IWM Sound archive

(19) Roland East, IWM Sound archive

(20) Jack Cannon, IWM Sound archive

(21) Harold Farmer, IWM Sound archive

(22) Patrick Cannon, IWM Sound archive

(23) The Somerville papers p. 401

 

 

Desert offensive, Libya 1940

Blenheim Mk Is in Iraq © IWM (CM 106)

War in North Africa was not a surprise and had been planned for since July 1937 with the Committee of Imperial defence reversing the Cabinet’s decision to exclude any government expenditure for defence against Italian aggression especially in North Africa where ports and the Suez Canal in need of protection and the Desert air-force was in need of modernisation. The Air Ministry further analysed the Italian threat in 1938 concluding that Italy would cross the border with a significant air-force and two motorised divisions. The Italian Airforce was appraised as already having 174 aircraft in Libya and be able to direct a total of 730 aircraft against the RAF within two months whereas the British could muster around 200 aircraft from across the Middle East with squadrons based in Palestine, Egypt, Sudan, Iraq and Aden with very little hope of significant reinforcements coming from Britain and arriving piecemeal.

   A joint planning committee was set up after General Wavell’s appointment as GOC-in-C of the Middle East in August 1939 with the newly created Air Officer commanding in Chief Longmore with the aim of working with the Egyptian Government and local commanders in the Middle East to coordinate against the Italian aggression.

   The main aim of the defence policy in the Air Ministry’s mind was to centralise their control of their forces but maintain a flexible approach but bringing in support from artillery and fighter forces but the Committee assigned the limited fighter forces to the Defence commander removing the flexible approach. The Air Council also believed that the key to victory was to destroy as many Italian Bombers before they reached their targets but the tactic that the Fortress Commander was likely to employ meant that the three fighter squadrons available would be scattered to the desired defence points and perform standing patrols. Not only did this blunt the offensive power of the fighters but would also mean they were unavailable for escort missions for the Blenheim squadrons based in Egypt who were ideally placed to carry out pre-emptive strikes on the Regia Aeronautica or their bases. Although fighter organisation was modified by the Air Ministry its primary role was for defence against the Italians with a secondary role for ground attack whist at the same time ongoing talks were attempting to expand the Bomber forces with two wings deployed to the Nile Delta and two squadrons for Army co-operation to be put at the disposal of Wavell in the Western Desert with communications passing from GOC HQ to the Squadrons rapidly with targets to be hit.

   The Director of operations at the Air Ministry was keen to affect a German style approach and strike the opposition as quickly as possible with potential targets being the Italian depots and supply system and the Italian Airforce on the ground well aware that there was no repair facility in Libya which could cope with major maintenance projects meaning even moderate damage to an aircraft would result in it being a write off or being shipped back to Italy. As the RAF carried out Douhet’s vision the Royal Navy and French could disrupt resupply across the Mediterranean cutting their supply line to Italian East Africa as well as Libya.

   The relatively small British force was assigned to carry out army cooperation, assault the supply

Regia Aeronautica SM 79 escorted by Fiats
 

system and Regia Aeronautica whilst providing support to the Royal Navy. A very ambitious target considering that by the 10 June 1940 AHQ in Egypt had five squadrons of Blenheim Mk Is and one squadron each of Bristol Bombay and Valentia transports that could be converted to carry a 2000 lb and 2200 lb bomb loads respectively on underwing racks. A reinforcement plan had been implemented which saw the obsolete aircraft in the theatre gradual replaced with the Blenheim with 211 Squadron being the first in April 1939, 45 squadron in June and 113 squadron by September as were 30 and 55 squadrons who were transferred from Iraq giving a total strength of 132 Blenheims and the possibility of another squadron to follow. There was also a plan for up to twelve heavy bomber squadrons to come from Britain with the Bombays and Valentias filling the gap until they arrived but it was a gap that widened as events overtook the theatre with the Wellingtons, Whitleys and Hampdens being held through 1940 for operations against the more pressing enemy, Germany.

   Another crisis facing the RAF in the Middle East was a distinct shortage of spare parts with Blenheim spares unable to support a war condition “for more than a short period” and the official history gave the example of only two spare petrol tanks being available to each squadron which would meant one of the most common areas to be hit would cause a large number of aircraft to be lost to attrition. Sir William Mitchell managed, with the approval of the committee of Imperial Defence, to “borrow” from British based squadrons to increase supply stocks across the summer of 1939 knowing that there would be no more than a trickle if war broke out on the continent. The arrival of the extra squadrons and their conversions to twin engine Blenhims had further put strain on the repair facility at Alexandria and steps were taken to free up space and to get tradesmen from Britain to alleviate the strain whilst the older, more obsolete aircraft were being packed away for dispatch to Afghanistan.

   A further facility was established at Abu Sueir to supply the operational squadrons with an aircraft storage section to provide spares, equipment and stores whilst a pilot training school was moved to the safety of Iraq. A motorised transport infrastructure was also increased as it was not adequate enough to get the supplies and squadrons to their forward bases. By December these facilities were far from perfect with them still geared to repairing single engine aircraft which would cause problems for the Blenheims who required engine replacement after 225 flying hours, the equivalent of two months of flying meaning that sixty engines would need replacing a month but the facilities could only cope with ten aircraft a month.

   Blenheim bombers were having a difficult time acclimatising to the sand with their intakes being close to the ground and very rapidly filling with sand which meant regular cleaning but there was a shortage of cleaning equipment as well as spare parts for the Lewis guns and the Blenheims Vickers K and 250 lb bombs with projections showing that after fourteen days of maximum effort the bomber force would be useless. Dust and sand would permeate into dials and interfered with the airscrews whilst the heat would make the cockpit’s Perspex crack or pop out of its fittings which put further strains on the maintenance crews, a strain not exerted by the older obsolete aircraft who had their own faults in the fact that once their spares ran out there would be no more. The sand thrown up by the aircraft taking off was so thick that pilots visibility would be next to nothing so the bombers would take off in a line abreast formation.

   The airfields available in September 1939 included five permanent stations in Egypt at Aboukir, Ismalia, Abu Sueir, Heliopolis and Helwas with further desert landing strips stretching to Mersa Matruh south of Luxor with some emergency landing grounds around the Suez Canal and Red sea. The desert landing grounds were very basic and in 1938 it was decided to build camp facilities and amass stocks of petrol and ammunition so that they could be used operationally at a moment’s notice with twelve of them operational by the outbreak of war however they varied in quality and surface including lose sand which was far from ideal. Facilities for the crews were also very basic including tented accommodation with prefabricated operations rooms and cook houses as well as Bessoneau hangers. However by the time war started some were still just patches of desert with the most basic of facilities with the deployment of the squadrons being so rushed that for the first raids armourers had trouble trying to find equipment and ammunition to get the bombers ready to take off. These emergency landing grounds were rendered unusable during the rainy seasons between November and April.  A further six airfields were immediately put into construction with their completion date due to be 1941. 

   The forces and organisation available were deemed adequate for the defence of Egypt from the Italians but should Germany become involved then the Desert Air Force would find themselves very stretched. It was also a concern to the Air ministry that the amassing of the force had been at the expense of the RAF’s bomber forces ear marked for war against Germany. If the RAF in the Middle East was to get reinforcements they had to look to factories in Egypt, India and South Africa especially as the theatre was still considered a backwater compared to France and Singapore as Germany and Japan were by far aggressively expansionistic than Italy.  

The Prime Minister in 1937 had expressed the view that Italy, although unlikely to be aggressive without assurances of German support, could no longer be regarded as a reliable friend. Limited expenditure to guard against a hostile Italy had therefore been authorised. From then onwards periodic reviews of our position in relation to Italy had been made.¹ 

   Italy was in a perfect position to cut the British supply lines across the Mediterranean with bombers operating across the Sicilian narrows and Libya as well as threaten the Red Sea and Suez Canal with air and naval forces in Italian East Africa. This would be their primary objective so that they could protect this colony. Any advance towards Alexandria from Tripoli would have to cross 1,100 miles of open desert which would be vulnerable to air attack however Italy had numerical superiority over Britain in the air and on the land. Italy’s air-force would need to be split between offensive duties and defensive actions to secure their maritime supply lines. The aircraft they had available according to the British European Appreciation 0n 1 April 1939 was 96 bombers, 81 Army co-operation and 90 fighters in Libya with the support of 444 bombers and a similar number of fighters based in Italy which could be available for transfer to the front to help cover the 250,000 troops.
The Italians had in reality carried out an exercise to test deployment of their bomber forces with amazing efficiency but leaving mostly light bombers behind. The main bomber in their arsenal was the Saviola Marchetti SM 79, a three-engine medium bomber nicknamed “Sparviero” (Sparrowhawk) which was also known as the Gobbo Maledetto – damned hunchback by its crews but it was considered to be “a fine and robust bomber that unfailingly operated in the most difficult conditions with great reliability.” The SM 79 had a top speed of 270 mph and a bomb load of 2645 lbs, heavier than a Blenheim. The SM 79 had a reputation from its brutally efficient operations in Spain which saw only four lost in combat through the war and killing 2800 civilians wounding a further 7000 in air raids however the lustre was waning as the world’s best bomber with the appearance of Germany’s modern Ju 88 and its reputation for invincibility being tarnished on 22 June when F/Lt Burgess shot down Tenente Solimene’s MM 22068 on a reconnaissance of Malta in a Gloucester Gladiator. A further

Gloucester Gladiators over Sollum © IWM (CM 354)

complication was that the SM 79 had no dust filters on their engines and this led to many not being serviceable. The levels of serviceability were compounded by severe shortages of spares and stocks leaving many easily repaired aircraft laying around useless on airfields. The British planners were concerned by the bomber force available to the Italians and their projections for an all out attack on Alexandria by forty eight SM 81 aircraft, each carrying 4000 lb bombloads could drop eighty-six tonnes of bombs in a day on the city and each carrying six gun emplacements making them difficult to shoot down by the RAFs Gladiators.  The Italian fighter force was made up of the robust CR 32 and CR 42 “Falco” biplanes which were on par with the Gladiator and were favoured by their pilots for their aeronautical agility. The Intelligence officers played down their capability in briefings claiming that their level of endurance was only some twenty five minutes and that the Blenheim could outpace them and belayed worry about damage by claiming that;
“If a stern attack developed the metal skin of the Blenheim will deflect the (50 calibre) shot” In September A/Sgt Blair found out the folly of this as the Blenheim he was in was attacked by an Italian fighter whose last 50 calibre bullet passed through the fuselage with a loud bang, through the pilot’s chair, through P/O Reynolds and out of the Perspex leaving Blair pulling the dead pilot off the control column and nursing the aircraft home.

   With Italy’s entry into the war the Mediterranean effectively closed to the British and Malta immediately came under siege. A few days later France’s surrender robbed Air Vice Marshal Longmore of 375 allied aircraft. However all was not bleak as the preparations for war had built up a ninety day surplus of fuel and explosives as well as a stockpile of spare aircraft but beyond that was a seventy day journey from Britain via Cape Town and the Red Sea through an ever growing gauntlet of U-Boats and light cruisers. Steps were taken to shorten this with an air bridge implemented by Group Captain Thorold in Takoradi with various stops along the 3697 mile journey to Abu Sueir but despite the length of the journey it only took six days! The first wave flew from Takoradi on 20 September. Although very useful it did put an awful strain on the incoming aircraft with a 10% wastage and already tired engines were thrust into the front line. Longmore would often complain to London of the shortages of aircraft much to Portal’s annoyance as his command suffered heavy losses but to make matters worse his protestations were supported by Wavell and Admiral Cunningham, both of whom were constantly making demands on Longmore’s command and found they were left wanting but it was something Churchill could not get to grips with and he readily criticised Longmore for holding a thousand pilots and aircraft as well as 16,000 personnel in the Middle East and suggesting he should return some to England to pass on their experiences to training units.
 

  As war became more and more likely Longmore believed that a Douet syle assault on Alexandria with SM 79s out pacing the Gladiators to devastating and so preparations were made whilst Air Commodore Collishaw believed that his group of three Blenheim squadrons should get in first. On the 10 June he ordered his squadrons to prepare for action and at nine minutes past midnight received the order from Longmore that his forces should:

Should carry out reconnaissance as arranged. Bombing formation as available should accompany reconnaissance in Northern area favourable targets observed especially concentrations of aircraft ²

   The Blenheims of 45 squadron took off at first light and made their approach towards El Adem air

80 Squadron's Blenheim Mk Is over the Iraqi desert © IWM (CM 109)

field by the safety of the sea. A signal from a 211 Squadron Blenheim reported the airfield was covered in parked aircraft with none of them dispersed. The force of eight Blenheims broke into sections and began their low level attacks dropping high explosives and incendiaries whilst excited gunners fired at anything that moved and at the flak batteries that began their belated accurate fire. The squadron began to gain height and reform off the coast near Torbruk when Sgt Bower’s Blenheim peeled away in flames and crashed into the sea. On the return flight F/O Finch had to make a force landing with a damaged engine and Sgt Thompson brought his damaged craft down at Sidi Barrain where it immediately burst into flames consuming the crew killing them all. A follow up raid by eighteen Blenheims of 55 and 113 squadron that afternoon suffered no losses and reported more heavy damage to the airfield and the aircraft still on the field and only the final raid’s B flight was chased by CR 32s who attacked from 12,000 feet diving down onto the Blenheims who were flying in a lose formation. Despite accurate fire they were easily outrun with the limited endurance possessed by the fighters showing through rather than the skill of the gunners. A/Sgt Ian Blair of 113 squadron had taken drums of a hundred rounds of ammunition rather than the usual sixty so that he would be able to fire longer and was found himself firing wildly at one aggressive CR 32 who pressed his attacks home.

This guy must have been twenty or thirty yards a CR 32 he was lethal from where he was. His deflection couldn’t have been very good but he was firing and I was going to have a blast at him but just as I was about to fire he broke off. ³

The standing patrols of Gloucester Gladiators reported a similar lack of Italian air activity along the border and not one bombing raid had been carried out. So where were they? The Italian High Command had indeed declared war on the Allies but had forgotten to inform their Imperial territories so aircraft were not dispersed, no raids were planned and no fighters on standby. A complication that arose over the coming months was concern about British fighter superiority as Longmore had made every opportunity to publicise the movements of his solitary Hurricane around his command making it look like several squadrons. Italian planners were hesitant to fling their bombers into action against superior forces which would leave them decimated.

   The first raid on Italian forces was hailed as a success by Collishaw and his men with many aircraft destroyed (actually eighteen) for the ttal loss of two aircraft and crews. The losses, although acceptable by Bomber Command standards in France they were concerning for Longmore who was well aware of the shortfalls of reinforcement and sent a message to Collishaw to be careful with his numbers.

   The following day the Blenheims were pressed into supporting a Naval sweep into the waters off Torbruk with twenty four Blenheims of 45, 113 and 211 squadrons were ordered to take off at dawn to target the port and airfields but low cloud meant six of 45 squadron returned to base whilst two of 211s bombers crashed on take-off and a third into a parked Bombay. The remaining six made it to the target but were intercepted by CR 32s who were easily outpaced with two of the Italians claimed by C flight. The only damage sustained came from the accurate Flak barrages thrown up by the ships in the harbour including the old First World War cruiser the San Giorgio with one of the bombers losing a propeller but managing to limp back to the British lines. The crews of 55 squadron were just as unlucky with Sgt Lulan, one of the observers, being struck by a propeller, a second Blenheim wouldn’t start whilst a third had to return due to mechanical issues. The remaining two powered on but found the target area swarming with some fifty fighters and decided that withdrawal was a better option. The only squadron to have any real luck was 113 squadron whose aircraft all got through. By the end of the day reconnaissance reported the San Giorgio was on fire and beached and a naval jetty was on fire.

   The 14 June was the Army’s turn to request assistance after a day’s rest. Fort Ridotta Capuzzo on the border was considered to be weakly held and of old Turkish brick construction so easily destructible. That morning eight of 211 squadron came in at low level dropping eleven second delayed fuses on the castle but the fuses were defective and exploded on contact showering the bombers with shrapnel. They turned for home leaving the fort still standing but damaged and an ammo dump on fire whilst that afternoon an army formation took the fort and 208 Italian prisoners. Elsewhere tow of 45 Squadron’s bombers hit Sidi Azoiz airfield and three Fort Maddalene leaving it damaged which was similarly captured by the army. A final aircraft was dispatched to bomb Giarabob and failed to return, its burnt out airframe was spotted near the target on a reconnaissance photograph near the target confirming its fate as the only confirmed loss of the day. In retaliation the Italians began bombing the British border positions.

   Torbruk offered up the most tempting target with tis naval oil reserves, army and air-force headquarters, ships of all manner in the harbour and an airfield with thirty-four aircraft operating from it. The heavy defence had precluded attack during the day but had been steadily assaulted by singular Bombays despite the first mission being scrubbed for fear of striking non-military targets. There were encouraging results with several small vessels being struck and a naval vessel sunk. Anti- aircraft fire was intensive and included “flaming onions” and searchlights which were not always effective but none of the raiders were lost. Combined raids were also carried out with eighteen Blenheims of 113 and 55 Squadron following up a successful night raid on the 15/16 June with a dawn strike but the fifteen that arrived were turned back by fighters having not done much damage. On other occasions a singular Blenheim of 113 squadron would act as a rudimentary pathfinder by bombing the port facilities at Torbruk and illuminating the target and anti-aircraft batteries for the Bombay as it approached with quite some success.

   Longmore had evaluated the Italians as being put on the defensive by Collishaw’s activities.”It obviously took the Italians by surprises and, in the case of the aerodromes, before they had effected adequate dispersal of aircraft and supplies”

   Despite this the Italians were stepping up to deal with the constant beestings and despite not attacking in the large knockout blow Douhet would have been proud of, their dawn and dusk raids on Sidi Baranni, Matruk and positions at Sollum with a dozen bombers caused problems for the RAF.

   The constant headache of reinforcement was also started to effect operations with Longmore conscious that every aircraft lost could not be readily replaced and his repeated requests for aid by fast destroyer were not being met with success. Portal simply had no spare aircraft to send and with France’s surrender and imminent German invasion looking likely his priorities were elsewhere. On top of this the Air staff gave a fresh estimation of Italian strength giving them four hundred bombers against Longmore’s two hundred across the theatre. Orders affectionately known as “Muzzling orders” were issued to Collishaw stating that “whilst fully appreciating the initiative and spirit shown by the squadrons operating under your command in the Western Desert, I must draw your attention to the urgent necessity of conserving resources”

 Longmore also took the precaution to remove 45 squadron from the desert and redeploy them in the Sudan. Air Commodore Drummond reported to Longmore that the time may come to face the Luftwaffe sooner than they had hoped.

It is clear that it would be a long while before we get any substantial wastage replacements for our forces which we shall ultimately need most desperately to ensure our holding of this country (Egypt). I therefore feel that we must consider very carefully every air operation we embark on. ⁴

   Operations were duly cut back to only those that provided the Army or Navy with a strategic advantage rather than short term tactical gain. Other raids were rewstricted to night operations or single aircraft. These cutbacks only emboldened the Italians who began bombing the RAFs airfields casing a retaliatory strike by four Blenheims on El Adem in conjunction with a singular on Torbruk and a withdrawal of forces from forward strips.

Arthur Longmore inspecting no.2 Armored Car Company © IWM (CM 150) 

   A sweeping assault in conjunction with the navy was planned for the 21 June with the Navy intent on shelling Badria which after original misgivings, it was agreed that the RAF should participate with 33 Squadron flying cover for the fleet as well as bombing Torbruk harbour and airfield to keep away the enemy whilst 55 Squadron had nine aircraft detailed to attack warships in the harbour. The mission was deemed so important that reserve aircraft were attached to the formation to replace any that suffered from mechanical failure. Blenheims of 55 squadron took off to attack the harbour and despite fighter interception which chased B flight away without dropping their bombs others attacked successfully leaving a large ship in the harbour on fire all for no lose but claiming two probable CR 42s who chased A flight and were kept at bay by concentrated fire. The attack by five aircraft of 211 squadron on the airfields at Torbruk and El Adem was also a success whilst the cruiser force of HMS Orion, HMS Neptune, HMAS Sydney and French battleship Lorraine all struck enemy positions and ammunition dumps encountering no problems.

   That very afternoon the GOC urgently requested attacks on a build-up of Italian forces at Bir El Gobi. A British advance managed to take Sidi Azeiz airfield following 113 squadron’s eleven strong attack and discovered dummy aircraft on the runways, a tactic claimed to be common place according to one POW throwing doubt on the RAFs claims in previous bombing missions. Another raid on 24 June on a force of 10,000 partially mobilised troops was carried out by eight of 55 squadron all reporting to drop bombs in the target area but failed to stop the formation advancing on the 29 June retaking Sidi Azeiz and Fort Capuzzo.

   Other operations were more successful including preparing to meet a rumoured Italian division at Solum and more single aircraft night raids including on the night of the 22/3 June when a lone Blenheim was guided into the target by the Italians who believed it was a friendly aircraft coming in to land and received a stick of bombs.

   The most successful attack was carried out on 27 June following information that the Italians were massing their aircraft at El Adem to El Gutti providing a temporary target. Twelve aircraft of 55 and 211 squadron attacked at dusk and caught around a hundred Italian aircraft on the runway and oil tanks in Torbruk four miles north west from the airfield. Despite heavy flak the Blenheims reported no fighters or serious damage. The follow up attack by 114 squadron at dawn the next morning did hit the airfield but encountered fighter opposition which engaged losing two of their number in the ensuing battle but claiming two of the British machines as well with a further one damaged. Another British aircraft was claimed to have been shot down over the sea with the San Giorgio beginning the barrage and joined by the airfield’s defensive guns. The wreckage that was recovered though was that of the SM 79 which was bringing Marshal Italo Balbo, Governor of Libya and military Commander in chief to the city with his remains recovered and buried on the 4 July. Further reports from POWs and reconnaissance showed that the airfield was soon abandoned and used as a transportation park.

   Although the number of sorties were scaled back at the end of June and into July the Blenheims were still called upon for further raids of strategic importance such as the rail head at Bir el Gobi on 4 July with intelligence estimating the Italians had gathered a significant level of supplies. Seven of 55 Squadron attacked but caused no significant damage to the gathered rolling stock. Between the 11-16 June Collishaw’s men had flown 106 sorties for the total loss of one Blenheim but between the 17 June and 5 July they had flown 100 sorties losing five but were starting to lose the initiative with the Regia Aeronatica becoming bolder with attacks on the Nile Delta and Desert outposts despite the Gladiator Squadrons claiming thirty four of their number in the same fortnight. On the night of 22 June Alexandria was attacked for the first time by bombers coming from the west in a clear light sky dropping bombs on the quayside and AME station. Longmore had to remain rigid though; Defensive operations but local offensive if opportune. 

  One such attack saw Collishaw working closely with his naval colleagues and dispatched nine bombers with six Gladiator escorts to attack the Bomba seaplane base whose aircraft had been harassing the Royal Navy. In a swift low-level attack saw the fifteen seaplanes on the base and their slipways bombed whilst the fighters strafed the area and set fire to a massive fuel depot whose flames also demolished a tool shed and caused two of the Italian aircraft to explode with a further ten being confirmed destroyed. A further raid on Bomba was carried out on the 20/21 August to test the defences, look for torpedo netting and evidence of Submarine activity. On the 22 August following a night raid by a Bombay three Swordfish assigned to Collishaw attacked the two submarines and their tender in the gulf of Bomba sinking one submarine and the Monte Gargane. The Blenheims of 202 group were also called to provide an aerial umbrella for naval reinforcements entering the area on 31 August and to attack all of the airfields in Cyrenaica by small formations of two or three Blenheims which were then carried out again as the Mediterranean fleet swept back to Malta with a total of eighty nine sorties being flown and successfully keeping the Italian air-force away from the British ships.

  The first phase of war in the desert was very successful with the RAF opening the hostilities with amazing effect before attrition and numerical superiority started to take its toll and the ever cautious Longmore was forced to “muzzle” his men. However his prediction that strong moral over numerical strength shone through as the four Blenheim squadrons of 202 group shone through with excellent performances for comparatively small loss.

 

1.         War in the Middle East Vol I p.17

2.         War in the Middle East Vol I p. 31

3.         IWM sound archive cat no. 27804 Ian Blair

4.         War in the Middle East vol I p.37

 

The death of the Advanced Air Striking Force

The 9 May 1940 started for Air Vice Marshal Barratt in a very inauspicious way at 2:15 a.m. with a call from London to warn him that Germany had issued an ultimatum to the Dutch, however there was no confirmation from the attaché in The Hague though it seemed like another “flap” like November and April. The squadrons were again brought to standby in readiness and although nothing came to pass that day they were held in a state of preparedness.
  

A formation of Fairey Battles

 Early the following morning the Luftwaffe made the first move with small groups of bombers attacking airfields at Bethenville, Mournelen, Berrey-Au-Bac and Reims-Champagne dropping high explosives and incendiaries but despite destroying hangers and tool sheds only three of the AASFs Battles were lost with a further two damaged. 142 Squadron received their visitors at 4:35 a.m. with six He 111 Bombers attacking between 600 and 1000 feet but causing minor shrapnel damage to one Battle and a clutch of German ordinance which failed to explode at all! They received another attack at 6:00 a.m. with incendiaries dropped causing no damage. In total forty-three French, ten Dutch and eight Belgian airfields were hit on the first day destroying 210 aircraft though the German crews claimed up to 829 aircraft destroyed on the ground. Had the Luftwaffe intelligence been sharper then the casualties in the North of France could have been a lot worse with only twenty one of ninety one airfields being attacked with half of them not holding first line squadrons and Luftflotte 3s crews failed to find any targets.

   By 6:00 a.m. news of German soldiers crossing the borders and paratroopers landing from Ju 52s reached the RAF and the Battle squadrons were brought up from Standby to Alert No.2 and very quickly Alert No.3 but by 10:30 a.m. when Barratt took control of the situation at Chauny the Battles were still on the ground. The Blenheims of the Component and AASF were sent on reconnaissance flights and spotted smoke over the Ruhr which obstructed most of their field of vision but vehicle columns a mile long were sighted heading north west from Kaldenkirchen. Three reconnaissance sorties in the norther sector were lost including P/O Thomas’ Blenheim of 57 squadron which came down at Echtveld at 11:30 a.m. with the crew all killed. F/Lt Wyatt of the same squadron was also injured in the arm by enemy fire

      As the day unfolded and the news of a widespread German assault on the low countries was reported the AASF were called to attack targets ten times but it was not until midday that eight Battles of 142 squadron, who had been on standby for two and a half hours, took off to attack a German column on the Luxembourg to Dippoch road. The formation had six Hurricanes flying as top cover as the low flying Battles approached the target but the danger was not coming from Messerschmitts above them this time and as soon as the Battles were close enough the German Flak opened up filling the sky with shards of hot metal that eviscerated the lightly armoured Battles at point blank range. The two sections came in at 250 feet and dropped their four 250lb bombs, set with eleven second delayed fuses. Of the seven Battles who reached the target (P/O Chalmers had returned following a problem with his landing gear) three failed to return. Sgt Spears and his crew managed to escape the Germans following their crash landing at Colmey whereas F/O Roth and his gunner were not so lucky and were taken away to the rear of the German advance and P/O Laws’ Battle crashed killing his crew. Other aircraft were severely holed with crewmen like LAC Cave, who was hospitalised on the return to base. P/O Corbett received a DFC for bringing his Battle back with an injured ankle and his observer, Sgt Irvine, dead. Despite these loses the Squadron’s record of events records proudly; “No. 142 Squadron was the first Squadron in the AASF to carryout operations on enemy columns.”

   Barratt was to dispatch other squadrons throughout the day to harass the columns with 150 squadron taking off in two sections of two and one of three taking off between 2:45 and 3:57p.m. Like 142 squadron they had had five aircraft on standby since 5:30 a.m. which was increased to eight at 9:45 a.m. and didn’t receive their preliminary orders until 1:10 p.m. The first wave led by F/Lt Weeks bombed the column found between Neufchateau and Bertrix attracting a similar hail of fire but Weekes and Sgt Andrews’ two Battles returned with P/O Campbell-Irons disappearing. The second wave also were never seen again after their take off whereas the third wing led by F/O Blom whose aircraft had been hit over Differdange by Flak which ruptured a petrol tank filling the cockpit with petrol fumes which impaired the crew’s vision and caused “Intense discomfort.” They failed to find a target between Luxembourg and Echternach but managed to find one near Gevenmacher and attacked at 100 feet and strafed with forward and rear guns but Sgt White’s Battle disappeared not long after the attack. Blom would later receive the DFC for attacking the column with his damaged aircraft despite the four missing aircraft only F/Lt Parker was killed with five men taken prisoner and Sgt White’s crew making a delayed evasion arriving on the 13 May.

   The crews of 103 squadron suffered quite extensively with three of the four bombers shot-down

F/Lt E Parker's wrecked Battle under guard

with P/O Drabble, Sgt Smith and LAC Lamble were all killed as were Sgt Poole and LAC Hutchinson of Sgt Lowne’s crew whereas P/O Wells and his crew as well as Lowne were all captured.



   The 10 May’s sorties showed that not only were the mobile columns easy targets as Allied planners had hoped but also that the Fairey Battle and indeed low flying Blenheims from Bomber Command, were exceptionally vulnerable to concentrated Flak. It was not just mobile flak batteries firing at the RAF but even German infantry firing rifles and motorbike and sidecar riders firing their mounted MG 34s! The AASF report stated:
Even at this early stage of operations the difficulties of operating against fleeting targets became evident. The Columns against which raids had been dispatched proved to have dispersed or to have moved elsewhere by the time the raid reached the area of operations.
This was the same problem encountered by Bomber Command over Heligoland coupled with murderous anti-aircraft fire and the threat of aerial superiority from German fighters.

   A further raid was authorised in the early evening when it was hoped that the failing light would mean there was less chance of being caught by marauding Messerschmitts especially as there were no Hurricanes or French fighters available for escort duties. Two half sections totalling four aircraft from 12 Squadron took off between 4.50 and 5.05 p.m. Although they did not encounter the Luftwaffe they did encounter “heavy crossfire” which severed F/lt Hunts bomb control cable and he retired to Piennes whilst Sgt Young, P/o Hulse’s observer was wounded in the shoulder.

   Through the fire F/lt Simpson dropped his four bombs and pulled away but was quickly informed by his observer, Sgt Odell that petrol was streaming from the tanks and he soon noted that the engine was starting to stutter as they crossed the frontier. Knowing that they would not make it back to their base Simpson decided to put the Battle down in a field in a controlled crash at 6:15 p.m. Odell and LAC Thomlinson pulled themselves free of the now burning wreck only to realise that Simpson was still in the cockpit and hurried to save their pilot. Although Tomlinson received burns to his hands pulling a similarly burnt Simpson between the two of them they managed to get 150 yards away before the Battle blew up. For their bravery Tomlinson and Odell received the DFM and Simpson the DFC. The only other aircraft not to come back was P/O Matthews who was reported last seen landing in a field at 6:00 p.m. but the whole crew were captured.

   Other squadrons had also engaged during the day with 105 squadron losing P/O O’Brien’s Battle and 218 Squadron whose aircraft reaped a similar level of flak killing LAC Baguley in the turret of L5402. Battles from 226 squadron joined the evening raids on a convoy taking off from Reims at 5:00 p.m.. Sgt McLoughlin reported anti-aircraft batteries on the surrounding hills north and west of Luxembourg and machine guns firing yellow tracer from railway cuttings. Despite being unable to pinpoint the troop concentrations Mcloughlin dive bombed but was unable to report specific damage whilst AC Russel emptied half a pan of his Vickers ammunition into targets. Sgt Barron bombed a convoy of thirty to forty vehicles not far from a large wireless station leaving a crater in the road and a near miss some fifteen yards away. But Barron was struck y anti-aircraft fire with a German bullet passing straight through his left leg but still managed to get his craft and crew home reporting seeing F/O Kerridge’s Battle in flames south west of Luxembourg. Kerridge was killed and Corporal Dixon badly burnt as the aircraft crashed into the northern suburbs of Faubourg de Luxembourg. F/O Cameron suffered a similar fate with ground fire shooting him down leaving his crew to join Kerridge’s in a POW camp and him ding in Diekirch hospital as the surgeons operated to save his arm.

   Of thirty-two Battles to go into action on 10 May thirteen were lost and the majority of the aircraft that returned were holed and damaged. The following day saw the AASF faced similar action against German columns with French reconnaissance pinpointing one consisting of important German units on the road from Prum to Echternach on its way towards Luxembourg. Six Hurricanes were sent to cover the target area above Prum at 9:45 a.m. but they returned having seen no Battles over the target area.

   Two half sections had taken off from both 218 squadron and 88 Squadron but none made it through with all four of 218s Battles being shot down. F/O Crews was brought down by ground fire which killed his observer Sgt Jennings and left Crews and Sgt Evans POW joining F/O Hudson and his crew. P/O Murray was badly burnt but similarly captured with his gunner and his observer hospitalised by the Germans at Limberg having lost his little finger. Only P/O Ridder of 88 Squadron returned as the sole survivor albeit heavily damaged and reported that:
his leader force-landed near Bastogne, and that he lost the remaining two aircraft near St Vith from ground fire. He was himself unable to drop his bombs because his bomb gear had been damaged and he returned followed by an Me 109. Of the remaining four aircraft there was no news at all.
None of the other crews returned or had landed in Allied controlled territory with F/Lt Madge’s Battle crashing on the Bastogne to Neufchâteau road with Sgt Whittle killed. Of the missing Battles P/O Mungovan and Sgt Robson were captured but all of P/O Skidmore’s crew and AC1 Maltby were killed. The combination of accurate ground fire and Messerschmitt patrols was starting to prove a deadly combination

   The Blenheims of the Air Component were faring no batter in their reconnaissance duties with two

Bristol Blenheim Mk IVs

of the four sorties sent to the Albert Canal being lost with Sgt Voi lost at 3:30 a.m. and F/O Ballis failed to return from the 8:30 p.m. patrol. The other squadron to see action was 53 Squadron which returned three of four Blenheims with no footage due to low cloud but lost P/O Alistair Panton who was bounced by six Messerschmitts whose concentrated fire shattered the control panel and caused the starboard engine to explode in flames whilst Sgt Bence in the rear turret cried out that he was hit and Sgt Christie collapsed from a head wound over the navigators table. Having brought the burning Blenheim down into a meadow. Panton pulled Christie free of the burning wreck before returning to pull Bence free whilst ammunition and fuel exploded around them and the Luftwaffe fighters making strafing runs at them. Panton managed to load his crew into a commandeered car and dodge a German column and Stuka attack to get his crew into a Belgian hospital. Bence lost his left leg due to his injuries but Christie and Panton managed to escape back to British lines.

   The RAF headquarters made the decision made the decision at midday that no reconnaissance flights should be made in the Maastrict area as the Luftwaffe had gained superiority and it was too dangerous and by 1:45 p.m. the Germans had taken the Canal and occupied Tongres whilst the Belgians retired to the Gotte river and the Wehrmacht continued to grow in strength in the Belgian Ardennes and Maastricht.

   The Reconaisance information gained by the French and the Lysanders of the Air Component showed that the Belgian airforce had been decimated with thirty burnt out aircraft seen at Wunche and Tirlement airfield. Other reports had left the planners stumped as to where the German strike was going to come from with the continuing build-up of forces in the Belgian Ardennes and the powerful thrusts that had already taken Paliscul, Bouillon and Givonne with their apparent target being Sedan. The quandary came as to whether this was to draw off attention from the Low Countries or the main thrust that would bypass Maginot into the French Hinterland but the “unpleasantly strong” forces in Belgium left them unsure. Barratt signalled GQG that he was;

Not yet able to decide which of the two following enemy threats is the main attack, general axis Maastricht – Gembloux with secondary thrusts on axis Bois-le-due – Tilbery or attack in the Ardennes in general direction Mézières with purpose turning the Maginot line.

   The decision was made for them by the Belgians who on the night of 11 May had sent an urgent

Crews boarding their Fairey Battle

request stressing the need to destroy two remaining bridges over the Albert Canal situated three miles to the south west of Maastricht. The Belgians had sent a team of engineers to destroy them but they had failed to do so because they had encountered stiff German opposition which led to the decapitation of the commanding officer by shell fire which also cut all means of telephone communication.

   The two bridge, one near Veldwezelt and the other near Vroenhoven on the M-Tongros line, were being fortified by German troops with flak emplacements and with all probability an umbrella of Messerschmitts. With such staggering odds an all-out attack by the whole AASF was ruled out and a smaller formation of volunteer crews was to be sent instead.

   When the assembled crews of 12 Squadron were asked for six volunteer crews they all volunteered and lots had to be drawn. Barratt did what he could to give these men a fighting chance and coordinated with Bomber Command to attack other crossings in the Maastricht area and German columns to draw off the Luftwaffe whilst also providing ten Hurricanes as escort.

   The Battles took off at 8:18 a.m. with three under F/O Garland heading for Veldwezelt and two under F/O Norman Thomas for Vroenhoven. The sixth aircraft flown by P/O Brereton suffered from a faulty wireless set so a second aircraft was quickly appropriated but that one had a mechanical fault with the hydraulic gear on the bomb rack failing. It was too late for them to get a third aircraft ready and with disappointment the crew returned to await the results of the raid unknowing that the faults had spared their lives that day.

   F/O Thomas and P/O Davey continued with their three Hurricane escort towards Vroenhoven but encountered a sweep of around thirty Messerschmitts when they were still twenty miles from the target. The Hurricanes, though outnumbered ten to one charged into the Germans and distracted them long enough for Thomas and Davy to make their attack runs on the bridge through a fierce barrage of anti-aircraft fire and small arms. The two Battles dived from six to two thousand feet and dropped a total of eight 250 lb bombs and striking the target. Sgt Mansell, Davey’s observer reported that “On looking down we saw that one bridge now matched the other” and the escorting Hurricanes saw bombs bursting on or near the target.

   The fire was too thick though and F/O Thomas’ Battle came down in flames and crash landed next to the target with the crew quickly captured. Davy was hit quite badly and he was also quickly attacked by a 109 which made two passes before diving away through a gap in the clouds trailing smoke following a blast from AC1 Patterson’s Vickers. Mansell contacted Davy down the intercom to tell him that the port fuel tank was leaking, trailing white smoke. Davy took the decision and try and bring L5241 back but not risk the lives of his crew and whilst over Maastricht he ordered Mansell and Patterson to bail out whilst he attempted to nurse the Battle home.



Fairey Battles attacking a German column (IWM C1737)

   Garland’s formation encountered the same level of flak but Garland did not hesitate and brought

his formation down on the bridge whilst German trucks snaked across it. One of Sgt Grey’s bombs send a column of water into the air showing a near miss but others struck home with one German truck bursting into flames whilst another struck the first span but Garland was seen to immediately burst into flames and crash. As the other two aircraft pulled out of their attack runs they were set upon by the Luftwaffe with one aircraft crashing into the river and the other into a field. P/O McIntosh, despite severe burns had dropped his bombs and managed to bring the burning wreck into a landing in a field within German territory. When his crew were interrogated the German officer was incredulous that the British had allowed them two days to fortify the bridge before attacking. Sgt Marland’s was last seen climbing out of control and claimed the lives of the whole crew.  Only Davy returned to base that day out of fifteen men who left that morning. Sgt Mansell returned having evaded German patrols but AC1 Patterson broke a bone in his foot on landing and was unable to escape the German held territory.

   Although the losses were high the crossings had been destroyed which had been the main objective of the mission and the German advance slowed. Garland and Grey were both awarded the Victoria Cross posthumously whilst Davy was rested but on his return to duty he was far from enthusiastic about being back on Battles.

   Holding the Germans at the Albert Canal was to prove fruitless as Holland surrendered on the following day and reconnaissance flights, although hampered by low cloud, which caused four sorties to be aborted and enemy fire which damaged two with another failing to return, reported the Germans had crossed the Meuse. When reports of German soldiers on the left bank were reported the AASF requested permission to attack but it took the BAFF HQ three quarters of an hour later it was decided that no attack would be carried out on this occasion with the official history recording that;

 The reason for returning a negative was not recorded; probably the targets were considered unsuitable, or else action was left to the French who operated with a few bombers in this area before midnight.

   The Germans were throwing their weight against the Meuse at where their main Schwehrpunkt would be and Guderian’s combat engineers brought up the last of their bridging equipment whilst the Panzers of Army Group A began to access and the flak detachments under the command of Oberst von Hippel began to dig in around the area having been brought to the front with all due haste. The Luftwaffe were also operating over the bridgehead attacking French positions and providing an umbrella of fighter cover for the vulnerable German soldiers in rubber dinghies and combat engineers struggling to construct pontoon bridges. By the morning of 14 May the Germans had occupied a front from Vringne-sur-Meuze to Mouzon with a depth of ten miles to Vendressa-la Nelville. Despite the order the day before not to engage the AASF had been put on standby with operations planned for the morning with three half sections to attack pontoon bridges at Sedan and two half sections at the Dinant sector. The situation was fairly fluidic though and during the night French Bomber forces claimed the Dinant bridges destroyed and the AASF raid scrubbed. By first light six Battles from 113 squadron were detailed to attack four bridges over the Meuse and at Chiers and four from 150 squadron took off at 7:35 a.m. to attack pontoon bridges at the island north of Villers and between Romilly and Allincourt. Both raids reported intense anti-aircraft fire from German positions but no fighters. Both formations were given fighter escorts with Hurricanes escorting the former and the French the latter and despite one of 103s pilots being injured all of the crews returned and reported success except for the island bridge which could not be located and so instead the two Battles attacked German troops in the village of Moliry.

   The results of these early raids were encouraging especially considering the levels of loss experienced on the previous days. As the crews debriefed and supplied the Intelligence officers with fresh reports on the German disposition plans were being drawn up for attack on German columns near Breda. By 12:15 p.m. the French contacted Barratt and pleaded for all of the help he had available to stop the German advance. There was a major thrust developing in the Dinant sector but more importantly the Sedan bubble was expanding and in need of checking with the French position being attacked before they themselves could launch a counterattack. General Gamelin and General Georges requested as much help as could be mustered with Barratt contacting the Chief of the Air Staff and ordering every possible bomber to be ready from 2:05 p.m. at the shortest possible notice.

   A plan was devised in coordination with the French to see them alternate attacks with three hour intervals with the AASF up first as the French had launched an attack of forty bombers escorted by a similar number of fighters at 12:30 p.m.. Barratt’s plan was for a wide spread of five brides to be attacked by eleven Battles each attack lasting over forty-five minutes with twenty minutes between attacks. Columns were also to be attacked in the same raids from Bouillon through Givena to Sedan with all seventy seven aircraft in the air at the same time.

   As with all plans there were two minor hitches with the orders reaching 76 wing, who were due to lead the attack, not getting their orders until 3 p.m. and not getting airborne until 3:25 p.m. and, although of little impact, only seventy-one aircraft took off.

   The delay in orders meant the Battles did not arrive in order and it is difficult to say who arrived first but 12 squadron were part of the first wave sending five aircraft to attack columns and lost four including Acting F/o Clancy who was also the acting commander of B-flight who came down at Pourn-St Rémy where Clancy was taken prisoner and his crew buried. A-Flight’s Commander, F/O Vaughan faired little better despite dropping his bombs on the road between Sedan and Givonne he was brought down and killed along with his observer Sgt Shelton-Jones. Vaughn’s gunner, J. D. Wright along with Sgt Winkler’s crew were taken prisoner. The soul survivor, P/O McElligott returned to base at 4:24 p.m. having witnessed Vaughan’s attack and the German flak emplacements following his successful bombing run.

   The eight Battles of 142 squadron led by Squadron Leader Hobler were met by not only a hail of anti-aircraft fire but also standing patrols of Messerschmitts from Jg 26, Jg 27 and Jg 53 which proceeded to engage the helpless British aircraft quickly claiming F/Sgt Spears’ P2333 which came down at Choloy killing two of the crew but were repulsed by AC Greenall manning F/O Reed’s gun who claimed to have shot down one of the German fighters. Hobler also fell to the Bf 109s and was badly burnt but was assisted by his crew, Sgt Kitto and Cpl Barbrooke who helped him to evade capture. On his return the gallant Squadron leader was hospitalised and eventually evacuated. F/Lt Wight and P/O Chalmers attacked the bridges with success and returned to Berry-au-bac reporting that they had seen fresh bridge works being built on both sides of the river. They were eventually joined by Sgt Spears and P/O Oakley and his crew who had managed to escape from a forced landing at Eely leaving the only unaccounted for aircraft being F/Lt Rogers who was posted as missing but was in fact killed with his whole crew. With the high numbers of crews returning it could be argued that 147 squadrons losses were less severe than others as aircraft were easily replaced but with the pressure building on the AASF both were rapidly becoming short supply.

   The last wave from 76 wing was 226 squadron who were similarly mauled with all of the aircraft sustaining damage with Sgt Annau having to abandon his attack having had his bomb release gear shot away by flak along with his left aileron and tail plane! Squadron Leader Lockett was seen crashing in flames with only one parachute spotted and was swiftly followed by P/O Dawn and Sgt Moseley. Two Battles hit the target and returned having absorbed a lot of fire from ground forces and in the pilot’s opinion, possibly from the French!

The worst losses were felt by 105 squadron’s Battles who took off from Villeneuve-les-Vertas at 3:40 p.m. to attack three bridges over the Meuse and encountered intense flak with five Battles falling in ten minutes with four of the crews killed and fifth returning by car to the airfield later that day whilst P/O Murray’s forced landing in a heavily damaged bomber on the airfield but perhaps the luckiest escape was that of F/O Gibson who came down behind enemy lines and finding himself and his crew captured by the Germans. Seizing on an opportunity he slipped away from his guards and made it back to French lines where due to his injuries he was admitted to hospital which is where his luck ran out as he was still being treated when the Germans overtook him and he re-joined his men in captivity. The Battles of 150 Squadron who had had such relative success in the morning engaged again and dispatched four aircraft to attack the pontoon bridges but all were lost in quick succession After the first bloodless sorties carried out by the squadron the four afternoon sorties were wiped out with one survivor, LAC Summerson. The other eleven men were all killed and buried in Choloy, Douzy and Donchery cemeteries.

   The German fighter patrols were growing in number with fighters of JG 26 and 53 operating in

Hans-Carl Mayer as a Hauptman

large numbers escorting their own bombers, of which Stg 3 flew some 300 sorties a day at geschwader strength, and engaging the British as they approached piecemeal. The Blenheims of 114 and 139 squadron (flown by 114 crews) lost five of their eight strong formation with Oberleutnant Hans-Carl Mayer (1/Jg.53) claiming two of them on top of two Battles whilst his wingman Oberleutnant Ohly claimed two more Blenheims and a Battle. They approached a pair of Blenheims with Meyer taking the right-hand side one and Ohly the left and making their passes leaving one burning and then finding another pair and doing the same thing. This time Mayer pressed home his attack and claimed his fifth victory of the war. Feldwebel Stark also attacked one of the Blenheims but following a burst of fire the bomber seemed to stay airborne. Much to his wingman’s surprise Stark got closer to his victim as the Blenheim exploded engulfing the pursuing White 3 leaving no trace of either aeroplane or crews. Unteroffizier Heinrich Hönisch, Stark’s wingman also put in a claim for two Battles and a Hurricane that day.

   One of the Blenheim pilots, Sgt Marcus Potter, was attacked by four 109s with one attacking from in front and three from behind. The German fire forced Potter to jettison his anti-personnel bombs and despite attempting to strike the bridge at Sedan was forced to withdraw with severe damage to the aircraft panels, propeller, cockpit and control panel. Although during their briefing he’d been assured that there would be fighter cover over the target area he did not see a single British fighter while he overflew the target area. He was left with no illusion of the strength of the Luftwaffe over the river.

We expected them to be defending the crossing coming into France they had to come through Sedan. Obviously they were going to defend it.

   The other Battle squadrons suffered just as heavily with 218 squadron losing seven of ten aircraft with only the injured P/O Harris returning, 88 squadron lost only Sgt Ross’ Battle with all killed and L5233 was heavily damaged. The men of 103 squadron lost three of their eight attacking aircraft with P/O Cunningham receiving a direct hit from and anti-aircraft shell causing the Battle to explode mid-air killing all aboard whilst despite injury F/O Fitzgerald pressed home his attack before crashing due to damage. The injury did not slow him down as he and Cpl Madkins evaded back to Allied lines as did the other aircraft’s crew flown by Sgt Beardsley who had been pounced upon by a Bf 109.

   It was the hardest battle the AASF would ever fight and despite the heroism of the pilots flying into what they would call “Hell on the Meuse” they were slaughtered by the overwhelming German opposition. Guderian would later praise his gunners describing the battle in his memoirs:

   There was now a most violent air attack by the enemy. The extremely brave French and English pilots did not succeed in knocking out the bridges, despite the heavy casualties that they had suffered. Our anti-aircraft gunners probed themselves on this day, one and shot superbly. By evening they calculated that they had accounted for 150 enemy aircraft. The regimental commander, Oberst von Hippel later received the Knight’s Cross for this.

   Whilst crews were buried, marched to captivity or made desperate attempts to evade captivity including one wounded pilot swimming the Meuse, an observer and gunner evading sitting with their mortally wounded pilot until the he died the following day and then evading, Barratt took the news of forty aircraft lost of seventy-one and went into shock. It is reported that he went back to his office and hung a “Do not disturb sign” on the door and crying at his desk for the loss of his men.

   Within four days the AASF had been not only been blunted but decimated as a fighting force.