The Prinz Eitel Friedrich and SS William P Frye

The common conception of the Kaiserliche - Marine's attacks on neutral and especially American shipping was the sinking of the Lusitania but the first shots fired against the neutral United States occurred on the 27th January 1915 by the Hilfkreuzer SMH Prinz Eitel Friedrich.

Here is the German cruiser's journey and the consequences it encountered by attacking the neutral vessel.

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SMH Prinz Eitel Friedrich

As vice-admiral von Spee's fleet prepared to head south for Cape Horn a final instruction to Captain Thierichsens which was to make the most of the German naval superiority and to attack British trade whilst giving the impression that the East Asiatic Squadron were still operating there with action and radio messages. He set about sending messages with Leipzig's call sign "Li" repeatedly as if Leipzig was signalling Scharnhorst. Allied shipping, like German merchants a few weeks previously had taken to port or sailing at night and close to shore to avoid detection. Prinz Eitel Friedrich only achieved one victory at this time when she encountered the SS Charcas on a foggy 5th December before boarding, taking the crew off and sinking her with her cargo of 220 tonnes of nitrate. It had been a lucky catch because the local head of the New York and Pacific steam company had put out an order following a sighting of the Prinz Eitel Friedrich at Valparaiso for all shipping to stay in port. As this was not an official order from head office the Charcas sailed keeping to the territorial waters however the fog had forced her away from the coast but still forty miles away from the usual track.

Having waited for the designated amount of time Thierichsens prepared to follow after his Admiral around the cape and hopefully catch up at a later point. Bad news struck on the 10^th December when a radio message from Montevideo to Stanley that alluded to the defeat of the East Asiatic, a fact that was confirmed on the 11th when a Daily Mail radio query to the Bishop of the Falklands asking about the sinking of Scharnhorst, Gneisnau and Leipzig.

Thierichsens had to revaluate his plans for his vessel in the light of a superior British fleet at the Falklands would soon be rounding the cape to secure British trade routes and be searching for the vessel that had been transmitting on behalf of Leipzig and his vessel was known by sight. The Pacific colonies had long been overrun so he knew that there was no point returning there but he was also constrained by the threat of British warships in the South Atlantic and in all probability sweeping around the Horn. There was a simpler solution; Thierichsens took his vessel to a "dead zone" in much the same way Huhn took Leipzig to the Galapagos. Easter Island was chosen as the place they could sit out and wait for the British searches to pass. If von Spee's fleet had been wiped out in its entirety then any sweep would be cursory and would hopefully leave quickly allowing Prinz Eitel Friedrich free reign. Then again his vessel was known in the region and there was no doubt they would be looking for the vessel that had been masquerading as Leipzig.

As the German vessel turned towards her new destination she came across the French barque Jean carrying 3500 tons of coal, a very welcome stroke of luck. A prize crew was sent over and the vessel taken into tow its cargo would be transferred in the remote harbour at Easter Island. The very next day the Prinz Eitel Friedrich came across a British barque, the Kidalton bound for Calou from Liverpool. As her cargo was of no use to the Germans the ship was promptly sunk and they continued on their way with the Jean in tow arriving at Cook’s bay on 23^rd December.  On arrival the Germans set about coaling from the Jean whilst Mr. Edmunds the manager of the Williamson-Balfour sheep company was brought aboard to see Thierichsens who issued a demand for forty sheep for provisions after Christmas but refused to bring any news of the war or what his vessel or intentions were. It was an interview that made Edmunds so uncomfortable that he declined a later invitation for Christmas festivities aboard for fear he would be taken prisoner.

Thierichsens’ forces set up a radio antennae on one of the highest points on the island to listen for news from the Americas and more importantly any approaching ships. This was a flagrant violation of the rules of neutrality but this was of no concern to the German Captain, the island was far too remote to worry about any Chilean naval intervention and his officers reportedly treated the island as if they owned it. Once their primary concerns of coal and stores had been addressed they took Jean out to sea and sank her with gunfire on the XX January. The crews of the fallen barques were put ashore on the 6^th January and Thierichsens put the island to his rudder. The prisoners were picked up two months later by a Swedish freighter save for a few who had died due to an outbreak of dysentery on the island and a half of the Jean’s crew who had promised not to raise in arms against Germany, the others were willing to abandon their parole having already turned down rescue by the British vessel Skerries on the 28^th February.

Thierichsens had enough coal and mutton to last until April and knowing his Admiral was gone, the Pacific was closed to him and the Atlantic seaboards were closing with the Royal Navy and their Japanese allies were scouring the seas for any raiders left behind. There were only two options left to him both of which involved sailing up the trade spines causing as much damage as possible and then break for Germany or intern in a neutral port. Obviously they hoped for the former. The Prinz Eitel Friedrich was beginning to suffer from the extended time at sea too, her engines were tired, her boilers needed cleaning and her belly was fouled causing her top speed to drop below her original 15 knots. This was a matter of concern for Thierichesens, however not as great a problem as how he was going to avoid the British navy. The only way to round the Horn was to go as far south as possible as the British would more than likely be checking channels and islands to the north but not along the 61^st Parallel which was as close to the Antarctic as they could. It was exceptionally cold especially for men in tropical uniforms and the ship’s company was on alert for ice as there was a very real danger from “growlers” and icebergs.

Knowing that his vessel’s speed was compromised and not wanting to draw attention Thierichsens decided to avoid the faster steamer lane and opted for the sailing route believing that he could still make captures without the Allied navies being drawn to investigate. Although fewer in number and harder to spot there was the advantage of their due dates being a lot more flexible if a vessel was delayed there was no great concern or the were months rather than weeks away. More importantly none of the vessels carried wireless sets and so could not call for help and they could not run even from his tired vessel. Although he had enough supplies there was still hope that they would come across a collier or ship that could be plundered to restock his holds but what would be desirable would be a tender to arrive but the likelihood of that was becoming very diminished.

What hadn’t factored in to pre-war German planning was the damage to the local economies that commerce raiding was doing and this led the South American republics to begin to enforce their neutrality by force. The SS Union, was caught by the Kronprinz Wilhelm was carrying 3500 tons of coal for the Argentine Railway and Electric power stations which was a big blow. It also damaged relations with British companies who traded meat, grain, nitrates and other valuable materials in these countries and there was a worry that Britain could take her very lucrative trade contracts elsewhere.

There also came the question of violating their sovereignty and all the German warships that had passed through South American waters were responsible in one way or another. Leipzig and Nürnberg had stopped vessels in territorial waters, Karlsruhe had allegedly had a secret cove on the Brazilian coast where she had gone for coaling and had messages concerning British movements, the whole East Asiatic squadron and Dresden had spent lengthy periods of time sheltering in neutral territory at Mas a Fuera and Easter Island. No action could be taken against the East Asiatic Squadron as it was too powerful and more importantly it was known after his stay in Valparaiso that von Spee was merely passing through the area and his Cruiser units did not harass the trade routes to the extent that was feared, though complaints were made to the German consulate. The Germans though did not pay them much heed as it was considered a means to an end with cordial relations being re-established after the war and the German merchant marine taking up some of Britain’s lucrative trade contracts. The South American republics were not going to wait for the end of the war and instead took action to reassert their sovereignty and take action against the lingering Auxiliary cruisers that were lingering.  The Kosmos line cruisers that had assisted Leipzig and von Spee were all interned whilst others were watched very carefully whilst the Roland line’s SS Holger‘s actions saw the company penalized significantly. Holger was believed to have lain in port at Pernambuco transmitting information concerning trade movements to Karlsruhe and Kronprinz Wilhelm an action that saw her boarded by the Brazilian authorities and her wireless set dismantled! To make matters worse Holger sailed out of port on the 1^st January 1915 without permission to resupply  Kronprinz Wilhelm with coal, food and water before moving on to Buenos Aires carrying prisoners. Pernambuco was locked down with the port Captain and other senior officers being replaced and when rumours of the battle cruiser SMS Von der Tan’s escape from the North sea reached them only the Otavi managed to escape the impound. The Brazilians also took action against rumours of a secret base for Karlsruhe somewhere along the coast as well as a network of coast watchers with hidden wireless sets and although nothing was found the coastline and surrounding countryside was scoured. All of the nations tightened up their rules on coaling times and repair times and any vessel known to have acted as a tender or had intentions of acting as a tender was interned immediately including the Seydlitz when it turned up in KLJKJKLJKLJ. The Odenwald was caught leaving San Juan in Puerto Rico by the Americans and the Norwegian vessel Gladstone changed her name to Mariana Quesada and was given permission to change nationality by the Costa Rican consulate in Newport Virginia to sail under their colours. Under her German captain she sailed for Costa Rica and arrived at Limon on the 5^th December where the Costa Ricans immediately impounded her and took away the right to sail under their flag. This did not stop the Mariana as she snuck out of harbour without a flag or orders on new years day and skirted around the coast of Brazil finally putting in on the 23^rd January at Pernambuco where she was immediately impounded and her machinery dismantled so there would be no further escape. Elsewhere the Patagonia was arrested by an Argentinian cruiser and taken to Bahia Blanca on 21^st December and the Mera was which had put to sea to meet von Spee was forced to return to Montevideo and was impounded.

SS William P. Frye

How much of this Thierichsens knew is debatable but having seen his support network in the Pacific dry up quickly it is safe to assume that he was not going to take any chances and avoided using radio traffic to give away his position. It was a valid move that meant that the first news of the Prinz Eitel Friedrich was from the Skerries which had seen the crews of Jean and Kidalton in late February and placed the vessel in the Pacific. With ample space aboard the former liner prisoners were held aboard and not set ashore unlike the other raiders which would frequently offload them on prizes or tenders leaving a rough trail. The first confirmed sighting of the ship and her position would not come until she arrived at Newport News in Virginia in March.

The sailing lanes were a lot quieter than perhaps Thierichsens had hoped for and it was not until 26^th January when they caught the Russian sailing vessel Isobel Browne and on the following day the French Pierre Loti. Both ships had their crews removed and the vessels sunk with gunfire. The 27^th also saw the first shots fired at an American vessel by Germany when the William P. Frye was pulled over carrying cargo of grain to Queenstown in Ireland. Although not a contraband cargo the German Captain believed that the grain could be given to the British army or by selling it to the Irish civilians could allow other grain to be passed on to the army and so ordered his men to destroy the cargo by throwing it overboard. By the following day with the task still not complete and spurned on by either impatience or through worry of being caught out in the same place for too long Thierichsens gave the order for his men to take the American crew from the vessel and to sink her with gunfire. The American Captain Kiehne was furious and protested but to no avail.

Sailing on the French vessel Jacoben was caught and sunk on the 28^th February as well and these four prizes in three days gave the crew a morale boost for the first time since capturing the Jean and hoping to add to the tally the Prinz Eitel Friedrich began to patrol the same area of the sailing lanes and advanced north at a slow speed to conserve fuel eventually capturing the Invercoe and her cargo of wheat on the 12^th February only a few hundred miles from where he had sunk the Jacoben and only thirty miles away from where Kronprinz Wilhelm had caught the Sementha only nine days before! It was around this time that they intercepted a message from Berlin for Kronprinz Wilhelm.  It advised the larger liner that the naval situation had drastically changed, the blockade was tightening up and there were too many Royal Navy vessels ahead and behind them and the German Navy would be unable to meet them and the chances of a tender were next to impossible. They believed the best course was for the liner to intern itself in a neutral port be it Spain or the United States. The German crew were pleased to learn that there was another vessel nearby but the feeling that of disappointment that they had come so far only to be denied at the final hurdle must have been very hard for them to stomach. No contact was attempted with Kronprinz Wilhelm and instead they continued to press northwards with dwindling coal and food supplies and as the number of captures had significantly dropped they believed they had exhausted the sail route knowing that internment was now the only option.

They reached the St Paul Rocks – Fernando Noronha line and on the 18^th February stopped the 3605 ton steamer Mary Ada Short bound for St Vincent carrying a cargo of 5000 tons of maize from Rosario. Unlike Thierfelder Thierichsens did not take the ship off the route and strip her of anything and everything useful including every last lump of coal and instead sank her and moved on quickly. This turned out to be a very clever move as the following day HMS Otranto passed the spot carrying the survivors of the East Asiatic Squadron to their POW cages. Had she come across the raider the British vessel would no doubt have added another significant amount of von Spee’s men to her holds.  The move also meant that they were able to catch the French liner Floride of the Compagnie Générale trans Atlantique line taking on her passengers and crew before turning east. On the 20^th February he caught his last vessel, SS Willerby from Marseille to Plate carrying nothing but water ballast. The Prinz Eitel Friedrich was in a bad way, her engines were in severe need of overhauling and his engines broke down regularly and with as many prisoners as crewmen the stores were dwindling quickly. It was only a matter of time before they would have to put into a neutral port.

Having narrowly missed the auxiliary Edinburgh Castle on her journey south and pulled into Newport News, Virginia having sailed 3000 miles from where she had taken Willerby. The arrival of the raider finally revealed to the world that they had been in the Atlantic. Other than the report from the Skerries, the only other report of Thierichsens’ vessel came from the Iquique which had reported sighting her on the 7^th March just four days before she arrived in Virginia. Her arrival caused quite a stir that was reported in the local papers such as the Troy Times of New York after the customs team came aboard and discovered their arms and prisoners. The German officers knew that they could not continue without a serious overhaul of the engines, a thorough scraping of the befouled belly which had picked up barnacles and other parasites from two oceans and a complete restocking of the coal bunkers they were reported to be tight lipped but all hoping for internment. 

Prinz Eitel Friedrich serving as the USS DeKalb (© IWM (Q 58257)) 



Whilst customs officer Captain Hamilton conferred with the neutrality board in Washington, Thierichsens sent communications to the German Consulate naval attaché, Captain Boy-Ed whilst closing his vessel to everyone save for the customs officials. Of the three hundred or so prisoners only the Captains were allowed ashore with the first class passengers of the Floride who were kept under watch of the American Customs officers but the one person that Hamilton wanted to speak to was the one person that would cause the most problems for Thierichsens as Captain Kiehne of the William P. Frye told his tale. Thierichsens had other problems too. As the Ship’s band played “Deutschland uber Alles” to celebrate his birthday he had to contend with reports of Royal Navy wireless transmissions growing closer, they finally knew where he was and he knew the reports were confirmed by the two British steamers, Bolton Hall and a second carrying horses to Avonmouth. There was also the question of what to do with the prisoners with many refusing to honour any parole agreement that would see them not take up arms with Germany again. Captain Monssion of the Floride told the press on the 8^th March that the German Commander had said he was willing to take his vessel out to fight the British with his prisoners still aboard.

As the investigation into the sinking of the Frye continues the German captain played for time refusing to hand over the American vessel’s papers claiming they should go to the prize courts in Berlin and that the Americans should make their claims of compensation there but as a concession he would make a copy of the papers. On the other hand he was trying to seek permission to extend his stay from twenty four hours to the seven weeks he believed his ship required. This was eventually agreed by the US neutrality board but under strict supervision to make sure the strength of the vessel was not increased. On the 18^th March the Secretary of State W J Bryan wrote to the German Ambassador, Bernstorff, to tell him that the Prinz Eitel Friedrich required fourteen working days to be made seaworthy and by extension were allowed to stay in port until midnight on the 7^th April or face internment. On the 29^th March Thierichsens was told by the Secretary of State that the twenty-four hour rule would take effect should a British ship leave port further delaying any departures but this was of little concern and did not change the fact that the Royal Navy would soon be outside and waiting for him.

As the diplomatic debates intensified so did British interest and HMS Cumberland and HMCS Niobe were sent to the Chesapeake to await her departure which was considered to be the first move of a fresh campaign by axillaries in the Atlantic. The Germans had heard their signals and now the choice was fight and lose or intern. The Royal Navy strategists were suspiciously eying the German liners in New York and fearing that if they were to try to break out they assigned vessels to watch from Halifax to Bermuda. Weight was added to the argument as the SS Pisa began to coal and resupply in New York harbour being fully ready to leave on the 28^th March. There was another rumour that the German fleet had detached more cruisers to run the blockade and head out into the Atlantic, including the elusive Von der Tam.

The 2^nd April saw a blizzard strike the bay and with communications to the American main land

lost and visibility at a minimal the British feared that Thierichsens had seized the moment and broken forth. When the snow cleared she was seen to still be in port. The time was nearing though with the Prinz Eitel Friedrich taking on a pilot on the 6^th April and making it be known that he was going to sail with all of his prisoners and go down fighting against the British. He also told the press that he had word from the Von der Tam and that the German battle cruiser was on her way to assist him by decimating the blockade. With his stores and coal collated Thierichsens prepared to leave port on the 8^th April.

Everybody held their breath. Would the German commander really hide behind his human shield and go muzzle to muzzle with the Royal Navy? Would the British fire upon a ship laden with prisoners including women? Would the mighty Von der Tam appear on the horizon and save Thierichsens and his men?

The raider never left port and to the relief of everybody waiting in the harbour, on the British and Canadian ships and indeed on the German vessel, the ship powered down and Thierichsens officially requested internment. His prisoners and armaments were handed over as there was no reason to fight on, no where to go and no reason to sacrifice his men and the prisoners for a gesture. They would sit out the war in a shanty town with the crew of the Kronprinz Wilhelm until America declared war in 1917, took their ships into their service and placed the crews in various Prisoner of war camps finally releasing them in 1919.

SMS Leipzig - the Terror of the West Coast of America

SMS Leipzig

Early morning on 1^st September 1914 the sentries at Esquimalt Naval base spotted smoke plumes on the horizon. At last HMCS Rainbow was returning from her mission to locate the two missing sloops Shearwater and Algerine and was shepherding them home.

The vessel grew larger on the horizon. Something was not right about it and as it grew closer it became obvious that this wasn’t Rainbow. Neither was the second cruiser which was in line astern behind the first.

Binoculars were reached for and the vessels scanned. They were an unfamiliar design but flew Russian flags as they sailed confidently towards them. The duty commander was called but he wasn’t expecting any Russian vessels.

Then the shooting started. The two cruisers turned and delivered full broadsides, their ammunition falling with deadly accuracy. Within twenty minutes of firing the oil tanks were ablaze, vessels in the harbour were sunk, sailors and civilian workers fled in terror or cowered in whatever shelter they could. SMS Leipzig and Nürnberg turned seaward and set course for Vancouver.

This attack never actually occurred but the Canadian Admiralty and Government were acutely worried that it could and there would be nothing that they could do to stop it.

At the outbreak of the First World War SMS Leipzig was on patrol off the Mexican coast “flying the flag” for Germany and protecting German nationals who were getting caught up in the Mexican civil war, she had relieved SMS Nürnberg so it could return to Tsingtao for refit and some R&R. The reports that the Second Reich was now at war with the British Empire opened up a new problem for the German vessel.

SMS Leipzig, the sixth of the Bremen class light cruisers, had been commissioned on 20^th April 1906 from the AG Wesser shipyards in Bremen. At three hundred and sixty-five feet long and displacing 3816 metric tonnes she was by no means a mighty warship but her ten 10.5cm guns and two torpedo tubes made her more than a match for any merchant vessel or liner that should come into contact and indeed more than a match for the two Royal Navy vessels on the same station. HMS Shearwater and Algerine were two sloops with no more than only 1”- 1.5” thick armour over the boilers and machinery and only 25 pounder guns, 3 pounder guns and three maxims machineguns. On the outbreak of war these two vessels were told to leave as quickly as they could before they could be found by Leipzig. Frigattenkapitän Haun’s vessel was of better use as a multi mission cruiser which supported larger battleships in fleet engagements and his crew were long term enlistments trained in gunnery skills like the rest of von Spee’s squadron but they were in need of shore leave and rest.

The response by the Canadian admiralty was a little panicked. The only vessel available to them was the aging HMCS Rainbow which was the only surface unit on the west coast and half the Canadian’s entire fleet. Rainbow had been practically decommissioned and was really only a training vessel put was pressed into service with only two thirds of her complement aboard and armed with training shells filled with black powder which were the only available shells in the Naval store at Esquimalt. The promised train of ammunition had not arrived from the East coast by the time Rainbow was ordered to sea on the night of 3^rd August. Commander Walter Hose’s orders were to;

 “Proceed to sea forthwith to guard trade routes north of the Equator, keeping in touch with Pachena, until war has been declared.”

Hose did not rate his vessels chances against the modern German cruiser with her high velocity shells and superior guns. Indeed afterwards he stated that;

“To know where he [Leipzig] was exactly at that time would have been Rainbow’s main contribution… My main armament was my wireless, and that only had a range of two hundred miles.”

Neither did the dock workers who watched Rainbow leave and one stated;

“Few of those who saw her departure on that eventful occasion expect to see her return.”

HMCS Rainbow

With the dispatch of Rainbow the Naval strategists realised that the city of Vancouver, Prince Rupert Island, the Naval base as Esquimalt and other possible targets were now defenceless from the German vessels and could come under attack at anytime. Worse, should Rainbow fall to the German’s guns then it could be sometime before the Royal Navy’s China station could dispatch more ships to defend the Canadian shore. Two submarines which were being built for Chile in Seattle were hurriedly bought by the Canadian government and commissioned to form a basic defence force. Now all they had to do was wait and hope that the German vessels stayed away.

Commander Hose used the first two days at sea holding near Cape Flattery and Destruction strait practicing drill and calibrating the guns. If he was going to go into action he was going to be as ready as he could be. On 4^th August at 20:07 he received word that war had been declared and he made course for the South but by 21:00 he was ordered to return to Vancouver to resupply with modern ammunition. Hose proceeded at increased speed with the intention to arrive the following day but by 18:00 on the 5^th he was ordered to immediately change course and head south to escort Algerine and Shearwater who had left San Diego the day before with Leipzig in pursuit (last sighted at Magdalena bay). Rainbow proceeded at 3/5ths power and arrived at San Francisco on 7^th August at 6.00. Hose could not see the two sloops and presumed them to be either in port or seaward. Through want of information he decided the best course of action was to enter San Francisco to recoal and speak to the consulate.

Rainbow had been exceptionally lucky during this time. Although due to orders from the President and despite there being 500 tonnes of coal bought expressly for the use of Rainbow by the British Consul, the American authorities only allowed 50 tonnes of coal to be put aboard as she had enough coal to get her to the nearest British port. Hose could also get no concrete information on the location of the Leipzig or Nürnberg and after the Hamburg line freighter Alexandria (who was reportedly working as an auxiliary for Leipzig) passed the Golden gate bridge Hose decided it was best to head out to sea and head north. An hour before he was due to depart though Hose received confirmation that Leipzig was heading to San Francisco and would be there in the following days. A German vessel in port had loaded up with supplies and lubricating oil and was due to leave on the 8^th to meet the German warship(s) and transfer the cargo at sea. This made Hose’s mind up and Rainbow left quickly and headed south to meet Leipzig or the supply schooner. In foggy weather he held his position for two days waiting but to no avail. The only vessel they saw was a small Mail steamer from a German owned company in San Francisco which buzzed around them under the American flag reporting Rainbow’s position to the German cruiser. With his coal levels now reaching their safety margin Hose decided he had to return to Canadian waters to resupply and hopefully meet up with the two sloops or the Canadian supply ship that had put to sea. Before doing so the crew tossed over all the flammable woodwork which, when it washed up on the American shores, gave the impression that Leipzig had sunk her.

On 12^th August however the Rainbow saw a three funnelled cruiser hulled vessel steaming towards them at full speed. Fearing it was the Nürnberg or Leipzig Hose ordered his vessel to turn 14 points away at full speed and ordered battle stations. His plan was to pull away and ready his stern guns before turning and attacking. Thankfully it was the liner SS Prince George which had been fitted up as a hospital ship and sent to escort Rainbow on her mission and to pick up survivors from her inevitable sinking. She also carried orders for the ship to return to base with her.


On the 2^nd August Leipzig was anchored at Mazatan, Mexico but soon left for a sweep up the coast towards San Francisco in the hope of catching British flagged merchant vessels coming out of port. It was a good plan as San Francisco was a good stopping point for trade and more importantly coal up for the final push to Canada. The only drawback was that all precautions had be taken not to pull over a neutral American vessel. His orders only covered attacking mercantile shipping and any small enemy vessels that he came across, any larger vessels or fleets were to be avoided at all costs. The Nürnberg had left the region on the 21^st July heading from San Francisco to Honolulu to rendezvous with von Spee and the Kreuzerwaffe. Haun was alone but the Allies did not know that and mercantile shipping began to seize up. Insurance companies were very tetchy about insuaring vessels when an enemy cruiser was in the sea-lanes, it is very bad for business. Captains were also wary about putting to sea in their livelihoods and risking their crews lives.

As the intrepid Rainbow put to sea from Esquimalt, the Leipzig was cruising up the west coast searching for any shipping but she found nothing. Either ships were scattering as she approached or were refusing to put to sea. Haun received transmissions that the Royal Navy were waiting for him with a cruiser out by the Golden gate bridge, although he was informed of its obsolete nature he was painfully aware that he was many miles from a German port for repair and proceeded cautiously through the fog. On reaching San Francisco on the 10^th August Haun put in to coal up his vessel and get an idea of what British flagged vessels were about. International law stated that he could only take on coal and conduct minor repairs for twenty four hours in a neutral port and the US authorities in San Francisco were very strict at this time and Leipzig had to leave before she had been coaled properly. After consulting the German consulate Haun had decided to keep his vessel seaward of the Golden gate bridge as he believed that he would catch something either going in or out, especially colliers with which to stock his much depleted bunkers. He was in no rush to attack Rainbow or look for the sloops as if he were to sustain any damage his anti commerce campaign would come to an end very quickly, he also feared that if coaled insufficiently he would be forced to make the ignominious decision to intern one of the Kaiser’s warships with out any victory to show for it. It was resolved that if he could find no coal that he would steam after Rainbow and fight before interning his damaged and low on coal vessel.  There is a local rumour that a German battleship sheltered at Conception bay during the period and this very well could have been Leipzig awaiting shipping.

In San Francisco 25 steamers carrying in excess of 60,000 tonnes of Barley and large amounts of other trade were waiting for Leipzig to leave. In Seattle grain, salmon, flour and lumber were building up awaiting shipping to collect it. Businesses were frozen awaiting deliveries and removal of exports but whilst the German cruiser remained nothing moved.


Leipzig was forced to leave the area of San Francisco on the 18^th August as after a week of inactivity caused by the British Admiralty’s order to all Merchant shipping to “stay in port”. News came that HMS Newcastle from Admiral Jerram’s China station was on its way across the Pacific to assist the Canadian fleet and that as relations with Japan looked to be deteriorating the armoured cruiser Idzumo, which had been off the coast of Mexico as well, would also come looking for Haun’s vessel. Before leaving though Haun invited journalists aboard Leipzig, personally met the mayor of San Francisco and donated two Japanese bear cubs to the zoo. He also proclaimed that the Leipzig would seek out enemy shipping and fight;

 “the number and size of our antagonists makes no difference to us.”

The decision was made to head south and Leipzig got underway and she proceeded to the Gulf of California where she laid low for a week and on the 8^th September she coaled from the German Freighter Marie and railway trucks from the Sonara railway company that were assembled on the shore for Haun’s use. The very next day, along with Marie he left his sanctuary and cruised up the gulf where at 2.30 am they scored their first victory. The tank steamer Elsinore which failed to see the cruiser in the sporadic rain squalls and despite her turned down running lights was picked up by Leipzig’s searchlights. After the crew was taken aboard the Leipzig the Elsinore was consigned to the depths.

HMS Shearwater

Haun promised the Captain of the Elsinore that he would put them ashore on the Marie at Calao but changed his plans and headed out towards the Galapagos Islands, arriving on the 17^th September and left the prisoners under the watch of one German officer before coaling and leaving on the 21^st. As the Leipzig had sailed south all the shipping had been held in port so Captain Haun was hoping that by heading out to the remote Galapagos it would be assumed he had left the theatre heading out towards the Pacific. He planned a surprise attack on the trade routes along Ecuadorian and Peruvian coast.  The first casualty was handed to him on a plate.

The after shocks of Leipzig’s patrol up to San Francisco were still being felt by the Canadian and British shipping though. HMCS Rainbow overtook Shearwater on 13^th August near the Straits of Juan de Fuca and escorted to Esquimalt where in a very quick turn around of re-coaling and taking on High explosive ammunition (which lacked the correct fuses and were thus fairly useless) and headed out the same day to find Algerine. The last sloop was found in the early hours the next day by the Prince George. She had run out of coal and had unfurled her sails but meeting strong headwinds her journey north had been slowed. Following the arrival of the fuses on the 15^th of August Commander Hose requested permission to go and seek out Leipzig. Permission was duly granted and on the 18^th Rainbow set sail for San Francisco once again. However later that day the order was quickly countermanded and Hose returned to base having been ordered to await reinforcements from Admiral Jerram’s China station; HMS Newcastle was due soon and they could proceed together. Before Newcastle could arrive an urgent summons was received from Prince Rupert Island where the locals were certain they had seen Leipzig and Nürnberg. Rainbow set off immediately searching for the Germans bolstered with crewmen from the RCNVR and the two sloops as well as her new ammunition but found nothing not even the US steamship Delhi which had supposedly resupplied the two German cruisers on the night of 19^th-20^th August. Little did they know that Haun and Leipzig were actually in the Gulf of California some 1998 miles away and Nürnberg was even further and was coaling at the Enewetak atoll with von Spee’s armoured cruisers. Commander Hose decided to take Rainbow on an extended patrol of the north British Columbia coast returning to Esquimalt on the 2^nd September.

The reinforcements had arrived in Rainbow’s absence. On 25^th August the IJN Idzumo arrived at Esquimalt and on 30^th so did the Newcastle under Captain Powlett who took immediate command of the whole of the Naval operation as the senior Naval officer and began organise shore defence guns and mine laying to protect the coast. Rear Admiral Story arrived in mid September to take command of the situation after the Canadian Naval department became concerned about the methods Powlett was using as they considered all of these defences unnecessary and more importantly expensive! They wanted to also reassert Canadian authority over the Canadian Navy. Story quickly took charge as the senior officer and put things in order.

Newcastle and Idzumo began their sweep south on the 3^rd September leaving Rainbow to guard the northern approaches in case Admiral von Spee’s squadron arrived to the north. They found nothing. Idzumo was left to guard the entrance to San Francisco in case Leipzig were to double back and Newcastle carried on alone, safe in the news that Nürnberg had been sighted in Honolulu on the 1^st-2^nd September. There was evidence that Leipzig had been through the waters leading to Panama, only rumours, sightings and old information greeted the British rather than the elusive prey. Powlett made a thorough search of the area and arrived  at Santa Rosalia at the Gulf of California’s mouth on 17^th September. He theorised correctly that Haun would head for the Galapagos islands and may join up with Nürnberg again, if she had turned east to the South American coast rather than west to von Spee’s fleet. Having set up lookouts and an intelligence network on the coast and believing Leipzig had too much of a head start and may have Nürnberg with her he decided to return back to his station on the Canadian coast.

The SS Bankfields was carrying 9 tonnes of Copper ore and 5950 tonnes of sugar when she began her journey at 4am on the 24^th September unaware that the British consulate’s order to hold all shipping until Leipzig could be located had been delayed by her company’s German owner who may or may not have also been in contact with the German warship. Blissfully unaware of the threat the freighter continued in a straight line across the gulf of Guayaquil on the Panama track until 8am on the following day when she was pulled over by the German cruiser and ordered to follow her after a brief boarding action at 8.55. Six and a half hours later the unmanned prize was sunk by gunfire and Leipzig again began to crawl down the coast looking for prey. Haun found the seas devoid of British shipping, word of his existence had paralysed the sea lanes here and his search was fruitless.  He decided to head for the Lobos de Afuera Islands where on the 28^th he was met by a Kosmos liner Amasts which brought fresh coal.

After failing to catch the Tamar, a British freighter which stuck close to neutral territorial waters,

SMS Dresden

Leipzig planned to turn west again but was signalled that fresh vessels were coming to assist. There was also contact from the Admiralstab in Berlin. Another German cruiser, SMS Dresden was running from the Royal Navy on the east coast of South America and had rounded Cape Horn, he was ordered to meet Dresden so that they could work together in commerce raiding and for mutual defence. On the 2^nd October a radio message from the Dresden, the first German warship they’d seen in three months, came through;

My position is Mas a Fuera Island. Intend to proceed to Easter Island to make contact with Cruiser Squadron.

The news that Admiral von Spee had brought the squadron across the ocean must have been greeted with much elation aboard the German cruiser, she was no longer alone in unfriendly waters and the Admiral was sure to have a plan of action. On the 3^rd October three more Kosmos liners arrived fully laden with coal for him. They were the Anubis, Karnak and Abessinia.  Leipzig planned to move forward with purpose and Haun decided to make for Easter Island as a rendezvous point where Dresden and Leipzig could meet and plan their next moves but first he ordered Abessinia to fully coal up his cruiser on the 3^rd October until the 4^th.

Further communications with Dresden on the 5^th carried orders from von Spee coordinating their arrival and on the 12^th October the squadron reformed off the neutral port at Easter Island. Admiral von Spee’s fleet of two armoured cruisers (Scharnhorst and Gneisnau) and three light cruisers (Nürnberg, Dresden and Leipzig) was now fully attended by colliers and supply ships . The Admiral now had a fleet that could reckon with an English patrol. He could make his way to Germany with these ships.

On the 1^st October the SS Marie put in at Callao and released the Bankfields’ crew. Coincidentally a small sailing boat from the Galapagos islands also put in to the mainland carrying half of the Elsinore crew. They had escaped from their solitary German captor on 24^th September and spent a week at sea trying to get back to report Leipzig’s position and activities, all to late now. This information was relayed however to the Royal Navy commander who was rounding Cape Horn, Rear Admiral Craddock who had come to find von Spee and his ships.

Captain Benteen's orders

Benteen during the Civil War

Captain Frederick Benteen of the US 7th Cavalry took stock of the situation that was before him and was forced to make a decision, a decision that he has been criticised for since that fateful day on 25th June, 1875 on the banks of the Little Big Horn river.

He decided to disobey orders from his direct superior, Lt Col George Armstrong Custer, the CO of the regiment, and not advance to meet him and instead hold position with the embattled Major Reno.

The action definitely saved Benteen's three companies and the Ammunition train but also saved Major Reno's survivors from annihilation, but some argue doomed Custer's forces to death.

Custer's whole approach towards the Indian village was flawed from the beginning, it worked on the assumption that they would be rounding up women and children and that the braves would be out fought by the brave soldiers of the 7th Cavalry or flee before them. Custer was impatient and would not wait for the infantry column, nor would he take a battery of heavy Gatling guns because they would slow his advance. His aim was to move as quickly as possible living on the run like the  Native Americans did and the Gatlings, which required four horses each would slow down the advance and he wanted to catch the tribes before they dispersed. He also turned down assistance from the 2nd Cavalry believing that his men were the best and could defeat anyone.

There is some merit in his not taking the Gatling guns as they were prone to jam and as his unit would travel at thirty miles a day, average, they would have indeed impeded his advance. The arm chair tactician and many fellow officers at the time agree that having the ability to have a battery of guns that could fire 350 rounds a minute would have been devastating if deployed against a charging enemy.

On approaching the hostile country Custer's lack of intelligence and knowledge of the lay of the land or his enemies numbers or dispositions became evident and he began to divide his forces to scout them out and to give himself warning. Benteen's three companies were deployed on the far left to scout through rough terrain and make sure there would be no surprises for the rest of the column.

The rest of the command moved forward and sighted the Native encampment that his Crow scouts had reported as the biggest village they had ever seen. Custer believed that he was only going to face 800 warriors and the majority of the village were women and children. He divided his forces again to try and stop the Natives fleeing to the south, Custer's lion's share of the regiment would swoop in from the North as Reno struck from the South catching the them in a Hammer and Anvil manoeuvre that would force the natives to surrender (to avoid fighting amongst their Women and children) and submit to escort back to the reservation. He also believed that most of the braves were asleep in their tepees and would be caught out.

His hand was then forced when his scouts arrived to tell him that native riders had picked up his trail and were following him and that they had been sighted on the bluffs above Custer's position. If he didn't strike now, the initiative would be lost and the natives would disperse into smaller groups and flee which would be impossible to catch.

Reno's men advanced towards the village from the south with their flank covered by thick foliage and their view of the village likewise blocked and his men charged full speed abreast until they came around the river bend and were suddenly met with the enormity of the Native encampment. Had his forces been armed with Sabres they could have cut through cutting and slashing as they went causing chaos. As it was Custer had forbidden the 7th from carrying sabres. Reno's only hope was that if he formed a tight knit firing line and hoping that massed rifle fire would stop a counter charge and provide the anvil that Custer had wanted. Standard procedure was for the troopers to form into groups of three riflemen and a fourth to hold the horses in case they needed to break. He held a good position with the river to his front and the impassable brambles on the right and they began regular volley fire. Then it all started to go wrong as the Natives began to respond, they saw his vulnerable left side and began to attack it and even setting fire to the long grass forcing the men to withdraw. Their superior numbers began to tell and Reno would later testify he believed they were five to one. Finally when one of his Arikara interpreters, Bloody knife, was killed and his blood and brains covered the major's face. Reno's nerve broke and he called out to his men;

All those who wish to make their escape follow me!

There followed a rout as Reno led his men backwards towards the bluffs at their rear in complete disorder.

The exact nature of Custer's movements are unknown but as the 210 men approached the village, possibly trying to ford the river at Minneconjou ford at the centre of the village but were repulsed by a handful of sharpshooters. The native oral history makes claim that Custer was killed her as an officer in buckskin next to a standard bearer was shot dead into the water. Custer's body was found further north with the rest of his troopers so it is unlikely but someone certainly fell here.

Cooke's written order with Benteen's translation on the top.

 Custer took stock of the situation and the numbers of natives who were aligned against him and passed an order to his adjutant, the Canadian 1st Lieutenant William W. Cooke. The order was written hurriedly and thrust into the hands of sergeant Giovanni Martino, one of the buglers to deliver directly to the hands of Captain Benteen.

It read simply: Benteen come on. Big village, bring packs. W. W. Cooke. P.s. bring packs.

Knowing the pack mules were following behind slowly and not knowing what action was facing him ahead Benteen ordered his men to rest and water the horses for twenty minutes before advancing. Again he has been criticised for this decision but it is a reasonable action for a cavalry officer expecting action for you'd want fresh horses to face a charge. He claimed at the Reno enquiry that he asked Trumpeter Martin about what was ahead and he said that the "Indians were skedaddling"1 and saw no rush to follow up at speed.  He eventually moved off and arrived at Reno's position by complete coincidence and made that fateful decision.

As he approached he saw a fire fight up on the bluffs and thought it was the whole regiment and began to advance towards them, suddenly seeing a group of Tribesmen he charged with his orderly before finally recognising them as Crow scouts - they told him it was not going well, fearing that the force on the bluffs was the whole regiment having been whipped he moved to join forces and assess the situation.

The situation was bleak, the ammunition pack train was about an hour and a half away, natives were firing on Reno's position and they had taken losses in the disorderly flight. At the Reno hearing he described that Reno's men were in good order and that Reno had regained his composure, his men were still scattered around the bluffs for individual preference for firing but in relative good order, the nearest natives were about a mile away and there were some 900 Indians circling nearby but out of range.

Reno told Benteen that he had no idea where Custer and his 210 men were, they had followed the orders that had been issued with the understanding that Custer would support them as they advanced. That was the last order he had received. Benteen showed him the order he had received but then decided that he would be better placed to defend Reno's shattered forces. His men joined their tired and wounded comrades and began digging rifle fire pits to better protect the men and keep their firing rate up.

Captain Thomas Weir requested permission to ride towards the sound of volley fire stating they had a duty to try to reach the rest of the regiment and support their Commanding officer. Reno and Benteen refused to budge and Weir, without orders, charged forward with his troopers but they only managed to push forward for a mile before they were forced to retire again by large numbers of tribesmen. All that they could see of Custer's men was swirling dust and gunfire. It was already too late.

Benteen believed that they were under attack from up to eight thousand Natives and the fire became more lively, so much so that; You only had to show a hat or a head or anything, to get a volley toward it. 2 As Custer's men were firing their last shots the Sioux turned and headed in full force against Reno. Benteen's account describes a harrowing evening and night with the Natives shooting at anything that moved followed by heavy fire the next day. Rudimentary breast works were dug and Benteen led a charge to clear the enemy from the ravine before retiring back towards the summit of the bluffs and they dug in and waited around their horses and the ammunition train.

So did Benteen make the right decision? Should he have followed his orders without question towards Custer?

In short, I think he made the right decision to disregard the order. Had Benteen ignored Reno's position and forced their way towards Custer they would have been destroyed too. Reno's forces were shattered and short of ammunition and could not have moved out in any sense of order and without attracting the fire from below. Captain Weir's advance took place only thirty minutes after Benteen arrived and they were forced to withdraw quite quickly and that was before the ammunition mules had arrived. Benteen had no knowledge of what was ahead of him nor the exact position of Custer nor the number of enemies he was facing. The situation was totally untenable and without the information or the ammunition he could go nowhere. Had he advanced it would have been likely that his three companies would have been caught out on the trot and met the same fate as Custer leaving the Sioux able to cut what was left of Reno's forces to shreds.

Two men did leave the ammunition train, Boston Custer (the colonel's brother) and Henry Reed (his nephew). They went at full speed to Custer's side where they were killed.

Benteen's three companies could not save the lives of Custer's 210 men but they did save the lives of Reno's as well as their own.

Guard down! The death of Officer Stites and the Battle of Alcatraz

The 2nd May 1946 was the beginning of a dark and bloody episode in the history of Alcatraz prison, an episode that saw two guards and three prisoners killed and a further two inmates executed for their role in the murder of Correctional Officer William A. Miller.

The escape plan itself was fairly straight forward and would have been a masterful move had it worked.
Officer Miller was over seeing Bernard Coy, who was sweeping the floor when he was called over to the c block door by Marvin Hubbard who had just returned from cleaning the kitchen areas. Whilst Miller was carrying out a check on Hubbard to make sure he hadn't taken any contraband he was attacked from behind by Coy and between the two men they restrained Miller, grabbed his keys and released Joe Cretzer and Clarence Carnes. Coy then scaled up to the gun gallery with a home made tool to spread the bars at a weak spot. Having greased himself up and starved himself for a few weeks Coy was able to slip in and lay in wait for officer Burch. After surprising Burch on his return he restrained him and lowered his Colt M1911, clubs and keys down to the others below.

Quickly moving on D-block they surprised Officer Cecil Corwin and forced him at gunpoint to release a dozen more prisoners, many of whom returned to their cells not wanting to be part of the escape attempt. However Sam Shockely and Miran Thompson joined the attempt.

The plan was to break out of the main doors using the guards keys and then using the guards as cover move to the launch (which docked between 14:00-30 daily) and head for the freedom of the mainland.
Luckily Miller had held on to the yard key so as not to disturb the Gun gallery guard, Burch, whilst he was on lunch, when they realised what was happening Miller quickly dropped the yard key down the toilet in the cell they were being held in. In the confusion of what keys to use the prisoners managed to jam the lock - the escape attempt had all but failed.

There were now up to nine guards held captive in cells as they each began rotation and suddenly found themselves in the Prisoner held block. In frustration Coy opened fire on guards in a nearby watch tower wounding one, he also bumped into assistant Warden Ed Miller who was carrying out a reconnaissance in force and fired on him too.

The alarm was raised and the area locked down.

Back in the block, Thompson and Shockely urged Cretzer to open fire with a Colt pistol on the guards so that they wouldn't be able to testify who was in the escape attempt. He openned fire in the enclosed space and it resulted in five injuries (three serious) including William Miller who would later die from those injuries.
At 18:00 another armed reconnaissance was organised under Lieutenant Bergen. The aim was to break into the gun gallery and gain the upper ground over the Prisoners and force them to surrender or be killed in a shoot out.

One of the guards was Senior Corrections officer Harold Porter Stites.

Stites had been born in Kansas on 3rd June 1897 and is recorded as living in Topeka Ward 2, Shawnee, Kansas on the 1900 Federal census with his father F. Herbert Stites, his mother Jennie and brother Fred.
By the 1910 census his father had died but he had a brother Edwin and Herbert.

He signed up to the Army for World War One (on 5th June 1918) where according to his Draft card he had been working as a Head waiter and was described as having blue eyes and brown hair.
His grave stone showed that he served as a Private First Class in 27th Infantry division which took part in the bloody fighting in France breaking the Hindenberg line.



Stites with his daughter Thelma

Post war he moved to Levenworth and began working as a prison guard. He married Bessie Etue on 21st November 1925 and they settled to having a family. By the 1940 census the family were living in Los Angeles and he had a Daughter Thelma (b. 1927), James (b. 1929), Robert (b. 1931) and Herbert (b. 1937). It is strange that the family lived in LA rather than on Alcatraz island itself. The guards worked six days straight with one day off and their families lived in close proximity. Even the Guard's family's laundry was washed and repaired by the Prisoners. According to Anna Thuman's book (see references) if a guard was well liked, like her step father Walter Donnington, then you could expect your belongings to be taken care of but if you were disliked then you could find items missing, ripped or buttons torn off.

 One can only assume that Stites didn't want his family trapped on the island should something happen. After all at Levenworth the prisoners would escape and disappear, on Alcatraz they could attack the guard's families, take hostages or even commit murder with relative impunity which was a constant worry of the families when an escape attempt was under way.

On 23rd of May 1938, senior Corrections officer Royal C. Cline was beaten to death by three convicts who then escaped onto the roof of the industries building. They attempted to take the guard tower on the roof and threw scrap metal at the guard on duty. Officer Stites returned fire with a rifle and the .45 revolver. Inmates Franklin and Lucas were injured but Limerick was mortally wounded in the head and died soon afterwards. Stites was called into an enquiry into the death of Limerick but was eventually exonerated. It makes sense that in the wake of this that they would have been moved off the island and Stites reassigned for the duration. This would tie into the 1940 census result showing the family in LA.

Now he was part of the team that charged C-block gun gallery. They laid down heavy suppressing fire whilst other guards tried to free Burch. The prisoners returned fire causing the guards, who were trapped in the confined space of the gallery, to take wounds. Stites was hit in the back and shouted out "I'm hit." He was quickly pulled to safety with the other wounded and the assault abandoned but was pronounced killed by an unknown assailant.

The US Marines were called in to settle the siege. At 19:00 another rescue attempt was mounted and unarmed guards rushed D-block under heavy cover from Gun galleries. One was wounded but they managed to recover the wounded guards and got them out to safety. When all was clear the barrage began. Holes were drilled in the roof of the block and grenades dropped down to corner the prisoners in a Utility corridor. By the next day they telephoned Warden Johnston to broker a deal but were told unconditional surrender was the only option. Later that day a guard on patrol was shot at and the barrage began again until 21:00. The following day armed groups of guards would sporadically run through the corridor and fire off rounds. At 9.40 the bodies of Cretzer, Coy and Hubbard were discovered and the siege was lifted.

Senior Corrections officer Harold Porter Stites was buried at Golden Gate national cemetery, San Bruno, California on 5th July. His daughter Thelma gave birth to his first grandchild the following year. His wife Bessie is buried in the same plot.

For their part in the murder of Officer Miller, Shockley and Thompson were sentenced to death together in the San Quentin Gas chamber and Clarence Carnes was sentenced to life as he was only 19 and too young to stop them from killing Miller.

References:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_alcatraz For an overview.

http://www.findagrave.com/cgi-bin/fg.cgi?page=gr&GRid=10819 For details of his grave and death.

http://www.bop.gov/about/history/docs/fallen_hero_cline.pdf on the 1938 breakout attempt

http://www.bop.gov/about/history/docs/fallen_hero_stites.pdf on the death of Stites

Census' information from Ancestery.co.uk and the 1940 census here.

A Brief History of Alcatraz by the US Department of Justice, Kindle edition

Alcatraz School girl; A memoir my life on the Rock, Anna Thumann, Kindle edition