Episode 3: The cruise of the Leipzig podcast

The loss of SMS Ariadne at Heligoland Bight

The battle of Heligoland Bight on the 28th August was an outstanding victory of British Naval daring with the Kaiserliche marine attacked on its home ground. One of the victims of the raid was the Gazelle class cruiser SMS Ariadne.

The Gazelle-class light cruiser was part of the evolution from the Bussard class through the individual vessels Gefion and Hela and was the first German modern class of cruiser not to have sail rigging and would be the basis for the development of future German light cruisers especially their immediate successor, the Bremen class of which SMS Leipzig was a member.

SMS Ariadne in action at Heligoland Bight

The Gazelle class was designed for speed with a top rate of 21.5 knots a 2 knot advantage on Gefion and 6 knots on the older Bussard class. They also sported ten 4.1" S/K L/40 guns which could pack quite a punch against lightly armoured or unprotected warships like the Bussards as well as two torpedo tubes. Speed was bought at a cost to armour though and the Gazelles only had 20-25mm deck armour, 50mm sloping Krupp steel sides, the gun shields were 50mm whilst the conning tower was 80mm with a 20mm roof protecting the ship's officers.

With Germany's growing colonial interests and territories in the Pacific Ocean the Gazelle class was envisioned as perfect for patrolling the vast reaches and getting to trouble spots quickly or scouting ahead of the High seas fleet. Their combat value against contemporary British Pelorus class cruiser had twice the deck armour though eight QF 4" guns, eight 3 lb quick firing guns and two torpedo tubes with a comparible speed of 20 knots. The succeeding Highflyer class sported eleven 6" QF guns , 9 12lb guns and six 3 pounder quick firing guns, a speed of 20 knots and double the armour of the Gazelles.

The Ariadne was completed in 1901 and assigned to the High Seas fleet reconnaissance force and the in 1905 she was moved to the Cruiser division. By the outbreak of the First World War it was realised that the combat value of the Gazelle class was limited and Ariadne was detached as a patrol and guard vessel off the Heligoland Bight. The patrol of the Bight was carried out at night by fast moving Destroyers and Torpedo boats who were escorted onto their stations by light cruisers like Ariadne and her sister Frauenlob with Rear Admiral Maass commanding the destroyers from his Light cruiser Cöln. On the 28th August the Ariadne had been rotated out of patrol duties and lay at anchor in the Jade river with the crew carrying out routine maintenance and duties when at 9:00 gun fire was heard followed shortly by a wireless transmission from the cruiser Stettin - the British were attacking a Cruiser support was needed immediately. 

Damage done to Frauenlob during the battle

The British plan was simple. The Harwich force commanders; Commodores Keyes (Officer commanding submarines) and Tyrwhitt (Officer commanding Destroyer flotilla) devised a cunning plan to disrupt the orderly German Destroyer patrols with a night time raid using three submarines as decoys and then cutting off the German response with thirty-one of their own destroyers whilst a line of submarines would watch the Jade and Wesser estuaries in case larger German surface units were to move out and assist.

There were some alterations made by the Admiralty including moving the time of attack to 0800 and catching the morning patrol. The request for the Grand Fleet to be within reaction range and six light cruisers under Commodore Goodenough was also turned down by Chief of Staff, Vice Admiral Sturdee. It was felt that Cruiser force C, the old Cressey class cruisers 100 miles away and Force K’s two Battlecruisers New Zealand and Invincible 40 miles away would be more than adequate.

Admiral Jellicoe, the Commander of the Grand fleet was not even informed of the request by London and only found on on the 26^th August, two days before the operation. Hoping to catch the German fleet unawares he requested that his warships were in attendance. London only allowed for Battlecruisers and Vice Admiral Beatty brought HMS Lion, Queen Mary and Princess Royal with Goodenough’s 1^st Light Cruiser Squadron in support. Jellicoe sent Tyrwhitt an urgent dispatch to inform him of the changes but it was never passed from Harwich to Arethusa, Tyrwhitt’s flagship.

Visibility on the 28^th August was atrocious with mists restricting views to 3 miles. At 7:00 the German Destroyer G-194 spotted a vessel steaming towards them with a flotilla of destroyers emerging through the mist. It was Arethusa. G-194 turned to flee whilst being chased by several Royal Navy destroyers. The German Captain, Korvettenkapitan Buss called for assistance and the remaining vessels of the 5^th Flotilla turned south for home and immediately came under fire with several taking damage and G-9 called for the coastal artillery batteries to bring down suppressing fire. The coastal batteries, which should have given the Germans superiority were unable to return fire as they could not tell friend or foe due to the proximity of the vessels and the mists.

Vice Admiral Scheer heard the wireless transmissions that called for Stettin and Frauenlob to come to the 5^th Flotilla’s assistance as well as two flotilla of U-boats to come to station. By 7:58 Tyrwhitt was forced to withdraw from his chase because they had got to close to Helgoland and with the arrival of Stettin and Frauenlob with their superior firepower and armour it was too dangerous for the destroyers.

Stettin seeing the British withdrawal and that their own destroyers were now safe turned for home but Frauenlob, another Gazelle became entangled in a furious duel with the brand new Arethusa. It was a battle that the German should have lost but Arethusa was suffering from teething issues including two of her 4” guns jamming and another being taken out by Frauenlob’s gunners. The battle came to an abrupt end with Frauenlob withdrawing after a 6” shell destroyed the bridge killing many including her Captain.

Surprise had been lost and Tyrwhitt decided the best course of action was to make use of the mists and return to the original plan and sweep east to west and roll up any enemy vessels they came across. It was a move that quickly saw dividends with six German destroyers chased. V-187 had originally responded to G-194 but by 8:20 was reporting the position of two unknown vessels to the light cruiser Köln who ordered her and all other destroyers to return to Helgoland. As V-187 turned she was set upon by four British destroyers. The commander hoped to make it to the Jade estuary and they ran solidly for 28-9 miles firing their aft 3.3" gun when she spotted two of Goodenough’s light cruisers; Nottingham and Lowestoft who began firing accurate salvos. The Germans tried a daring manoeuvre that would catch the British by surprise by turning straight towards the pursuing destroyers but were quickly surrounded and sunk. 
There was a growing confusion of British vessels who kept encountering each other in the mists and with Goodenough's presence unknown to Keyes and Tyrwhitt the farcical situation of British destroyers fleeing British cruisers and leading them on to British Battlecruisers began to unfold and even saw Goodenough hunting two of his own cruisers Nottingham and Lowestoft and Southampton trying to ram a British submarine which was attempting to fire torpedoes at it!

The German heavy units in the Jade river were uable to leave their moorings as the tide was out and they would be unable to clear the sand bar at the mouth of the estuary and the Flag officers presumed that none of the other heavy units outside of the Jade would be available and did not request them. Instead Konteradmiral Maass probed into the mist with his light cruisers Köln, Ariadne and Strassburg spread out searching for British ships and the Mainz approaching from the south hoping to cut off the British retreat.

Mainz had recieved the order to move from the Ems estuary at 10:00. Kapitan Pasche had ordered his vessel to raise steam and prepare to get underway as soon as he had heard the first wireless messages concerning the British attack but dutifully awaited the orders from above before leaving his position with the aid of a reconnaissance aircraft stationed at Borkum who was ordered to spot enemy vessels. After a short flight it returned to base having sighted nothing. Through the mists Arethusa and eight destroyers were spotted at about 11:30 heading west and Mainz turned to give them a starboard broadside hitting one of the destroyer's bridge. The German vessel turned North and encountered four Birmingham class cruisers who opened fire. Mainz reported taking fire at 11:55 and turned south towards the Ems estuary under constant fire from Goodenough's cruisers which eventually caused damage to the stearing mechanism.and Mainz drifted back into the path of Arethusa and her escorting destroyers.

"At the same moment the report reahed the bridge that three guns, with their crews, had been completely put out of action. In the stage of the action that followed, in which Mainz, with her helm jammed and going round in a circle to starboard, faced four cruisers of the Birmingham class and about twenty destroyers, our own fire was directed exclusively at the enemy destroyers. Against these only was a success worth mentioning possible. As several of the destroyers came quite close, it was possible to observe several hits upon them." -- Mainz's first officer Kapitanleutnant Tholens

By 12:20 the guns were all silent and the decks were shot to pieces with compartments below flooding with smoke and gas.

SMS Mainz sinking

Pasche gave the order to abandon ship and clear the conning tower but the order did not reach the whole vessel's company and another officer presumed Pasche dead and ordered any available gun to resume fire

Below decks the engineering crew were blissfully unaware of the state of the deck and calls to the bridge were left unanswered mainly because the tubes had been ruptured. In the main compartment it became clear the level of damaged sustained when water began running down the speaking tubes signifying water had penetrated the armoured decks.

The crew scurried through the wreckage over what remained of watertight doors and lockers, through she'll holes and onto the charnel house decks.

Commodore Keyes saw a signal from Mainz and brought his light cruiser, Lurcher alongside to save as many lives as possible and the wounded that could be helped. At 12:20 Mainz lurched and disappeared beneath the waves.

Köln and Strassburg came out of the mists firing their guns hoping they were forcing the British away unknowing what was awaiting them.

Vice Admiral Beatty had been listening to the wireless chatter and watching the clock knowing that as soon as the tides were right the might of the German High seas fleet could descend upon the destroyers and turn the day into a massacre. It was time to intervene to extricate the smaller units and his battlecruisers descended on Maass ripping Köln apart whilst Strassberg turned and fled saved only by her silhouette which looked too much like a British light cruiser. The only thing that saved Köln was the arrival of the unsuspecting Ariadne. Kapitän Seebohm later reported;

"Shortly afterwards gunfire was heard on our port bow, and we made straight in that direction. Shortly before 2 PM there emerged from the mist two ships, one of which, on our starboard bow, did not reply to our signal. It was recognised as an armoured cruiser so we immediately turned about. The second ship was Köln, which was being chased and would doubtless have got away if Ariadne had not appeared. The enemy immediately shifted his fire from Köln to Ariadne. Ariadne soon received a hit forward which started a fire in the coal, so that the stoke hold had to be abandoned on account of the danger from smoke. Five boilers were thus put out of action and Ariadne's speed was reduced to fifteen knots. Behind the enemy, which, judging by its silhouette, was the English Flagship Lion, a second English armoured cruiser soon appeared and joined in the action, firing at Ariadne for about half an hour at a range of from 45 to 60 hm., at times even from 33 hm. This last distance is only an estimate, as by now all the recording instruments were out of action. Ariadne received many hits from heavy guns, among them a whole series aft, which was soon enveloped in flames. Such of the personnel there as made good their escape owed it entirely to luck. The fore part of the ship also received a number of serious hits, one of which penetrated the armoured deck and put the torpedo chamber out of action, while another destroyed the sick-bay and killed its personnel. Amidships and the bridge, strange to say, were almost entirely spared. It is perfectly impossible to say how many hits in all the ship received. Apparently many shells passed through the rigging and were thereby detonated."

Fire soon engulfed the living quarters and decks burning uncontrollably with the extinguishers disabled. As the British disengaged possibly because the vessel was clearly doomed or because the smoke from the fires obstructed the range finder's view the surviving guns on Ariadne continued to fire independently at their attackers to no avail.

Seebohm praised his crew in his report;

In spite of the enemy's annihilating fire the ship's company worked with the greatest calm, as if on manoeuvres. The wounded were carried down by the stretcher-bearers. All ratings tried to carry out such repairs as were possible by themselves. The First Officer was carried away by a shell while between decks with the repairing section

Arrived to late; SMS Von der Tann

The forward magazine was thankfully flooded which meant the vessel wouldn't explode but the forward hatches were buckled from shell fire trapping crew below decks. Damage control reported the engines, boilers and rudder were in working order despite the telegraph having been cut. The wounded were gathered on the forecastle whilst the crew tried to fight the fires. The fumes and smoke was getting unbearable whilst the heat began igniting the ready ammunition on the deck showering the crew with shell splinters.

Seebohm ordered attempts to dave the ship to be abandoned and the crew assembled with the wounded on the forecastle where they cheered the Kaiser, sang the Deutschlandlied and the hymn for the flag. At 15:00, German time, the Bremen class SMS Danzig closed to the burning hulk and sent lifeboats.

The crew withdrew from the rapidly inhospitable forecastle to the midships where the wounded were lowered in boats. On a signal from the officers the rest of the crew jumped overboard and swam for Danzig's boats and the cruiser herself. The Stralsund also arrived and added her boats to the rescue operation lifting the Ariadne's non swimmers from the water and their rafts.

As Seebohm watched his former vessel he noted that the fires had finally died down and that the explosions had also calmed. He reasoned that his vessel and any men trapped below deck could be saved and immediately took himself to Stralsund with the intention of getting Kapitän Harder to take his vessel in tow.

However before any action could be taken Ariadne capsized suddenly and remained semi-submerged. The Gazelle had suffered 59 dead and 45 wounded from a crew of 257.

Meanwhile Köln was in a bad way. Maass was dead, the vessel burning, her hull holes from now to aft and her crew dead, dying, trapped or wounded. As a warship her time was over but as a hulk she had perhaps a little longer and the engineers managed to turn her South East and aim her roughly towards home but sadly she soon crossed Beatty's squadron again. Another two salvoes ended all hope that the ship could be saved scuttling charges were placed and the surviving 250 crewmen abandoned ship hoping for rescue from the British or their own ships.

Beatty was more concerned with getting his forces away before Hipper's dreadnoughts arrived. Arethusa was taken in tow and a withdrawal effected quickly and efficiently. Total British losses for the whole action were 35 dead and 55 wounded and no ships lost.
At 15:00 the Seydlitz and Blücher left port and joined the battlecruisers Moltke and Von der Tann who had not been in an estuary. They patrolled the area but by then the battle was over and the British long gone.

Admiral Scheer was to lament that;

If it was already known that the Heligoland Bight was insufficiently protected, because our scouting did not extend far enough, this day brought us the knowledge that a determined raid of the enemy against our weak forward patrol must inflict loss upon us every time. By the repetition of such surprises it might gradually be worn away altogether, while the Fleet got very little value out of its patrolling operations.Three days after the battle a German patrol fished leading stoker Neumann from the cold North Sea, he was the sole survivor of the 367 man crew of Köln.

Germany lost three light cruisers and a destroyer with some 1000 casualties including an Admiral. The Frauenlob was soon repaired and took her place in the Grand fleet scouting force. She would meet HMS Southampton again at the battle of Jutland in 1916 with deadly consequences.

The battle of the Falklands - Von Spee's end

It was 5am ship's time when SMS Gneisenau and Nurnberg broke formation with the rest of the East Asiatic squadron and set a northerly course for the Falklands. Captain Maerker, along with Huhn and Lüdecke, had voiced his concerns at the meeting with Graf Spee on 6th December about the proposed landing but he had been overruled.

The two cruisers were to advance to the east of Cape Pembroke at 14 knots and survey the mouth of Port William and subdue any defences. Once the way is clear Nürnberg would head out towards Berkeley sound to scout out British shipping whilst Gneisnau lowered boats to survey the outer harbour of Port William for mines. Once clear Nurnberg would enter the harbour of Port Stanley and take on stores whilst Gneisnau advanced to the channel between the two anchorages and lowered cutters filled with marines to arrest the Governor under the cover of Nürnberg's guns. The two cruisers were due to return to the rest of the squadron by 19:30.

The only worry was that the British fleet might have taken shelter in Port William harbour after Coronel and been bolstered to form another line of defence. As they approached the islands the Gneisnau's chief gunnery officer Lieutenant -Commander Busch relayed that there was thick with dust and smoke. As at Tahiti the coal stores were being burnt to deny them to the Germans. He also reported four A frame style mast heads visible which meant that the battleship that they had heard was accompanying Craddock was here joined by another, there was also a cruiser advancing to the mouth of the harbour. If Gneisnau could sink her there then the rest of the British fleet would be bottled up and easy pickings. signalling Busch's observations to the Scharnhorst, Maerker was confident the vessels in the harbour would pose little threat. The German cruisers advanced, ensigns flying and guns presented. It was 9.20 am.

In London Winston Churchill received a telegram from the Governor of the Falklands saying;

Admiral Spee arrived at daylight this morning with all his ships and is now I'm action with Admiral Sturdee's whole fleet which was coaling.

The fear that gripped the Admiralty was that Sturdee had been caught napping and the German Admiral was tearing him apart at his leisure in port. This would be worse than Coronel and the Mediterranean debacle combined and would do immeasurable damage to British prestige, especially in the Southern American states but also embolden the German navy at home into action.

Canopus beached at the Falklands for support

Things were not as desperate as they seemed though. Sturdee's fleet were indeed coaling with their boilers no where near full steam but Sturdee's noted calmness under pressure could save a situation  that might make a hotter headed Commander flap and panic making the situation worse. Glasgow was the first to see the signal from the lookout point at Sapper's hill via Canopus and tried to signal Sturdee's flagship but the smoke and clouds of dust that hung over the harbour obscured the signal flags, finally the 3" salute cannon was fired to gain the admiral's attention. There quickly followed a report that German warships were approaching from the southeas . Sturdee took stock of his vessels dispositions. The two heavy battlencruisers had colliers filling their bunkers, Glasgow and Carnarvon were fully refuelled but like the rest of the squadron had no steam up. Bristol and Cornwall had low fuel stocks and had opened up engines for maintainence. Only HMS Kent had steam up but lacked fuel.

After a few moments quiet thought the Admiral ordered Kent to leave port, colliers to move away and the whole force to get steam up. It would take time but that was all he could do. He was depending on Canopus to give enough covering fire with Carnarvon and Kent to keep the two cruisers at bay. His orders given, Admiral Sturdee went below for breakfast.

Canopus fired her heavy guns at maximum range of 11,500 yards at 9.20 sending up great white spouts of water in front of Maerker's vessel. Then the improbable happened as the last shell struck the Armoured cruiser's funnel sending German crew scattering for cover. By a twist of fate it was a practice shell and did not explode. Shaken, Maerker ordered the ships turn east but when another salvo did not follow up he resumed their course towards the ports whilst sending a signal to the flagship that they had come under fire. His intention was still to bottle the British fleet up.

Admiral von Spee had different aims though. Coal was vital to his squadron's journey and fresh supplies would be very welcome but not at the expense of irreplacable ammunition which would be needed if they made it to the North sea and had to run the British blockade. They could also not afford to take any lame ducks with them, especially not one of his Armoured cruisers. The British squadron at the Falklands was of no consequence. They had already set the coal stocks aflame and all were at anchor. In the time it took them to get out of the harbour and get a full head of steam his forces would have disappeared into the blue and heading for the rendezvous point with fresh colliers. The British would never catch him, especially not the Queen class battleship the only ship that posed a serious threat. More importantly this lucky escape meant that they would never find him out in the blue in such numbers again as they would need to split up to sweep for him. Orders were issued to Maerker to turn his ships around and rejoin Scharnhorst and the rest of the squadron heading east at a steady pace whilst the three support vessels released to the south east. On the arrival of his detached ships von Spee turned his warships south to give the illusion they were heading around the Cape for the safety of Chilean waters or to lose the British amongst the islands and bad weather.

There has been debate over the German admiral's actions and why he didn't press the advantage. With hindsight it is easy to see that the Germans could have easily caught Sturdee napping and, as Churchill and Fisher feared, take the fleet apart at anchor or bottle them up and escape. On the bridge of Scharnhorst a century ago though von Spee was playing the long game and every decission was made with one eye on the final confrontation in the North sea preserving as much of his squadron for that bloody day had to be his primary duty. They had already come half way, why throw it away for nothing?

With the Germans well underway, Sturdee's fleet slowly brought their boilers up to steam by mixing oil and coal. Glasgow was the first to pull out of port at 9.45 followed by Carnarvon and the two battlecruisers Invincible and Inflexible and the vessels began to give chase at 24 knots. The first major problem for Sturdee was that despite the icy clear and calm weather he could not see the East Asiatic Squadron. The amount of smoke being belched out from the two battlecruisers was obscuring the observers view. It was a particularly nasty thick acrid smoke caused by the burning of the mixed fuels. Sturdee quickly ordered Inflexible to his starboard quarter and Glasgow to his port and at the same time ordered the fleet to a more leisurely 19 knots so the armoured cruisers could keep up.There also followed a signal that the midday meal would still be served as normal at 11:45.


The three German support vessels were fleeing the Royal Navy at speed and separately to von Spee's warships. They had been ordered to head for Pitcairn island to await the East Asiatic or the outcome of the battle. Captain Fanshawe of the Bristol received a report that the German transports or colliers were making their way towards the Falklands at 11:00. Fearing the Germans were leading off the fleet so that an armed landing could take place Bristol was detached from the pursuit at 11:45 to locate the Auxiliary HMS Macedonia and find the German supply ships. If any of the raiders escaped they would be robbed of extra coal and supplies. He took Bristol west south west meeting the converted liner at 12:30 and turned towards Point Pleasant and together began their search of the area finding nothing over the next hour and a half.

There seemed only one logical course of action and he turned southeast, the direction von Spee's warships had been heading. It made sense that the supply ships would follow them at a distance or be heading for a rendezvous in the same direction. There soon came a message from Fitzroy, a small settlement near Point Pleasant. Two steamers had been spotted moving at full speed past the point and minutes later their smoke was spotted off to port from Bristol's conning tower. Fanshawe turned to investigate.

The Baden and Santa Isabel did not intend to be stopped and tried to run from the two British ships ignoring signals to stop for half an hour until at 15:30 Bristol opened fire on them. It was futile to resist and thinking of their crews lives the captains ordered a full stop. Fanshawe had been led to believe that these ships would be full of German Marines for the proposed landing and was ready to sink them as per Sturdee's extensive pre battle instructions, the white flags rapidly changed that and further investigation revealed their cargo of coal and food supplies.

At 19:00 with the prisoners removed to the Macedonia Fanshawe decided to follow his original order and both British ships opened fire before Bristol turned to follow Sturdee's line and leaving the Auxiliary to make certain the German ships sank.


By 12:20 Admiral Sturdee signalled Inflexible to "Engage the enemy" and together the two battle cruisers worked up speed to 26 knots and by 12:50 Inflexible was firing on the Leipzig at the rear of the German formation. Due to engine vibration and the smoke obscuring the rang finders the two turrets on each of Sturdee's battle cruisers took half an hour to sight and range con Spee's squadron.

SMS Scharnhorst

At 13:20 Admiral von Spee made the decision that could make or break his command. The British wanted his two Armoured cruisers destroyed and it would onlybe a matter of time before he would be forced into action, time in which Leipzig would take a critical hit. He would have to buy them time to escape. He might even be lucky and damage the British enough that he could still lead his squadron home but he doubted it. A signal was sent to the ligh-cruisers to break formation and escape as beast they could. He then signalled Gneisnau of his intention and together both ships turned East-north-east and commenced firing on the two battle cruisers.

The German Admiral's aim was to buy his light cruisers as much time as possible and to close the range so his 8.3" guns and if possible even closer and use his 5.9"s. His men were already performing well at ranging the British and then firing in ordered measured shots. One British officer commented;

The German firing was magnificent to watch. Perfect ripple salvoes all along their sides. A brown-coloured puff with a centre of flame marking each gun as it fired... They straddled us time after time.

 Sturdee on the other hand was struggling with bad gunnery. Not only were his reservist crews lacking in practice they were also struggling with the lack of visibility from all of their own smoke. The British whilst fighting at long range also found that they were losing out on accuracy and then Invincible took a hit forcing Sturdee to increase the range again. Von Spee seized on this opportunity to turn south again and try to escape again whilst they were out of range and hoped to encounter bad weather that could help them lose their pursuers. They managed to keep away for  forty minutes but ultimately Sturdee's top speed was too much for them and again the British shells fell about Scharnhorst and Gneisnau. The Germans turned on their axis and crossed the British T so as to bring their broadsides to bear. The manoeuvre did not work.

The German shells were accurate but they bounced off the Invincible and Inflexible's armoured decks where as the British 12" lyddite shells went through the German ships as if they were made of china causing death and destruction on the lower decks and shattering gun turrets. On Scharnhorst the Admiral's flag slipped to half mast and Maerker believed the Admiral dead and signalled Schultz (Scharnhorst's captain) to confirm it.
I am alright so far. You were right after all came the Admiral's reply. There was also one final order from Scharnhorst to Maerker to try and save his vessel if he could and then the flagship passed her sister ship heading straight for the British vessels. The battle had taken its toll on von Spee's flagship as she listed to port and her once proud engines pushed her at an ever decreasing speed and she was clearly taking on water. Pochhammer, the Gneisnau first officer later recalled seeing the flagship with;

Funnels are fallen, smoke was pouring out, flames were visible inside the vessel through shot holes and scuttles.But her guns crashed out furiously and without intermission.

Scharnhorst sinking

The Admiral was trying to buy time for his friend and son aboard Gneisnau and kept up a steady stream of fire on Invincible turning his ship to starboard for one last broadside. Scharnhorst's outer decks were beginning to flood as fires raged across her decks as she began to heel over to port and as the sea got to six foot from the fore turret she fired her last round then she slipped under the waves leaving a cloud of of steam, powder smoke and coal dust that left the crew of Gneisnau feeling a "boundless loneliness" and a fear of their own inevitable fate. Pochhammer felt the pall was saying "the Scharnhorst waits for the Gneisnau."

Maerker's vessel was in a poor state as well, her hull was holed and on fire. A shell had penetrated the after dressing room and not only killed the wounded being treated it also killed the Staff surgeon and the Squadron's Chaplin who was administering last rites. Pochhammer made a patrol below deck and reported to his Captain that there were piles of wreckage, dead and dying below decks and fires were breaking out. The engines were damaged and her speed much reduced. Despite von Spee's intentions and the high morale of his crew who were bringing up reserves to replace the dead and carrying up the ammunition to guns by hand in areas where mechanical hoists laid shattered, he knew escape was impossible. Both the Inflexible and Invincible had their guns trained on him and they were now joined by Stoddart on Carnarvon and between them they went about the business of taking out gun battery after battery pausing briefly thinking their work done but commencing again when a port battery squeezed out a final shot.

The battle was over and the German officers knew it. The Captain ordered the men on deck with anything that could float whilst another team opened the seacocks and planted charges. Officers were moving amongst the survivors issuing hammocks, wood from life boats and fittings when the vessel lurched starboard and those on deck pushed forward and over the port side and onto the Gneisnau's hull.

Many a clenched fist was brandished [at the British] and the men's fury found vent n full blooded seaman's oaths. Then the Captain, who preserved his wonted calm to the last, ordered three cheers for H.M the Emperor, and "Our good and gallant Gneisnau" and proceeded to sink the ship. Our crew, who had really given their utmost in endurance and courage, complied with enthusiasm and the strains of "Deutschland über alles" echoed through the ship with all its wonted vigour, followed by the hymn of the "Black, White and Red flag" which was flying riddled with shot, at the mainmast-head.

Inflexible picking up Gneisnau's survivors

The order was given to abandon ship and as she capsized two hundred men, including Pochhammer, Inflexible stopped to pick up survivors and in all 166 of her 764 compliment were pulled alive from the water and survived to serve the war in POW camps including Gneisnau's first officer Fregatten-kapitäin Pochhammer but not her captain or von Spee's youngest son Lieutenant Heinrich von Spee.
were plunged into the freezing 4° water which quickly claimed the wounded and weakened crewmen. The Albatrosses also descended on the wounded using razor sharp bills to tear at soft flesh and open wounds. The men were forced to try and defend themselves with the very flotsum they clung too, the effort tiring them out further and leaving them vulnerable to the cold.

The Kent, Glasgow and Cornwall pursued the light German units as fast as they could. Dresden was already pulling ahead of the other two Captain Luce of the Glasgow already believed that he could not bring that vessel to action before nightfall and signalled Cornwall that he would slow the Leipzig down so that the Cornwall could come up and sink her with its heavier guns. At 14:50 Luce opened fire and Captain Huhn responded by turning to present his broadside and firing off barrages, he knew that he could not escape and was prepared to give a good account for his vessel in the face of the enemy. Leipzig's navigational officer reported after the battle that his vessel's rate of fire was hampered by the fact only three of the starboard guns and only one port gun was occasionally able to fire on the enemy. This didn't stop the Leipzig striking the Glasgow and causing boiler damage that would stop her from chasing Dresden and concerned Luce enough to not close with her where the German's 4.1" guns would do more damage.

Cornwall closed to support Glasgow and at 16:42 Captain Ellerton's vessel blew Leipzig's foremast away and twenty minutes later struck the German with his full broadside which had set her on fire within an hour. After a patrol around the deck the chief gunnery officer reported to Captain Huhn that the guns were all spent and could offer no more resistance. Huhn stood philosophically for a moment before turning to his Chief torpedo officer and told him it was his turn. Leipzig tried to engage and strike the Glasgow and Cornwall but to no avail, the British heavy guns took their toll and the German cruiser slowed to a stop.

As Leipzig came under fire the Nürnberg and Dresden were going hell for leather to escape the British cruisers with the Dresden well ahead and HMS Kent doggedly pursuing Nürnberg. The British vessel's coal stocks were getting dangerously low but Captain Allen urged the stokers on and ordered all woodwork to be thrown on the fires to increase speed and despite her reputation as poor at holding her steam the ships engineers managed to coax the vessel to 25 knots which was over her commisioning top speed and well above what she was comfortable with, the over stretched engines were vibrating so much that the gun target controllers were next to useless!

The distance was down to seven miles and gradually closing until by 17:00 the Nürnberg opened fire with her stern guns hoping to deter her pursuers but to no avail, her shots sailed over the Kent.

Allen pushed his vessel harder to bring his 6"guns to bear and to narrow the chance of missing through the drizzle and fading light as well as the engine vibrations. Soon they began to return fire.

Despite Nürnberg's excellent rate of fire and accuracy her 4.1" shells could not penetrate the Armoured cruiser's plating. Kent on the other hand got in two lucky shots, one of which hit the after steering plane beneath the water line killing all save one in the compartment.

At 17:35 two of Nürnberg's overworked boilers blew and her speed was reduced to 18 knots. There was only one option open to von Schönberg - turn and fight to either disable the pursuer or go down with honour, he ordered his cruiser to turn 8 points to port to present her full broadside and fired.

Allen knew that his coal and the daylight were fading. If he wanted to stop the German cruiser he had to move to close range and trust that the Kent's armour could absorb the smaller vessel's shells. He brought Kent on a converging course at 6000 yards and the one sided exchange began.

By 18:00 the range had fallen to 3000 yards and although Nürnberg had managed to get a shell burst within one of Kent's gun turrets and one on the wireless room knocking out the communications the British ship was fairly undamaged. The German cruiser faired very differently and by 18.25 she had come to a dead stop, all but two guns were silent, her top mast had been shot away and fires were breaking out. Kent began to circle the crippled ship but the moment Nürnberg began to alter course, presumably to fire her other broadside, Allen gave the order to fire all his starboard guns at 3800 yards knocking out the forward guns and ravaging the forecastle before moving out of torpedo range and ceasing fire.

Nürnberg was barely afloat, the forecastle was decimated with no signs of life with a fire burning brightly under the bridge conning tower and she was starting to list and down by the stern. Still her flag flew defiantly and as Kent approached she opened fire again until five minutes later it was ripped down. Schönberg knew there was nothing left for his vessel and ordered his men to assemble on deck and to load the wounded into a lifeboat. With a final three cheers for the Kaiser the boat was lowered into the sea.

The Last man by Hans Bohrdt

Captain Allen had surveyed his lifeboats and found them all holed or shattered by shellfire and ordered his carpenters to begin repairs to the least damaged as quickly as possible. Within 20 minutes the gig andf cutter were also being lowered but it was too late. Nürnberg's boat of wounded had sunk due to its own damage and at 19:26 the cruiser suddenly heeled over to starboard and sank within four minutes taking the majority of the crew with her. The lifeboats moved forward but only managed to pull twelve men from the water alive, five were to die before reaching Kent or soon afterwards. As the ship sank the British saw some Germans clinging to some wreckage waving the Naval ensign attached to a staff and through the cold still night air heard them singing Deutschland über alles.

The Kent remained on station until 21:00 trying to search for survivors but no more of the crew of 322 could be found, including Lieutenant Otto von Spee, the admiral's eldest son and Captain von Schönberg.

Captain Allen later reported that;

I very much regret if my closing the enemy to such short range was the cause of so many casualties. If I erred in taking my ship too close to the enemy it was due to my extreme eagerness to sink her before she could escape, there were only a few hours of daylight left.

Kent had been struck 37 times during the fighting and had suffered four men dead and twelve wounded. Although it seems pretty much one sided the Kent came close to being destroyed. A German shell had burst against the A3 casemate and ignited some of the charges. A sheet of flame shot down the shell hoist into the ammunition corridor where another charge sat ready. Had this ignited the fire would have quickly spread into the magazine and caused a chain reaction that would have blown the ship up. Luckily Sergeant James Mates of the RMLI was stood at the bottom of the hoist and had the presence of mind to throw the charge away and flood the compartment. In gratitude but perhaps not fully recognising the danger that had been posed, the Admiralty awarded him the Military cross.

With a severe lack of coal the Kent began to limp back to Stanley at a fuel conserving dawdle that did not see them return to a very surprised Sturdee the following afternoon. With no W/T transmitter Allen had been unable to signal his status and Kent was presumed sunk.


Glasgow approached the smouldering wreck of Leipzig and signalled Captain Luce's message;

Am anxious to save life. Do you surrender?

Luce was still wary that although the guns had fallen silent and the German vessel clearly was near her end her Imperial ensign still flew from the foremast denoting she was still an active combatent despite being aflame at each end and her main mast and two funnels blown away. If he brought his ship in close would the German ship surprise him?

An ambush was far away from Huhn's mind. His ship was dying and he knew there was nothing more he could ask of her or the crew. Orders were sent out for the remaining crew to assemble amidships with life saving equipment and the sea cocks were opened to aid the vessel's sinking. After a brief address to the surviving 150 men and three cheers for the Kaiser he pointed to the flag fluttering from the mast and the inferno that was raging at its base.

If anyone can reach the ensign, they can haul it down, for we shall sink now.

Obediently one crewman rushed forward to the mast but was overcome by the flames before he could reach it. It was I of little consequence as the vessel was clearly mortally damaged and as soon as Huhn gave the order his men would leave the vessel and the battle would be over.

Through ill luck a gun fired, whether by mistake, design or a shell lodged in the barrel overheated in one of the many fires no one knows but the result was the same. Glasgow fearing she was under fire openned up with her main guns with deadly effect on the massed ranks of sailors. Blasts and shrapnel ricocheting off the conning tower blasted men to pieces, tore away limbs turning the decks into a charnel house awash with blood and the stench of cordite and death. Men scattered in panic hiding behind the gunshields or diving into the sea and swimming towards their aggressors but whilst the British thought there was still fight left in Leipzig they there would be no rescue. As the death toll rose the surviving fifty men clung to their cover as best they could and waited in terror for the violence to stop and in a lull managed to launch two green flares.

SMS Leipzig

Luce saw them and took this as the Germans attempting to communicate their surrender and at 20:12 and approached again signalling;

I am sending boats to save lives.

 At 20:45 the lifeboats were made ready for launch to pull Huhn's men to safety. Leipzig had no lifeboats left to launch, they had long been turned to splinters or burnt up. The surviving crew sat with their captain In the dark on the forecastle sharing his cigarettes and calmly waiting for the British boats to hit the water. Looking out into the black they saw the white hulled boats approach, their nightmare was nearly over. When the British reached 40 yards Huhn turned to his companions and ordered them over the side before turning and walking forward into the dark night, going down with his vessel.

The water was cold and with little light the men in the sea stood little chance as fatigue and wounds combined to sap them of their strength. They're splashing and cries soon diminished. The surviving officers blew their whistles and the four boats approached plucking men from the icy embrace of the sea. Glasgow's two boats pulled seven officers who's whistles saved their lives, and ten men, Cornwall's pulled one out one man. Out of a crew of 288 only 18 were saw the end of the battle.

After seven hours of combat Leipzig disappeared beneath the waves at 21:23. Von Spee's oldest and most obsolete vessel had acquitted itself well in the face of the enemy.

SMS Dresden escaped into a rain and fog squall and disappeared from the combat zone. The other survivor was the hospital ship Seydlitz. The former liner that was carrying some British prisoners (From the collier Drummuir) and supplies had been tailing von Spee's warships acting as a hospital ship but with the approach of Sturdee's squadron she used her superior speed to escape south slipping past Bristol. She finally disappeared into the darkness and around the cape. She came very close to disaster though as she passed within four miles of gunfire and explosions that turned out to be the death throes of Leipzig.

The battle of the Falklands was considered to be the most decisive naval battles of the First World War and saw the almost complete destruction of von Spee's force. The battle saw 2000 Germans killed and the rest taken prisoner for 10 British sailors killed and 20 wounded. It also closed the chapter of the regular Kaiserliche-marine hunting merchant ships. Outside of the North sea only Dresden and the estuary bound Konigsberg remained elusive.

Royal Navy's first loss - Coronel

TThe first of November 1914 became a historic date in the History of the Royal Navy and Admiral Christopher Craddock, who feared repercussions similar to Trowbridge, would not survive the day.

HMS Good Hope, Glasgow, and Monmouth along with their axillary Otranto were a long way from their Atlantic station as they approached Coronel on the Chilean coast.

Craddock, a professional and well liked flag officer had swept down the east coast of South America chasing the white whale that was SMS Dresden and any auxiliary vessels and the spectre of SMS Karlsruhe.

Terror of the Caribbean; SMS Karlsruhe

When the war started the German cruiser Karlsruhe was at Havana having relieved Dresden from her post and duties of flying the flag and protecting German interests and citizens during the Mexican revolution. Dresden had not left the Caribbean and was at Port au Prince. The threat that these two cruisers presented was very real. Both ships were fast modern and well armed and it would take quite a few vessels to track them down in the island filled Caribbean and like the corsairs of old Dresden and Karlsruhe could strike any vessel or port and colony at anytime working together or striking at opposite ends of the sea forcing the Royal Navy to divide their forces and commit a far larger force to find them.


The Caribbean sea is also the starting point for many journeys to Britain and a vital trade hub for vessels bringing merchandise south from the USA and raw materials from the South Americas as well as those coming through the Panama canal. Merchant trade would freeze up as Captains refused to sail and run the risk which could be crippling all because there were two German ships. There was also the lightly defended colonies that could be shelled or at worse have German Marines land and cause havoc amongst the populous.

Understandably Craddock saw that finding and defeating these enemies as quickly as possible as his number one priority. There were five cruiser squadrons operating around the Atlantic and Caribbean so dealing with any auxiliary cruisers could be coordinated at leisure but he would personally deal with these surface units with the vessels available in the Caribbean. From Vera Cruz on HMS Suffolk he ordered Essex and Lancaster to Halifax to cover New York and to reinforce the HMCS Niobe in case the German's went north. HMS Berwick was directed to Jamaica to defend Kingston and Bristol was sent south to join Glasgow off Pernambuco to watch the way south. It was a wide net and he would react with his armoured cruisers as soon as the two German light units appeared.

In London, the same wisdom at the Admiralty which interfered with the hunt for Goeben and Breslau and redistributed Admiral Jerram's forces and sabotaged the hunt for von Spee's fleet intervened again. The Admiralty believed the primary threat was the clutch of liners that were currently in New York harbour being armed to harass British trade. HMS Good Hope was detached from the Grand fleet for Halifax. Admiral Stoddart who's squadron was stationed at Cape Verde was ordered to detach Monmouth and send to Pernambuco and the Bristol was sent north with Essex, Lancaster and Suffolk to Sandy Hook.

Kapitän Kohler  had anchored Karlsruhe in a remote area of the Bahamas to rendezvous with the SS Kronprinz Wilhelm of the North German Lloyd line and a former Blue Riband winner (in 1902). They lay 120 miles north of Watling Island and began trading crew and equipment to bring the liner up Auxiliary status. Captain Grahn of the liner was demoted to First officer and Karlsruhe's Navigation officer Kapitanleutnant Thierfelder took command and began overseeing the transfer of equipment and crewmen.

HMS Berwick passed Karlsruhe in the night

Through a fluke of war Admiral Craddock's flagship on her northern journey came over the horizon onto the two German vessels miles from anywhere. Craddock couldn't believe his luck and ordered the Armoured Cruiser to intercept. Karlsruhe and Kronprinz Wilhelm began heading in different directions at full speed. Craddock prioritised catching the cruiser and set to chasing Kohler's vessel and signalled Bristol to reverse course and summoned up Berwick to try and cut off the German's retreat. Despite the speed of the German cruiser and the fact that she had only been commissioned that year compared to the eleven year old heavier vessel, Craddock managed to keep pace from 11am until nightfall when he finally lost contact. In the moonlight Captain Fanshawe of Bristol caught sight of the German vessel and opened fire at 7000 yards. Over the next two hours the vessels exchanged fire but to no avail and Kohler managed to slip away. Berwick prowled the Caribbean night searching for the German raider but to no avail. Craddock's luck had run out though, as his last cruiser swept for its' prey it changed course little knowing that just out of sight a desperate Kohler was fleeing. On the 12th August, with only 12 tonnes of coal left in her bunkers, Karlsruhe pulled in to Puerto Rico.

Craddock revaluated the situation and following reports that Dresden had passed the Amazon and was heading south and Karlsruhe was trailing behind her and with the lack of liners heading out of New York he decided to head south too. He transferred his flag to Good Hope, which was fractionally faster and left Suffolk and his already northerly stationed vessels to deal with any Auxiliary vessels and Karlsruhe should she change course. Craddock took Berwick and Bristol south to St Lucia to meet the French vessels Conde and Descartes on 23rd August. Meanwhile the Admiralty had also directed HMS Cornwall and the Auxiliaries Otranto and Macedonia to support the Glasgow and Monmouth. Craddock also considered, in agreement with the Admiralty that von Spee would probably be heading towards the Straits of Magellan. He began communicating with London and deploying his force to patrol the River Plate area whilst Glasgow and Monmouth were sent around the Magellan straits and requested information about von Spee. No one had sighted Scharnhorst and Gneisnau since early August in the Caroline Islands but they agreed that it was a possibility that von Spee could head that way.

Dresden had continued to sail south and had captured two merchant ships Hyades and Holmwood (on 14th and 24th August respectively) before learning that the Royal Navy was forming up on the Eastern end of the straits of Magellan. Kapitän von Ludecke put in to Hoste island to overhaul his engines on the 5th September and isolated his vessel laying low in case the British were sweeping the straits. After eleven days the repairs had been completed and von Ludecke had to make a decision as to what to do now. It would be too dangerous to return north to try and meet up with Karlsruhe would be met with British warships looking for him and sewing up German trade. Ahead of him was friendly but neutral Chile with a lack of British warships. There was also the promise of SMS Leipzig operating off the west coast of the Americas and the possibility of von Spees squadron. His decision was clear, even with out the orders from Berlin advising him to join Leipzig. He put to sea and headed around the straits.
On the 14th September Craddock received fresh instructions from London outlining what was expected of his squadron.

Leave sufficient force to deal with Dresden and Karlsruhe. Concentrate a squadron strong enough to meet Scharnhorst and Gneisnau, making Falkland Islands your coaling base. Canopus is on route to Abrolhos; Defence joins, keep at least Canopus and one 'County' class cruiser with your flagship. As soon as you have superior force, search Magellan Straits, being ready to return and cover Plate, or search north as far as Valparaiso. Break up German trade and destroy German cruisers.

His force now consisted of the armoured cruisers Monmouth, Good Hope, light cruiser Glasgow, the AMC Otranto, with the battleship Canopus inbound and the modern Armoured cruiser Defence which would prove invaluable against the von Spee's vessels and could keep pace with them should the German decide to run.

Then von Spee threw the British a curve ball. Despite Captain Maerker, the Commander of Gneisnau's consul not to, the Admiral had led his two Armoured Cruisers to Apia in Samoa and feinted North North West. The Admiralty reassessed this move and thought that the Germans weren't heading for South America but were disappearing into the Pacific again. They believed that Craddock would only be sweeping away German trade and merchant ships with perhaps a chance encounter with Leipzig or Dresden which should be caught in a pincer of Craddock and Newcastle, Rainbow, Idzumo and the IJN battleship Hizen coming down from the north. The Admiralty signalled Craddock to that effect on the 14th September requesting the Admiral's intentions.

HMS Canopus

The Admiral agreed with his superiors in London, the four vessels he had available were sufficient enough to police the German trade he did however have severe misgivings with
Canopus. The aging battleship had been due to be scrapped and was held under care with a reserve crew that had been augmented with reservists. There were also serious problems with the engines that were significantly reducing their speed. There was also a problem with the acting engineering officer who maintained that the engines could not produce a speed greater than 12 knots. Craddock believed that this millstone would only slow him down and would be of little benefit especially if von Spee's squadron wasn't present and even if they were there the lumbering leviathan would be left in the German's wake. His appraisal was to take Good Hope, Monmouth, Otranto and Glasgow on a sweep around the straits and leave Canopus to escort the colliers trailing along behind the rest of the fleet at her best speed. He made a full sweep of the Straits looking for Dresden in rough weather. Although there was evidence that the German vessel had been there, the British liner Ortega reported being chased by Dresden in early September to Craddock, von Ludecke however was nowhere to be seen. He divided his forces and took his cruisers back to recoal at the Falklands and sent Otranto on to Punta Arenas to interdict German trade. Once ready he ordered Glasgow and Monmouth back around the straits to sweep Orange bay whilst he waited at the Falklands in case von Ludecke doubled back around.

The Admiralty signalled Craddock on the 7th October with fresh intelligence;

It appears that Scharnhorst and Gneisnau are working across to South America. You must be prepared to meet them in company, possibly with a 'Dresden' (Either SMS Emden or Dresden) scouting for them. Canopus should accompany Glasgow, Monmouth and Otranto, to search and protect trade in combination. If you propose Good Hope to go, leave Monmouth on east coast.

Craddock responded that he was going to concentrate his forces with Canopus at the Falklands and that he was not going to allow his vessels currently on the west coast to travel north above Valparaiso. He also expressed concern that von Spee now had five vessels with (his two Armoured and three light cruisers) and also that Karlsruhe was operating again in the north and suggested to their Lordships that Essex be sent up north to relieve Cornwall which could then be sent to him. He also asked for an update on Defence.

Events began to overtake Craddock. The main thing was Karlsruhe. The German cruiser, after a hiatus to carry out engine and boiler repairs, was operating with success similar to Emden's of the coast of Brazil capturing 15 British and 1 Norweigan merchant vessel. The Admiralty were getting nervous about it and rediverted HMS Defence away from Craddock to sit with Admiral Stoddart's squadron which was patrolling the River Plate. The Admiralty were concerned that should Craddock have concentrate all the British ships and proceed around the straits then von Spee could out manoeuvre him, get behind him and shell the Falklands and Abrolhos coaling bases leaving the Royal Navy nowhere to coal below the Caribbean. Spee could then disappear. Battenberg and Churchill were shore that Craddock was going to only send Glasgow up to Valparaiso but concentrate the rest of his ships at the Falklands whilst Defence and Carnarvon formed a squadron off Rio.

They also signalled Stoddart to order him across from the African coast to head for Montevideo with his force of five vessels and the Defence trailing from Gibraltar.

When Canopus arrived on the 18th October Captain Grant reported to Cradock that his engines needed a refit and her boilers cleaned which would take five days, there was no guarantee that this would indeed would increase the speed. Craddock decided he had to go to the aid of Monmouth and Glasgow and set sail leaving orders for the Canopus to follow when able with the colliers. Before leaving he wrote a letter for Admiral Meux in England with instructions to send it should he be lost, he also buried his medals and decorations in the Governor's garden. Although the letter has been lost to the mists of time, it has been speculated that he wrote a defence of his actions so that he wouldn't face the same disgrace Trowbridge had or be made a scapegoat. He felt the Admiralty had stitched him into a corner and that should he fail to stop Spee he would be disgraced.

Indeed the Admiralty still believed that the situation on the west coast "seemed safe." They were full of faith that the Newcastle with the Japanese cruiser and battleship were heading south with all due haste and that Glasgow and Otranto would lead von Spee onto Craddock's cruisers and Canopus. Of course the ocean is a big place and there was every possibility they would miss one another which is where Stoddart's force was to form a second line. That is why they still withheld Defence which Craddock again requested and denied him on 28th October. Further to this, the IJN Hizen was still at Honolulu trying to capture the SMS Geier and nowhere near HMS Newcastle let alone chasing down von Spee from the north.

On the 13th October von Spee departed Easter Island with his force; Scharnhorst, Gneisnau, Nurnberg, Leipzig and Dresden with their flotilla of colliers. Spee was more than aware through reports from the German consul and agents throughout South America, that the British force was in the area. This would be his first test.

With Canopus some three hundred miles behind him (now moving at a faster speed when the Captain found the truth out about his engines capability.) with the colliers, Craddock ordered Glasgow to Coronel to send a message to the Admiralty whilst he spread his other ships into a search pattern of twenty miles apart to search for the Germans.

Spee received word that Glasgow had left Coronel and decided that he should give his men a taste of action and set sail to catch the light cruiser whilst she was alone. At the same time Craddock's men picked up a radio signature coming through clear as day.

"Le, Le, Le"

It was the Leipzig. Craddock, like his opposite number, decided to catch the light cruiser on her own. Obviously she hadn't met up with Spee's squadron and was still operating on her own. He ordered his vessels to find and engage her.

At 16:30 in rough seas and clear weather with interspersed squalls of rain Good Hope sighted smoke on the horizon. It wasn't Leipzig. It was Scharnhorst and Gneisnau supported by Dresden and Leipzig whilst the Nurnberg carried out a stop and search of a merchant vessel. He quickly brought his squadron into formation and using his speed to out pace the British kept them from closing knowing that he had the disadvantage of being on the shoreline side of Craddock. He kept up the dance until the sunset around 19:00. Then with his British force was silhouetted against the sunset.

At 12,000 yards the German armoured cruisers fired their first salvo first firing over their target and then short to judge the range. The third salvo struck Good Hope taking out the front gun turret killing the reservist officers and men who were trying to prepare for fire. The Good Hope caught fire. Moments later Monmouth was on fire as Gneisnau's shells struck home. Otranto had already fled the scene and Glasgow which was the only vessel crewed by regular Crews and gunners was opening fire on the Germans but her shells were falling short. She was also under fire from Leipzig and Dresden who were scoring hits. The gunners on Monmouth and Good Hope were also unable to return fire from the majority of their guns as they were too close to the waterline and in the rough seas they could not see the Germans. Further to that the German vessels were hard to spot against the coastline.

Craddock ordered his ships to close the range so that he could try and use his smaller guns and Good Hope and Monmouth charged forward, both aflame, Good Hope ploughed forward trying to fire and fearing that Craddock meant to launch torpedoes Spee ordered his vessels to scatter away from her and concentrate fire. Good Hope was struck by thirty five shells, the final one striking her forward magazine which sent a massive explosion through the ship and broke her apart sending 919 men, including Admiral Craddock, his dog Nelson and four Canadian midshipman (who were the first Canadian sailors killed) to the depths. The time was 19:50.

Monmouth was also aflame and taking on water. A shell from Gneisnau had struck the fore turret starting a fire that caused an ammunition explosion so violent that it blew the gun into the air and off the ship. She fell away and out of line with Good Hope at 19:35. Glasgow managed to close with her at 20:05 but could do very little to assist her. Captain Luce tried to encourage the vessel to turn North west but he received a reply that the she was so badly holed that should she turn she would sink even more quickly. With the moonlight behind them Luce made the decision to leave her behind and save his own vessel and protect Otranto.

Nurnberg closed with the stricken vessel and ordered her to surrender. Monmouth wouldn't or couldn't lower her flags and the German light cruiser fired a warning shot, the only response was Monmouth turning towards her so she fired her guns into the British vessel which promptly capsized at 21:58. In the rough seas and lack of light Leipzig tried to locate survivors but couldn't find any and the German squadron moved on leaving another 800 men dead in the cold seas.

Admiral von Spee was only certain that he had sunk Monmouth and was certain that Good Hope had eluded him at first but after searching the area was satisfied he had succeeded in turning back the British squadron.

I am well and almost beside myself with happiness one German sailor, Hans Stutterheim wrote in a

Scharnhorst coaling in Valparaiso showing signs of damage

letter home.

It was great news that was celebrated through Germany when von Spee reported it to the German consul in Valparaiso.

HMS Glasgow collected up Otranto and met up with Canopus and warned her of the German squadron and their ability. Luce took the stragglers back around the cape to the Falklands and safety. The Germans did not follow, they went to Valparaiso to repair and recoal. Letting the Glasgow escape would have deadly consequences for the Leipzig six weeks later...

SMS Leipzig - the Terror of the West Coast of America

SMS Leipzig

Early morning on 1^st September 1914 the sentries at Esquimalt Naval base spotted smoke plumes on the horizon. At last HMCS Rainbow was returning from her mission to locate the two missing sloops Shearwater and Algerine and was shepherding them home.

The vessel grew larger on the horizon. Something was not right about it and as it grew closer it became obvious that this wasn’t Rainbow. Neither was the second cruiser which was in line astern behind the first.

Binoculars were reached for and the vessels scanned. They were an unfamiliar design but flew Russian flags as they sailed confidently towards them. The duty commander was called but he wasn’t expecting any Russian vessels.

Then the shooting started. The two cruisers turned and delivered full broadsides, their ammunition falling with deadly accuracy. Within twenty minutes of firing the oil tanks were ablaze, vessels in the harbour were sunk, sailors and civilian workers fled in terror or cowered in whatever shelter they could. SMS Leipzig and Nürnberg turned seaward and set course for Vancouver.

This attack never actually occurred but the Canadian Admiralty and Government were acutely worried that it could and there would be nothing that they could do to stop it.

At the outbreak of the First World War SMS Leipzig was on patrol off the Mexican coast “flying the flag” for Germany and protecting German nationals who were getting caught up in the Mexican civil war, she had relieved SMS Nürnberg so it could return to Tsingtao for refit and some R&R. The reports that the Second Reich was now at war with the British Empire opened up a new problem for the German vessel.

SMS Leipzig, the sixth of the Bremen class light cruisers, had been commissioned on 20^th April 1906 from the AG Wesser shipyards in Bremen. At three hundred and sixty-five feet long and displacing 3816 metric tonnes she was by no means a mighty warship but her ten 10.5cm guns and two torpedo tubes made her more than a match for any merchant vessel or liner that should come into contact and indeed more than a match for the two Royal Navy vessels on the same station. HMS Shearwater and Algerine were two sloops with no more than only 1”- 1.5” thick armour over the boilers and machinery and only 25 pounder guns, 3 pounder guns and three maxims machineguns. On the outbreak of war these two vessels were told to leave as quickly as they could before they could be found by Leipzig. Frigattenkapitän Haun’s vessel was of better use as a multi mission cruiser which supported larger battleships in fleet engagements and his crew were long term enlistments trained in gunnery skills like the rest of von Spee’s squadron but they were in need of shore leave and rest.

The response by the Canadian admiralty was a little panicked. The only vessel available to them was the aging HMCS Rainbow which was the only surface unit on the west coast and half the Canadian’s entire fleet. Rainbow had been practically decommissioned and was really only a training vessel put was pressed into service with only two thirds of her complement aboard and armed with training shells filled with black powder which were the only available shells in the Naval store at Esquimalt. The promised train of ammunition had not arrived from the East coast by the time Rainbow was ordered to sea on the night of 3^rd August. Commander Walter Hose’s orders were to;

 “Proceed to sea forthwith to guard trade routes north of the Equator, keeping in touch with Pachena, until war has been declared.”

Hose did not rate his vessels chances against the modern German cruiser with her high velocity shells and superior guns. Indeed afterwards he stated that;

“To know where he [Leipzig] was exactly at that time would have been Rainbow’s main contribution… My main armament was my wireless, and that only had a range of two hundred miles.”

Neither did the dock workers who watched Rainbow leave and one stated;

“Few of those who saw her departure on that eventful occasion expect to see her return.”

HMCS Rainbow

With the dispatch of Rainbow the Naval strategists realised that the city of Vancouver, Prince Rupert Island, the Naval base as Esquimalt and other possible targets were now defenceless from the German vessels and could come under attack at anytime. Worse, should Rainbow fall to the German’s guns then it could be sometime before the Royal Navy’s China station could dispatch more ships to defend the Canadian shore. Two submarines which were being built for Chile in Seattle were hurriedly bought by the Canadian government and commissioned to form a basic defence force. Now all they had to do was wait and hope that the German vessels stayed away.

Commander Hose used the first two days at sea holding near Cape Flattery and Destruction strait practicing drill and calibrating the guns. If he was going to go into action he was going to be as ready as he could be. On 4^th August at 20:07 he received word that war had been declared and he made course for the South but by 21:00 he was ordered to return to Vancouver to resupply with modern ammunition. Hose proceeded at increased speed with the intention to arrive the following day but by 18:00 on the 5^th he was ordered to immediately change course and head south to escort Algerine and Shearwater who had left San Diego the day before with Leipzig in pursuit (last sighted at Magdalena bay). Rainbow proceeded at 3/5ths power and arrived at San Francisco on 7^th August at 6.00. Hose could not see the two sloops and presumed them to be either in port or seaward. Through want of information he decided the best course of action was to enter San Francisco to recoal and speak to the consulate.

Rainbow had been exceptionally lucky during this time. Although due to orders from the President and despite there being 500 tonnes of coal bought expressly for the use of Rainbow by the British Consul, the American authorities only allowed 50 tonnes of coal to be put aboard as she had enough coal to get her to the nearest British port. Hose could also get no concrete information on the location of the Leipzig or Nürnberg and after the Hamburg line freighter Alexandria (who was reportedly working as an auxiliary for Leipzig) passed the Golden gate bridge Hose decided it was best to head out to sea and head north. An hour before he was due to depart though Hose received confirmation that Leipzig was heading to San Francisco and would be there in the following days. A German vessel in port had loaded up with supplies and lubricating oil and was due to leave on the 8^th to meet the German warship(s) and transfer the cargo at sea. This made Hose’s mind up and Rainbow left quickly and headed south to meet Leipzig or the supply schooner. In foggy weather he held his position for two days waiting but to no avail. The only vessel they saw was a small Mail steamer from a German owned company in San Francisco which buzzed around them under the American flag reporting Rainbow’s position to the German cruiser. With his coal levels now reaching their safety margin Hose decided he had to return to Canadian waters to resupply and hopefully meet up with the two sloops or the Canadian supply ship that had put to sea. Before doing so the crew tossed over all the flammable woodwork which, when it washed up on the American shores, gave the impression that Leipzig had sunk her.

On 12^th August however the Rainbow saw a three funnelled cruiser hulled vessel steaming towards them at full speed. Fearing it was the Nürnberg or Leipzig Hose ordered his vessel to turn 14 points away at full speed and ordered battle stations. His plan was to pull away and ready his stern guns before turning and attacking. Thankfully it was the liner SS Prince George which had been fitted up as a hospital ship and sent to escort Rainbow on her mission and to pick up survivors from her inevitable sinking. She also carried orders for the ship to return to base with her.


On the 2^nd August Leipzig was anchored at Mazatan, Mexico but soon left for a sweep up the coast towards San Francisco in the hope of catching British flagged merchant vessels coming out of port. It was a good plan as San Francisco was a good stopping point for trade and more importantly coal up for the final push to Canada. The only drawback was that all precautions had be taken not to pull over a neutral American vessel. His orders only covered attacking mercantile shipping and any small enemy vessels that he came across, any larger vessels or fleets were to be avoided at all costs. The Nürnberg had left the region on the 21^st July heading from San Francisco to Honolulu to rendezvous with von Spee and the Kreuzerwaffe. Haun was alone but the Allies did not know that and mercantile shipping began to seize up. Insurance companies were very tetchy about insuaring vessels when an enemy cruiser was in the sea-lanes, it is very bad for business. Captains were also wary about putting to sea in their livelihoods and risking their crews lives.

As the intrepid Rainbow put to sea from Esquimalt, the Leipzig was cruising up the west coast searching for any shipping but she found nothing. Either ships were scattering as she approached or were refusing to put to sea. Haun received transmissions that the Royal Navy were waiting for him with a cruiser out by the Golden gate bridge, although he was informed of its obsolete nature he was painfully aware that he was many miles from a German port for repair and proceeded cautiously through the fog. On reaching San Francisco on the 10^th August Haun put in to coal up his vessel and get an idea of what British flagged vessels were about. International law stated that he could only take on coal and conduct minor repairs for twenty four hours in a neutral port and the US authorities in San Francisco were very strict at this time and Leipzig had to leave before she had been coaled properly. After consulting the German consulate Haun had decided to keep his vessel seaward of the Golden gate bridge as he believed that he would catch something either going in or out, especially colliers with which to stock his much depleted bunkers. He was in no rush to attack Rainbow or look for the sloops as if he were to sustain any damage his anti commerce campaign would come to an end very quickly, he also feared that if coaled insufficiently he would be forced to make the ignominious decision to intern one of the Kaiser’s warships with out any victory to show for it. It was resolved that if he could find no coal that he would steam after Rainbow and fight before interning his damaged and low on coal vessel.  There is a local rumour that a German battleship sheltered at Conception bay during the period and this very well could have been Leipzig awaiting shipping.

In San Francisco 25 steamers carrying in excess of 60,000 tonnes of Barley and large amounts of other trade were waiting for Leipzig to leave. In Seattle grain, salmon, flour and lumber were building up awaiting shipping to collect it. Businesses were frozen awaiting deliveries and removal of exports but whilst the German cruiser remained nothing moved.


Leipzig was forced to leave the area of San Francisco on the 18^th August as after a week of inactivity caused by the British Admiralty’s order to all Merchant shipping to “stay in port”. News came that HMS Newcastle from Admiral Jerram’s China station was on its way across the Pacific to assist the Canadian fleet and that as relations with Japan looked to be deteriorating the armoured cruiser Idzumo, which had been off the coast of Mexico as well, would also come looking for Haun’s vessel. Before leaving though Haun invited journalists aboard Leipzig, personally met the mayor of San Francisco and donated two Japanese bear cubs to the zoo. He also proclaimed that the Leipzig would seek out enemy shipping and fight;

 “the number and size of our antagonists makes no difference to us.”

The decision was made to head south and Leipzig got underway and she proceeded to the Gulf of California where she laid low for a week and on the 8^th September she coaled from the German Freighter Marie and railway trucks from the Sonara railway company that were assembled on the shore for Haun’s use. The very next day, along with Marie he left his sanctuary and cruised up the gulf where at 2.30 am they scored their first victory. The tank steamer Elsinore which failed to see the cruiser in the sporadic rain squalls and despite her turned down running lights was picked up by Leipzig’s searchlights. After the crew was taken aboard the Leipzig the Elsinore was consigned to the depths.

HMS Shearwater

Haun promised the Captain of the Elsinore that he would put them ashore on the Marie at Calao but changed his plans and headed out towards the Galapagos Islands, arriving on the 17^th September and left the prisoners under the watch of one German officer before coaling and leaving on the 21^st. As the Leipzig had sailed south all the shipping had been held in port so Captain Haun was hoping that by heading out to the remote Galapagos it would be assumed he had left the theatre heading out towards the Pacific. He planned a surprise attack on the trade routes along Ecuadorian and Peruvian coast.  The first casualty was handed to him on a plate.

The after shocks of Leipzig’s patrol up to San Francisco were still being felt by the Canadian and British shipping though. HMCS Rainbow overtook Shearwater on 13^th August near the Straits of Juan de Fuca and escorted to Esquimalt where in a very quick turn around of re-coaling and taking on High explosive ammunition (which lacked the correct fuses and were thus fairly useless) and headed out the same day to find Algerine. The last sloop was found in the early hours the next day by the Prince George. She had run out of coal and had unfurled her sails but meeting strong headwinds her journey north had been slowed. Following the arrival of the fuses on the 15^th of August Commander Hose requested permission to go and seek out Leipzig. Permission was duly granted and on the 18^th Rainbow set sail for San Francisco once again. However later that day the order was quickly countermanded and Hose returned to base having been ordered to await reinforcements from Admiral Jerram’s China station; HMS Newcastle was due soon and they could proceed together. Before Newcastle could arrive an urgent summons was received from Prince Rupert Island where the locals were certain they had seen Leipzig and Nürnberg. Rainbow set off immediately searching for the Germans bolstered with crewmen from the RCNVR and the two sloops as well as her new ammunition but found nothing not even the US steamship Delhi which had supposedly resupplied the two German cruisers on the night of 19^th-20^th August. Little did they know that Haun and Leipzig were actually in the Gulf of California some 1998 miles away and Nürnberg was even further and was coaling at the Enewetak atoll with von Spee’s armoured cruisers. Commander Hose decided to take Rainbow on an extended patrol of the north British Columbia coast returning to Esquimalt on the 2^nd September.

The reinforcements had arrived in Rainbow’s absence. On 25^th August the IJN Idzumo arrived at Esquimalt and on 30^th so did the Newcastle under Captain Powlett who took immediate command of the whole of the Naval operation as the senior Naval officer and began organise shore defence guns and mine laying to protect the coast. Rear Admiral Story arrived in mid September to take command of the situation after the Canadian Naval department became concerned about the methods Powlett was using as they considered all of these defences unnecessary and more importantly expensive! They wanted to also reassert Canadian authority over the Canadian Navy. Story quickly took charge as the senior officer and put things in order.

Newcastle and Idzumo began their sweep south on the 3^rd September leaving Rainbow to guard the northern approaches in case Admiral von Spee’s squadron arrived to the north. They found nothing. Idzumo was left to guard the entrance to San Francisco in case Leipzig were to double back and Newcastle carried on alone, safe in the news that Nürnberg had been sighted in Honolulu on the 1^st-2^nd September. There was evidence that Leipzig had been through the waters leading to Panama, only rumours, sightings and old information greeted the British rather than the elusive prey. Powlett made a thorough search of the area and arrived  at Santa Rosalia at the Gulf of California’s mouth on 17^th September. He theorised correctly that Haun would head for the Galapagos islands and may join up with Nürnberg again, if she had turned east to the South American coast rather than west to von Spee’s fleet. Having set up lookouts and an intelligence network on the coast and believing Leipzig had too much of a head start and may have Nürnberg with her he decided to return back to his station on the Canadian coast.

The SS Bankfields was carrying 9 tonnes of Copper ore and 5950 tonnes of sugar when she began her journey at 4am on the 24^th September unaware that the British consulate’s order to hold all shipping until Leipzig could be located had been delayed by her company’s German owner who may or may not have also been in contact with the German warship. Blissfully unaware of the threat the freighter continued in a straight line across the gulf of Guayaquil on the Panama track until 8am on the following day when she was pulled over by the German cruiser and ordered to follow her after a brief boarding action at 8.55. Six and a half hours later the unmanned prize was sunk by gunfire and Leipzig again began to crawl down the coast looking for prey. Haun found the seas devoid of British shipping, word of his existence had paralysed the sea lanes here and his search was fruitless.  He decided to head for the Lobos de Afuera Islands where on the 28^th he was met by a Kosmos liner Amasts which brought fresh coal.

After failing to catch the Tamar, a British freighter which stuck close to neutral territorial waters,

SMS Dresden

Leipzig planned to turn west again but was signalled that fresh vessels were coming to assist. There was also contact from the Admiralstab in Berlin. Another German cruiser, SMS Dresden was running from the Royal Navy on the east coast of South America and had rounded Cape Horn, he was ordered to meet Dresden so that they could work together in commerce raiding and for mutual defence. On the 2^nd October a radio message from the Dresden, the first German warship they’d seen in three months, came through;

My position is Mas a Fuera Island. Intend to proceed to Easter Island to make contact with Cruiser Squadron.

The news that Admiral von Spee had brought the squadron across the ocean must have been greeted with much elation aboard the German cruiser, she was no longer alone in unfriendly waters and the Admiral was sure to have a plan of action. On the 3^rd October three more Kosmos liners arrived fully laden with coal for him. They were the Anubis, Karnak and Abessinia.  Leipzig planned to move forward with purpose and Haun decided to make for Easter Island as a rendezvous point where Dresden and Leipzig could meet and plan their next moves but first he ordered Abessinia to fully coal up his cruiser on the 3^rd October until the 4^th.

Further communications with Dresden on the 5^th carried orders from von Spee coordinating their arrival and on the 12^th October the squadron reformed off the neutral port at Easter Island. Admiral von Spee’s fleet of two armoured cruisers (Scharnhorst and Gneisnau) and three light cruisers (Nürnberg, Dresden and Leipzig) was now fully attended by colliers and supply ships . The Admiral now had a fleet that could reckon with an English patrol. He could make his way to Germany with these ships.

On the 1^st October the SS Marie put in at Callao and released the Bankfields’ crew. Coincidentally a small sailing boat from the Galapagos islands also put in to the mainland carrying half of the Elsinore crew. They had escaped from their solitary German captor on 24^th September and spent a week at sea trying to get back to report Leipzig’s position and activities, all to late now. This information was relayed however to the Royal Navy commander who was rounding Cape Horn, Rear Admiral Craddock who had come to find von Spee and his ships.