The fall of Tsingtao

SMS Scharnhorst and HMS Minotaur in Tsingtao early 1914 (IWM HU 64344)

   As the Geopolitical situation deteriorated the situation in Tsingtao grew tense. Orders came through for all gunboats to return to base, and the Yangtze river gunboats Otter, Tsingtao, and Vaterland simply disarmed themselves and the crews hurried back to the Naval base leaving the boats at their moorings where they were taken by the Chinese.

   Searching for a safe port and bearing news from Berlin warning of possible if not probable war, the arrival of Austro-Hungarian cruiser Kaiserin Elizabeth on 21 July prompted the Emden’s Fregattenkapitän, Karl von Müller, to call a council of war as the senior Naval officer in port. Although it was all speculation as to whom they would be fighting, the fleet still had to mobilise, defend the colonies, escort colliers to a rendezvous for squadron manoeuvres, and above all not get blockaded in port. The cruisers of the East Asiatic Squadron and the skill of her crews were more than a match for the Russian forces and could also match the French. The big question lay over England, and how swiftly HMS Minotaur and Triumph could swing into action or Australia and New Zealand to organise their vessels and soldiers for occupation forces. There was the chance that Japan would join her ally England and lend her vast and modern warships to the struggle—her recent aggressive foreign policy and voracious need for fresh territorial gains meant that this would be very likely. There was a prevalent view in Germany that Europeans were superior to Asians, which led to the Kaiser declaring that he would rather surrender Berlin to the Russians than Tsingtao to the Japanese.

   It was obvious that Japan’s involvement could mean a siege sooner rather than later, and with Germany their sole source of coal and ammunition, it would only be a matter of time before Tsingtao would be forced to surrender. Things in the islands would be more cut and dry; with no formal defences, and only a handful of Melanise policemen and army reservists on each island, an organised Allied landing would quickly overpower German resistance. The only plausible defence would be for von Spee to catch the invasion forces unescorted, or for an organised guerrilla war against the Allies. The nearest the Germans came to this was Leutnant Herman Detzner disappearing into the jungles of New Guinea. If the war was restricted to Russia and France, their limited reinforcements in the region and more pressing priorities on the European front would mean attacks on the colonies would be less likely. Only Britain’s involvement would include enough soldiers to occupy all of the scattered islands and their overwhelming sea power could escort invasion transports and hunt the East Asiatic Squadron.

   On 22 July the Cormoran’s captain, Zuckschwerdt, ordered his crew to work around the clock, using spotlights at night. Supplies and ammunition were organised to warehouses by her slip, so they could be loaded quickly when it was fully operational. Although Zuckschwerdt knew that the Cormoran would stand little chances against a modern warship, it was better to be at sea than trapped in port awaiting capture or internment, which was the likely outcome for the inhabitants of Tsingtao. Adalbert Zuckschwerdt had been in the Pacific a long time and was well known throughout the fleet with a reputation for fairness laced with discipline, and a stubborn streak that favoured action rather than wasting time on deep contemplative thought. Even though he avoided harsh personal exchanges and was quiet and conscious of others, with the advent of war he was putting an amount of zeal and strength into getting the Cormoran ready. Throughout the colony the efforts to mobilise the flotilla of gunboats for defence, the colliers for supplying the Kreuzerwaffe, and the creation of auxiliary cruisers moved at pace. Korvettenkapitän Sachse of the Iltis was ordered to mobilise the dockyard to war. Korvettenkapitän Friedrich Luring of the Jaguar was ordered to stay in British Shanghai to reorganise German operations there whilst his vessel fled under Leutnant Fritz Matthias before handing over command of Karl von Bodecker the former commander of the Tiger. The Jaguar along with the Luchs, Tiger, Iltis, and torpedo boat S.90 were charged with protecting the harbour at the direction of Governor Alfred Meyer-Waldeck.

   Emden was put on a war footing and through July her readiness was increased until 31st, when all her unnecessary equipment, flammable trim, and excess personal effects were stored in a warehouse on the dock. Her ammunition and coal stocks were fully supplied, so when the orders came through, she would be ready to leave immediately. A shore party was also arranged to assist with the receipt of telegraphs and increase the military capability. Von Müller was determined to leave port on the 31st, this was to avoid a blockade that would see his ship wasted and to comply with orders from Berlin—to get as much available coal out of the harbour and delivered to von Spee. After meeting with Zuckschwerdt to hand over command of the naval forces and give directions, he ordered the cruiser to leave port at 7.30 p.m., with the S.90 sailing ahead to clear the way and scout for enemy vessels while the collier Elsbeth sailed behind. When reports came through that Russia had declared war on Germany, von Müller was given permission to carry out his plan; after releasing the Elsbeth to head for Yap the Emden turned towards the Tushima straits hoping to find Russian shipping plying the trade between Nagasaki and Vladivostok, or the Russian cruiser Askold. On 4 August, the lookouts spotted a vessel flying the Russian flag and moved to intercept. When the ship responded to the warning shot by opening up her engines and commencing evasive manoeuvres, as well as sending out a plethora of wireless transmission signals, von Müller loaded his guns and fired a few shots closer to the vessel. On the third passing through the rigging, the Russian vessel came to a stop, still sending SOS signals that the German Captain hoped had been jammed by his vessel’s signals. On inspection the Russian vessel, SS Ryazan, turned out to be a modern German passenger vessel built in Danzig in 1909, with a top speed of 14 knots and decent capacity. Reservist Leutnant Lauterbach led the boarding party over to secure the vessel, almost falling in the sea when his small launch got caught in a swell alongside the ship. The Russian Captain protested that he did not know war had begun, he protested that the Germans were pirates and he protested that he did not speak German. Lauterbach reminded him that he had seen him in Tsingtao and knew he could speak German, he also reminded him that the Russian had tried running, which meant he knew war had begun. On inspection of the cargo manifest, he found that the vessel was carrying tea, iron railings, salted meat, and spirits, as well as some passengers who also protested that they were being kidnapped. Von Müller decided to take the vessel back to Tsingtao for conversion and turned both vessels around operating in blackout and wireless transmission silence; the passengers aboard the Russian vessel were not cooperative and kept turning lights on and, when the bulbs were removed, taking them from other fittings. Lauterbach was kept very much on his toes. The two vessels passed many Japanese fishing vessels and even intercepted a transmission that Britain was now at war with Germany, a very ominous piece of news but he had no wish to run into any of the heavier British vessels.

   On arrival at port, von Müller ordered the immediate resupply of the Emden and took Zuckschwerdt to see Meyer-Waldeck to report his success and future plans. It was decided that the liner Prinz Eitel Friedrich should be fitted with guns and crew from the Tiger and Luchs, and placed under command of Fregattenkapitän Max Thierichsens of the Luchs. All excess sailors were to be assigned to marines, formed into infantry detachments ready for the eventual siege. Though not what they were trained for, it was the best solution that could be hoped for as they needed everyone who could carry a rifle to assist. Zuckschwerdt reported that Cormoran’s engines had been repaired and tested that very morning. However, the haste at which it had been reassembled by tired men, working day and night, meant that the repairs had not been successful and the engine merely shook herself apart, causing the propeller shafts to break. Its completion would take a further few days at least. It was decided to convert the Ryazan into another auxiliary using the crew and Captain of the Cormoran due to her having a good rate of speed and crew capacity. With the older Bussard out of commission it made sense to at least use her guns and crew for something useful. Zuckschwerdt began work immediately, using the large spotlights and twelve-hour shifts that had been in place from his previous command. The new vessel was also to be called Cormoran in honour of the previous vessel—to carry on the legacy. In four days of continual work the vessel was ready for commission, with eight 4-inch guns deployed, two searchlights, ammunition, food provisions to last five months at sea, and 2,000 tons of coal. Due to the small coal bunkers on the new the Cormoran, the crew quarters had to be converted and the crew were assigned to sleep on the decks of the ship. The crew was topped up with reservists, volunteers from the Vaterland and Iltis and the new recruits that had arrived just two months beforehand. The total compliment was twenty-four officers, 218 men, and fifteen helpers, including four Chinese laundrymen.

   Events were beginning to overtake Tsingtao, with news that the Japanese fleet had sailed on 8 August and the German’s worst fears were confirmed by a telegram from Berlin that stated war with Japan was imminent. SMS Emden reacted to von Spee’s summons to Pagan Island by leaving port on 6 August taking the Prinz Eitel Friedrich and the collier Markommannia, with a small flotilla of other colliers leaving on separate routes to meet the Admiral. Zuckschwerdt was determined not to get caught and the Cormoran left Tsingtao on 10 August at 2 p.m. amidst a growing chatter of Japanese wireless transmission traffic, with concerns that the vessel may not make it to the open sea. S.90, predominantly used as a scout ship, reported the horizon all clear and with one last look at Tsingtao the Cormoran slipped out to sea. Over the next few days came warnings from command of the Japanese fleet detaching and operating heavily in the area. On the 15 August the Japanese ultimatum arrived; this gave the Germans a month to abandon Tsingtao to the Japanese, and to remove all warships from Chinese waters immediately—they gave the Germans eight days to respond. Obviously this was unacceptable to the Germans and Mayer-Waldeck responded with a letter:

It is a matter of course that we can never consent to surrender Tsingtao to Japan without drawing the sword. The frivolity of the Japanese demand admits but of one reply. But it implies that we must reckon on the opening of hostilities at the expiration of the date fixed. It will be a fight to the finish.
Another German wrote in his diary of the Japanese ultimatum, ‘they can tell this to a Russian but not to a German’.

   A heavy Japanese presence, with a week until hostilities were declared, meant that any operations in the Yellow Sea would be perilous, and so the Kaiser’s newest auxiliary had to head south away from her coaling base. Flying her Russian flag, the Cormoran, tried to slip past islands and Japanese fishing boats at night so as to avoid observation, all the while listening to continued Japanese wireless transmission messages that seemed closer and closer. After four days at sea, and lacking communication from the radio station at Yap, Zuckschwerdt decided to use a general radio call out. Gaining a response from the steamer Ahlers, who reported an English vessel visible on the horizon. The Cormoran rushed towards the scene only to receive a second message that it was in fact another German vessel—the Göttingen of the Deutshe Lloyd steam company. Although Zuckschwerdt ordered his vessels truned about, he received orders the next day from the Scharnhorst to rendezvous with these two ships, and to bring them immediately to him—he required as much news as possible. However, it was not as simply as it initially seemed to be; the Cormoran got caught in a storm knocking her 100 nmi off course, which also damaged the wireless transmitter, smashed a lifeboat, and saw supplies being washed out to sea. It was not until 21 August that they met with the two wayward German vessels and began their journey to von Spee (which took another four days), passing the released Gouverneur Jaschke, which pointed them towards the Majuro Island. Within the lagoon lay the Prinz Eitel Friedrich, Titania, Yorck, Prinz Waldemar, Holsatia, Mark, and Longman, with the Emden and the Nürnberg detached. Zuckschwerdt immediately reported to his Admiral and submitted for inspection.

   In Tsingtao the situation looked bleak. They had amassed a force of 1,500 men in four infantry

Some of the Prinz Heinrich Kompagnie at Tsingtao

companies with 140 cavalry men, six quick-firing 3-inch guns organised into a field artillery battery, two machine gun detachments, and 140 engineers. There was a further 750 men coming from Tientsin, under Oberstleutnant Kuhlo, and a Taube aircraft, flown by the redoubtable Gunther Plüschow. A second Taube had crashed on her maiden test flight, putting pilot Leutnant Müllerkowski in hospital and his aeroplane in pieces. Further reinforcements had come from the Prinz Heinrich Kompagnie, part of the Shanghai Volunteer corps, the elements of this detachment arrived carrying Lee Metford rifles and wearing British cut uniforms and ammunition pouches and were quickly assimilated into 7. Kompangie of III. Seebataillon. The German forces would be no match for a large Allied army and they knew it; however, the British had estimated that it would take five months to organise and deploy an Indian garrison, reliant on favourable conditions. Japan on the other hand would be more than ready as it had no other military commitments. Tsingtao had a tactical advantage of a strong mountainous defence to the north, as well as neutral China; if the Allies were to obey the rules of war and not violate China, they would have to come from the sea. The harbour was well defended with guns, mines, the torpedo boat S.90, and the gunboats all under the Kaiserin Elisabeth. There were also diplomatic channels for Mayer-Walbeck to explore. He tried to get Washington to intervene by making European settlements in China neutral, and also contacted China to say that they would like to terminate the lease and give it back. Washington was not interested and China just terminated the lease refusing to take it back. This only gave legitimacy to the Japanese claim that the Germans were unwanted interlopers in Asia, and they would expel them ‘…for the assurance of peace of the Far East and the preservation of China’s territorial integrity’.

   Martial law had already been declared on 1 August and the German troops had already filed into their trenches, fortifications, and strongpoints preparing for an invasion. The Japanese were likewise anxious to gain the colony, and had already begun massing its troops ready for embarkation and preparing a blockade. While the German government looked at the ultimatum, they would be joined by a subordinate Anglo-British force under Colonel Barnardiston. The force of 23,000 men and 142 guns landed on 2 September to the north of Tsingtao in Chinese territory, setting up a headquarters in the provincial town of Tsinanfu. This was much to the consternation of local British consul John Pratt, who argued this was a violation of Chinese neutrality akin to Germany’s march through Belgium, but he was hushed by his superior in Peking. After the Chinese protested, the Japanese stated they were going to secure the railway network and any Chinese resistance would be seen as friendly to Germany and an act of aggression to Japan. The march was impeded by bad weather and heavy rains that flooded large parts of the plains, but as they marched the Japanese censored all local communications and removed all Europeans from their line of advance to mask their numbers and strategy.

   Mayer-Walbeck was informed of the landing and began preparations to strengthen the northern approaches, sending Kuhlo’s men to the mountains to dig trenches, lay mines, and prepare artillery emplacements using Chinese labourers. There followed several days of inaction, with only two very ineffectual Japanese air raids and one Japanese spy, shot for trying to poison the water supply with Typhus. A third air raid on the Kaiserin Elizabeth and Jaguar was also attempted to no effect. The second Japanese landing came on the 18th, supported by the Anglo-Indian forces shipped in on rented Chinese vessels on the 22nd, in the south of the peninsula. Their advance was slow as the weather had turned the roads into quagmires bogging down the men and their equipment. Relations were strained between the two allies and General Kaimo, though polite and reserved, saw this as a solely Japanese venture of which the British were allowed to tag along. His officers did not think much of the British fighting skills and, on more than one occasion, mistook them for German troops and fired at them. The weather, and Kaimo’s cautious advance, meant that it was the end of September when the naval blockade opened fire for the first time, destroying the Russian cemetery, a pigsty and Bismarck barracks prison.

 As the bombardment, began the German defenders fell back from the front line to protect

SMS S.90

themselves and it was up to the remnants of the East Asiatic Squadron to strike back for Germany. On 28 September the Iltis was damaged by Japanese artillery and along with a toothless and damaged Tiger, Luchs, and Cormoran was towed to deep water and set aflame to stop them falling into enemy hands. The Jaguar remained busy engaging enemy shore batteries and positions as well as causing the destroyer Shirotaye to be grounded on the 3 September. The Jaguar had also engaged in an unsuccessful sortie with the Kaiserin Elisabeth before the cruiser donated her large 6-inch and 2-inch guns forming the 'Batterie Elisabeth'- her excess crew assigned to the garrison. These were not the only victories for the navy, the minesweeper Lauting and torpedo boat S.90, with the support of one of the shore batteries bombarded HMS Kennet on 22 August; S.90 hit Kennet twice forcing her to withdraw. This success was again repeated by Kapitanleunant Brunner's vessel as she ran the Allied blockade on the evening of the moonless 17 October torpedoing the Japanese Cruiser HIJMS Takachiho killing 271 of her crew of 325. This was an outstanding success, but celebration was short lived as at 1:30 a.m. a wireless message was recieved from S.90;

Have attacked enemy cruisers with three torpedoes, registered three hits. Cruiser blew up at once. Am hunted by torpedo-boat destroyers return to Tsingtao cut off, trying to escape south, and if necessary shall explode boat.    BRUNNER.

Brunner was forced to scuttle of the Chinese coast and the crew interned themselves, eventually being held in Nanking. The gunboats continued to shell the Allied vessels, with the minefield around the harbour would claim three Japanese steamers. Despite their limitations the last surface units of the East Asiatic were going down fighting against a much superior force.

   However, the ground forces were becoming more fatalistic knowing that they were outnumbered six to one. One German officer told his men ‘we cannot obtain victory here; only die. Still, before it reaches that point, take as many of the yellow Apes with you as you can’. As they withdrew (to twin lines along the ridges around the settlement) they destroyed bridges over mountain gorges and destroyed the Mecklenberg Inn. The Germans gave a token night attack, but were repulsed. Following this, the allied forces attacked in the middle of the month, pushing the Germans back along the line except at a strong point where the German Cavalry were able to aid in driving off the infantry and take a toll on the enemy. A negotiated ceasefire occurred after this assault, in order to bury the dead. The Japanese were playing a long game, bringing 100 heavy siege guns, with 1,200 rounds each, to the top of Prinz Heinrich Heights. They began shelling on 31 October. The land bombardment was joined by naval guns, up to 11 inches in calibre. Although the Germans did respond at the Japanese land positions, with accurate spotting from the unstoppable Plüschow, they soon ran out of ammunition. Their guns sat silent as the Japanese rained death upon their positions for a whole week, setting coal stocks and petrol tanks on fire and causing the 150-ton docking crane to collapse under the incessant fire.

   The weather still caused massive problems for the attackers, slowing their advance. The hostile weather killed several engineers and eight Welsh soldiers, who were constructing a pontoon bridge across a swollen river, all the while Japanese fire came down upon the Germans.

   On 6 November, Plüschow flew out of the encirclement clutching the last of Meyer-Waldeck’s dispatches. He came down in a rice paddy, though still managed to get the dispatches out and back to Germany. He also began his long journey home, which involved travel via China, Japan, across America by train, and a boat to Italy, which unfortunately for him stopped at Gibraltar, where he was taken prisoner. He eventually escaped from Donnington Hall POW camp in England, working at the London Docks before eventually slipping out to Holland and finally into Germany. On the same day, the Japanese infantry charged in a great wave through the remains of the German lines under the cover of darkness and swept through the tired German defenders, taking 200 prisoners and forcing others from their positions, which the defenders often detonated. Other fortifications were abandoned, left full of bodies and equipment. The Japanese urged the Germans to surrender, while at the same time switching to shrapnel shells to cut down the fleeing infantry. By morning the struggle was over, with the surrender of the remaining forces to the Allies. The Jaguar was scuttled that morning and joined the Kaiserin Elisabeth, which had been scuttled on the 2 November by her commander Richard Makovicz after she had exhausted her ammunition; his final message to his ship was ‘Addio Lisa’. Meyer-Waldeck refused to fight on—some of his officers felt that they should—and sent a message to Kaimo: ‘…my defensive means are exhausted. I am now ready to enter into surrender negotiations for the now open city’. The German marines and sailors of the East Asiatic had put up a spirited defence and held out against Allied forces for three months, a lot longer than anyone had thought possible and caused 727 killed and 1,335 wounded, for the loss of 199 and 504 wounded.

German prisoners from Tsingtao held in Japan © IWM (Q 52827)

   When the Allies marched into the town, the Germans lined the streets in silence to watch the Japanese. The moment the British column arrived they turned their backs in disgust, for their use of Asians to fight their battles instead of fighting them honourably. The surrender documents were signed by the chiefs of staff for the German and Japanese forces and, in yet another snub, the British were left out. The Kaiser was deeply disappointed, but could not be surprised—the best support he had been able to offer were words of encouragement: ‘With me, the entire Germanic nation looks with pride on the heroes of Tsingtao whom, true to the word of the Governor, are fulfilling their duties. You should know all of my appreciation.’

   The garrison laid down its arms and marched into Japanese captivity, to be freed and returned to Germany in 1920.  One British officer described the garrison:

…their dejection was far from pleasant to watch. They were brave men, they had done their best, their clothes were ragged. They seemed amazed to see Britons standing by and, as though with final effort, they raised their heads as they passed and met me eye-to-eye with burning looks.

With the loss of the port the only harbour with a German Imperial grade shipyard in the whole Pacific was lost to von Spee. It was of no consequence to the Admiral as he was an ocean away when it fell.

von Mücke's odyssey

The Emden's landing force before embarking on Ayesha

Korvetten-kapitän Helmuth von Mücke sat in a boat with the rest of his fifty strong landing force watching HMAS Sydney chasing the heavily damaged Emden and realised that he had to do something and ordered his men back to Cooling Island. He had enough fire power to defend the island from an armed landing and if he could dig in on the beaches his four machine guns could make short work of any boats approaching. The big problem was that as soon as the boats had been shot at the Sydney would begin firing her big guns and with no cover to speak of he would only bring death to his small command. What else could be done? Honour demanded that he at least make a show of force especially against an enemy he bitterly despised. He gave the relieved civilians permission to take boats to one of the other islands and ordered his men to dig in and prepare the beaches for an assault but then his eyes settled on the schooner Ayesha in the harbour, his men hadn’t got around to destroying it and suddenly an escape plan began to form. Whilst Sydney was finishing off Emden and looking for Buresk he personally inspected her sea worthiness and satisfied that she could make it at least to a neutral port where another boat could be procured he returned to the beaches and ordered his relieved men to begin massing supplies and anything they could feel that would be useful to an escape attempt or long periods of time at sea. Their foraging was aided by some of those on the island who brought out pipes, tobacco, clothing, water, drums of petrol and blankets as well as offering information about tides, courses, wind and weather in the region. Von Mücke was also advised that Ayesha’s bottom was rotten and that HMS Minotaur and a Japanese cruiser were nearby as well as the Sydney. What hope would he have in a rotten ship that was no longer used with little in the way of supplies? Nevertheless as the sun set the Emden’s steam launch towed “His Majesty’s newest ship” under the battle flag of the Imperial Navy out of the harbour.

Life aboard was pretty basic with the majority of the men sleeping on the iron ballast below decks as the only two beds were reserved for von Mücke and the off duty Lieutenant. Day to day running was the complete opposite of life on a modern steam driven warship and soon the strict German military discipline was allowed to slide with washing in stale water or in impromptu baths during rain storms, shaving was not compulsory and cleaning of teeth was abandoned as were uniforms which rapidly fell into a state of disrepair leaving the crew in a state of semi nudity. There were also hardships with water turning bad in rusted containers which was rectified by catching rain water through a crafted canvas chute and carried in pales to the cleaned tanks. There was also boredom with no room to drill and after cleaning the deck little housekeeping to be done and the majority of downtime was taken up with singing, talking or the few of the crew who were knowledgeable about Sail teaching the others.

For von Mücke there were weightier concerns. The Ayesha was indeed rotten, he had discovered how bad it was shortly after Direction Island whilst poking around in the hold. Should they run over a reef the ship would be torn apart. He was aiming for the Dutch ports of Padang or Batavia but his overall destination was even more ambitious with a choice of three, either German East Africa to join up with General von Lettow-Vorbeck’s forces, locate Königsberg and report to Kapitän Looff or to return to Tsingtaō. He also had to contend with the nagging concern of being intercepted by the Allies. His total armament was four machine guns and twenty nine rifles and his plan was to bring his schooner close to the enemy ship and open fire with what he had whilst sitting under the cruiser’s big guns. They did however take no chances with all the weapons stored below decks and the state of undress only added to the illusion that of a simple trading vessel. With no ability to run or turn away all they could do was hope not to be spotted or questioned and on the one occasion a steamer paid too much attention they were able to bluff their way past.

Wind and weather were a continual problem and damage to the sails and equipment had to be repaired where possible. It took several days to get into Padang harbour where an on going debate with the Dutch authorities developed with them mounting pressure on the three German officers to quietly intern their vessel. With that came news from the other German and Austro-Hungarian steamers. Tsingtaō had fallen, Königsberg had been forced to hole up in the Rafugi estuary and was under siege. There was also news of hard battles and campaigning in East Africa and von Lettow-Vorbeck disappearing into the bush. Whilst the Dutch refused fresh clothes, combs and toothbrushes as it was deemed that it would increase the fighting strength of the vessel. Despite all of the set backs von Mücke and his two officers said they were going to sea and with their fresh food and gear donated by the German vessels in port they sailed into the night singing “Wacht am Rhein” only to be joined by a row boat carrying an reservist officer and engineering officer who wished to join them.

Von Mücke kept the Ayesha heading west hoping that the captains of the German ships in Padang would come looking for them and after two weeks on a foggy 14
^th December the freighter Choising caught up with them and the Emden’s crew transferred to the steamship. It was with a heavy heart that the crew gathered to watch their home of 1709 Nautical Miles disappeared beneath the waves with her sea cocks open and holes bored through the rotten hold at 16:58 on the 16^th December.

The Choising was only a moderately better vessel and only averaged four knots with cramped conditions as most of the men were delegated an ex-coal bunker for quarters. Nevertheless it was the hand that had been dealt and von Mücke was going to take it and he had a new destination. News in Padang had revealed Turkey was waging war against England and as his men were not infantry trained nor able to locate von Lettow-Vorbeck’s forces and Kapitän Looff had enough of his own problems without fifty more mouths to feed  and so it was decided to head for Turkish territory. After crafting an Italian flag and disguising the vessel as the merchant vessel Shenir they headed for the straits of Perim without charts of the region finally arriving on the 7^th January 1915. As they approached a small British blockade von Mücke prepared to sacrifice the Choising and get his men to shore in the largest rowboats with orders to “Obey your officers”.

As a precaution the Choising was blacked out and hugging the coast so as to avoid being silhouetted they were however, illuminated by the Perim lighthouse but attracted no attention from the British gunboats and the Germans were able to slip past and land outside Hodeida the following day. There was a very optimistic belief that all they had to do was march into the town of Hodeida, board the Hejaz railway to Constantinople and they would be back in Kiel in a fortnight. After a misunderstanding which almost saw the garrison attack them as an Allied force making a hostile landing they were greeted with great ceremony and for the first time since leaving Emden they slept on real beds in the local barracks. The path ahead was a tricky one with the sea guarded by the Allies and a long route on land would take two months but with the certainty of the Allies catching them in the thin straits of the Red sea they were forced to prepare for a land march and von Mücke requested the necessary camels, water, food, guns and equipment from the Turkish commander. This endeavour would take two weeks. The climate was hard for the European sailors and despite boiling the water and regularly taking Quinine disease like Malaria and Dysentery quickly caught hold of them and fearing the complete loss of his men before they marched out von Mücke sought advice as to where he could take his men. He was directed to Sanaa in Yemen where the mountainous climate was similar to that of Europe and the water cleaner. The Germans set out on horseback for the journey which proved uneventful but was excellent preparation for the march they would have to endure from Hodeida to the railway. Although Sanaa did prove a better place to rest than Hodeida the sicknesses continued to ravage his forces and they sat for four weeks until they were well enough to ride back to the sea. The land journey was no longer an option, his men would never survive, they would have to sail.

On arriving back at Hodeida von Mücke was able to secure two Turkish Zambuks, a type of sail boat which only had one deck and room for about forty men in each. He divided his forces, their Turkish escorts and equipment in two and placed the wounded under Leutnant Gerdts. Together, under cover of darkness on the 14^th March the two vessels moved up the straits and split up so as to lessen the chance of capture by the British blockade manned by two gunboats and the auxiliary HMS Empress of Russia. Taking the chance that the British would not be on duty on a weekend they pressed through the shallows and passed the line where the British ships were stationed without any incident. Life on the Zambuks was very basic, they were small and cramped and there was a continuing problem with lice which were removed from clothing every morning, the most in one shirt was seventy-four! The journey was slow and a little tedious, more so than it had been on the Ayesha as there was absolutely no room to move about at all and everyone huddled under the woollen blankets at night to stay warm and in the sun to stay cool. This was not a great way to travel for the sick but was their only hope as travelling by land and camel would be a virtual death sentence. Knowing that they needed a break von Mücke ordered the boats moved to land at the island of Marka. Their pilot guided von Mücke’s boat over the shallow reef which they passed over a  with a concerning shudder but passed out the other side unscathed, the second boat was less fortunate and Gerdts’ boat ruptured and sank quickly. As the sun sank quickly von Mücke risked his whole party by firing flares, making noise and even lighting a fire on his boat to attract the survivors who were now swimming in the dark shark infested water towards the shoreline. Through some stroke of luck there had been no fatalities with non-swimmers and the sick being brought in on makeshift rafts and a canoe. With no other option but to press on they managed to squeeze all seventy men into one boat and pressed onwards having spent the morning trying to recover what they could from their sunken fellow. With their luck returning a stiff southerly wind caught high in the sail and brought them into Coonfidah where they were able to get hold of a larger Zambuk and proceed further by sea in the company of a Turkish official and his wife who were likewise heading to Constantinople and relished the escort of heavily armed Germans.

The journey by water stopped at Leet in the 24^th March as they had been using the 350 mile long reefs known as the Farisan bank to dodge pursuit with their shallow bottom Zambuks but beyond Leet it was wide open sea and there was more news that their planned destination of Djidda was under Naval blockade by the British and absolutely no ship got past without inspection. There was no other choice but to continue by land so Camels and supplies were gathered. The landing party suffered its first casualty at 3am on the 27^th March as Seaman Keil, who had contracted Typhus in Hodeida finally succumbed. The shipwreck had weakened him further and the loss of all of their medical supplies in Gerdts’ Zambuk had condemned him. The day after burying him at sea the column of ninety camels moved out tied muzzle to tail marching for eighteen hours a day and only camping between 10am and 4pm during the hottest period. Their road was a perilous one along the coast in territory that was known to be crawling with robbers. Fortune continued to shine on them as there was a full moon that illuminated their trek but they took no chances with weapons at the ready, the machine guns divided between the head of the column and the rear guard under Leutnant Schmidt. On the 31^st they were greeted by a Turkish officer and his seventeen men at a water hole, they were from the garrison of Djidda sent ahead to meet them. They brought news that they were only a day’s march away but that the land ahead was plagued by a band of robbers numbering forty men an insignificant number considering the firepower they were carrying and if seventeen men could get past them then there should be no problem pushing on after a few hours rest. During the night Bedouins were sighted on the dunes but they backed away leaving the column unharrassed, with their goal so close von Mücke finally began to relax his guard and unclipped his bandolier and laid his rifle across his lap before turning his camel down the line to check in with Schmidt.

The firing came from nowhere and everywhere, the whole column was surrounded with bullets raining down from all directions, von Mücke led a group of men to the head of the column rifles at the ready, this time there could be no avoiding an infantry engagement. The Camels were pulled down and the two machine guns were deployed and sprayed in the areas of rifle flashes whilst they evaluated the situation. Although the fire came from  ahead and to the left there was no way of telling how many foes surrounded them until the sun had risen properly and then the sea of Bedouin that were camped out around them became crystal clear, von Mücke would later estimate there were three hundred against his fifty German and twenty-four Turkish troops. The Germans had twenty four pistols, thirteen German rifles left supplemented by ten old and three new Turkish rifles with the four machine guns. Bayonets were fixed and the enemy charged, an organised infantry manoeuvre with silver bayonets shining in the sun caused the Bedouin to scatter leaving one German wounded and seventeen Turkish missing and later found in Djidda after beating a retreat much to the German’s consternation. There were also injuries to the Arabic porters who had taken shelter with the camels which had drawn the most fire. The Bedouin dead could not be counted but fifteen were found during the bayonet charge armed with the latest breach loading British rifles.

The equipment was quickly redistributed between the unwounded camels, the wounded men strapped to the sides and quickly formed into lines abreast with a skirmish line in the front under Leutnant Gerdts and rear under Leutnant Schmidt heading for the sea. If they could reach the coast they would illuminate a side of attack. Dr Lang and Leutnant Wellmann led the main caravan whilst Leutnant Gyssling took charged of the flanks ready to respond to any attack. They rode for ten minutes before the enemy fire resumed but thankfully fell short. Leutnant Schmidt’s force bore the brunt of the fire and a shot killed one of the machine gun bearing camels. A request was sent forward for a fresh beast whilst Schmidt ordered the machine gun deployed and fired at the horde that was forming around him, moments later he was laying mortally injured and seaman Josef Rademacher was killed outright and Wellman took command as he brought up two spare camels. This was becoming more and more like an organised attack rather than just a random raid by bandits, von Mücke had mad it common knowledge that a heavily armed German company was moving up to Djidda to try and scare off bandits but it seemed to have attracted a stronger foe.

The fire stopped suddenly as two of the remaining Turkish soldiers ran towards the Bedouins waving white flags of parley which provided time for the Germans to dig in with sandbags filled, camels circled, machineguns placed at the corners of the compound, wounded and Dr Lang placed in a secure position and the water buried where it could not be hit by random gunfire. The Bedouins demanded the Germans disarmed themselves, handed over all of their supplies, ammunition, water, camels and £11,000s before being allowed to move on unmolested to which von Mücke refused. The firing went on all day until nightfall but with no more casualties despite the growing accuracy. It was hot and the men hadn’t eaten all day, the moment they so much as lifted their heads above the parapet than a bullet whistled past. Ammunition was running short especially that half of it was defective having lain underwater in the Zambuk shipwreck for a day and an order was quickly circulated to conserve the “dry” ammunition for the machineguns in case of night attack. As night fell the trenches were deep enough that the men could relax and the men were allowed to sleep in shifts leaving half on duty under an officer after an inspection and cleaning of all weapons. They also had to bury Leutnant Schmidt who had died at 9:00 pm.

A runner was sent on to Djidda which von Mücke estimated as eight hours march on foot away and before dawn the men were roused, given water and hard tack biscuits. As the sun rose so did their opponents who began their incessant shooting again only to be met with full disciplined volleys from the German line as they tried to bluff their strength and coordination but the ammunition situation meant that it soon dwindled. Fireman Lanig was hit twice and died whilst another man was severely wounded. All Dr Lang could do was to dose the wounded up with brandy and patch the wounds with the bandage packs left over from Emden, it was heart breaking to watch the men die and not to be able to do anything to assist but it was all Lang could do until they got to Djidda. There was also an infestation of dung beetles that began swarming over the encampment crawling over the faces and clothes of the sleeping and wounded alike and increasing the chance of a lockjaw infection. On top of that was the incessant heat of the desert and the ever present sand that coated their faces, stung their eyes and filled their trenches but yet they held on for another day.

As night fell again two more runners were sent out for Djidda and the Germans tried to get some sleep. The prolonged combat was starting to take its toll upon the sentries and when a pack of jackals were attracted by the smell of dead camels they opened fire believing it to be a Bedouin raiding party.

The beginning of the third day was critical for the small band of sailors as water was almost depleted as was the ammunition with no word from Djidda. To surrender opened up too many possibilities none of which were palatable to von Mücke who instead planned to sit out the day, hope for relief and if none was to arrive break out on foot. It was a risk but there was a chance that some of his men might make it but he would be forced to sacrifice the sick and wounded.

An envoy from his aggressors quickly put any fears to rest by lessening the demand and asking for £20,000s and allowing them to keep arms and supplies. The wily German commander believed they were briefly because they had seen the approach of a relief column. He gambled with his men’s lives by posturing and telling his visitor that he had more than enough ammunition and water for four weeks, his men were in an excellent position covered by their machine guns. He also invited his opposite number to entreat with him face to face but this was angrily refused. He was told to surrender and meet the terms or face the consequences. The demand was met with curt refusal. Silence followed a last frantic Bedouin volley but the Germans held their ground in case it was a trap. Soon camels of the Turkish army arrived under the Emir of Mecca’s second son arrived and after redistributing supplies they marched leaving forty dead camels and their two fallen comrades.

Having reached Djidda his sick and wounded were taken to the military hospital which slowed their departure time by some days but they were finally getting treatment. There was great apprehension at proceeding on foot in case they were ambushed by the same group of Bedouins and so they once again decided to run the British blockade in a zambuk. News was spread that they would be travelling by camel to try and draw attention to the desert and away from the sea lanes. During the night of the 8^th and 9^th April they stole out of the harbour and proceeded by shallows and coast as far as Sherm Rabigh where they traded for a fresh boat and headed out again. A general weariness was setting in, they had been travelling in one way or another since August six months before and Germany was still a long way off. With three dead and others wounded and sick there must have been a growing worry that they might not make it through but their commander was determined and considering what they had faced getting this far they had faith in him to get them through.

They reached Serm Munnaiburra on the 28^th April which lay 10 nautical miles short of El Wegh their destination but it also marked the end of the protective reefs and not willing to push their luck they proceeded over land arriving the following day and enjoying the well needed baths and sleep. With one final mountain trek with camels to El Ula before them von Mücke decided to take no chances finding his outlook coloured by the previous caravan becoming more suspicious and cautious ordering that every night rudimentary trenches were dug, loaded rifles kept to hand and sentries set. They found that the mountain climate was cooler, far more agreeable to Europeans and more importantly there was plenty of fresher drinking water.

Despite encroaching on a Sheikh’s territory and causing upset for not using his camel the journey was uneventful and the tired Germans arrived at El Ula station and into another world unscathed. Their commander had ridden ahead and things were prepared for them including bathing facilities, food, cold German wine, fresh uniforms, letters from home, the Iron Cross and comfortable chairs.

During the journey to Constantinople they were treated as celebrities and greeted with cheers and marching bands a far cry from the hardships of their global trek. The atmosphere in Constantinople was electric. The landing party headed by von Mücke, his officers and the war flag they had carried before them since leaving Emden flying on their left paraded with every bit of precision they had done at Kiel before the Commander in Chief of the Turkish Navy Admiral Wilhelm Souchon. Coming to a halt von Mücke lowered his sword and reported;

“The landing party of the Emden, five officers, seven petty officers and thirty men strong”

Their only loses being two killed by the Bedouin and one to disease and others too sick to parade. It had been an epic journey that ensured von Mücke would be elevated to national hero and his books Emden and Ayesha would go on to be best sellers in Germany during the war and worldwide afterwards.

The end of the raider SMS Emden and the battle of Cocos

Franz Joseph Hohenzollern

Prinz Franz Joseph von Hohenzollern, the Kaiser’s nephew, was having the worst day of his Naval career, possibly of his life as he stood on the burning deck of SMS Emden looking at the remains of the vessel he had served upon as torpedo officer. The fore deck was covered with wounded German sailors and marines suffering from burns, abrasions, broken limbs, splinters and disfigurements from the hour long battle with the Australian cruiser that had now left the scene. He and a small band of sailors held rifles and Lüger pistols and aimed them at the sky trying to drive off the Albatross that had descended upon the wounded tearing at cheeks, eyes and wounds.

It hadn’t always been this way. He remembered the day they left Tsingtao to look for Russian vessels as the band played Am Wacht Am Rhein, the day they returned with the Ryazan, the first victory of the war, the journey to meet von Spee, the last signal from Scharnhorst back on the 14^th August;

Emden detatched – (Emden detached.)

The vessel had gone on to have an impressive career commerce raiding in the Indian Ocean having rigged up a dummy funnel to appear like HMS Yarmouth she was able to act in secrecy able to approach British vessels and then once on top of them raise the German Ensign and signal:

Stop your engines, send no wireless signals

On the 10^th September, whilst operating on the Calcutta to Colombo trade spine, Kapitän von Müller captured the Greek vessel Pontoporros carrying equipment for the English but instead of sinking the vessel took the vessel into his service as a collier and began paying the crew. The next three days saw them pull over seven more vessels which had their crews removed to another captured vessel, Kabinga which was released to take the crews back.

Two encounters with neutral vessels changed the situation for von Müller’s command drastically. The first, a Norwegian, informed him of the British warship, HMS Hampshire patrolling for him and others were joining them. The second vessel, an Italian, immediately reported the incident to the British. Admiral Jerram responded by halting all trade in the area and dispatched British and Japanese cruisers to find the German cruiser whilst his armoured cruiser Minotaur and the Japanese battle cruiser Ibuki were sent to seek out where the Emden was getting her coal, if she, like Karlsruhe had a secret base that she was operating from. There were plenty of islands and deserted coast line, as well as many in India who did actively wanted rid of the British who might aid the Germans as a means to the end to remove the Imperial yoke. As for von Müller, he had already decided to quit for the east coast of India.

The 22^nd September saw the German’s most audacious move and von Hohenzollern stood upon the deck of Emden in the early hours of the evening as the cruiser approached Madras harbour and began firing. Oil storage silos were set on fire, a ship was sunk in the harbour, defensive guns silenced, 20,000 people fled and the British admiralty were left red faced by one German cruiser and 130 rounds of ammunition in half an hour.

Despite the irritation and many victories of Emden and her crew, the British admiralty and Churchill grew to admire the bravery of the plucky German commander and the gentlemanly conduct with which he carried out his war. All prisoners were treated fairly, they were fed well and kept until it was safe to release them in a group, on one occasion with a cheer for von Müller.

Trying to keep the British guessing he struck out at Western Ceylon taking another two vessels and then turning to the Maldives to re-coal and proceed to fruitlessly interdict the trade route from Australia to Calcutta. By then the crew was tired, strained and his engines and vessel long over due for repair and refit having sailed so many miles in the previous two months. Von Müller brought his vessel to the British outpost Diego Garcia some 600 miles from his hunting grounds. The gamble paid off as the islanders were unaware of the commencement of hostilities and they welcomed the German cruiser and von Müller played up to the charade and allowed his engineers to repair the island's motor launch whilst the crew rested, his boilers and pipes were cleaned and the cruiser's belly scraped off. After ten days  von Müller heard that the Royal Navy had reinforced the Hampshire and Chikuma with the auxiliary Empress of Asia which meant the area was safe to return to and so they left port with all their repairs completed. Yet again Emden was successful and between the 16-19th October they caught out seven vessels and released prisoners on the Saint Egbert to Cochinon the 20th October.

Admiral Jerram immediately ordered all merchant vessels to leave the trade routes and to black-out at night time. He also ordered that Askold and Yarmouth be released from convoy duties to begin searching for the Emden. He also ordered the Chikuma and Zhemchung to link up with the armoured cruisers Tokiwa and Yakimo to scour the east of the bay of Bengal.

The most daring raid came on the 28th October when Emden brazenly cruised into Penang harbour, an island off Malaya, with her false funnel raised, and began firing. Her torpedo officer von Hohenzollern gave the order to fire the first torpedo which struck the Russian cruiser Zhemchug as it lay at anchor. Moments later the German guns riddled the hull sending most of the Russian sailors fleeing for cover before a second torpedo struck igniting the forward magazine causing an explosion that lifted the ship up in the water before sinking her leaving 88 dead and a 121 wounded out of a crew of 250. The Commander, Cherkassov was off ship with a lady friend whilst the crew were drinking on deck without anyone on watch. All the ammunition, save twelve shells, were locked away so the one salvo that the Russians fired was all the ammunition they had available.  

The French destroyers in port began to get up steam and von Müller worried that a torpedo attack was imminent and despite the array of merchant ships and facilities that were prime targets the Kapitän decided it was not worth the risk to stay and made for the open sea.



French destroyer Mousquet

The French destroyer Mousquet was encountered as Emden withdrew and began opening fire but the German fire was too accurate and heavy killing the Captain, Lieutenant Théroinne and 46 of the crew with 36 wounded. Emden rescued 33 French sailors from the sea and put them on a passing British steamer with an apology for shooting at an unarmed Government launch during the raid.

The raid's purpose, apart from to cause chaos and damage Allied ships and prestige and to draw the Allied vessels to the east. His next raid, the severance of the radio transmitters at the Cocos islands severing communications between Australia and India. They were also aware that there was a troop convoy heading across the area and with his activity in this area it would cause the Allies to concentrate in the east meaning von Müller could return to the west coast of India again.

After coaling from the Exford on the 8th November, having spent the night searching for her, von Müller ordered Emden onwards and Exford to sail for Cape Horn and to steer away from where he believed the troop convoy was sailing in radio silence (it was actually 150 nautical miles southeast of the Cocos making for Ceylon) and von Müller and his crew were unaware of the real proximity of the Allied warships cutting through.

Early on the morning , 5.50am of the 9th November, a four funnelled cruiser heaved into view of Cocos island and came under the watchful eyes of the Superintendent of the Eastern telegraph company, Darcy Farrant. They had been warned by Admiral Jerram that they could come under attack at any time and to keep an eye on the horizon. As he examined the vessel he noticed that the fourth funnel looked wrong and examined it closely discovering it was in fact canvas. He immediately found Mr La Nauze and got him to run to the W/T sets and send an immediate SOS.

Offshore the Emden lowered a steam launch with first officer Hellmuth von Mucke leading fifty hand picked armed men with machine guns, demolition charges and W/T operators who could identify the right kit to destroy. Some of the team included gunners who were included as a reward for their excellent work at Penang. The Germans rushed ashore and overpowered the La Nauze and Farrant. Von Mucke's men began by placing charges on the tower (accidentally bringing it down on a large stock of whiskey), destroying motor rooms, electrical generators, the radio rooms and began pulling up the Atlantic cables. This took over two and a half hours, longer than von Müller had hoped for as von Mucke was having trouble cutting the cables.

Out at sea the SOS transmission had reached HMAS Melbourne via HMS Minotaur. The Melbourne was leading the troop convoy and was only fifty miles away from the beleaguered radio station. Captain Silver, her commander, was in two minds. Naval strategists feared that the Konigsberg from Africa, had broken into the Indian ocean and was either working with Emden or in concert with her and targeting other targets. The IJN battle cruiser Ibuki under Captain Kato pleaded that for the honour of Japan and the cruiser they would like to be the ones to take the Emden. Silver, however had was worried that Konigsberg could still attack the convoy and if he detatched the battle cruiser, he could be putting the vulnerable soldiers in danger as well as Melbourne and Sydney. However Konigsberg could be at the Cocos too. After great deliberation and much to Captain Kato's horror, Silver detached the Sydney at 7.00

von Müller, German corsair

At 9.00 von Müller was alerted by his lookouts that there was smoke on the horizon - it could only be one thing. Despite his operator's best efforts to jam the Island's signals he knew that some must have got through. He ordered the recall signal be blown from the ship's horn and for Emden to raise steam. Knowing it was a light cruiser he decided to put the ship to sea and brought the crew to high alert and left a bewildered von Mucke with his landing team bobbing in their launch watching Emden leave.

As they hadn't been expecting action Emden's engines were not at full steam and the engineering officer told von Müller that it would take an hour to get up to full speed. This was Emden's greatest strength over the Sydney who had larger guns and armour, von Müller would have to try to buy time but it was not to be.

Sydney opened the ball sending her first salvo over, Emden returned fire but with the same consequences as the gunners tried to find the range. Gaede, the gunnery officer ordered corrections and relayed to his Captain that the Australian vessel was firing 6" shells. Von Müller ordered Emden to close the range and brought her closer to the enemy bringing her 4" guns to a more effective range. The move paid off as the third salvo took out both of Sydney's fire control stations and another shell fell into the fo'castle between Captain Glossop and his first officer but did not explode. The German gunners had failed to turn their shells to active and were in effect, firing blanks. Had it gone off, the confrontation with Sydney would have ended much differently.

As the Australians brought their guns under manual range fire control the Germans fired another five salvos from 9000 yards starting a fire on Sydney's aft Starboard gun which could have started a magazine fire that could have caused catastrophic explosion but again, nothing. Emden's luck had run out. It had reached 10:05 and the Engineers could not provide full speed yet. The battle looked to be turning against them.

The Sydney's first major hit on Emden ripped the radio room apart killing all of the inhabitants, a second took off the foremast, the third killed the gun crews of the bow guns below the Conning tower and splattering the Command crew with blood and splinters. This was only the beginning as round after round ripped through the German cruiser taking down the fore funnel, ripping the rest of the fore gunners to shreds and wounding von Müller, another took out the stern guns knocking over a large stack of ammunition which started a fire. Damage control crews rushed to the area and tried to control it and recover the wounded gunners. Sixteen were dead including their officer, Levetzow who was a close friend of von Hohenzollern. The signals officer Guerard and his men were killed next as the foremast was taken out.

The situation was dire as Emden burned, her gunners were dead, wounded or dying as were their replacements, the ammunition hoists were wrecked and with the speaking tubes from the bridge destroyed as well it was really only a matter of time. Gaede was killed trying to assist on the decks and von Müller tried to asses his options. He ordered his loyal helmsman, the only survivor left in the bridge, to bring her to starboard and try and make a torpedo run. It was all he had left but even that was impossible. Von Hohenzollern reported that the torpedo flats were out of action. It was only 11:00. There was only one option left to von Müller and he ordered his helmsman to change course for Direction island and the reef and try and beach the cruiser. The Sydney continued to bombard them in rapid succession tearing more holes in the superstructure but the German's kept their nerve until the reef stopped the vessel with a loud grinding screech of metal on rocks.

The wreck of Emden

As Sydney left to catch Emden's collier, Buresk, von Müller assessed the situation. His ship's fighting, indeed sailing career was over, a third of his men (100) were dead and another twenty were badly injured. Ship's doctor Luther and von Hohenzollern reported to the Kapitän for orders. They were dispatched to the decks to rally the able-bodied and lightly wounded to put the fires out and gather the wounded on the foredeck. Others destroyed the code books and smashed gunnery equipment, if the Australians were to take this ship they would not get anything useful from her. Apart from the heat, fire and wounds the crew soon discovered that there was no fresh water available as the tanks were below decks surrounded or contaminated with salt water. Volunteers dove into the sea to swim to the island and bring back coconuts but the razor sharp rocks and strong currents ripped the men to shreds, von Müller would have to wait and make do.

Sydney found the Buresk out at sea and boarded her only to find the German prize crew had already opened the seacocks and she was already past saving. The Australian crews pulled the Germans free and brought them aboard where it was reported that one of the officers had said that there was no way that von Müller would surrender. This was backed up when Sydney returned to the wreck and saw the German ensign still fluttering in the wind. Captain Glossop signalled the Germans asking them if they surrendered, no response, he tried again and received a message saying they didn't understand the signal as codebooks were destroyed. They tried a morse code signal but no response. Glossop felt there was no other recourse but to open fire again for a solid five minutes tearing greater holes in the already ruined German vessel. Von Müller had been too busy trying to get his wounded together and stabilise his vessel and he had neglected to pull down the ensign, its' still flying meant that she was still at action stations. With another fifteen men killed in the shelling and more diving over the sides into the reef. He ordered the flag torn down and the battle came to a quick halt. Sydney turned away for Cocos to secure von Mucke's command slowing to pick up German sailors who'd been blown overboard.

Von Mucke had watched Emden charging off towards Sydney and realised what was happening. He ordered the pinace back to the island where they secured the radio crew and began digging slit trenches and deploying the machineguns. As they watched the on going battle von Mucke realised that Emden was doomed and made a daring decision. His men decamped to the island's sailing schooner Ayesha and made her seaworthy and fled the island whilst Sydney was hunting the Buresk. The journey they undertook over the next six months was to become one of the greatest escape stories of the First World War with von Mucke leading his men across the Indian ocean, through the Ottoman empire and finally arriving in Constantinople and reporting to Admiral Souchon.

By the time Sydney had secured the W/T station it was nightfall and von Müller's men had to stay aboard the remains of the swan of the Pacific with wounded dying from their wounds. The next morning the Australians approached with the doctor from Cocos to assist the German crew. With 137 men dead and another 69 wounded, von Müller handed over the remains of the crew and with a last look around his command stepped off onto the Australian lifeboat as the last man aboard, the sparkling career of the raider was over, much to the relief of the British Admiralty.

Von Müller's career was summed up by a reporter for the New York Times;

Her commander is doing with luck and skill an appointed task fully legitimised by the laws of war. Our own Paul Jones did the same thing, and to this day is occasionally called a pirate by the British. They know, however, that he wasn't one, and no more is the commander of the Emden.

The fate of SMS Karlsruhe

Fregatenkapitan Erich Kohler

On 4th November 1914 an explosion ripped through the German Cruiser SMS Karlsruhe breaking it in two and taking more than half the crew with her. One of Germany's newest warships, having only been commissioned in January of that year. Fregattenkapitan Erich Kohler was criticised by Geoffrey Bennett in his book Naval battles of the First World War for being ineffective compared to Kapitan von Muller's Emden. However this is not entirely accurate as after Emden the Karlsruhe was the most successful lone raider capturing 16 vessels in three months.

Kohler's campaign almost stuttered to a stop within days of the outbreak of the war. At the outbreak of the war the Karlsruhe was in the Caribbean sea to having relieved SMS Dresden on station to fly the flag for Germany and protect German citizens (and interests) during the Mexican revolution. The standard order to Cruiser commanders serving in overseas was to conduct cruiser warfare against any military targets and trade at the best of your ability. The Captain of the cruiser would have full jurisdiction and freedom to make the best choices. Kohler took his vessel out in a remote corner of the Bahamas laying 120 miles north of Watling Island where on the 6th August he rendezvoused with SS Kronprinz Wilhelm and began the slow process of transferring weaponry and crew over. Not long after putting two of the 10.5cm guns, a machine gun and a small compliment of crew under the Karlsruhe's  navigation officer Kapitanleutnant Thierfelder when smoke was spotted over the southern horizon. It was HMS Suffolk the flagship of Rear Admiral "Kit" Craddock and she was heading straight for them. Kohler ordered the transfer to cease, to raise steam and prepare to get underway, an order that Thierfelder echoed on the liner and the two German vessels parted company at top speed, the Karlsruhe heading up to 27 knots and the liner at 23 with HMS Suffolk giving chase to the cruiser which made course away from the liner. After a spirited chase that spanned around eight hours Suffolk was forced to finally give with the German's speed out pacing them. This was not  the end of the chase though. At 20:15 HMS Bristol which had reversed course on Admiral's orders caught a glimpse of the German cruiser in the moonlight. Captain Fanshawe closed to 7000 yards and opened fire. A brief exchange began but being caught at a disadvantage Kohler decided to retreat using his superior speed. The darkness again saved her as HMS Berwick changed course at the last minute when near enough on top o her.

The encounter worried Kohler. The Royal Navy were obviously searching for him and having been chased by at least two cruisers he decided that the Caribbean was too risky for a sustained campaign. The other thing that swayed his decision was coal. If he could pull over enough freighters (as Emden did.) he could sustain  his coal but that was a big if especially that it seemed the Royal Navy were actively searching him for him (with more ships than were searching for Emden). He could not do as von Muller did and relocate somewhere else quickly if there was a lack of coal. There was the option of raiding ports and colonies but this presented the problems of temporary gain and no guarantee that he could take coal stocks as to do so took time, time that he may not have if a radio transmission was sent and Craddock's ships were coming. There was also a choice that the port authorities may do what the French did at Tahiti to von Spee and ignite the stocks which would mean Kohler would have expanded fuel, ammunition and men for nothing. All three of these resources were irreplaceable and beyond value. The easiest target was the British merchant marine but where to find them?

On the 9th of August the Karlsruhe pulled into San Juan, Puerto Rico with only 12 tonnes of coal left and began coaling. Whilst in port he took control of the Hamburg-Amerika line Patagonia to coal up and head off the coast of St Thomas and wait for him to reach there. Karlsruhe pulled into Curacao three days later and took on another 1,100 tonnes  and met another German vessel Stadt Scheieswig and ordered them to carry as much coal as she could to the coast of Brazil. He then headed out along the coast of Venezuela picking up the Patagonia before proceeding in the Dresden's tracks.

Karlsruhe's first victory was on the 18th August some 180 miles east of Barbados and well off the usual trade route, some 70 miles north in fact. The Bowes Castle had been advised by Captain Luce of the HMS Glasgow that a German cruiser may be stalking merchant shipping and so it was best to avoid the usual routes. At 16:45 she had the misfortune to be overhauled by that very same German cruiser. After removing the crew to the Patagonia and any supplies the merchant ship was scuttled.

The following week he rendezvoused with his second collier Stadt Scheieswig at St Joao Island where he re-coaled and sent her on to Maranham where it arrived on the 2nd September. The arrival of a German ship buying up coal and supplies was reported to Admiral Craddock. Kohler took his cruiser along the coast trying to stay hidden and in a secluded inlet coaled from the Patagonia on the 30th. The following day he received good news via his wireless sets. Three German ships made themselves available to him. The Nord Deutsche line Crefeld and the Hamburg-Sud Amerika line vessels Asunchion and Rio Negro who were all directed to meet at Rocos reef.

Rocos reef was a focal point for trade travelling down from Europe and for the route that ran from New York to Cape San Roque. Here Kohler could have a massive impact on trade and gather a huge amount of supplies. He was immediately rewarded by overhauling the Strathroy which was on to Rio from Virginia bringing coal to the Brazilian government.  The steamer realised something was wrong despite being some 80 miles off the trade route and when she saw Karlsruhe on the horizon and tried to escape but was quickly pulled over. Kohler sent a prize crew aboard and had the prisoners were transferred to the Asuncion though a contingent of Chinese sailors were retained with the German prize crew to assist in the running of the Strathroy. He brought his officers together and explained his plans.

Coaling at sea was not only impractical due to the rough seas but also because it meant that both the tender and Karlsruhe would be vulnerable should the Royal Navy come over the horizon he would be caught. Kohler's plan was simple. Whilst cruising the coast he had identified a small inlet that was remote. The Strathroy would go with the Patagonia and lay at anchor. When supplies ran low Karlsruhe would sneak back to the inlet to coal and resupply. It would mean leaving the trade routes for the best part of a week but it was preferable to the alternative.
Luck played a big part again as at this time the Dresden pulled over two cruisers (Hyades and Holmwood) at the River Plate which immediately drew off the Royal Navy. The Royal Navy (Otranto, Glasgow and Monmouth) had already started a sweep of the Brazilian coast from the Rocos reef but three days before Karlsruhe arrived there with her flotilla of tenders! Admiral Stoddart, who was in command of the second nearest squadron had his hands full watching the Canaries from Cape Verde and policing ships heading towards England from South Africa and neither he or Craddock had the vessels available to police the route permanently which meant the Karlsruhe could operate with relative impunity. Kohler also devised a scheme to try and catch scattered shipping, his cruiser would sit between two tenders at a distance which increased the visibility of the squadron and they either drifted (to conserve coal) or cruised during the day time and at night they went into darkness and pulled in together. Where as Emden played a daring fast paced campaign, Karlsruhe played the waiting game. He also redistributed coal and supplies amongst the ships in the flotilla so that he could accommodate hundreds of prisoners which had the effect that he didn't have to send ships back to port to drop them off and meant that little to no intelligence was gathered about her movements for seven weeks! Kohler was incredibly cautious not to give away his position, even to the point of ignoring direct W/T messages from the Kronprinz Wilhelm which was in the vicinity on the 4th September.

SMS Karlsruhe

Along with coal the Karlsruhe was also reliant on the merchant ships to provide him with food and on 3rd September he boarded the Maple Branch out of Liverpool that was carrying livestock for exhibition in Brazil. The freshly slaughtered pigs, sheep and cows were a very welcome addition to the German crew and the foreign prisoners.

There was another close call where Karlsruhe and the Asuncion barely missed the Cornwall and Good Hope on the 6th as the Germans cruised to their secret base. After returning on the 10th they floated for four days without seeing anything until the Highland Hope was pulled over on the 14th. The British vessel had been running without lights through the night as per Admiralty instruction but was still sighted and pursued until daybreak. This encounter led to yet another lucky escape for Kohler's men. Whilst his men were boarding the vessel he received a W/T message from a neutral Spanish vessel, Reina Victoria Elene asking what was going on. Kohler managed to bluff his way through the meeting and told them they were a British convoy. He ordered his men to hurry up with stripping their prey which proved to be a prudent move as his Radio operators reported intercepting communications between the Spanish vessel and a British vessel, HMS Canopus a pre-dreadnought battleship that was cruising south to meet Craddock. This episode forced Kohler's hand and he again relocated to another part of the trade spine.

He returned on the 20th September after a period of coaling and captured an amazing five vessels in  two days! Two of them were neutral (Swedish Prinsessan Ingeborg and Italian Ascaro and they were set free.) and on their release they provided the first intelligence on the Karlsruhe on the 28th September when Ascaro arrived at her destination of St. Vincent. A third neutral, Maria, a Dutch ship carrying wheat to Ireland which was deemed by Kohler, and in the German high courts in 1915, to be a reasonable target as they were going to a British port and could go to the British army.

One of his captured colliers, the Indriani, was a modern vessel with a modern Marconi set and was soon renamed Hoffnung (Hope) and became one of Karlsruhe's permanent consorts. The Strathroy was scuttled having run out of coal and the last of her crew were transferred to the Crefeld which had become the flotilla's prison ship and carried in excess of 150 prisoners! Although the treatment of these crews was good it was getting more than a little crowded aboard and there were a lot of hungry mouths to feed, something the Germans were struggling to do with the long periods with no victims.

SS Crefeld a liner for 192 passengers carried 415 prisoners!

In the beginning of October things improved again. News arrived that Craddock's vessels had gone south to find von Spee, which was doubly good news that the Karlsruhe was less likely to run into the armoured cruisers and that the East Asiatic squadron could be on her way, however there was also news that another British cruiser was nearby and Kohler again relocated to another part of the spine which proved fortuitous because he sailed into a stream of homeward bound vessels catching another four vessels in three days carrying general stocks and much needed foodstuff. Their capture was very lucky and as all the vessels were forty miles off the trade routes and travelling with lights dimmed following to the letter the Admiralty orders. Crefeld now carried 350 prisoners and it was decided that on the 13th October she should make for the distant Tenerife so that by the time she arrived any intelligence about the German cruiser's position would be out of date. Thankfully before she left the cargo ship Condor was pulled over with a cargo of foodstuffs and 2000 cases of condensed milk! Although the journey was uncomfortable the vessel arrived without incident, though narrowly missing the auxiliary HMS Victorian and arrived on 22nd. The 415 prisoners could not tell the Allies any information beyond what had happened to them and their time in captivity and that Kohler had four tenders and ample fuel. They couldn't tell him about the German's plans or whereabouts.


Kohler continued to operate in the same area until the 22nd October which was the allotted date for the Crefeld's arrival. He moved off and spent time coaling in preparation for his next move. He had formulated a plan to strike where the British would not be looking. The Caribbean.

On the 4th November with the Hoffnung and Rio Negro in attendance the Karlsruhe was heading towards Barbados for a daring raid that would bring the Royal Navy back to the Caribbean to search for him whilst he slipped back to the trade routes. Most of the crew had gathered on the fore of the ship to hear the Ship's band along with their Captain up in the fore-bridge when a massive explosion ripped through the vessel tearing the vessel in half. As the aft bobbed for a further twenty minutes before disappearing below the waves the two tenders rushed forward and saved 129 of the crew and 15 officers. Sadly though Kohler, 14 officers and 259 men were killed. Although the explosion's cause has never been definitively identified it is considered to have been an ammunition explosion that caused a chain reaction.

The crew of the Hoffnung were taken off with all needed supplies and promptly sunk by Rio Negro which then made the slow journey back to Germany arriving in December having run the British blockade. In a sad coincidence it arrived at a time when the German admiralty were planning on recalling Kohler's vessel.

Although Kohler's campaign is not as glamorous as von Muller's in the Indian ocean it still managed to capture a large number of vessels. Despite this its impact was much less significant. Where as Emden became infamous and von Muller a legend Kohler and Karlsruhe were more of an irritant. The two ships pulled over by Dresden had more of an impact on shipping and Naval deployment than Karlsruhe's actions and the arrival of Crefeld with news of all of her successes. The trade route was so lucrative and made shipping companies so much money that they weren't worried about the possibility that there was an unlocated German raider on the route and Kohler's secretive and overly cautious moves meant that no one really thought much of a vessel being overdue at first coupled with the amount of ships that had gone up the trade routes without seeing anything. The sixteen vessels destroyed is impressive but was a mere drop in the ocean of vessels that had got past and the losses were more than sustainable. If they hadn't been then Stoddart would have had to make a concerted search for him.