Captain Benteen's orders

Benteen during the Civil War

Captain Frederick Benteen of the US 7th Cavalry took stock of the situation that was before him and was forced to make a decision, a decision that he has been criticised for since that fateful day on 25th June, 1875 on the banks of the Little Big Horn river.

He decided to disobey orders from his direct superior, Lt Col George Armstrong Custer, the CO of the regiment, and not advance to meet him and instead hold position with the embattled Major Reno.

The action definitely saved Benteen's three companies and the Ammunition train but also saved Major Reno's survivors from annihilation, but some argue doomed Custer's forces to death.

Custer's whole approach towards the Indian village was flawed from the beginning, it worked on the assumption that they would be rounding up women and children and that the braves would be out fought by the brave soldiers of the 7th Cavalry or flee before them. Custer was impatient and would not wait for the infantry column, nor would he take a battery of heavy Gatling guns because they would slow his advance. His aim was to move as quickly as possible living on the run like the  Native Americans did and the Gatlings, which required four horses each would slow down the advance and he wanted to catch the tribes before they dispersed. He also turned down assistance from the 2nd Cavalry believing that his men were the best and could defeat anyone.

There is some merit in his not taking the Gatling guns as they were prone to jam and as his unit would travel at thirty miles a day, average, they would have indeed impeded his advance. The arm chair tactician and many fellow officers at the time agree that having the ability to have a battery of guns that could fire 350 rounds a minute would have been devastating if deployed against a charging enemy.

On approaching the hostile country Custer's lack of intelligence and knowledge of the lay of the land or his enemies numbers or dispositions became evident and he began to divide his forces to scout them out and to give himself warning. Benteen's three companies were deployed on the far left to scout through rough terrain and make sure there would be no surprises for the rest of the column.

The rest of the command moved forward and sighted the Native encampment that his Crow scouts had reported as the biggest village they had ever seen. Custer believed that he was only going to face 800 warriors and the majority of the village were women and children. He divided his forces again to try and stop the Natives fleeing to the south, Custer's lion's share of the regiment would swoop in from the North as Reno struck from the South catching the them in a Hammer and Anvil manoeuvre that would force the natives to surrender (to avoid fighting amongst their Women and children) and submit to escort back to the reservation. He also believed that most of the braves were asleep in their tepees and would be caught out.

His hand was then forced when his scouts arrived to tell him that native riders had picked up his trail and were following him and that they had been sighted on the bluffs above Custer's position. If he didn't strike now, the initiative would be lost and the natives would disperse into smaller groups and flee which would be impossible to catch.

Reno's men advanced towards the village from the south with their flank covered by thick foliage and their view of the village likewise blocked and his men charged full speed abreast until they came around the river bend and were suddenly met with the enormity of the Native encampment. Had his forces been armed with Sabres they could have cut through cutting and slashing as they went causing chaos. As it was Custer had forbidden the 7th from carrying sabres. Reno's only hope was that if he formed a tight knit firing line and hoping that massed rifle fire would stop a counter charge and provide the anvil that Custer had wanted. Standard procedure was for the troopers to form into groups of three riflemen and a fourth to hold the horses in case they needed to break. He held a good position with the river to his front and the impassable brambles on the right and they began regular volley fire. Then it all started to go wrong as the Natives began to respond, they saw his vulnerable left side and began to attack it and even setting fire to the long grass forcing the men to withdraw. Their superior numbers began to tell and Reno would later testify he believed they were five to one. Finally when one of his Arikara interpreters, Bloody knife, was killed and his blood and brains covered the major's face. Reno's nerve broke and he called out to his men;

All those who wish to make their escape follow me!

There followed a rout as Reno led his men backwards towards the bluffs at their rear in complete disorder.

The exact nature of Custer's movements are unknown but as the 210 men approached the village, possibly trying to ford the river at Minneconjou ford at the centre of the village but were repulsed by a handful of sharpshooters. The native oral history makes claim that Custer was killed her as an officer in buckskin next to a standard bearer was shot dead into the water. Custer's body was found further north with the rest of his troopers so it is unlikely but someone certainly fell here.

Cooke's written order with Benteen's translation on the top.

 Custer took stock of the situation and the numbers of natives who were aligned against him and passed an order to his adjutant, the Canadian 1st Lieutenant William W. Cooke. The order was written hurriedly and thrust into the hands of sergeant Giovanni Martino, one of the buglers to deliver directly to the hands of Captain Benteen.

It read simply: Benteen come on. Big village, bring packs. W. W. Cooke. P.s. bring packs.

Knowing the pack mules were following behind slowly and not knowing what action was facing him ahead Benteen ordered his men to rest and water the horses for twenty minutes before advancing. Again he has been criticised for this decision but it is a reasonable action for a cavalry officer expecting action for you'd want fresh horses to face a charge. He claimed at the Reno enquiry that he asked Trumpeter Martin about what was ahead and he said that the "Indians were skedaddling"1 and saw no rush to follow up at speed.  He eventually moved off and arrived at Reno's position by complete coincidence and made that fateful decision.

As he approached he saw a fire fight up on the bluffs and thought it was the whole regiment and began to advance towards them, suddenly seeing a group of Tribesmen he charged with his orderly before finally recognising them as Crow scouts - they told him it was not going well, fearing that the force on the bluffs was the whole regiment having been whipped he moved to join forces and assess the situation.

The situation was bleak, the ammunition pack train was about an hour and a half away, natives were firing on Reno's position and they had taken losses in the disorderly flight. At the Reno hearing he described that Reno's men were in good order and that Reno had regained his composure, his men were still scattered around the bluffs for individual preference for firing but in relative good order, the nearest natives were about a mile away and there were some 900 Indians circling nearby but out of range.

Reno told Benteen that he had no idea where Custer and his 210 men were, they had followed the orders that had been issued with the understanding that Custer would support them as they advanced. That was the last order he had received. Benteen showed him the order he had received but then decided that he would be better placed to defend Reno's shattered forces. His men joined their tired and wounded comrades and began digging rifle fire pits to better protect the men and keep their firing rate up.

Captain Thomas Weir requested permission to ride towards the sound of volley fire stating they had a duty to try to reach the rest of the regiment and support their Commanding officer. Reno and Benteen refused to budge and Weir, without orders, charged forward with his troopers but they only managed to push forward for a mile before they were forced to retire again by large numbers of tribesmen. All that they could see of Custer's men was swirling dust and gunfire. It was already too late.

Benteen believed that they were under attack from up to eight thousand Natives and the fire became more lively, so much so that; You only had to show a hat or a head or anything, to get a volley toward it. 2 As Custer's men were firing their last shots the Sioux turned and headed in full force against Reno. Benteen's account describes a harrowing evening and night with the Natives shooting at anything that moved followed by heavy fire the next day. Rudimentary breast works were dug and Benteen led a charge to clear the enemy from the ravine before retiring back towards the summit of the bluffs and they dug in and waited around their horses and the ammunition train.

So did Benteen make the right decision? Should he have followed his orders without question towards Custer?

In short, I think he made the right decision to disregard the order. Had Benteen ignored Reno's position and forced their way towards Custer they would have been destroyed too. Reno's forces were shattered and short of ammunition and could not have moved out in any sense of order and without attracting the fire from below. Captain Weir's advance took place only thirty minutes after Benteen arrived and they were forced to withdraw quite quickly and that was before the ammunition mules had arrived. Benteen had no knowledge of what was ahead of him nor the exact position of Custer nor the number of enemies he was facing. The situation was totally untenable and without the information or the ammunition he could go nowhere. Had he advanced it would have been likely that his three companies would have been caught out on the trot and met the same fate as Custer leaving the Sioux able to cut what was left of Reno's forces to shreds.

Two men did leave the ammunition train, Boston Custer (the colonel's brother) and Henry Reed (his nephew). They went at full speed to Custer's side where they were killed.

Benteen's three companies could not save the lives of Custer's 210 men but they did save the lives of Reno's as well as their own.

Operation Banquet - British bombers over the beaches

Tiger moth Trainers were to carry out Banquet

Desperate times call for desperate measures and never has Great Britain been as desperate as it was in
the summer of 1940.

As 2400 German aircraft bombarded the RAF's fighter command and around 3000 barges were being pooled to transfer the 6th and 9th Armies across the English Channel. The British Military began looking at contingences in case the RAF were unable to overcome the odds.

As the majority of the light and medium bombers would be ear marked for attacking the heavily defended invasion fleet and ports, a new plan had to be organised for attacking the beaches and on the 13th July a survey of available aircraft for operations was ordered. The solution was Operation Banquet.

Banquet was divided into several different phases depending on where the aircraft were coming from be it Banquet Civil (using Civilian aircraft - which was dropped quickly), Banquet 6 (absorption of some of Group 6 units), Banquet 22 (absorbing 22 group army co-operation units), Banquet Alert (Fleet air arm training units under RAF Costal command) and Banquet Training. In all 350 aircraft of various types and quality were thrown together for this last ditch exercise.

Banquet Training and Alert are the most concerning as they consisted of trainee pilots considered to be of "a certain level of ability" and their instructors.

The aircraft they were to be assigned were modified Tiger moth trainer bi-planes which lacked basic defensive armament, self sealing fuel tanks or armour. They also lacked bombsights and only had racks that had been designed for small bombs weighing about 9kg.

The general plan was for the Tiger Moths to fly over the target once to identify it and then turn around and go into a shallow dive and release their bombs. these small bombs would have been very ineffective against enemy armour but could have proved deadly to infantry on the ground.

The problem was that the Tiger Moths would be attacking individually with only a handful of bombs under fire from anything the German's could fire at them and with the lack of armour and slow speed would have meant that even the small arms fire carried by infantrymen could have brought the planes down.

Further to that the inexperienced pilots would have been easy pickings in their trudging bi-planes to the Bf 109 E fighters.

The pilots spent the summer of 1940 practicing bombing but due to shortages the Tiger moths were flown from the front cockpits whilst a second man dropped bricks out of the rear cockpit to simulate the drop.

Paddy Denton, a young Bomber Command trainee had this to say of Banquet.

It was an indication of how ill prepared for war we, as a nation were. When there was some sort of threat of attack, presumably from the sea, some of the more serviceable Tiger moths were fitted with bomb racks and tiny little bombs, about 3lb, I would have thought.
These appalling threats to an invader were rehearsed without the benefit of Bombsight or anything so sophisticated by a neat HEAT Robinson device of little leavers in front of the intrepid aviator.
The experience did make me ponder about the possible outcome of the war.
(Bomber Crew, P. 43)

There was also another branch of Banquet that had Tiger Moths fitted with long metallic blades with the notion that they would fly through clouds of paratroopers and cut their parachute chords or the unfortunate soldiers in half immune from enemy fire as they would be in close proximity to their own troops!

So could Banquet have been pulled off?

In the desperate times of a German invasion of the British Isles there is no doubt that these 350 aircraft would have been thrown at the beaches swarming with German soldiers or concentrations of Paratroopers and a sizable chunk may have actually reached their targets.

The Luftwaffe fielded approximately 600 Bf 109s which had the task of providing escorts to any bomber attacks, sweeping the beaches to protect the infantry and forming an aerial umbrella over the landing craft to protect against the RAF's other bombers. All this over a front stretching from the Isle of Wight to Ramsgate! It would be fair to say they would have been very stretched allowing the aircraft of Banquet to get through.

There is also a good chance that the Tiger moths would have been difficult to intercept due to their slow speed. In the hands of a good pilot a biplane can avoid getting hit by rolling away. By the time the 109 realised they had missed and come around the Biplane would have got away. Sadly these would not be experienced pilots and their unarmoured crates would have broken up after a few rounds.

The biggest risk would have come from ground fire and although the soldiers would have had more pressing issues, like British machine gun posts and hard points, there is no doubt some form of defensive fire would have been thrown up .

Banquet would have been an unpleasant surprise for a German invader and I have no doubt that in Britain's most desperate hour these aircraft would have taken off. It would have been a gallant yet bloody defence of England's shores.

Feldwebel Severloh's stand at Omaha beach

US troops preparing to land at Omaha

Tomorrow (6th June) is the 70th anniversary of the D-day landings in Normandy. The landings are

the largest seaborne invasion in history with the support of over a thousand Allied aircraft and millions of soldiers, sailors, paratroopers, support staff and airman.

The German army facing them were veterans of the Eastern front but were frightfully out numbered and outgunned. Their lines of communication were severed, their were paratroopers roaming behind the lines and backed up by French resistance fighters. Armoured support was miles away and their advances painfully slow as the Allied airforce severed the railway lines and roved over the countryside with rockets and 20mm cannons shooting up anything that moved.

In a day full of brutality and heroics there were many who deserved the mantle and medals. One such man has been overlooked by many for the service he performed for his country.

The young conscript Corporal who was just shy of 22 years old and already a veteran of two years, found himself at the forefront of action on Omaha beach. As his Lieutenant co-ordinated artillery on the enemy positions he took to a machine gun and defended his position whilst his comrades brought him ammunition  for the heavy machine gun and two rifles. He was at his position for several hours holding up the enemy advance until he ran out of ammunition.

Heinrich Severloh

His name was Heinrich Severloh, though History remembers him as the "Beast of Omaha", he was responsible for the deaths of up to two thousand American soldiers on his own. As the ramps opened on the landing ships he would aim the MG-42 into the mass of tightly packed soldiers cutting them down before they could even get onto the beach. His suppression fire forced the GIs on the beach to cling to the sands and he claims that his shots with the KAR 98 rifles was so accurate that he was killing on one shot every time. He expended 12000 Machine gun rounds and 700 rifle rounds at the enemy whilst Leutnant Freking tried to coordinate the artillery.

As the American advance began to break through they were ordered to abandon Widerstandsnest 62 and taking a small group of prisoners with two other soldiers, withdrew to the nearby village of Colleville-sur-Mer where they surrendered to the Americans on the following day. He was exceptionally lucky as Freking and the survivors of Widerstandsnest 62 were taken prisoner by vengeful American soldiers angered by their heavy casualties on the approach to the bunker and executed on the spot.

It is one of the great problems with history that one man's hero is another man's villain. Servolah is one such man. In an article written in the Daily Mail many years ago wrote of the brave heroism of the Allied soldiers then wrote exceptionally critical description of the Servolah's actions. History will always be written by the victor but when a soldier is fighting for an evil regime their actions, no matter how brave or honourable they may be, will always be considered abhorrent and decried.

Weidling's surrender of Berlin

Weidling after his capture

On the 2nd May 1945 General Helmuth Weidling, Commander in chief of the defenders of Berlin gave the following order to the garrison after agreeing to the text with General Chuikov of the Russian Army:

Am 30. April 1945 hat der Führer Selbstmord begangen, und so verlassen die, die Loyalität zu ihm geschworen hatte. Laut Befehl des Führers, würden Sie deutsche Soldaten mussten auf, trotz der Tatsache, dass unsere Munition aufgebraucht ist und trotz der allgemeinen Situation, die unsere weiteren Widerstand sinnlos macht Berlin für die Bekämpfung gehen haben. Ich bestelle die sofortige Einstellung des Widerstands. WEIDLING, General der Artillerie, der ehemalige Bezirkskommandant in der Verteidigung von Berlin

On 30 April 1945, the Führer committed suicide, and thus abandoned those who had sworn loyalty to him. According to the Führer's order, you German soldiers would have had to go on fighting for Berlin despite the fact that our ammunition has run out and despite the general situation which makes our further resistance meaningless. I order the immediate cessation of resistance. WEIDLING, General of Artillery, former District Commandant in the defence of Berlin

Drill Hall massacre in Chatham

A Gothat G.IV in flight

The four biplanes droned through the night sky at sixty miles an hour. The twelve men were a long way from home huddled in their open cockpits and gun turrets talking amongst themselves and keeping a sharp look out for enemy aircraft. The fifith aeroplane had been forced to return to base but the remainder continued on.

Below they passed over an island and suddenly the target became clear. Around the corner of the estuary lay the town of Chatham full lit in the night sky. The pilots changed course and brought the four Gotha G.IV bombers of Kagohl 3 (Kampfgeschwader der Obersten Heeresleitung 3 or commonly known as England Geschwader.) around to face the city and the Naval dock yard. They had crossed the coast at Westgate at 22:35 on the 3rd September and began their approach on Chatham and Gillingham at 22:50.

Following the defeat of the Zeppelins the German Luftreitkrafe began using the new Gotha G.IV bombers for operations against England during the day but wih improving British defences they were forced to swithc to night raids for the first time. This was the England Geschwader's first sortie at night and was totally unexpected.

Security in Chatham had become rather lax. There was no blackout and earlier that day there had been an air raid drill. Local cinemas had shown a news flash that said there would be a further drill later in the day with the Anti Aircraft artillery being fired. Now as the aircraft rumbled over head and the anti Aircraft batteries began to fire people rushed out to get a glimpse of the action and the artillery opening up as part of a drill whilst Soldiers tried to clear the streets.

The Drill hall today

The Germans passed over the Dockyard and the barracks of HMS Pembroke and released two 50kg bombs. Down below them somewhere in the Dock yard was Able Seaman Henry Sams (my Great Grandfather's younger brother) who had been serving on HMS Vanguard up until the end of May.

Due to an outbreak of Meningitus and the ensuing quarintine of the barracks quarters a large number of sailors were sleeping in the Drill hall, as was a group of Sailors from HMS Vanguard who had been rostered to return to the ship before her sinking in July and were awaiting reassignment, this group could have included young Henry Sams.

The 500kg bomb fell through the glass roof and exploded amongst the sleeping men and the blast tore through the open space but due to the Concrete floor mostly redirected up towards the ceiling shattering the glass roof and sending a shower of deadly glass shards down into the men.

Sidney A Moseley RNVR, who was the assistant Mapymaster wrote the following description;

I heard the noise of gun fire and bomb-dropping, but we had grown accustomed to such music, and I did not trouble to stir. In a few minutes, however, a steward came to infrom me that "They were over the building and had dropped a bomb."! Officers, he said, were ordered below.

That bomb, you remember, was one of the few Hun Bull's-eyes. It fell on the top of the men's quarters and killed a large number of the fellows whom I had seen drilling a few hours previously. The Huns were still above the building when I went across to the drill-hall. In the semi-darkness the scenes were weird and soul-piercing But waht was so stirring to watch was the whole-hearted contempt the surviving sailors had for the presence of danger. I believe I was the first officer present, but there was no need to give orders to such men. They worked expeditiously and carefully, removing the debris of broken glass and timber, the dead and the dying bodies of their comrades. [1]

Another witness, Ordinary Seaman Fredrick Turpin described:

It was a gruesome task. Everywhere we found bodies in a terribly mutilated condition. Some with arms and legs missing and some headless. The gathering up of the dismembered limbs turned one sick….It was a terrible affair and the old sailors, who had been in 

several battles, said they would rather be in ten Jutlands or Heligolands than go through another raid such as this. [2]

 

The falling quarter inch thick glass had caused many injuries including decapitations and severing of limbs as well as puncture wounds all the way down to minor lacerations. The clearance operation took until the following afternoon and lasted 17 hours, but only those with thick soled boots could work amongst the shards to rescue the injured or the dead. The wounded were taken to the Naval hospital (now Medway maritime) but the sheer number of injuries stretched the medical facilities available to the absolute limit, they were not prepared for such a disaster.

 A total of 131 men were killed and a further 90 were wounded by the end of it.

 

The bombers had scored a lucky hit, their bomb aiming skills were limited and their equipment exceptionally basic. The flight of Gothas also dropped bombs on Maxwell road (which killed another sailor and the blast knocked his friend and their female companions over), Maritime hospital's grounds, the Woodlands Navy cemetery, on the lines, Brompton school (which was badly damaged), Marlborough road, York avenue, College avenue and a house in May road. There was a fear that poison gas had been dropped as well as a noxious smell filled the air around May road but thankfully it was nothing. However the death toll was the highest caused by any air raid and was the highest that the UK would see until the Luftwaffe returned to the skies above Kent and London some twenty three years later, but even then this was the highest death toll the Medway towns have ever seen.

The RFC scrambled several aircraft to attempt to intercept the enemy aircraft but with a lack of any kind of detection system they were flying blind and all four aircraft returned to their bases in Belgium unaware of the devastation they had caused.

Leading Stoker W A Osborne's grave at Woodlands

Ninety eight of the killed were intered in Woodland's road cemetery in a convoy of vehicles draped in Union Jacks and followed by a procession of men who provided them will a full military burial on the 6th September 1917. Their graves can still be visited today and can be found scattered amongst the many other war dead and those killed on HMS Bulwark.

The names of the 130 are as follows:

A Goddard           J Hammond       W Wakeford
R Mayes              S Hare                E Walsh
J Abrey                F Hartnall          W Walton
J Anderson          T Haville            J Warne
R Anderson         A Haxell             H Wate
H Barker             A Hay                  G Watson
H Bavister           J Henderson       G Wooton
J Beha                 H Hill                  W Gillett
G Bell                 E Hoskins
F Benmore         A Humphrey
J Benson             J Jackson
W Berwick         S Jackson
W Beverley        H Jones
H Bird                A Kennedy
G Boyd              A Langridge
J Brightwell       C Lemmon
M Brown           W Littlewood
W Bullock         J Loose

Engineerman T S Cropley's grave at Woodlands

G Butler            F Lutitt
F Cable             S Macey
A Cairns           A Macgregor
T Carmichael   N Mackay
C Cash              J McGregor

A Charlton       A McLean
R Clark            G McLoughlin
W Clark           J McNish
C Clarke          P Moore
J Clements      A Moss
R Collett         J Nicholson
K Cooke         W Nolan
B Corker         W Osborne
F Crocker        F Parker
T Cropley       W Payne
W Curd           R Peters
F Diver           A Purton
R Ellis            J Raven
A Finlay         F Reyner
L Fish            S Rigden
R Franklin     H Sharp
T Ginn           W Shirley
A Gladwell    G Simpson
H Godden      R Smith
W Godwin     W Smith
N Gooby        W Steed
C Goodsell    A Sutherland
G Gunn         J Venney
S Hadley       A Voice

(Source of names www.Naval-History.net/xDKCas1917-09Sep.htm)

It is unknown how much of this was experienced by young Henry Sams or whether he was in the Drill hall on that fateful evening. He survived the war and served in the Navy into the mid 1920s, mainly around Chatham and Sheppey in training establishments and on Submarines as well as HMS Erebus when it sailed to Arkangel and shelled Bolshevik positions in the White Sea... That however is another story.


Other links:

http://www.merseysiderollofhonour.co.uk/obits/ships/pembroke.htm

http://www.kenthistoryforum.co.uk/index.php?topic=9213.0

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=47136

Also; The Gillingham Chronicles by R. A Baldwin, Baggins books, Rochester, 1998.

Photographs (except the Gotha which was taken from Google) were taken by the author.

Bomben Auf Rochester

Short Stirling bomber like those built at Rochester

Rochester airport, now a familiar landmark, was built in 1933 and Pobjoy opened a factory on the site for

the production of Short aircraft not long afterwards.

Although the 23rd RAF training school was at Rochester from formation (until September 1939 and the outbreak of the war,) there were no active fighter or bomber squadrons on the civilian field. The military fields of RAF Detling, Gravesend and Eastchurch were nearby though and the Luftwaffe intelligence often confused military and civilian fields.

Pre-war the German civil airline,  Lufthansa, flying Heinkel He 111 and Junkers Ju 52 aircraft with covert reconnaissance cameras flew over much of Europe, including the UK photographing many airfields and facilities for the Abwehr. When war started the OKL (the Luftwaffe high command) had photographs of the Shorts factory and the Davis estate which they believed was part of the same facility.

As the Battle of Britain moved to the second phase, the attack on the RAF's airfields, an AufklGr ObdL reconnaissance aircraft flew over the airfield and took another round of photos to update the previous ones.

The first raid was chalked for the 13th August, Adlertag but the Stukas of Luftflotte 2 failed to find the target and instead attacked areas across Kent and Detling airfield.

The airfield had night time defences to stop a Paratroop landing with large wooden poles and anti glider defences that were dragged out every evening. In the day time the local Home guard sat in earthen slit trenches armed with nothing more than rifles whilst two scanned the skies with binoculars. Though nearby palmerston forts at Borstal, Bridgewood and Horsted were fitted witg up to date AA Batteries. 

The complex was on constant standby and the evacuation of the factory happened so often that work was constantly slowed down and almost trickled to a halt.

On the 15th a lone Junkers Ju88 A1 of 5(f) 122 was lost in the Thames estuary having flown another Recon flight over Rochester, its crew were listed as MIA. It was an ominous sign.

Dornier Do.17z bombers of the Luftwaffe

Kampfgeschwader 3 began its attacks on north Kent hitting coastal targets later that day. A large formation of 100 planes crossed the channel between Dover and Deal and proceeded to targets along the coast.

 John Chinery of the local Home guard spotted sixteen Dornier Do 17z bombers descending from the North east at 10,000 ft diving fast and dropping a mixture of high explosives and incendiary bombs. They passed low before wheeling over the residential estate and completing a loop and heading back towards the estuary.

As they approached, scaffold workers nearly threw themselves down their ladders and ropes before fleeing towards their shelters.

The raid took a matter of minutes but  300 bombs had fallen.

The damaged hanger and Stirling aircraft

The damage was extensive. The parts stores were aflame, number 11 Stirling on the runway was torn apart as well as five in the assembly hanger, the office block was also damaged, hangers had lost their roofs but fortunately the main supporting beam did not collapse which saved the rest of the aircraft in the factory. The staff canteen roof had also been destroyed with a direct hit on the car park which did no damage any of the parked cars. The Davis estate suffered five demolished houses and more damaged with a total of 9 injuries but no fatalities.[1]

There was one casualty in the factory. A fireman who was sheltering in a Fire watcher's Bell shelter (generally considered to be fairly safe and constructed of steel) was killed by shrapnel that passed through the wall.

I've consulted the roll of honour for Kent Fire service but have not found any serving Fire officer who died that day so he may have been an employee of Shorts or an auxiliary.

The Stirlings that were lost were;

No.N3645, N3647, N3648, N3649, N3650 and N3651

KG 3. was engaged by 54 Squadron from Hornchurch (Spitfires) and although I am unable to determine which Staffel took part in the raid on Rochester the following aircraft were lost that day.

(Off Reculver) Lt. Kringler's Dornier was brough down by AA fire and RAF fighters. Uffz Depenheuer, Gfr Rohleder and the Kringler were KIA but Obgfr Duda was made a POW.

Same area; Lt. Wlakter, Fw Schauer and Uffz Kirchubel and Pieronczyk were all captured.

A further five planes were lost (four over the estuary and one off Dover) from the unit as they hit targets from Margate, Sheppey, Chatham and Rochester airport unfortunatly the KAHRS had not been able to identify them.

54 Squadron's diary reads thusly;

54 Squadron Operational Record Book – 15 August
4 patrols during the day resulted in 2 clashes with the enemy. By now the order “patrol behind Dover and engage enemy fighters” is becoming as familiar as the old convoy patrols.
Flt Lt Deere claiming a Me 109 destroyed (11:18 hours).

18:28 hours: Flt Lt Deere 2 He 113s. 1 probable was gained for the loss of Flt Lt Deere’s machine when he was shot down in Kent after a flight which has taken him (unwittingly) over Calais Marck! He suffered only a sprained wrist after a parachute jump at 15,000 feet.

On the 4th September the Luftwaffe returned for a second raid. Many workers, suffering from stress and jitters caused by the first raid and the ensuing drills decided to flee to the nearby woods rather than the shelters. Unfortunately the Luftwaffe's incendiary bombs scattered into these very woods, thankfully there was only one fatality and two injuries. The Davis estate took another pounding as did housing around Borstal with six houses completly demolished causing eight injuries.

The damage from the first raid and the prioritisation of Fighter construction meant that Shorts could only think about saving what they could from the wreckage and redistributing Stirling production to other facilities including the underground works at Strood, factories in Swindon and as far away as Ireland. By the following year however, with the skies relatively clear of Luftwaffe action, Shorts returned to the site and began construction of the heavy bombers again.

Bibliography

Aircraft Casualties in Kent Part I, Compiled by G. Baxter, K. Owen, P. Baldock, Published by Meresborough Books, Rainham, 1990.

Kent Airfields, Kent Aviation Historical Research Society (KAHRS), "Rochester" P. MacDougall, Meresborough books, Rainham, 1992

http://www.kenthistoryforum.co.uk/index.php?topic=388.0

http://battleofbritainblog.com/

General Lee's report on Gettysburg 1863

After the battle of Gettysburg General Robert E. Lee the Commander of the Confederate Army wrote this letter to Jefferson Davis, the president of the Confederacy.

Headquarters army of Northern Virginia

Near Gettysburg, P.A, July 4 1863

Mr President: After the rear of the army had crossed the Potomac, the leading corps, under General Ewell, pushed on to Carlisle and York, passing through Chambersburg. The other two corps closed up at the latter place, and soon afterward intelligence was recieved that the army of General Hooker was advancing. Our whole force was directed to concentrate at Gettysburg, and the corps of Generals Ewell and A. P. Hill reached that place on the 1st July, the former advancing from Carlisle and the latter from Chambersburg.

The two leading divisions of these corps, under reaching the vicinity of Gettysburg, found the enemy, and attacked him, driving him from the town, which was occupied by our troops. The enemy's loss was heavy, including more than 4,000 prisoners. He took up a strong position in rear of the town, which he immediately began to fortify, and where his re-enforcements joined him.

on the 2nd July, Longstreet's corps, with the exception of one division, having arrived, we attempted to dislodge the enemy, and , though we gained some ground, we were unable to get possession of his position. The next day, the third division of General Longstreet having come up, a more extensive attack was made. The works on the enemy's extreme right and left were taken, but his numbers were so great and his position so commanding, that our troops were compelled to relinquish their advantage and retire.

It is believed that the enemy suffered severely in these operations, but our own loss has not been light.

General Barksdale is killed. Generals Garnett and Armistead are missing, and it is feared  that the former is killed and the latter wounded and a prisoner. Generals Pender and Trimble are wounded in the leg, General Hood in the arm, and General Heth slightly in the head. General Kemper, it is feared, is moortally wounded. Our losses embrace many other valuable officers and men.

General Wade Hampton was severely wounded in a different action in which the cavalry was engaged yesterday. Very respectifully, your obedient servant,

R. E Lee,
General