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| HMS Russell |
With Admiral Nicholson’s 3rd Battle Squadron
based at Dover as part of the Anti-invasion plans (arriving on the 15th
November) it was only logical to use those “Duncans” to carry out the
bombardment. Nicholson’s flagship HMS Russell
and HMS Exmouth were chosen and were
to be escorted by the destroyers Archer,
Attack, Ariel, Ferret, Forrester, Druid and
the Defender. As the area would be
undoubtedly mined and in spite of complaints from the Senior Naval officer at
Lowestoft four pairs of fast minesweepers from Lowestoft were detailed to clear
a path for the force. Also attached to the force would be the airships Astra Torress and Parecval who would
monitor the fall of the battleship’s shots and report back damage caused if the weather permitted.
The main target for the Russell and Exmouth was the Bruges Canal lock and any submarines or vessels in the harbour as well as military buildings within the town including two new defensive batteries that had been recently established. The force left Dover at 3:30 a.m. on the morning of the 23rd November with four destroyers escorting the battleships and four ahead protecting the minesweepers. They passed the western end of the Thornton ridge by forenoon and at 12:30 p.m. they reduced speed to 6 knots so that the sweepers could clear a path. This was easier said than done though with the sweepers encountering strong currents that spread their nets and with the heart stopping moment when a moored German mine was sighted between the sweepers and the battleships. Swift action averted a crisis and the ships continued to position and enter the Wielingen Channel and run down to Zeebrugge arriving at 2:30 p.m.. Nicholson ordered his guns to aim at the harbour, defensive forts and the railway station.
With the Airships unable to leave Kingsnorth due to weather so destroyers stationed three to four miles to port of the battleships attempted to spot the fall of shot but were fairly unsuccessful in their attempts. The Russell and Exmouth open fired with their fore turrets at 12,500 yards before firing in regular salvoes and after fifteen minutes they altered course by four points to port so as to narrow the range to 6000 yards allowing the 6” guns and after turrets to fire as well. They altered course again once they had passed the Wielingen Light ship as the two minesweepers had to retire and bereft of protection it was decided to turn and return back through their track through the safe waters. All firing ceased at 3:40 p.m. as the two ships passed out of range and the taskforce returned to their various ports.
Dutch press would later talk of serious damage and U-boats destroyed and sinking in the harbour but Admiral Nicholson was less enthusiastic about his force’s effort over the seventy minute ordeal. The North easterly wind had blown Nicholson’s own smoke between him and the harbour obscuring the targets and with the destroyers unable to report accurately his hits it was hard to say for definite what he had done but was confident that the lock was at least out of commission.
During the bombardment the Russell and Exmouth had fired 76 rounds from their turrets and a further 143 rounds of the 6” ammunition each but the Exmouth had fired off a quantity of shrapnel rounds which although deadly for men swarming over decks, failed to do any damage to the target buildings.
Nicholson’s assessment of the bombardment was fairly accurate with the real damage being negligible with only an electric power station for the lock being temporarily out of action meaning the Germans had to open the lock by hand. No U-boats were sunk as none were present and the batteries remained silent as Nicholson was out of range. The whole bombardment failed to affect the Germans who continued to strengthen the defences and further request more U-boats for operations in the area.
monitor the fall of the battleship’s shots and report back damage caused if the weather permitted.
The main target for the Russell and Exmouth was the Bruges Canal lock and any submarines or vessels in the harbour as well as military buildings within the town including two new defensive batteries that had been recently established. The force left Dover at 3:30 a.m. on the morning of the 23rd November with four destroyers escorting the battleships and four ahead protecting the minesweepers. They passed the western end of the Thornton ridge by forenoon and at 12:30 p.m. they reduced speed to 6 knots so that the sweepers could clear a path. This was easier said than done though with the sweepers encountering strong currents that spread their nets and with the heart stopping moment when a moored German mine was sighted between the sweepers and the battleships. Swift action averted a crisis and the ships continued to position and enter the Wielingen Channel and run down to Zeebrugge arriving at 2:30 p.m.. Nicholson ordered his guns to aim at the harbour, defensive forts and the railway station.
With the Airships unable to leave Kingsnorth due to weather so destroyers stationed three to four miles to port of the battleships attempted to spot the fall of shot but were fairly unsuccessful in their attempts. The Russell and Exmouth open fired with their fore turrets at 12,500 yards before firing in regular salvoes and after fifteen minutes they altered course by four points to port so as to narrow the range to 6000 yards allowing the 6” guns and after turrets to fire as well. They altered course again once they had passed the Wielingen Light ship as the two minesweepers had to retire and bereft of protection it was decided to turn and return back through their track through the safe waters. All firing ceased at 3:40 p.m. as the two ships passed out of range and the taskforce returned to their various ports.
Dutch press would later talk of serious damage and U-boats destroyed and sinking in the harbour but Admiral Nicholson was less enthusiastic about his force’s effort over the seventy minute ordeal. The North easterly wind had blown Nicholson’s own smoke between him and the harbour obscuring the targets and with the destroyers unable to report accurately his hits it was hard to say for definite what he had done but was confident that the lock was at least out of commission.
During the bombardment the Russell and Exmouth had fired 76 rounds from their turrets and a further 143 rounds of the 6” ammunition each but the Exmouth had fired off a quantity of shrapnel rounds which although deadly for men swarming over decks, failed to do any damage to the target buildings.
Nicholson’s assessment of the bombardment was fairly accurate with the real damage being negligible with only an electric power station for the lock being temporarily out of action meaning the Germans had to open the lock by hand. No U-boats were sunk as none were present and the batteries remained silent as Nicholson was out of range. The whole bombardment failed to affect the Germans who continued to strengthen the defences and further request more U-boats for operations in the area.
